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Abstract 
Unbecoming Silicon Valley: Techno Imaginaries and Materialities in 
Postsocialist Romania 
by Erin McElroy 
 
Unbecoming Silicon Valley: Techno Imaginaries and Materialities in 
Postsocialist Romania traces the racial and technocultural worlds tethering 
postsocialist Romania and post-Cold War Silicon Valley. Geographically, it traverses 
the Romanian cities of Bucharest, Cluj, and Râmnicu Vâlcea, the Molovan city of 
Chișinău, as well as the San Francisco Bay Area. Questioning what it means for 
postsocialist Romania to desire “becoming” Silicon Valley, it also asks how 
imaginaries of illiberal, corrupt postsocialist Eastern Europe informs the post-Cold 
War West. Methodologically, I engage ethnography, as well as reading and at times 
coproducing technology, maps, speculative fiction, media, infrastructure, and archival 
work. While deeply invested in the politics of displacement, I focus upon how 
socialist and pre-socialist techno-urban histories are updated, hacked, and rearranged 
in postsocialist times. 
Analytically, I engage the concept of Silicon Valley imperialism, or the global 
condition in which Silicon Valley’s existence is necessitated by its unending growth, 
and in which it devours people’s intimate lives and personal data while also 
consuming global and even outer space imaginaries in novel ways. Silicon Valley 
imperialism deploys what I describe as racial technocapitalism, a concept that I use 
to map racial dispossession amidst technocapitalism. Engaging these twin concepts 
allows for a decentralized analysis of race, space, politics, and technocultural 
reproduction. By tracking their geographic entwinement, I theorize a postsocialist 
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moment. In this way, I read postsocialism as a post-1989 condition that endures on 
both sides of the former Iron Curtain, and that recodes configurations of race and 
empire today. In this way, I position the current “Tech Boom 2.0” in Silicon Valley as 
a postsocialist phenomenon. I also analyze how, as socialist-era techno-culture is 
pathologized on both sides of the former Iron Curtain, pre-socialist fascist 
technological imaginaries are reinterpreted in the name of anticommunism. And yet, 
socialist-era technologies and their aftermaths endure, entwined in wires and 
infrastructure, while also coded into hardware and speculative fiction. As I question, 
how, by reading technological futures past, might we dream of new technological 
futures yet-to-come, futures illegible to Silicon Valley imperialism and racial 
technocapitalism alike. 
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Introduction—Unbecoming Silicon Valley: Techno Imaginaries and 
Materialities in Postsocialist Romania 
 
“Is this what it’s really like in Silicon Valley?” my friend asks me, imagining 
that the Romanian city of Cluj’s recent rebranding as “the Silicon Valley of Europe” 
implies two-way comparativity. Somehow, we’ve managed to find our way inside the 
Japanese NTT Data’s new Cluj branch, and feelings of curiosity and clandestineness 
have overcome us, even though there’s nothing sneaky about our being inside. NTT 
Data, an information technology (IT) firm “nearshoring” an array of software services 
and “real-time solutions” with “global delivery capabilities” in forty countries, 
acquired Romania’s own EBS software company in 2013. Soon after, it remodeled 
the former office, in part paving the way for “urban renewal” of the downtown 
Mărăști neighborhood. Flashing a colossal sign godlike upon the techno horizon, 
NTT’s interior is replete with fake wall plants, human-shaped robots, and large soft 
mushroom statues, all appealing to the astrofuturist science fiction aesthetic of outer 
space travel and speculative futures. The fourth floor, home to wEBSiteBistro, is now 
opened up to guests, where one can order food and drinks from electronic pads on the 
balcony, surrounded by cranes and the echoing sounds of new development. This is 
where we are, sitting upon the threshold of Europe’s new Silicon Valley. 
Over the last decade, Romania's IT industry has gained international attention, 
with the country boasting the continent’s fastest internet and a growth of startups and 
firms, particularly in Bucharest and Cluj, but also in cities such as Timișoara, Iași, 
and Brașov. Across these cities, technology capital, real estate, and urban politics 
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have been entangling in new ways, often resulting in increased rents around newly 
constructed IT office buildings, as well as racial dispossession. As property values 
and entrepreneurial culture boom, Roma residents are frequently pushed to peripheral 
wastelands, to interstitial spaces squeezed between the urban and rural. At the same 
time, anticommunist protests known as the “Light Revolution,” largely designed by 
the IT sector, use technology to index Western aspirations and create temporal 
distance from Romania’s “dark” socialist past. In doing so, they often fetishize the 
pre-socialist interbellum, which in Romania was marked by fascism and eugenics—
other technologies of race and racialization. It was then that Bucharest was 
recognized as “the Little Paris of the East,” and Timișoara as “the Little Vienna of the 
East.” How do these past moments of aspirational comparativity relate to the updated 
“Little Silicon Valley” of today? What other worlds might come into being or become 
visible if Silicon Valley ceased being read as the zero point of contemporary analysis, 
and if we began instead to read history as connected and accumulative rather than as 
just comparative? To address these quesions, in this project, rather than employing a 
comparative framework, in which two distinct spaces are compared side by side, I 
advocate for connected methods, which foreground entanglements across space and 
time.1 My connected approach remains rooted in community organizing, and centers 
housing, technological, and cartographic justice as fields of inquiry. 
While economists understand the contemporary tech boom to be driving 
economic and urban growth in Romania (Colliers International 2018), IT usage and 
effects vary dramatically across the country. After all, Romania not only contains one 
of the EU’s highest poverty rates, but also fewer IT personnel per total employment 
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than any other European country except Greece, along with a low IT GDP percentage 
(Eurostat 2018a; Eurostat 2018b; Eurostat 2018c). Yet in Cluj, IT is the largest 
professional sector, driven by global capital and outsourcing, meanwhile fed by 
public universities offering a wealth of courses in programming, hardware 
development, and more. Most firms are outsourcing ventures, seeking cheap labor, 
technological prowess, and a form of “Europeanness” harder to obtain in more 
geographically but also culturally distant Global South and East locales. 
In Mărăști, but also in Bucharest’s Pipera neighborhood, once home to 
socialist era computer development, many IT workers earn up to five times more than 
their neighbors (Fiscutean 2014a; Petrovici 2019). Today, these technologists are 
enwrapped in contexts of gentrification, much as in California’s own Silicon Valley. 
At the same time, Western tech workers, some of whom parade as “digital nomads” 
by using anti-Roma racially appropriative language, are landing in Romania, 
contributing to contexts of global tech-induced gentrification. 
Nevertheless, Romania is clearly not Silicon Valley. Further, this is not the 
first time in which the country has experienced a technology boom. Cyber 
development was deeply entrenched within the socialist project, while also uniquely 
characterizing socialist and postsocialist underground IT practices. While Romania 
produced the most third-generation computers in the Eastern bloc during socialism 
(1960s and 1970s machines with integrated circuits and miniaturized transistors), it 
also hacked Western computer models to produce an array of fourth-generation 
microprocessor computers in the 1980s. After socialism, underground practices of 
cabling, piracy, and hardware assemblage characterized the transitional period. 
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Siliconization has meant the capitalization of these practices and infrastructure, along 
with the cheap labor that nearshoring provides. What does Romania’s current Silicon 
Valley status index of its postsocialist present, and what unique IT and property 
histories endure, formally and underground? 
My friend and I, as members of Căși Sociale Acum (Social Housing Now), 
are in the midst of a collective mapping project of Mărăști gentrification, and there is 
probably no better place than NTT’s balcony from which to observe the terrain. As 
we have been charting, with the Siliconization of the neighborhood, evictions are on 
the rise, disproportionately targeting Roma households. In this way, Siliconization 
echoes processes of tech-driven racial dispossession in California’s own Silicon 
Valley, where technocapitalist growth constitutes and is co-constituted by a form of 
racism – one coated in (and coded through) liberalism. In Cluj, or orașul viitorului 
(city of the future), socialist-era infrastructure is hollowed and mined to become the 
technology of the future. This transpires as Roma residents are displaced, some of 
whom end up homeless, racially banished to the city’s waste site, Pata Rât. 
Siliconization, in other words, dispels those remaindered by techno-urban 
renewal to the wastelands of Western modernization, to interstitial geographies 
known as the maidane that border the urban and rural. Just blocks away from NTT, 
on Anton Pann Street, a Roma family who had been living there for twenty-two years 
was recently evicted. And today, we ran into a Roma couple who will be displaced 
later this month. Living upon a crumbling lot without running water or utilities, 
squeezed between the new City Casa residential complex and the new German iQuest 
campus, they knew that their time was limited as soon as the cranes came in. “All of 
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the space around here is becoming too valuable,” they shrugged on their break from a 
job recycling cardboard with a motor-less cart. While socialist urbanization provided 
housing and jobs to Roma (many of whom had been living precariously before 
socialism began in 1946 due to a longue durée of racism), postsocialist technological 
urbanism, or techno-urbanism, restores former racialized property regimes. 
This dissertation project focuses upon the fictions and frictions caught up in 
postsocialist Siliconization. By fictive, on one hand I allude to the speculative 
fantasies and desires entrenched in both socialist and postsocialist technocultures. But 
also, I suggest that Romania’s Siliconized status is one of many imagined narratives 
that, while partly true, also elides other histories. In this way, my project refers to 
imaginaries that the contemporary tech boom is simply a result of what I describe as 
Silicon Valley imperialism, or the global condition in which Silicon Valley’s 
existence is necessitated by its unending growth, in which, zombie-like, it penetrates 
and devours people’s intimate lives and personal data while also consuming global 
and even outer space imaginaries in novel ways. It’s true that as an imperial form, 
Silicon Valley aims to augment its own reproduction “at home” in California by 
instilling new fantasies of “becoming Silicon Valley” upon various terrains. This 
occurs in its urban peripheries, for instance, in Oakland, but also globally. Yet 
whether in Oakland or in Romania, while Silicon Valley imperialism (or techno-
imperialism for short) is real, so are older histories of racial capitalism and 
imperialism, upon which Siliconization rests. Also real are other techno-urban futures 
and futures past, unrecognizable to Silicon Valley imperialism. These are often 
deleted through Silicon Valley’s attempts to maintain sovereignty. Yet some 
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obstinately remain, rubbing up against and put into friction with Western aspirations, 
desires, materialities, and imaginaries (Rofel 2007; Tadiar 2009; Tsing 2005). These 
deleted and enduring histories, futures, and futures past, I argue, are requisite in 
understanding the contours of the postsocialist present. Their very infrastructures and 
visions are enfolded into the Silicon Valley of the East, haunting its real and unreal 
present—sometimes overtly, sometimes in back-end code.  
Romania, a country that bears long and complex histories of fantasizing the 
West, is an apt place from which to study both real and imagined iterations of Silicon 
Valley imperialism and its methods of techno-normativity, or the reproduction of 
Silicon Valley’s futurity through installations of Western aspirational fantasies. 
Techno-normativity erases Romania’s own cyber deviance from historical memory, 
installing fantasies of Western recognition. Silicon Valley, as a Cold War construct 
exacerbated in post-Cold War times, has not only helped shape the dreams wrapped 
up in postsocialist transition, but it has also materially altered the landscape. In doing 
so, it instantiates what I describe as racial technocapitalism, an analytic in which, in 
order to map racial dispossession amidst technocapitalist geographies, I draw upon 
Cedric Robinson’s observation that capitalism has always been co-constituted by 
racism, beginning within Europe (1983). 
This project engages the twin concepts of racial technocapitalism and Silicon 
Valley imperialism to allow for a decentralized analysis of race, space, politics, and 
technocultural reproduction. By tracking their entwinement in Romania and Silicon 
Valley, I theorize a postsocialist moment. Here I should note that I understand 
postsocialism as more than just a historical phase and/or geographic descriptive, but 
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rather as a conceptual frame that denotes both the displacement and enduring 
significance of socialism (Atanasoski and Vora 2018; Gille 2010; Popa 2019). In this 
way, I read postsocialism as a post-1989 condition that haunts and informs both sides 
of the former Iron Curtain despite normative accounts of “the end of history” 
(Fukuyama 2006). I also read postsocialism as recoding configurations of race and 
empire today (Chari and Verdery 2009). As such, postsocialism, as an analytic, helps 
shed light upon novel shifts and obfuscations between public and private realms, 
neo/liberalism and illiberalism, and global race/space and its unevenness (Horvat and 
Štiks 2015; Moodie and Rofel forthcoming). It also points to how socialist 
institutionalized practices and visions survived the end of state socialism, and how 
they endure alongside both end-of-history revisionist narratives and socialist nostalgia 
(Rofel and Yanagisako 2019; Yurchak 2013). Yet postsocialism additionally 
highlights utopian futures past and present, many of which involve technology and 
infrastructure (Buck-Morss 2002; Chelcea and Pulay 2015; Collier 2011; Kurtović 
and Sargsyan 2019; Murawski 2019). 
Throughout this project, I analyze three phenomena unique to Romania’s 
relationship with Silicon Valley imperial circuits: entanglements of technology, race, 
and urban lifeworlds; socialist and Cold War techno histories as they inform those of 
the postsocialist/post-Cold War present; and the entwining of Silicon Valley and 
Romanian IT imaginaries and materialities. In doing so, while wary of Silicon Valley 
analytic hegemony in studies of technoculture, I remain curious about the local 
frictions that transpire when Silicon Valley culture brushes up against that of 
Romania in both expected and unexpected ways. For instance, even during socialism, 
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Romania maintained numerous technological trade agreements with Western 
countries and the UN, unlike its neighbors. And today, regardless of ongoing paranoia 
about human informants lurking in the midst, and despite ongoing reporting of 
deviant activities to the Romanian Intelligence Services (the postsocialist specter of 
the socialist-era notorious Securitate), there is little regard for the impact of data 
colonialism on people’s everyday lives. How can the layering of two very different 
surveillance regimes from opposite sides of the Silicon/Iron Curtain be understood as 
constitutive of the postsocialist technological present? How does postsocialist theory 
help us understand such configurations while also queering techno-normative 
approaches of materializing Siliconized futurity? After all, techno-normative 
reproduction is only one of many means of crafting techno-future possibilities. How 
do postsocialist analytics point to other futures past and present unarrested by 
technocapitalist dreams and desires? 
This project is based upon ethnographic work in the Romanian cities of 
Bucharest and Cluj, as well as in the San Francisco Bay Area and Silicon Valley. I 
also briefly visit the Romanian city of Râmnicu Vâlcea and the Moldovan city of 
Chişinău. Unbecoming Silicon Valley emerges from reading and, at times co-
producing, technology, maps, speculative fiction, infrastructure, and archival work. 
By doing so, it traces shifting relationships to technological futurity, race, and space. I 
ask what Romania's current Silicon Valley status indexes of its postsocialist present, 
and what unique IT and property histories endure, formally and underground. By 
focusing upon how techno-urban growth is differentially understood according to 
race/ethnicity, class, and generation, I map the uneven postsocialist spacetime of 
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racial technocapitalism and Silicon Valley imperialism alike. 
In what follows, I question why technology in Romania and postsocialist 
space has been so central to understandings of progress, be they of socialist modernity 
or transition to liberal democracy. Put differently, what does technology have to do 
with socialism, the Cold War, and their intersecting “posts”? In the spacetime of 
Siliconized Romania, both totalizing and localizing narratives fall short when 
constructed in isolation. Analysis thus necessitates a transnational approach, coupled 
with deep ethnographic engagement and interdisciplinary reading practices.  
 
Racial Technocapitalism 
In California’s own Silicon Valley and its urban peripheries, technocapitalism 
has long induced contexts of racial dispossession as Black and Latinx residents are 
disproportionately displaced to pave way for a largely young, white, wealthy, and 
male IT workforce (McElroy 2019; Mirabal 2009). Might it be that Siliconization 
inheres contexts of racial dispossession by accumulating momentum and geography? 
This is what my friend and I ask ourselves upon NTT’s balcony as we attempted to 
map what Ananya Roy describes as contexts of “racial banishment,” or the expelling 
of subaltern communities to the far edges of urban life (2017), in this case, to the 
wastelands, or the maidane. But there, sitting upon the oraşul viitorului, we find 
ourselves growing suspect of a form of comparativity that sees Romanian cities as 
Silicon Valley rather than as non-fungible techno spaces in and of themselves. As I 
suggest, while Silicon Valley imperialism does indeed transmit new forms of racial 
technocapitalism, by simply understanding Siliconized Cluj as such, unique techno 
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histories are torn from the palimpsest that is postsocialist Romania. These histories 
have everything to do with the intertwinement of technology, space, and race in the 
specific histories of Romania, and Romania’s unique historical transnational 
engagements. 
As such, and as I further elaborate upon in Chapter 1, my approach to 
gentrification studies here diverges from those who center Western cities as models 
for comparativity (Atkinson and Bridge 2005), as well as those that privilege class 
over race in assessing the causes and effects of dispossession (Lopes-Morales 2016; 
Slater 2017; Walker 2018). Instead, my approach aligns with scholarship coming out 
of critical race studies, feminist studies, and postcolonial studies that necessitates 
theorizing race and its transnational transits (McKittrick 2006; Lowe 2015; Roy 2014; 
Silva 2007). This approach attends to the violence of technocapitalism, yet 
understands that race is not simply subordinate to, but rather co-constitutive of, 
technocapitalism’s ability to transform space. 
Gentrification in Romanian cities functions in part by restoring pre-socialist 
understandings of racialized space through practices of property restitution 
“transitional justice” mechanisms, in which pre-socialist property is returned to the 
heirs of former owners (Chelcea 2012). Due to a long accumulation of racism in 
Romania, few Roma were pre-socialist property owners, and thus very few are able to 
claim restitution rights (Achim 2004; Petrovici et al. 2019). Not only did many Roma 
workers lose employment after 1989 as factories became privatized, but many lost 
their homes. And yet, restitution in Romania is coded through the liberal language of 
transitional justice and heritage (Florea 2016), signaling who is and who is not 
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designated as human upon postsocialist geographies of rights (Atanasoski 2013; 
Lemon 2018; Yoneyama 2016). This language also reflects what Liviu Chelcea and 
Oana Druță describe as “zombie socialism” (2016), or the anticommunist discourse 
that, in valorizing neoliberal futurity, pathologizes socialism as a dark and deadened 
aberration to be overcome. In this way, the socialist period becomes conflated with 
the fascist one that preceded it. Yet for numerous poor and racialized residents, 
socialism offered employment and housing for the first time in national history—
provisions that evaporated with postsocialist transition. Indeed, long before its more 
Stalinist turn, socialism in Romania emerged in response to fascism. In exploring the 
various housing injustices that transition has concretized, I align this project with that 
of the Housing Justice in Unequal Cities network, which prioritizes housing justice 
rather than gentrification as a field of inquiry.2 To this, I add technology justice as a 
supplemental field, one that doesn’t conflate all technology into the domain of 
imperialism, and that rather understands technological justices of the past and present 
as real.  
To understand zombie socialism upon racialized technospace, a postsocialist 
analytic approach is requisite. As Neda Atanasoski and Kalindi Vora argue, 
postsocialism, as an analytic, needs to become less simply a description of time and 
space and more a mode of theoretical engagement (2018). After all, why should 
postcolonial studies so often do the theoretical heavy lifting, with postsocialism 
relegated to geographic and temporal descriptives? Because technology was such a 
central component of state socialism and the Cold War (Beller 2018; Buck-Morss 
2002), and because, as scholars of postsocialism have argued, both projects endure 
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(Dzenovska and Kurtović 2016; Rofel 2019; Scott 2013; Yurchak 2017), postsocialist 
theoretical work might attend to technological geopolitics, cultures, and 
infrastructures as they existed during socialism and transformed after 1989. As Joseph 
Masco observes, in post-Cold War times, much of the world remains scrambled upon 
a “utopian-apocalyptic circuit board” (2016), shaping understandings of technology, 
utopia, and deviance. For instance, while Russian and Romanian “illiberal” hackers 
have been framed as guilty by US liberal pundits for having “hacked” US democracy, 
inciting the “postliberal” dawn of Donald Trump, it has since been revealed (via the 
2018 Cambridge Analytica scandal) that Silicon Valley practices of data colonization, 
algorithmic governance, and Big Data may be more at fault. While I study this 
phenomenon in more detail in Chapter 4, its complexity illuminates the more general 
need to maintain a postsocialist approach in analyzing Silicon Valley and Eastern 
Europe entanglement. Such an approach is aligned with Sharad Chari and Katherine 
Verdery’s call for “post-Cold War ethnographic” practices (2009), or ethnographic 
work that foregrounds the connections and discontinuities between Cold War and 
post-Cold War imperial forms and racial technologies. 
Since the emergence of the Trump era, liberal pundits in the US have been 
blaming illiberal Eastern European and Russian hackers for Trump’s victory. 
Borrowing Cold War grammars and projecting neo-McCarthyistic hysteria, US liberal 
media has used this to pin down their case against Trump. Of course, Trump has also 
been waging his own war on socialism, which crumbles these contradictory 
alignments. And, the Russian oligarchs with whom he has colluded are wealthy 
because they capitalized upon the collapse of the Soviet Union. This sheds light upon 
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an epistemological impasse brought on by the Cold War paradigm—that is, the 
positing of liberalism and illiberalism as opposites in the political-ideological 
spectrum. This Cold War opposition once mapped the so-called free and unfree 
worlds. Yet by continued reliance upon it today, we fail to understand how this map 
enables fascism to grow. I map this out in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, looking to the rise of 
fascist dreams in California’s own Silicon Valley, as well as to popular protest culture 
and techno-urban development projects in Romania. As I observe, in the heart of the 
post-Cold War (today’s Silicon Valley), fascist “alt-right” ideologies such as the 
“Dark Enlightenment” accumulate,3 recoding past eugenicist aspirations. Meanwhile, 
fascist imaginaries of the pre-socialist era are reinterpreted in postsocialist Romania 
in order to pathologize the “darkness” of socialist technology and urbanism. Today, 
on both sides of the former Iron Curtain, fascist futures differentially yet connectedly 
entwine with technofuturist visions, informing what might be described as 
technofascism. 
How might postsocialism, as an analytic, help map the updating of pre-
socialist fascist imaginaries on both sides of the former Iron Curtain? How can 
postsocialist conceptual frameworks help us understand the connections between 
fascism, imperialism, and their technological reinterpretations? During the time in 
which state socialism was solidifying across the Eastern bloc, both Hannah Arendt 
(1971) and Karl Polanyi (2001) studied connections between liberal democracy and 
fascism. They each, in different ways, suggest that fascism (particularly Nazism), 
emerged out of crises in liberal empires. Arendt maps a Nazi genealogy rooted in the 
late-19th century German colonial expansion and genocide in Namibia. Nazism, 
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located within Western history, after all espoused the acquisition of “vital space,” an 
imperial project funded through “race thinking.” Meanwhile, Polanyi sees the 1930s 
rise of fascism as an effect of state-enforced laissez-faire and self-regulating market 
economies. These markets, left unhindered, could not but help produce colonial 
domination, he suggests. 
Nikhil Pal Singh argues that although these two thinkers offer a great deal to 
studies that connect liberalism, imperialism, racism, and fascism, they both failed to 
fully understand the raciality of US liberalism, as well as its implications in Cold War 
socialist space (2017, 111-113). As he also points out, Arendt’s critique of Stalinist 
totalitarianism and German Nazism have too easily merged in popular interpretations, 
leading to conflations of fascism and socialism (a reification that endures in liberal 
imaginaries on both sides of the former Iron Curtain). Yet it was anticommunism that 
enabled the US to globally extend “Manifest Destiny” during the Cold War, under the 
aegis of “containing” Communism. This endures following the Cold War, updated in 
the Cold War 2.0. How can one understand this expansionism in connection to the 
fascist mode that preceded it, particularly as the former reproduces contexts of racist 
genocide, deportations, incarceration, and more? 
Postsocialist analytics, I suggest, help illuminate how both liberalism and 
fascism have historically relied upon imperialism. Post-Cold War Silicon Valley 
imperialism builds upon prior imperial iterations, mobilizing liberalism in the name 
of containing illiberalism. At the same time, it allows racial technocapitalism to grow 
unhindered. In its bolder moments, the merging of these twin concepts—Silicon 
Valley imperialism and racial technocapitalism—spawn the possibilities of 
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technofascism. Today, as the West looks toward the East for illiberal preﬁguration, it 
is imperative to look at the conditions than enable fascism (imperialism and racism) 
rather than fall into the ahistorical trap that understands fascism as endemic to 
socialist Eastern Europe. And in Eastern Europe, if the liberal fantasy of 
technocapitalism liberates nothing except technofascism, perhaps it is time to imagine 
other technological futures. In this way, Romania might be a better space from which 
to theorize the perils of liberalism rather than illiberalism. At the same time, Silicon 
Valley remains an apt space from which to theorize the raciality of technocapitalism 
and imperialism alike. 
While absorbing technological histories and infrastructure of the socialist 
period, and while bolstering the restoration of pre-socialist property regimes as part of 
a broader urban renewal process, racial technocapitalism in Romania also preys upon 
the linguistic prowess of Romanian workers. As I have heard recounted numerous 
times, the only real requirement for IT call center work is English fluency. NTT, for 
instance, boasts 100 percent English fluency (NTT 2018). This fluency can be traced 
back to socialist and transitional histories. During socialism, people were mostly 
restricted to watching only one television station. But eager for more, people began 
illegally streaming neighboring countries’ channels, learning foreign languages, from 
Bulgarian to Serbian. After 1989, Western programming flooded the channels, and 
people, already accustomed to learning language through TV, quickly mastered 
English. “Now they teach English to all the kids at school,” a colleague observed, 
“but our generation, we learned from the Cartoon Network.” A former call-center 
worker in Bucharest mentioned that it was by watching US television that she learned 
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how to smile like an American and feign a US genre of enthusiasm, one largely 
absented from service work in Romania but necessary for outsourced labor (cf. 
Hochschild 2012). She worked for a US company for two years, where she was 
forced smile even while writing emails to clients “who could tell.” Meanwhile, those 
with coding skills are praised by their employers for “being so damn good at 
programming,” one friend in Timișoara working for a small Seattle-based startup told 
me. But he is only paid a small portion of what his US contemporaries are. “It’s 
beyond patronizing,” he shrugged. Yet his colleagues herald Western companies as 
salvific, he told me over a beer after work one evening in a bar that would soon be 
shut down in the gentrifying neighborhood. But why is it that there is such 
technological prowess in Romania to begin with? 
Unbeknownst to many promulgators of Siliconization, Romania excelled in 
hardware production during socialism. In part this was due to the country’s own 
maverick status in the Soviet-led satellite state trade agreement, Comecon (Mureșan 
2008). Though Romania was slated to specialize in agriculture, the Communist Party 
dreamt of other futures, ones involving industrialization, urbanization, and 
informatics. Vasile Baltac, who had been a key researcher in the state’s first computer 
projects, and who rose to become Minister of Machine Tools, Electrotechnics, and the 
Electronics Industry in the 1980s, today leads a software company in the same office 
in which he worked during socialism. As he recounted one morning to me in the tall 
and relatively narrow brick building in Bucharest’s Pipera neighborhood, surrounded 
by photographs of early MECIPT-2 computer teams from the 1960s, socialist 
Romania invested heavily in computer production. Soon it began selling machines to 
17  
China and the Middle East. University informatics, physics, and cybernetics research 
centers were highly valorized by the regime, and there was far more gender equality 
then than in the Siliconized worlds of today, he added. By the end of socialism, 
Romania had produced more than twenty-five computer models, from the Felix in 
Bucharest to the TMS in Timișoara. As other programmers have reminisced, the 
national radio station even broadcast raw code after midnight on Thursdays so that 
emergent programmers could tape it and then spend the week decoding it. “Mostly it 
was just airplane schedules, or information about the weather, but still, it taught us a 
lot,” my friend’s brother recalled, with a large grin across his face. 
After 1989, the land that factories (computer and otherwise) sat upon was 
bought by real estate speculators, divided into joint stock trades, and sold. Western 
firms such as IBM, Hewlett Packard, Microsoft, and Oracle swept in to absorb former 
IT workers. In Cluj, the production of HC386 computers was halted, and “everything 
just shut down,” Bogdan Tirziu, a self-taught programmer and retro-computing 
enthusiast, explained one rainy day over drinks. There are only four of HC386s left in 
the country today. Bogdan is trying to implement a local computer museum in Cluj, 
but he has gotten no support from the City Hall. Official computer memory, it seems, 
has become devoured by zombie socialism as well. But Bogdan offers another insight 
useful in theorizing the entwining of Siliconization and zombie socialism in Cluj. 
“Contrary to what people think, the tech boom is not being led by firms, but by a 
particular generation of people, now in their mid-30s.” This “Xennial” generation, 
occupying that interstitial space between Gen X and Millennials, correlates with what 
Bogdan describes as the “X86 Generation,” a reference to Intel’s x86 microprocessor 
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architecture. 
Conceived of in Cold War Silicon Valley in 1978, the x86 microprocessor has 
since embodied numerous iterations, and still dominates desktop and mobile 
technology. While in the West, Xennials are defined as being born pre-digital, but 
easily adapting to digitization in the 1990s. But in postsocialist Romania, most 
Xennials were not able to afford Silicon Valley technology, despite the growing 
prevalence of Western firms and products. Instead, this generation had to learn how 
to create its own hardware and infrastructure, often by adapting and hacking existing 
models. By reading computer magazines and by hanging out at internet cafes, Bogdan 
learned how to create his own internet network, and soon connected twenty-four 
people in his block. “It’s really people in this generation that are creating all of the 
software and systems that the West wants today,” he tells me. Unlike Millennials, 
who grew upon digital technology platforms, the Xennials had to make the leap from 
analogue to digital. In Romania, it was the perfect combination of socialist IT 
continuity, socialist and postsocialist austerity, and Xennial temporal placement that 
concretized the foundation that the West entered to exploit. 
While Bogdan became a retrocomputing expert and while some of his peers 
became software programmers, others became hackers—people now pathologized by 
the West as dangerous and illiberal, threatening to destroy US democracy. As such, 
we can understand racial technocapitalism as a multifaceted process that stabilizes 
pre-socialist racial configurations while at the same racializing the socialist period 
and its continuities. In other words, while Roma continue to be racialized in Romania 
and made subjects of internal (and also external) racism, racial technocapitalism also 
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functions by racializing the space of Romania as technologically backwards and 
retrograde. This process does not affect all lifeworlds in Romania evenly—far from it. 
But it does result in the ruination of numerous lives, objects, and futures. 
 
Silicon Valley Imperialism 
Gentrification in Romanian cities is not the fault of socialist and transitional 
technological development, nor that of the X86 Generation, though it does capitalize 
upon transitional histories and socialist remains. Gentrification is also a result of other 
times and racial configurations, some of which predate the very transformation of 
Silicon Valley from the orchard capital of California to the suburbanized land of 
Silicon chips. Perhaps gentrification in postsocialist techno-urban space might best be 
understood as a complex process in which Western firms prey upon: 1) a unique 
layering of socialist and transitional technological histories; and 2) postsocialist 
urbanizing processes that restore pre-socialist racialized property relationships. 
Nevertheless, Silicon Valley is not an innocent player. In attempting to reproduce 
itself elsewhere, Fukuyama’s “end of history” predictions gain strength. 
Although past technological and urban history is sometimes hidden in IT 
infrastructure and imaginaries, sometimes it stands out overtly. While NTT absorbed 
EBS, even maintaining the CEO of the former company, much of the surrounding 
“chic modernist” development builds upon former industrial and residential spaces. 
The German iQuest campus sits upon the ruins of the Flacăra textile factory on 
Someșului Street, near to where the also German Bosch is developing a new campus. 
The canteen of the former factory now houses firms with abstruse names such as 
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Doc.Essensis and CCSCC. One block down, the old Napochim plastics factory 
((known as “The Red Flag” when it first opened in 1947) and the former Arbator 
butchery are being transformed into a new apartment block and into the “Oxygen 
Mall” respectively. Still on NTT’s balcony, my friend and I laugh, “See, it’s not the 
greenwashing of postsocialism—it’s the oxygen-washing!” This oxygen-washing, or 
the covering up of and parasiting off of socialist-era urban infrastructure—while 
simultaneously instilling new racial meanings of space and future—is precisely what 
I mean by Silicon Valley imperialism. 
Silicon Valley does indeed imagine itself as imperial, and in doing so, it 
shapes and reshapes understandings of progress, from within its California imperial 
hub to understandings of progress in Western and Eastern Europe alike and beyond. 
Silicon Valley contains more billionaires per square foot anywhere else on earth, 
more patents than anywhere else in the US, more venture capitalists than anywhere 
else globally, and three of the world’s largest companies—Google, Apple, and 
Facebook. Most devices of networked life and the smart city run on networks 
constructed by Silicon Valley companies. As Richard Walker writes, “the mythology 
of the plucky tech entrepreneur has diffused around the world, becoming a key 
element in the capitalist dream world of today” (2018, 7). This dream is alive and 
well in Bucharest and Cluj, where Western entrepreneurs offer workshops, TED talks, 
and more around the clock on how to become better at capitalism, how to 
successfully amass Big Data and mobilize artificial intelligence (AI), or how to 
successfully pitch one’s startup to a Silicon Valley funder. Significantly, Silicon 
Valley emerged as the center of global technocapital during the Cold War (O’Mara 
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2015); its position has only enhanced afterwards in post-Cold War times, stabilizing 
its cultural, political, and economic centrality. This stabilization also facilitates the 
epistemological erasure of other technological futures, past and present, deleting 
routes that fail to appear on Google Maps. But how to map this?—my friend and I 
wonder, still sitting upon NTT’s balcony. 
There, blankly staring out at new construction surrounding us, my friend, 
older than I, begins to remember the thrill that she had as a child in the 1970s, when 
the nearby Central Commercial Center opened its doors to the public for the first 
time. Today, the top floor of the building has been transformed into ClujHub, a 
coworking space with daily talks in which successful Westerners attempt local 
entrepreneurial inculcation. It also houses Uber, much to the chagrin of local taxi 
drivers, many of whom are Roma and who have been engaged in protests against the 
California-based “unicorn” startup. Recounting her first visit to the very same space 
with her mother, my friend pauses, questioning if that not-so-distant memory mirrors 
that of NTT opening its cosmological fourth floor up to us today. How much does 
contemporary change rest upon socialist times, when industrialization, urbanization, 
and also informatics became central priorities of the regime? “Is the contemporary 
landscape more like 1970s urbanism, or more like contemporary Siliconization 
elsewhere?” we wonder. How does one reconcile the reality of multiple origin points 
and non-linear entanglements? 
While remaining critical of Silicon Valley’s imposition as the Greenwich 
Mean Time for all technofuturist imaginaries, and of its tendency to clone contexts of 
racial banishment abroad, perhaps more generative understandings of local techno-
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urbanism might emerge through analytic decentralization (Amrute 2016; Chan 2013; 
Ouředníček 2016; Rai 2019). After all, the Siliconization of Cluj does not simply 
reproduce technocultural dynamics upon a tablă ştearsă (tabula rasa). On the 
contrary, it lands upon the infrastructure of former plants, many of which were part of 
socialist modernity’s own project of techno-urbanism—an endeavor aimed at 
implementing class equality, national autonomy, and urbanization. Siliconization 
rests upon these histories and their infrastructures, while also entwining with post-
1989 infrastructural processes of racialized restitution and privatization. 
Not only is it important to study technocultures urban lifeworlds often 
overlooked in Silicon Valley imposition and comparativity alike, but it is also 
necessary to read technological modernity from the perspective of those who lived 
through the demise of socialism in their countries (Chari and Verdery 2009; 
Petrovzsky and Țichindeleanu 2011). In her monograph on Cold War and post-Cold 
War technologies of communication, Alaina Lemon observes that there has been far 
more curiosity amongst Russians about US culture and technology than the other way 
around, while US proponents of liberal democracy grow increasingly squeamish of its 
Cold War counterpart (2018). Indeed, ethnographies of Cold War technology have 
been either overly US-centric, or disproportionately focused upon Soviet and US 
antipodes and their “flashy flagships” of the US/USSR space race and nuclear 
armament (Hecht 2011, 2). In contrast, while I theorize Siliconization and technology 
from the space of Romania, I also theorize Silicon Valley through postsocialist 
analytics. This decenters the West and the Soviet Union from studies of socialism, but 
also brings the West into conversations on postsocialism, where it is often vacant. 
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Silicon Valley imperialism can be onto-epistemological in nature (Barad 
2003), or, as some of my friends in Romania describe, self-colonizing. Gentrification, 
as both a popular understanding of urban change, but also an analytic, can mean 
deleting socialist techno-urban histories and the politics that informed them, eliding 
their entanglement with the present. In this way, by reading postsocialist urban 
transformation simply as a result of gentrification, technological pasts and presents 
become gentrified. This paves way for the heralding of Western firms such as Google 
and IBM, both of which sponsored Bucharest’s most recent LGBT Pride, much to the 
chagrin of leftist queer organizers. Thus, gentrification, as an analytic, can mean 
imposing Silicon Valley comparativity as mode of framing the present, while also 
assuming the West as the center of technological and geopolitical knowledge 
production. What other futures past and present might emerge by reading the techno-
urban present through other fields of inquiry, from that of housing to that of 
technological justice? 
 
Queering Postsocialism, Corrupting Techno-Normativity 
Silicon Valley imperialism functions through the expansion of techno-
normativity, reproducing its own future by penetrating formerly impenetrable space, 
from intimate bodies to outer space to postsocialist geographies. In Romania, techno-
normativity instills techno-imperial understandings of progress, deleting what might 
be rendered queer, corrupt, and illiberal cyberculture from Romania’s socialist and 
transitional past. In doing so, it draws upon Elizabeth Freeman’s “chrono-
normativity,” or the use of time to meld human bodies into maximum productivity 
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(2010), while also inculcating “illiberal” geopolitical spaces and cultures with desires 
of becoming chrono-normative. Techno-normativity thereby facilitates the 
penetration of Silicon Valley technologies, practices of AI, and data colonization. 
Indeed, Silicon Valley imperialism and zombie socialism are techno-
normative in their temporal framing, and by queering postsocialism, other 
technological futures come into play. Queering in this sense looks to socialist-era 
transitional technological practices, some of which endure below the surface of both 
the state and Silicon Valley imperialism. In this way, queering postsocialism 
provincializes techno-normativity and techno-imperialism. Methodologically, 
queering unearths antiracist and anti-capitalist techno futures past, some of which 
materialized, some of which are still being dreamt. 
By queering, and aligned with queer theory, here I diverge from reading 
queerness as a simple identarian code or sexuality descriptive, but rather, in the words 
of Ronak Kapadia, “as a critical set of interpretive strategies that makes possible the 
production of alternative knowledges, affects, and affiliations” (2014, 230). He goes 
on to describe what he calls “queer cartographic critique,” or a mode of inquiry that 
maps “how knowledge is secured under the conditions of late modern imperialism, 
but also prioritizes the affective, sensorial, and everyday visions, sounds, and 
practices of diasporic and minoritarian life” (ibid., 230). As a methodological antidote 
to what Ella Shohat diagnoses as the “disciplinary and conceptual boundaries that 
continue to quarantine interconnected fields of inquiry” queer cartographic technique 
places “often ghettoized histories, geographies, and discourses in politically and 
epistemologically synergetic relation” (Kapadia 2014, 229; Shohat 2006, 15). Here I 
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want to expand upon Kapadia’s antidote in order to connect postsocialist with queer 
understandings of Silicon techno-normativity. 
By queering techno-normalization, one also ends up corrupting postsocialist 
understandings of temporality. While anticommunists in Romania and in the US 
frequently pathologize socialism and its endurance as “corrupt,” here I question how 
we can queer the concept of corruption (without also undermining legitimate 
concerns of neoliberal violence post-1989). Queering and corrupting here thus look to 
techno-utopic futures past and futures yet-to-come, those coded as excess in both 
state socialist and postsocialist techno-imperial understandings of futurity (Popa 
2019). In this way, I understand queerness as engaging with desires for futures 
unrecognizable by the state (whether socialist or not), and unreadable through Google 
glass. In other words, queerness does not align itself with state socialism, but it does 
question the pathologization of anti-capitalism in the postsocialist Siliconized present. 
It finds alignment with queer of color critique (Hong and Ferguson 2011; Ferguson 
2004; Muñoz 1999), in that it understands emancipatory antiracist and queer 
postsocialist futures as inextricably entangled. It also finds connection and intimacy 
in projects of non-alignment, be they of international solidarities past or present. 
Queering postsocialism thereby involves studying technologies of prior times, 
not for the sake of recuperation, but rather, in the words of Carolyn Dinshaw, to 
“touch the past” (2006), or to “touch across time” (2001, 203). While this allows the 
exploring of what Jonathan Flatley describes as the “dead ends and detours we might 
share with those who came before us” (2008, 7), it also recognizes that the corrupt 
past is not fully dead. Like that application icon you dragged into your computer’s 
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trash bin forgetting that the icon is only one many files having to do with an 
application’s programming, there are uncounted bytes hiding on your aesthetically 
new (but infrastructurally entangled-with-the-past) machine. Queering postsocialism 
thus engages with practices of memory. Karen Barad suggests, “Remembering is not 
a process of recollection, of the reproduction of what was, of assembling and ordering 
events like puzzle pieces fit together by fixing where each has its place. Rather, it is a 
matter of re-membering, of tracing entanglements, responding to yearnings for 
connection, materialized into fields of longing/belonging, of regenerating what never 
was but might yet have been” (2015, 406-407). But what if the materials of this re-
membering are rendered contaminant, corrupt, and black? In this case, touching the 
past becomes a queer act in and of itself. In what follows, I engage in queering 
postsocialism by scavenging through the corrupt past, digging out dismembered 
computer parts, salvaging discarded IT magazines, hacking together futures past and 
futures yet to come unrecognizable to, and yet beyond intimate with, Silicon Valley 
imperialism. 
Today, Western tech companies with branches in Romania have followed 
trends emergent in San Francisco to pinkwash queer justice work (cf. Stanley 2018). 
Pride parades marinate with Google balloons, while Ikea billboards welcome queer 
consumers into their calculations of capital accumulation. For Google, this means 
rendering Silicon Valley as the future of liberal inclusivity, aligned with what Jodi 
Melamed describes as racial liberalism, or a post-Second World War set of Western 
strategies for managing the racial contradictions that antiracist and anticolonial 
movements exposed. As she writes, “In contrast to white supremacy, the liberal race 
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paradigm recognizes racial inequality as a problem, and it secures a liberal symbolic 
framework for race reform centered in abstract equality, market individualism, and 
inclusive civic nationalism” (2006, 1). In this way, antiracism and homonormativity 
have become absorbed into US capitalism, with racial liberalism providing its logics. 
Silicon Valley imperialism updates this imperial technique by adapting what 
Atanasoski and Vora describes as “technoliberalism,” in which “technology advances 
humans towards a postracial future by asserting a post-labor world in which racial 
difference, along with all human social difference, is transcended” (2019, 2). And yet, 
postracial futures continue to instill racism and hetero/homonormativity, temporally 
reliant upon the reproduction of racial technocapitalism and Silicon Valley 
imperialism. 
David Scott argues that temporal experience is always discursively rendered 
through fictive models that connect beginnings, middles, and endings, along with 
pasts, presents, and futures (2015, 70). Both underground and official technological 
projects of the socialist era, particularly in the realm of cybernetics, informatics, and 
computation, had different temporal imaginaries than those of Silicon Valley, state 
socialism’s technological counterpart. There were different futures at stake. While the 
project of transition into the end of history sought to obviate technological difference 
and homogenize techno imaginaries into Cold War Silicon models, the end of history 
has yet to arrive. Underground practices of cyber deviance continued to flourish in 
Romania in the 1990s and 2000s, from DIY cabling practices connecting 
neighborhood blocs to cities such as Râmnicu Vâlcea, known as “Hackerville” by the 
West, seeping with illiberal, corrupt threat. Today, despite Siliconized narratives that 
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gentrify socialist and transitional underground techno-urban pasts with totalizing 
explanatories of top-down globalization, other techno histories queer the wires of the 
Siliconized present. These, like “leftovers from a former future stranded in the 
present” (Scott 2015, 5), corrupt Silicon Valley imperial time, or postsocialist 
common time. 
As Anita Starosta suggests, the forging of this common time transpires 
through the act of translation, or “a process of a never-finished synchronization 
among multiple temporalities—and, by the same token, the process of forging the 
only possible authentic ‘we’” (2014, 2005). And yet, as she marks, translational is 
never a fully finished process, and that due “perverse tongues,” the common “we” of 
postsocialism is never fully concretized. These perverse tongues queer the locution of 
the socialist past and its endurance. Queering thus means reading socialist and 
transitional pasts, rendered corrupt, as simultaneously touching, bolstering, and 
corrupting what is articulated as the Siliconization of Romania. Siliconization, like 
the common time of history’s end, can thus be read as a heteronormative event, one 
that reproduces teleological dreams of Western becoming in ways that fuel the labor 
and resource needs of the West. One that becomes corrupted by coding technologic 
presents as inextricably entangled with socialist histories. Atanasoski and Vora offer, 
“Postsocialism marks a queer temporality, one that does not reproduce its social order 
even as its revolutionary antithesis” (2018, 141). Continuing, “Resisting the 
revolutionary teleology of what was before, postsocialism creates space to work 
through ongoing legacies of socialisms in the present” (ibid., 141). As I question here, 
in Romanian techno space, what are these legacies, and how do they queerly corrupt 
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Silicon Valley techno-normativity? How can queering refuse the resurrection of state 
socialism, instead offering a framework through which one can read deviant techno-
entanglements of the present? 
 
Degentrifying Gentrification Studies 
Just as Silicon Valley dominates geographic and epistemological centrality in 
conversations on technology and technoculture, Western cities and their processes 
have long taken the center stage in gentrification debates. These understand 
contemporary Western urban trajectories as auguring non-Western futures. This is 
particularly evident in Bucharest and Cluj, with primary-colored Google balloons and 
neon astrofuturist signage holding the urban horizon in place. But these processes 
also invoke the pre-socialist era, a time in which Bucharest was described as “the 
Little Paris of the East.” Not coincidentally, this was also a time of extreme fascism, 
marked by the attempted elimination of Roma and Jews. While fantasies of becoming 
Western go back to the Enlightenment in Romania, and as state socialism itself can be 
understood a post-enlightenment trajectory (Buck-Morss 2002), fantasies of 
Westernization uniquely bracket the socialist period, invoking multitemporal 
bidirectional spacetime travel fantasies of becoming Western and White. It is in part 
because of this that Liviu Chelcea suggests that to understand gentrification in 
Eastern European cities, scholarship needs both be more attentive to issues of 
displacement, and to issues of time and space (2017). Here, I attempt to be more 
attentive to all, diverging from, yet nevertheless conversing with, debates emergent in 
comparative urbanism. These debates question whether or not gentrification has 
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“gone global,” and if comparativity imposes Western theories into Global South and 
East locales (Ghertner 2015; Maloutas 2012; Ouředníček 2016; Roy 2017; Shin, 
Lees, and López-Morales 2016). 
While there are good points to be made as to the problematics of, as Matthias 
Bernt articulates, both universalizing and individualizing comparisons in these 
debates (2016, 643), importantly they have been ongoing for some time in 
postcolonial studies, anthropology, and comparative literature (Appadurai 2000; 
Chakravarty 2009; Comaroff and Comaroff 2012; Lowe 2015; Rofel 1999; Spivak 
1988; Tsing 2000). While it is promising that these conversations now too in media 
res in urban studies, with scholars such as Asher Ghertner suggesting that 
gentrification, as an analytic, may not apply in “much of the world” (2015), there may 
be much to learn from other fields that long reworked comparativity. For instance, in 
Sanjay Subrahmanyam observes that comparative approaches to traditional area 
studies might force false reductions, and that perhaps rather a connected approach 
might be more useful in understanding spatial tethering and transactions (1997, 745). 
A connected approach to reading techno-urban change and their accompanying 
desires in Romania foregrounds its current multitemporal racial conjuncture. As 
Barad studies, past moments are always enfolded into the present, so that any moment 
in time is haunted by, and entangled with, futures past (2017). This also aligns with 
Marilyn Strathern’s insights on partial connections (2004). Further, as Bernt observes, 
comparative urban studies debates are often stymied by the theoretical foundations of 
gentrification research; other fields need to come into the fore if such debates are to 
be advanced (2016, 643). More specifically, Roy (2017) argues that urban studies too 
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often elide deep histories of racial disposability that contemporary neoliberalism rests 
upon, and that engagement with other disciplines is requisite in understanding 
processes such as racial banishment. 
As such, to degentrify gentrification theory from the ground up, one must 
foreground unique configurations of temporality entangled in postsocialist cityscapes 
not necessarily familiar in the field of urban studies. Critical race studies, postsocialist 
studies, and postcolonial studies are particularly useful in examining imaginaries of a 
return to pre-socialist racial property regimes—processes of ridding postsocialist 
cities of their “subhuman” inhabitants. These fields are also useful in reading 
fantasies that see Silicon Valley as liberating postsocialist time from the darkness of 
socialism. While there is much to learn from those mired in leftover time, or the 
lifeworlds rendered surplus in neoliberal calculi of Western liberal becoming, there is 
also much to learn from the very idea of time travel itself and the post-Enlightenment 
dreams it promises. These dreams are founded upon what Sylvia Wynter defines as an 
incorporative logic of becoming “Man,” or the white human of Western modernity 
(2003). To become Man, one must continually reincorporate a set of master codes 
about who does and who does not constitute the proper subject of the future, 
substituting one set of codes for another to maintain human verses non-human grids 
of intelligibility. 
In postsocialist times, liberalism codes socialism and its afterlives as non-
human. In Siliconized contexts, this coding can be understood as what Neferti Tadiar 
describes as metropolitanist processes of “uber-urbanization,” in which “intermittent 
detours into leftover spaces, where the pools and eddies of excess life-times—the life-
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times of the urban excess—collect” (2016, 57-58). These pools, these “remaindered 
life-times,” exist beyond the pale of social reproduction. They “consist of a diverse 
array of acts, capacities, associations, aspirations in practice, experiential modes, and 
sensibilities that people engage in, draw upon, and invent in the struggle to make and 
remake social life under conditions of their own superfluity or disposability” (Tadiar 
2013, 23). In doing so, these lifetimes disrupt the presumed end of history, rendering 
the triumph of Western globality merely fiction. 
While urban studies literature is not known for its investigations of time 
travel, nor its explorations of racial capitalism for that matter, there are important 
interventions that postsocialist urban studies does make. Urban studies was, after all, 
revitalized in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War to better theorize the 
newly accessible “world of cities” (Robinson 2002), many of which were 
transforming through new injections of neoliberal democracy. But through this, a 
dominant analytic emerged, one that understands postsocialist cities as “correcting” 
themselves, catching up to their Western counterparts. As Martin Ouředníček writes, 
“The need for an appropriate explanatory and predictive basis within post-socialist 
urban geography, coupled with the newly opened borders, the rejection of the 
socialist past, and the admiration of everything Western, have created ideal conditions 
for an uncritical implantation of Western theoretical concepts, for the westernization 
of the spoken language in general, and in academic vocabulary in particular” (2016, 
547). Nearly three decades later, postsocialist urbanists have begun to realize the 
problematics of such an approach, now more apt to acknowledge the limitations of 
Western conceptual frames, aligning themselves with postcolonial urban studies. But 
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nevertheless, as Ӧrjan Sjӧberg worries, postcolonial urban studies, much like 
postcolonial studies more generally, always seems to do the heavy theoretical lifting, 
while postsocialism becomes used simply as a geographic or temporal descriptive, 
with postsocialist cities simply rendered “case studies onto themselves” (2014)—a 
concern shared by critical scholars of postsocialism more generally. As such, here I 
think alongside Atanasoski and Vora (2018) in their provocation to consider what 
postsocialism as method might do to studies of postsocialist techno-urban formations. 
 
Postsocialism as Method 
Racial technocapitalism in the postsocialist city, violent as it is, and 
dynamically magnetized as it is to both old and new centers of global capitalism, does 
not reduce peripheral lifeworlds simply as racial technocapitalism’s effects. In order 
to read these worlds outside of racial technocapitalism’s purview, one might learn 
from the leftover time of the maidane. Otherwise, such lifetimes only appear to be an 
effect of capitalism, without their own agency and analytics. As Starosta suggests, in 
postsocialist times, “perverse modes of personhood and locution—deriving from the 
socialist past but not reducible either to its official doctrines or to its official dissident 
cultures—persist in the present” (2014, 207). 
By aligning with those whose lives and struggles disrupt the common time of 
post-1989 global neoliberalism, one might read postsocialist urbanization as a racial 
technology that recodes both historical and transnational modes of racial banishment, 
dispossession, and possession in the name of liberal democracy and the liberal 
(techno)human who constitutes it. As Roy offers, “the foundational dispossession of 
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certain subjects is constitutive of liberalism and its economic geographies” (2017, 
A9). Postsocialist Eastern Europe is an integral space from which to theorize 
liberalism and its neoliberal iterations, as not only was the collapse of socialism 
designed by proponents of liberal democracy, but after its disintegration, Silicon 
Valley imperialism crafted postsocialist space as a laboratory for racial 
technocapitalism. It is thereby useful to focus upon how everyday lives and intimate 
spaces have been impacted by technologies of transition. 
Unbecoming Silicon Valley engages in a multimethodological and 
interdisciplinary practices of reading other lifeworlds and studying archives, fiction, 
media, and infrastructure. In doing so, I follow Lisa Lowe’s methodological approach 
of “reading across archives” to understand the “intimacies and contemporaneities that 
traverse distinct and separately studied ‘areas’” (2015, 6). Doing so unsettles, she 
writes, “the discretely bounded objects, methods, and temporal frameworks canonized 
by a national history invested in isolated origins and in dependent progressive 
development” (ibid., 6). Following her lead, I suggest that to understand both racial 
technocapitalism and Silicon Valley imperialism in postsocialist Romania, one must 
depart from isolated practices of only reading from one genre, but also only from 
singular geographies and temporalities. Here I read from an array of sources and 
spacetimes, from Communist archives of informatics and computation to speculative 
fiction created in postsocialist space, from urban planning logs of Siliconized space to 
infrastructure itself. 
The need for a more interdisciplinary approach in understanding the unique 
layering of geographies, technocultures, and urbanities, invokes Arjun Appadurai’s 
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writing on technoscapes, or the disjunctures imposed when technological 
development entwines with global flows of people, cultures, and capital in irregularly 
shaped spaces (1990). Technoscapes, he suggested decades ago now, can of course be 
understood in part by traditional indicators and comparisons such as World Bank 
reports, but the complexity that underlies their formation “are further out of reach of 
the ‘queen of the social sciences’ than ever before” (1990, 298). In part, this is 
because technoscapes are also informed by imaginaries, from those of imagined 
worlds to those of imagined communities, from those of financial speculators to those 
of housing justice activists speculating upon anti-capitalist technological futures 
(Anderson 1983; Bahng 2017). Imaginaries bear material effects upon geographies of 
postsocialist gentrification. To read and learn from them, one must, in addition to 
engaging in anthropological fieldwork, look to the creative work, literature, counter-
maps, and media created at the interstices of both socialist and Siliconized 
technoscapes. 
In part, Appadurai writes of technoscapes and their transnationality against the 
tradition of area studies and its tight bounding of geopolitical space, a claustrophobic 
mapping practice that partitions the globe into digestible fragments for US 
scholarship and governance alike (1996). Like Intel’s x86 microprocessor, area 
studies emerged under the auspices of Cold War knowledge production. While the 
Intel’s technology was hacked, modified, and altered by those in Romania to get 
away from technocapitalism’s paywall, critical area studies too has emerged to 
provide think accounts and details needed to decenter Western vocabularies, 
promoting transnationalism, fieldwork immersion, linguistic proficiency, and even 
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interdisciplinary inquiry (Arondekar and Patel 2016, 155). Indeed, despite its Cold 
War incentives to apportion space, as David Ludden suggests, area studies has 
become perhaps “the most creative venue for studies of imperialism and the imperial 
aspects of globalization,” having become “a necessary counterweight to the 
decontextualizing force of universal globalism” (2003, 136). This has incited scholars 
such as Warwick Anderson to propose postcolonial area studies of technoscience 
(2009, 169), one that Fa-ti Fan argues must be “non-essentializing and de-
territorializing” (2007, 8). In engaging in such a practice, Anderson, also building off 
of Kuan-hsing Chen’s work on “Asia as method” (2010, 223), asks what it might 
mean to theorize “Asia as method in Science and Technology Studies (STS)” (2012). 
For Anderson, such an approach, rather than establishing a canon or methodology, 
points to a locus of enunciation, one that aims to decolonize Western universalism 
Yet also, as a mode of border thinking (Anzaldúa 1987), such an approach 
understands the simultaneity of the local and global, yet it remains open to multiple 
frames of reference. 
Building upon Anderson’s provocation, here I ask, what might it mean to 
theorize postsocialism as method in Science and Technology Studies (STS)? For one, 
it would engage what Atanasoski and Vora describe as pluralizing postsocialism as 
method (2018), or the studying of local and transnational socialisms of the now and 
of futures past through a multitemporal and multi-spatial scope, shattering fictions of 
socialism’s and capitalism’s supposed singularities. In addition, theorizing Romania 
as method in STS understands the frictions of Romanian socialist and transitional-era 
technoscapes as they brush upon against those of Silicon Valley imperialism. The 
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frictions that these bifurcated yet entangled technological worlds pose and repose 
with each other is far from monolithic; they look different depending upon one’s 
vantage point. 
Ethnographic methods, consisting of formal interviews, as well as participant 
observation, are integral in understanding not only the material impacts of IT 
globalization, but also how different understandings of futurity, technology, and 
postsocialism collide and entangle. Ethnography facilitates the weaving together of 
complex perspectives, from those compiled at tech meetups to those of socialist-era 
hardware engineers now unemployed and nostalgic. It offers a lens through which to 
read the imaginaries of Light Revolution liberals to those organizing for housing 
justice from the maidane of urban renewal. Ethnography can help map the frictions of 
postsocialist spacetime, for instance those in US rental property technology call 
centers in Cluj, and those of Hackerville, the infamous mountain town where 
computer hackers such as Guccifer (known for hacking Hillary Clinton’s emails) 
have emerged. Indeed, in the wake of the 2016 US elections, Romania, Russia, and 
Silicon Valley have emerged as more tightly entwined than ever. An interdisciplinary 
ethnographic approach sheds light on its tautness, foregrounding the material effects 
of Silicon Valley imperialism and racial technocapitalism alike. 
The research that follows has been conducted in collaboration with two 
housing activist groups that I am part of in Romania, as well as one critical 
cartography and digital humanities collective that I cofounded in San Francisco, the 
Anti-Eviction Mapping Project (AEMP). Emerging in the height of the San Francisco 
Bay Area’s Tech Boom 2.0, the AEMP has since been documenting dispossession 
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and resistance struggles in Silicon Valley’s backyard (McElroy 2019). Committed to 
theorizing technological futures outside those of technocapitalism, the AEMP looks at 
technofutures past and present that use technology to fight against the racially 
dispossessive effects of Silicon Valley. I explore the AEMP more in length in Chapter 
4, which studies racial dispossession in Silicon Valley’s own California backyard. As 
I suggest, postsocialist analytics, along with community-led critical cartography 
projects, are useful tools in understanding the present. 
In recent years, the AEMP has collaborated with Bucharest’s Frontul Comun 
pentru Dreptul la Locuire (Common Front for the Right to Housing / FCDL) and Căși 
Sociale Acum, based in Cluj, to produce data and analytics useful to anti-
displacement organizing. The two Romanian collectives work with displaced tenants, 
holding direct actions and community events for housing justice. Operating outside of 
NGO and non-profit models, priority is placed upon producing work that directly 
empowers on-the-ground struggles, creating research with and not for communities 
most impacted by postsocialist disaster capitalism (Klein 2007; Tallbear 2014). In this 
dissertation, I draw upon collaborative work conducted with the AEMP, FCDL, and 
Căși, for instance in Chapter 1 where I explore double dispossession in postsocialist 
Cluj, or the process in which Roma are physically evicted to the maidane of urban 
renewal as Western digital nomads and “digital Gypsies” displace Roma in 
allegorical incantation. At the same time, drawing upon this collaborative work, much 
of which relies upon and crafts new technologies and critical cartographic methods, I 
question, how might mapping racial dispossession as connected across time and space 
help create new forms of international solidarity? How might we use technology to 
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create technofutures unrecognizable to Silicon Valley imperialism? 
In her provocation to entwinte comparative literature and area studies (2003), 
Gayatri Spivak writes, “Just as socialism at its best would persistently and repeatedly 
wrench capital away from capitalism, so must the new Comparative Literature 
persistently and repeatedly undermine and undo the definitive tendency of the 
dominant to appropriate the emergent” (2003, 100). Not writing for a new 
comparative literature, but rather for a new understanding of techno-urbanism in 
Romania, it appears that without an interdisciplinary lens attentive to both local and 
transnational field languages, the imaginaries and materialities that enable the 
becoming and unbecoming of Silicon Valley fall flat. It is this practice of intertwining 
the local and transnational, while attending to the temporal technological 
entanglements of futures past and present, that I describe as a connected and 
postsocialist methodological approach. Postsocialist Romania, as part of Western 
Europe’s own maidane, bears its own heterogenous technocultures and technologies 
of race, but these are always in some way entangled with the West, refusing 
singularity and any semblance of postsocialist common time. 
At the same time, I suggest here that postsocialist analytics are important in 
theorizing urban transformation even within the Bay Area, where increasingly 
commonist space, from public bus stops to public parks, from SRO hotels to 
sidewalks, are unevenly being appropriated and expropriated by Silicon Valley 
imperialism. Silicon Valley itself is a Cold War phenomenon, with its imperiality 
constitutive of posts and ghosts. Digital nomadism emerges from these specters, 
updating Romantic Orientalism while landing upon pre-socialist fascist fantasies. 
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Why should postsocialist urban studies be confined to formerly socialist space, 
especially if the post-Cold War is global? What might considerations of postsocialist 
temporality do to understandings of urban transformations across the planet, from 
Bucharest to Berkeley, from the Silicon Valley of Europe to that of California? 
 
Chapter Map 
My first chapter, “Digital Nomads in Siliconizing Cluj: Material and 
Allegorical Double Dispossession,” studies the arrival of digital nomads in Cluj, 
Romania. I focus upon what I describe as double dispossession, in which “digital 
nomads” allegorize technocapitalist fantasies by appropriating Roma identity on one 
hand, and in which Roma are evicted to make way for the arrival of Western digital 
nomads and tech firms on the other. While Roma are materially dispossessed as Cluj 
Siliconizes, they are doubly dispossessed by the conjuration of the deracinated digital 
nomad/Gypsy. As I suggest, this figure discursively drags with it onto-
epistemological residues of 19th-century Orientalism—a literary genre that emerged 
within the heart of Western European empires. The recoding of the nomad today, I 
argue, indexes techno-imperiality. Double dispossession, as a phenomenon, makes 
clear that prior histories bolster, and are consumed by, globalizing techno-
imperialism. Here I advocate for a connected rather than comparative approach in 
understanding double dispossession, focusing upon connections across time, space, 
and genre. 
My second chapter, “Corrupting Techno-normativity in Postsocialist 
Romania: Queering Code and Computers,” looks the remembering and recoding of 
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socialist-era and transitional “corrupt” technology in the postsocialist present. I focus 
upon how prior technocultures, wires, games, and computers have laid the 
groundwork for contemporary Siliconization, which attempts to coopt and erase the 
infastructures of the past all at once. Today, outside of corporately funded 
hackathons, other technoscapes also live, often pathologized by the West as 
threatening the longevity of techno-normative time. In investigating socialist 
underground IT cultures that have endured since socialism, I ask, how can Romanian 
cyber deviance pervert the temporality of Silicon Valley techno-imperialism, while 
queering the analytics used to understand the reproduction of contemporary 
technoscapes? Might it be that narratives of Siliconization are heteronormative in 
their framing of temporality, and that by queering postsocialism, other understandings 
come into play? In asking these questions, I look to speculative techno futures past 
and yet-to-come. 
In “The Light Revolution, Blood Gold, and the New Times of IKEA: 
Impossible Spaces of Dissent,” I examine postsocialism as an emerging theoretical 
concept useful in assessing contestations of post-1989 liberalism. Rather than fall into 
stereotypical invocations of Eastern Europe as a historical and geopolitical site from 
which to preﬁgure of illiberalism and totalitarianism in a post-Brexit and post-Trump 
era West, I instead ask, what can Eastern European postsocialist politics of protest, 
development, and renewal teach us about the perils of liberalism? How does the 
reorganization of public and private space undergird the conditions of forgetting that 
enable postsocialist disaster capitalism, which speaks not only about Eastern 
European speciﬁcity, but also more broadly about the contradictions of Euro-
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American liberalism made apparent in its recent crisis? Empirically, I study the 2013 
Save Roșia Montană campaign against a Canadian goldmining company. I trace the 
movement’s adaptation into a liberal space of “all protestors matter” ethos, which I 
suggest helps explain the liberalism of the 2017 Light Revolution protests against 
socialism, corruption, and technological backwardness. As I ask, why is it that today, 
hundreds of thousands take to the streets to purge socialist ghosts, but not the 
violence of neoliberal corporations, for instance, IKEA, which has been clearcutting 
Romanian forests at alarming rates, and which bears actual fascist histories? Posing 
these questions allows me to investigate the contours of the political within a 
particular postsocialism-liberalism nexus. 
My fourth chapter, “Postsocialism, Technofascism, and the Tech Boom 2.0: 
From Technologies of Racial/spatial Dispossession to the Dark Enlightenment,” 
centers upon the postsocialist spatiotemporality of Bay Area gentrification, postracial 
liberalism, techno-utopics, technofascism, and antifascist dissent in the post-Cold 
War Bay Area. Postsocialist temporality here envelops Tech 2.0, which follows the 
racial booms and busts of the late-1990s Dot Com Boom and the 2008 subprime 
mortgage crisis. The Cold War and its cessation, I argue, are key events in 
understanding the Bay Area’s tech booms. At the same time, Bay Area Siliconized 
geography is an apt spatiotemporality from which to theorize postsocialism. In this 
way, I read postsocialism as a heterogeneous and global condition, as well as an 
analytic entry point for understanding contemporary political rearrangements, 
continuities, and discontinuities that inform whiteness and liberalism in the Bay Area. 
In reading contemporary Bay Area techno-urban transformations ethnographically, it 
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becomes clear that regional racial, fascist, and liberal imaginaries today are not only 
haunted by, but also co-constitutive of, Cold War ghosts, posts, and updates. How 
might we read new forms of data colonialism enacted by companies such as 
Facebook as techno-imperial and as a product of post-Cold War times? How might a 
postsocialist approach to post-Cold War Silicon Valley enable new insights regarding 
techno-imperial algorithms? 
Maintaining a postsocialist analytic, the fifth chapter, “Hacking the Inimical 
of Post-Cold War Time: Mr. Robot, the Dark Army, and the Doomsday Machine,” 
explores the framing of contemporary hacking plots, from the fictive ones of Sam 
Esmail’s television series, Mr. Robot, to contemporary attacks on the Democratic 
Party, blamed on Russia. Critical of how US dystopic imaginaries have transformed 
bombs into hacks, I study the liberal conjuring of Cold War ghosts as they frame 
postsocialist spaces such as Hackerville as centers of illiberalism. From the fictive 
hacking groups of Mr. Robot such as F Society and the Dark Army, to hackers 
Guccifer and Guccifer 2.0 – Romanian and Russian monikers made infamous for 
having hacked the Democratic Party—cybersecurity threats have reached the level of 
bomb in nuclear Cold War culture. Thus, in this chapter, I focus upon postsocialist 
temporality, postsocialist technoculture, and the crisis of liberalism, particularly as 
the latter reinterprets racial, fascist, and imperial configurations. As I ask, how, in the 
Cold War 2.0, have understandings of both the enemy and temporality been hacked? 
My final chapter, “Non-Alignment in Outer Space: From the Ruins of 
Postsocialist Astrofuturism,” focuses upon socialist outer space cosmologies as 
portrayed in Romanian film, art, and speculative fiction. While space race desires 
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contoured technological dreams on both sides of the Iron Curtain, little work has 
explored Communist intergalactic visions. Where Western conversations on 
Astrofuturism position the galaxy as either a place to colonize or to create anti-racist 
futures within, what happens when we shift lenses to the time and space of socialism? 
By reading futurist and social realist work, I study dreams of developing anti-
capitalist and anti-fascist utopias in outer space, to then cultivating them on earth. 
These ambitions correlated with dreams for a third-world internationalism, yet 
Romania’s ability to confront its own internal racism remained questionable. As I 
question, is this in part why Romania never fully managed to join the non-alignment 
movement and sustain its utopic dreams in outer space? 
The epilogue, “Blackface on the Nightshift, Proptech AI, and the Posthuman 
Landlord,” looks at novel forms of anti-Black racism in postsocialist Romania, and 
how racism transits. Most focus is placed upon the Invitation Homes call center in 
Cluj. Invitation Homes, the US’s largest landlord corporations, a post-2008 
phenomenon, that now also uses property technology and artificial intelligence to 
manage its real estate. But it also outsources labor, creating contexts in which both 
anti-Black racism and anti-Eastern European xenophobia entangle. What do these 
practices reveal about postsocialism, race, and technology in a postsocialist moment? 
How does race travel through technology, and how might a connected approach help 
chart new routes for international solidarity? 
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Chapter 1: Digital Nomads in Siliconizing Cluj: Material and 
Allegorical Double Dispossession 
 
In 2018, Cluj-Napoca’s mayor Emil Boc announced the introduction of a 
public robot named Antonia as part of Cluj, Romania’s newfound status as “the 
Silicon Valley of Europe.” Although Antonia proved only to be a computer 
algorithm, lacking the robotic stock image body displayed in the press, she, as the 
first “public robot mayoral servant,” was nevertheless conjured as part of a 
widespread techno-futurist vision reflected in Romanian infrastructure and 
imaginaries alike. One only has to momentarily walk through Cluj’s Mărăști 
neighborhood to breathe in new construction particles and observe fiber optic cabling 
sticking out of buildings like alien tentacles, waiting to be connected. Former 
industrial socialist factories, from the Flacăra textiles factory to the Napochim plastics 
factory, are being converted into IT plants for foreign firms like Bosch and iQuest, or 
into fancier residential blocks. 
Blocks away, the co-working ClujHub just relocated to the top floor of the 
Central Commercial Center, a socialist-era department store opened in the 1970s. 
There, talks, gatherings, and meetups occur around the clock, mostly geared towards 
inculcating Romanian programmers with entrepreneurial skills. These spaces also 
attract “digital nomads,” transient IT workers largely hailing from the West. 
Sometimes digital nomads just enter Romania briefly to give talks; sometimes they 
reside for longer, taking advantage of Cluj’s budding IT scene, largely dictated by 
practices of Western outsourcing. Outsourcing, also known in Romania as 
“nearshoring” due to the country’s geographic proximity to “the West,” scripts 
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Romanian IT workers into the robots of Western technocapitalism. Often, outsourcing 
is directed by digital nomads and Western IT firms alike. 
Digital nomads, also problematically self-ascribed as “digital Gypsies,” refer 
to tech workers who both fantasize and actualize the dream of being able to live and 
work anywhere, while at the same time remaining plugged into Silicon Valley 
infrastructures, economies, and lifeworlds. Divorced from Roma materialities and 
identities, digital nomad/Gypsy fantasies today rather resemble 19th-century 
Romantic Orientalist narratives written by white men from the hearts of European 
empires that fetishize “Gypsy freedom” (Lemon 2000; Saul 2007; Trumpener 1995). 
These feature bourgeois protagonists who exoticize the freedom and taboo of the 
racialized, sexualized Gypsy—an allegorical figure that, like the digital nomad, 
abstracts and mutilates diverse Roma experiences. Outside of Western texts, most 
Roma are not “nomadic,” and many have been subject to violent histories of forced 
displacement, racial dispossession, and racist representation (Achim 2004; Lancione 
2018; Pusca 2015; Woodcock 2007). Why is it that digital nomads/Gypsies allegorize 
technocapitalist fantasies by appropriating Roma identity, while Roma evictees are 
subjected to forced nomadism to make way for their arrivals? What does this have to 
do with past imperial forms and fantasies? 
In Siliconizing Cluj, digital nomadism today is accompanied by forced and 
racialized “nomadism” for others. It was in the dead of a cold December night in 
2010 that a collective of over 300 Roma residents were displaced from their homes on 
Coastei Street in the city-center, so that the Finnish IT company, Nokia, could 
construct a downtown office building. While much of the city heralded the migration 
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of the tech company’s branch from Germany to Romania, representing in the popular 
imaginary modernization and Europeanization, the displaced Roma, many of whom 
were forcibly relocated to “social housing” adjacent to the city’s municipal waste site, 
Pata Rât, felt differently. Nokia had been offered a two-year tax break to move to 
Cluj, through a city-initiated program to incentivize tech growth. However, before the 
office was completed, Nokia abandoned its Romanian outpost altogether to relocate 
to China, where new tax breaks awaited. 
In the temporality of postsocialism, Roma matters are spatial matters.4 Today, 
the displaced Roma residents remain mired in the toxicity of Pata Rât, beached upon 
the maidane—supposedly uninhabitable wastelands squeezed between the rural and 
urban. Stranded in postsocialist space, Romania’s most racially subjugated minority 
are pushed into toxic sinkholes as tech speculation takes hold. There, in postsocialist 
time, the rhythm of modernity’s drumbeat only registers as progress to some. 
This chapter looks at the spatialization of inherited yet global dispossessions 
in postsocialist Cluj. It focuses upon how digital nomads and global IT capital use 
material advantages to unwittingly (and sometimes wittingly) appropriate the spaces 
and identities of Roma, whose lives are made more precarious as a result of 
gentrification. While Roma are materially dispossessed to make way for new IT 
office buildings and residential complexes, they are doubly dispossessed by the 
conjuration of the deracinated digital nomad/Gypsy. As I suggest, this figure 
discursively drags with it onto-epistemological (Barad 2003) residues of 19-century 
Orientalism—a literary genre that emerged within the heart of Western European 
empires. Orientalist texts frequently appropriated “Gypsy” freedom to allegorize the 
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sexuality and raciality of Western imperialism. The figure being updated today, I 
argue, indexes the imperiality of technocapitalism, or techno-imperialism. As in the 
past, nomadic fantasy hinges upon a Western imperial hub, one that has expanded 
from Western Europe to now also include California’s Silicon Valley. 
One might venture that racial dispossession in the Silicon Valley of Europe 
mimics that of other Siliconizing spaces, most obviously the gentrifying San 
Francisco Bay Area where tech speculation incites the rampant displacement of 
tenants of color (Maharawal and McElroy 2018). There are also other “Silicon 
Valleys” popping up across the world, including, but not limited to: Silicon Alley in 
New York City, Silicon Fen in Cambridge, Silicon Wadi in Israel, Silicon Mountain 
in Cameroon, Silicon Cape in South Africa, Silicon Savannah in Nairobi, Silicon 
Lagoon in Lagos, Silicon Island in Kyushu, Silicon Plateau in Bangalore, Silicon 
Peninsula in Dailan, Silicon Paradise in Costa Rica, Silicon Bayou in New Orleans, 
Silicon Valley North in Ontario, Silicon Forest in Portland, Silicon Slopes in Salt 
Lake City, Silicon Prairie in Dallas, Silicon Hills in Austin, Silicon Beach in Los 
Angeles, another “Silicon Valley of the East” in Penang, Silicon Gulf in the 
Philippines, Silicon Oasis in Dubai, Silicon Saxony in Dresden, Silicon Allee in 
Berlin, Silicon Docks in Dublin (considered another European Silicon Valley), and 
the list really does go on and on. Understanding these spaces as undergoing similar 
phenomena, for instance evictions, might invoke universalizing methods and 
analytics (e.g. Eviction Lab 2019; Slater 2017), as well as urban studies literature on 
comparative urbanism, plantetary gentrification, and global cities (e.g. Shin, Lees, 
and López-Morales 2016; Robinson 2011). While there is exciting work being in 
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these domains, particularly work critical of Anglo-American theoretical dominance 
(Ghertner 2016; Roy 2017), the phenomenon of Siliconization, as well as double 
dispossession, in Cluj, for instance, calls for an approach beyond traditional urban 
studies and social scientific studies, attentive to complex interplays of imperialism, 
temporality, globalization, and race. This is not to deny the importance of 
comparative work, but it is to also call for something else.  
In assessing these entanglements in postsocialist, Siliconizing Cluj, it becomes 
clear that prior histories bolster the present. Postcolonial and postsocialist studies 
offer important perspectives in understanding this history. Their analytics are useful 
in theorizing racial dispossession locally and globally, but also materially, 
allegorically, and historically. Spivak, in writing of the Siliconization of Bangalore 
and the historic dislocations it recodes, suggests, “Every rupture is also repetition” 
(2000, 5). Building upon this, I argue that the Siliconization of Cluj is only possible 
through the accumulation of material and allegorical dispossessions (double 
dispossession), put in “friction” with new global flows and entangled histories (Barad 
2011; 2017; Tsing 2005). I thus advocate for a connected rather than only 
comparative approach in understanding double dispossession in times of techno-
imperialism, one that, while rooted in place, analyzes tethered displacements across 
time, space, and genre. 
A connected approach highlights what I describe as racial technocapitalism, a 
global racial project that flourishes under the conditions of postsocialist 
“development” and “democratization,” both techno-imperial projects. Racial 
technocapitalism draws upon and then attempts to overwrite the earlier racial projects 
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upon which it relies—a mode of Spivak’s repetitive rupture-making. These earlier 
projects include slavery and failed reparations in Romania, as well as settler colonial 
violence of the 19th century Western Europe that deracinated Roma lifeworlds. 
Racial technocapitalism and techno-imperialism are thus twin concepts that I rely 
upon here to theorize entangled histories as they manifest in and between postsocialist 
Romania and Silicon Valley. The figure of the digital nomad, also racial, marks the 
spatiotemporality of this new techno-entanglement. 
In what follows, I explore double dispossession by thinking from the maidane 
of allegory and evictions, and by thinking from the time and space of globalization. 
First, I introduce the concept of digital nomadism and the Silicon Valley desires it co-
constitutes. I proceed to retrieve allegorical genealogies of digital nomadism, looking 
to 19th-century Orientalist literature. 19th-century subjunctive forms are now being 
updated to both allegorize and enable techno-imperialism. This illuminates why 
traditional urban studies scholarship alone is insufficient in theorizing digital 
nomadism, techno-imperialism, and racial technocapitalism. Other approaches 
attentive to fantasy and history are requisite, for instance the reading of contemporary 
media pieces, 19th-century Orientalist literature, digital nomad blogs, and antiracist 
digital story-maps—all of which I study here to supplement ethnographic work. 
This ethnographic research in Cluj largely transpired between 2016 and 2018, 
and it informs three empirical sections. This includes a study of racial property 
histories before, during, and after socialism. I also map the racial banishment that 
Roma residents experience amidst Siliconization. Lastly, I turn to the landing of 
digital nomads in Cluj as they constitute, and are co-constituted by, techno-
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imperialism. In these sections, I draw upon narrative data collected with Căși Sociale 
ACUM (Căși / Social Housing NOW), a housing justice collective with whom I 
collaborate. Căși works with displaced tenants, many of whom are Roma, conducting 
research that directly empowers on-the-ground struggles. With Căși, I collaboratively 
produced an online interactive story-map, Dislocari, referenced in this chapter. 
Dislocari features narratives and eviction routes of seven Roma residents now living 
in Cluj’s waste site, Pata Rât. Each narrator describes a series of past displacements 
from the city-center that eventually landed them in the maidane. Their stories shed 
light on the longue durée of racial dispossession upon which techno-imperialism 
rests. These narratives disrupt digital nomad notions that Roma mobility is steeped in 
enchantment. 
 
Digital Nomadism 
While digital nomads can be understood as a genre of “lifestyle migrants,” or 
middle-class and wealthy Western travelers who profit from incomes earned at high 
rungs of uneven global labor divisions, and while urban studies scholars are 
importantly linking the landing of lifestyle migrants with contexts of transnational 
and tourism-related gentrification (Hayes 2014; Cócola-Gant 2018), digital nomads 
are also embedded in older colonial allegorical structures. Thus, in addition to 
understanding digital nomadism through urban studies and globalization frameworks, 
cultural, literary, and decolonial analyses are also useful. As Claudia Breger suggests, 
to displace the dominant and disfiguring narratives written about “Gypsies,” we might 
have to read them “in terms of their discursive constitution as well as with regard to 
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the (fictional and/or historical) lives of their protagonists, narrators and authors” 
(133). Following her lead, in this section I explore the fictional and historical lives of 
digital nomads—their desires, their world views, and their genealogies. In doing so, I 
focus on the racial, sexual, and colonial contours that undergird digital nomadic 
lifeworlds. As I argue, 19th-century forms haunt contemporary dreams of 
spatiotemporal independence. By seeing how discursive forms inhere over time, 
insights are gained into contemporary spatiotemporal processes that otherwise would 
be hidden in urban studies analyses. 
As a phenomenon, digital nomadism is often attributed to Tsugio Makimoto 
and David Manners and their 1997 Digital Nomad, in which they presaged a future 
run by wealthy IT business professionals, equipped with a “digital toolkit,” who could 
live a life of “location independence.” But even decades earlier, other speculative 
futurists such as Arthur C. Clarke envisaged the idea, foretelling a world much like 
today, in which “any businessman, any executive, could live almost anywhere on 
earth and still do his business” (Australian Broadcasting Company 1974). As he 
elaborated, “In the global world of the future, it will be like if you’re living in one 
small town, anywhere anytime, about a third of your friends will be asleep. . . So, you 
may have to abolish time zones completely, and all go on the common time, the same 
time for everybody” (AT&T 1976). 
Clarke’s “common time” is the same time that many of today’s digital nomads 
venerate as enabling location independence. Just as digital nomad racial fantasies of 
today are no longer confined to 19th-century allegories, neither are they restrained to 
Clarke’s speculative fiction—though one can argue that differences between 
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speculative fiction and reality have always been fictive. As Aimee Bahng suggests, 
“Both financial speculation and speculative fiction participate in the cultural 
production of futurity – a term that highlights the construction of ‘the future’ and 
denaturalizes its singularity, even while acknowledging its substantial effects on how 
we materialize the present” (2015, 666). Today, in the words of Alexis Lothian, “the 
spectacle of speculative destruction converges intimately with the unpredictable yet 
repetitive events of climate change; science fiction imagery becomes 
indistinguishable from news reports” (2018, 2). Yet at the same time, queer, 
decolonial, and Afrofuturist speculative future writing from the past has opened up 
future possibilities and imaginaries of the present (brown and Imarisha 2015; Muñoz 
2009). But here, it might be that technological forecasting of the Cold War 1970s 
opened up digital transit and technocapitalist fantasies of the present. For instance, 
today’s digital nomads are paid Silicon Valley salaries, and enjoy easy transit 
between “exotic” locales, aligned with Clarke’s projections. From the Latinx Mission 
District of San Francisco to spaces farther away from Silicon Valley, such as Bali and 
Bucharest, digital nomads traverse the globe without losing capital to tourism costs. 
For instance, James Taylor, who identifies as an “award-winning entrepreneur,” a 
“white middle-class professional living in a first world country,” wrote a 2011 blog 
post describing the rise of this new lifestyle. He and his wife transit between Europe 
and the US running app-enabled auto-pilot businesses. In his words, “being a Digital 
Gypsy is more a frame of mind than genealogy” (Taylor 2011). As his testimony 
evidences, the Gypsy/nomad endures transnationally, enabled by Silicon Valley 
technology capital and infrastructure. 
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As becomes evident when studying Gypsy fictions and their colonial 
geographies, Gypsy figures often emerge from the hearts of imperial geographies, 
thereby reflecting imperial consciousness. Walter Mignolo writes of how, by latticing 
itself with coloniality during the Renaissance, modernity became the inevitable 
present of history, with Europe as its center. Afterwards, during the Enlightenment, 
Greenwich was remapped as “the zero point of global time,” or the common time of 
the era (2011, 22). During the 19th century, at the height of Romantic Orientalism 
and numerous European colonial projects, imperialism encapsulated new times and 
spaces into the common time of empire. Gypsy novellas, poems, and theater reflected 
colonial aspiration, along with imperial ambivalence and violence. In this way, Gypsy 
fiction mapped imperial dreams as they manifested new frontiers, often within 
Europe. 
Romanticism, as a literary, artistic, and intellectual movement positioned 
against industrialization, Enlightenment norms, and the logics of scientific 
rationalization, reached its peak by the mid-19th century, remapping national 
geographies of self-determination. Aesthetically, it embraced the sublimity of nature, 
emotion, spontaneity, individual heroism, and imaginaries of ancient national 
traditions, characterized by “a new and restless spirit, seeking violently to burst 
through old and cramping form . . . expressing an unappeasable yearning for 
unattainable goals” (Berlin 1990, 92). This restlessness interpellated the Gypsy into 
popularized epic poetry and novellas, where the figure effectively became the 
workhorse of national movements across the continent, connecting one imperial 
project to the next. 
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This coincided with the rise of Orientalism, a system that juxtaposed the 
exotic and haunting worlds of the Orient against those of a progressive, mechanistic, 
and cold Europe.5 Roma, who have been more prevalent in Eastern Europe since their 
medieval continental entrance, and who originally (albeit complexly) migrated in 
multiple waves from Northern India a millennium ago, have long been considered an 
Oriental European object. At the time, Orientalist fantasies of the East were 
frequently represented through racial and sexual symbolization, most prominently in 
graphic imagery of white Western men possessing sexually submissive Eastern 
women as a “male power fantasy” (Said 1978, 247). So too were Roma racialized and 
sexualized in European Orientalist literature. Therefore, the Gypsy in 19th-century 
texts stands in for peripheralized, less-than European locales, while simultaneously 
legitimizing the ontology of the nomadic colonizer. 
As I suggest, it is no small coincidence that Gypsy allegorical forms are 
reinterpreted today. Contemporary Silicon Valley imperium—a phenomenon in 
which the Valley materializes new nodes and edges to facilitate surplus capital 
accumulation—is enabled by a nomadic avatar conditioned by 19th-century 
subjunctive forms. In other words, digital nomads both enable and constitute Silicon 
Valley imperialism. Silicon Valley Time has now abdicated Greenwich Mean Time’s 
throne, a resignation that remains illusory yet integral to digital nomadic 
spatiotemporal visions, or Clarke’s “common time.” Often also illusory to the 
settler/nomad are its material effects, not to mention its genealogical underpinnings. 
Few digital nomads that I have spoken with or read consider the ways in which their 
landing and settling a place contributes to its gentrification, and none have 
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acknowledged the racial appropriation upon which their avatar depends. 
Take, for instance, digital nomad Matt Mullenweg of the San Francisco 
startup Automatic. In a recent film on digital nomadism by Youjin Do, “One Way 
Ticket: The Rise of the Digital Nomad,” Mullenweg brags that 95 percent of his 400 
employees live outside of San Francisco, in 47 countries. He aims to attract talent that 
questions, “Why do I have to commute to Mountain View every day and sit in a 
bunch of meetings and things like that?” As Mullenweg ventures, prospective 
employees will think, “Maybe I want to live in Mountain View part of the year, but 
maybe during the summer I want to go to Italy, or to Thailand, or Australia, or 
wherever it is, it doesn’t matter” (qtd. in Do). But as much as he promulgates 
spatiotemporal flexibility, his company’s nomads remain tethered to the physical 
concreteness and centrality of San Francisco—Silicon Valley’s urban outpost. In-
person meetings are still held there, and physical mail is still sent. Also, rents there 
have become the United States’ most expensive. 
Meanwhile, when departing from San Francisco and other Western locales, 
digital nomads often contribute to new forms of gentrification upon arrival. As digital 
nomad Kay self-critiques by blog: “This is gentrification at its simplest. This is 
globalization. This is the result of some very selfish, very narrow thinking” (2015). 
Continuing, “Every dollar we spend, every blog post we write, and every coworking 
space we patronize contributes to this inequality.” Not all digital nomads are this self-
critical, and there are variations and discrepancies amongst them. There are wealthy 
nomads from San Francisco who live months at a time in various locales, who 
periodically return to their companies’ headquarters. Others from Western European 
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countries now permanently live in Romania, where they manage Western outsourcing 
firms. Some digital nomads have moved to Romania to take advantage of cheap 
labor, and to launch their own startups. Others are not employed by firms, and instead 
pick up online gigs as they meander. I have interviewed several nomads of each of 
these genres in Cluj, and have found that while their stories all vary, the fact that they 
benefit from Western incomes is constant. 
Today, there are countless meetups, blogs, websites, and even comparative 
ranking sites advertising prime locations for nomadism. As one self-proclaimed 
libertarian digital nomad from San Francisco articulated in a Cluj café, the idea of 
settling down is not at all appealing to his millennial generation. The world is global, 
and success means being at home in the global world. “People used to brag about 
buying and selling real estate developments. I brag about developing my own apps 
while living in Airbnbs.” As Kyle Chaykya (2018) writes, “In the competitive 
freelance economy, geographic mobility has become a superficial sign of both 
success and creative freedom: the ability to do anything, anywhere, at any time.” 
For digital nomads, location independence is often enabled by a phenomenon 
that digital nomad “guru” Timothy Ferris, popularized as “geoarbitrage.” This refers 
to geographic arbitrage, which offers a spatial dimension to the financial concept of 
arbitrage, in which commodities and labor are bought and sold in different markets or 
derivative forms to take advantage of better prices. While geoarbitrage effectively 
expanded post-Bretton Woods with the end of the Gold Standard era, with speculators 
deriving new tactics of profit and extraction, in more recent it has been adopted by 
lifestyle migrants (Hayes 2014, 1954). “Digital Gypsy” James Taylor, for instance, 
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uses outsourced labor platforms like Elance and ODesk to accumulate money in his 
bank account while he sleeps. 
While geoarbitrage is real, and in the case of digital nomadism, undoubtedly 
linked to fantasies and materialities of location independence, there are more than 
simply capital calculations that determine where digital nomads land. As scholars of 
racial capitalism argue, the spatial inheres the racial, and one cannot theorize the 
contours of what Harvey terms “accumulation by dispossession” (2003) without also 
centering how racism has always informed the workings of capital (Chakravartty and 
Silva 2012). As Gaurav Jashnani, Priscilla Bustamante, and Brett Stoudt suggest 
(2017), processes of racial dispossession in gentrifying contexts are best understood 
as “dispossession by accumulation.” Thus, dispossession itself is accumulative, 
stockpiling up histories of racialized acts of eviction, containment, and expulsion. By 
inversing Harvey’s formula, here they suggest that not only does wealth accumulate 
by expropriating people and land, but that dispossession too is cumulative. Put 
otherwise, displacement is not a one-time event that dispossesses one person or entity 
so that another can profit; profit inheres multiple displacements, all with multiple 
temporalities and geographies that coalesce in particular spatiotemporal conjectures. 
Double dispossession is one form of accumulative dispossession, in which allegorical 
and material dispossessive histories compile and grow. It takes an interdisciplinary 
approach to understand this layering, one attentive to entangled rather than only 
comparative histories and geographies. 
Further, as Megan Moodie and Lisa Rofel write, in postsocialist contexts, 
Harvey’s understanding of the production of privatization and accumulation in times 
59  
of neoliberalism often elides unique postsocialist rearrangements of blurred private 
and public domains (forthcoming). This is certainly the case in Romania, where what 
was nationalized housing, infrastructure, and factories are now being re/privatized, 
while “social housing” is being crafted by municipalities along with Norwegian 
NGOs and Christian charities in public waste sites. Reading across sites and genres, 
while connecting the past with present, illuminates the raciality of double 
dispossession in postsocialist contexts and its particular, rather than random, 
geographies. 
In Cluj, double dispossession transpires through the accumulation of racist 
histories and fantasies. Other racial histories undergird the Siliconization of Cluj and 
the new contradictions of mobility that such processes inhere. Further, it is necessary 
to merge the practice of urban study with the practice of reading fantasy and desire 
(McElroy and Szeto 2018; Tadiar 2009). Doing so aligns with Arjun Appadurai’s 
understanding that technoscapes cannot be understood without attending to imaginary 
worlds and the irregularities that inform in their transits (2000). As he observes, work 
outside of the confines of traditional social sciences is often requisite. For instance, 
performing a “case study” in order to map the landing of digital nomads in Cluj 
would not likely brush up against a study of racial banishment to the maidane. Likely 
neither would consider the dreams and imaginaries of those willingly or unwillingly 
transiting from one locale to the next, and how such visions materialize uneven 
futures. 
 
Deracination 
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The temporality of the digital nomad is enabled by liberal ontologies of 
freedom tethered to property rights, yet seemingly exceeds Lockean and 
heteronormative articulations of the free property-owning subject. More important to 
the digital nomad is freedom of mobility—a freedom often paired with techno-
imperial speculative logics. As digital nomad Timothy Ferriss wrote in his 2009 
bestseller, The 4-Hour Workweek: Escape the 9-5, Live Anywhere and Join the New 
Rich: “$1,000,000 in the bank isn’t the fantasy. The fantasy is the lifestyle of 
complete freedom it supposedly allows” (13). In his words, the capitalist fantasy of 
property ownership has been displaced by techno-utopic desires of freedom. Yet this 
falls apart when studying colonial histories. To expand and control space, and to 
accumulate surplus value within it, colonial regimes have long privatized in the name 
of freedom (Lowe 2015). Otherwise put, mobility has long enabled the settlement of 
colonial regimes, materially, epistemologically, and ontologically. 
Historically, racial appropriation has been one technology of such coloniality, 
functioning through the deployment of reiterative stereotypes of the other, 
strategically disciplining and domesticating alterity. While digital nomads capitalize 
upon prior histories in Romania, they also appropriate the deracinated figure of “the 
Gypsy.” Racial appropriation has long functioned by deploying reiterative stereotypes 
of others, strategically deracinating, disciplining, and domesticating alterity. Jodi 
Byrd observes that appropriation of Indigenous lives in the US emerged as a colonial 
technology, in which Indigeneity became “a site through with the US empire orients 
and replicates itself” (2011, xiii). Put otherwise, appropriating Indigenous—and 
arguably also Romani—culture abets colonialism, much like land appropriation feeds 
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settler materiality (Asavei 2019). Critical of digital nomadism’s imperiality, Daniel 
Kay offers: 
 
Nomads like to talk about their enlightened lifestyles, but when it boils right 
down to it, we’re just a new breed of hipster. We appropriate places and lead 
trends, we go where life is cheap but hip, and we are a little bit in love with 
our own lives we have the economic potential to destroy communities.  
 
In this way, racial appropriation obviates Roma lifeworlds and contemporary realities. 
As Mihaela Drăgan, a Roma actress and playwright, admonishes of Roma 
personification in the arts and beyond: “We have an entire history of oppression and 
silencing, so no non-Roma artist has any right to represent us without asking us first” 
(quoted in Iancu 2017). 
The appropriation that Drăgan critiques (and that digital Gypsies embody) 
bears 19th-century Romantic Orientalist traces. This figure could transgress the 
borders of modernity, the nation-state, and private property. From Britain’s George 
Borrow to France’s Prosper Mérimée, from Germany’s Wilhelm Jensen to Russia’s 
Alexander Pushkin, 19th-century authors prolifically crafted stories of the fantastical 
wanderer. Frequently, these texts feature a white male protagonist who falls in love 
with a sexualized “Gypsy woman.” Often, he attempts miscegenation and life as 
Gypsy, but then realizes his dream’s impossibility, tragically murdering her. Most 
frequently written by authors whose countries were engaged in colonial projects, “the 
dark passionate Gypsy woman” and her death have been argued to allegorize 
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heteromasculine settler desire, as well as settler nostalgia for a pre-modernity (Lemon 
2000, 37). 
In Britain, 19th-century Gypsy novellas and poetry invoked a “national 
nomadology” (Duncan 1998, 382), in which the state allegorized its territorial 
expansion through the figure of the nomad. These works encode a nostalgic fantasy of 
pre-industrial landscapes and disengagement from modern life, mapping an imperial, 
open-range cartography. As the British John Clare characterized in his 1825 “The 
Gipseys Song,” Gypsies fantastically “pay no rent nor tax to none / But live untythd 
[sic] & free . . . In gipsey liberty” (1996, 52). This figure possesses the ability to 
transverse frontiers, find shelter in the dwindling commons, and evade paying rent 
and tax (resonant with contemporary sharing-economy endeavors), but also blends 
into the bucolic landscape, conceptualizing a country unscathed by the mechanization 
and boundedness of industrializing empire. Characterizing a nearby Gypsy camp, 
Clare journaled, “I thought the gipseys camp by the green wood side a picturesque 
and an adorning object to nature and I lovd [sic] the gipseys for the beautys [sic] 
which they added to the landscape” (ibid., 1985). Here, by signifying a premodern 
past and spatial transgression, the Gypsy stands in for British indigeneity and colonial 
expansion, mapping a new and contradictory understanding of national space and 
historicity. 
For instance, the protagonist of British George Borrow’s 1851 Lavengro and 
its 1857 sequel, The Romany Rye, is an Irish non-Roma scholar who performs the life 
of a Gypsy tinker, travelling with a band of Romani people upon English pathways. 
Borrow, a self-trained philologist, was fascinated by English Romanichals (Romani 
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people who migrated into Ireland and Britain as early as the 16th century) as well as 
Irish Travellers (semi-nomadic people indigenous to Ireland, many of whom migrated 
to England to escape British colonial and industrial forces). As the periphery to 
England and the British empire was in constant flux during this time, Borrow’s text 
recovers “an England deconstructed beyond ancestral Celts and Saxons, beyond a 
primordial Britain, into Gypsy origins, fastidiously unmapped in to secret margins 
and coverts, and the inner darkness of an unsettled, quasi-autistic self” (Duncan 1998, 
390). Thus, Borrow’s Gypsies, as Indo-European migrants untouched by modernity, 
are made the authentic carriers of Western civilization. While earlier British 
disfigurations falsely ascribed Romani origins as Egypt, hence the vernacular 
perversion “Gypsy,” Borrow also incorrectly ventures that Roma come from Rome— 
a Western imperial birthplace. As he writes, “I should not wonder after all . . . that 
these people had something to do with the founding of Rome. Rome, it is said, was 
built by vagabonds” (1991, 107). Nomadized imperial Rome thus becomes the 
centrifugal space of the timeless Gypsy, who, with a clairvoyant crystal-ball mythos, 
time-travels a premodern imperial myth into the historic present. As Toby Sonneman 
observes, “While romantic metaphors freeze the Gypsy image in the past, they 
contradictorily allow them a special vision into the future as well” (1999, 130). Not 
only are Gypsies free to wander beyond the spatial boundaries of empire, but also, 
they are endowed with the ability to detach from normative temporality, remaining 
fixed in the past while time-travelling into the future. 
As a movable (racial) figuration, the Romantic Orientalist Gypsy maps 
colonial desire—a desire that also transits between empires. For example, inspired by 
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Pushkin, in 1845, the French Prosper Mérimée composed Carmen, informed by 
Borrow’s fabrications (Lemon 2000). In the words of Mérimée, “You asked me the 
other day where I obtained my acquaintance with the dialect of the Gypsies. I got it 
from Mr. Borrow; his book is one of the most curious which I have read” (qtd. in 
Northup 1915, 143). Thus, the disfigured Gypsy depictions in Carmen were informed 
by transnational myths. Like Pushkin’s poem and Jensen’s text, the heterosexual 
desires for the untamed figure of Carmen in the poem represents colonial dreams; it 
was right before the novella’s conception that first Napoleon, and then 
Chateaubriand, occupied Spain, coinciding with Spain’s fading as a global power. 
José Colmeiro suggests that, as Spain became a less threatening imperial rival, it 
morphed into France’s submissive other, represented by the figure of the Gypsy 
(2002, 129): “Because exorcising the exotic other is ultimately a way for European 
bourgeois culture to exorcise its own demons,” he writes, “Carmen always must die” 
(ibid, 128). Yet within the novella, there endures a distinction between the Spaniards 
and Carmen/the Gypsies. This difference shows that even as Spain’s powers wane, 
Spaniards remained connected to the European body, unlike Carmen. 
Noteworthy here is that Carmen was created through a transnational fantasy 
spread by white men dreaming from the hearts of empire. Might the diffusion of 
digital nomadic fantasies be similarly operating, spread amongst Western 
technologists by blog rather than poem and play? Might this dissemination concretize 
techno-imperial imaginaries but also materialities? What has transformed between the 
scripting of these 19th-century texts and digital nomad blog posts of today? Perhaps 
there is something to be learned from the repeated murder of the sexualized and 
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racialized Gypsy and the imagined embodiment of the figure in contemporary 
technoculture. 
For instance, in the case of German Orientalism, which was informed by the 
solidification of the German Empire in 1871, textual forms utilize the Gypsy to 
consolidate German national identity. Wilhelm Jensen’s 1868 Die braune Erica, for 
instance, is narrated by a restless German natural scientist longing for exotic alterity. 
The text begins with the scientist desiring a rare plant, erica janthina, but as the text 
progresses, it is revealed that this plant in fact symbolizes the true object of his 
yearnings: A Gypsy woman who entices him to leave his settled life. Transfixed by 
Erica’s androgynous, racialized body, the professor murmurs her name in scientific 
language one night in his sleep, which she hears in her “natural language,” drawing 
her to him. Upon falling in love with him, she leads him to the rare and beautiful 
moor-dwelling heather that he had been searching for. When they arrive to the spot 
where the heather grows, Erica is bitten by an adder and falls ill. The scientist 
recognizes that despite his knowledge, he remains powerless to heal her. She accepts 
her death—not because of the bite, but because of impossibilities of miscegenation. 
When he reasserts his love for her, to his astonishment, she heals herself by applying 
the antitheses of modern scientific orthodoxy—a wild, ecstatic, and unending dance, 
which mysteriously cures her. Although they then marry and live a settled life on the 
margin of German territory, she eventually leaves him—an expression of the 
spontaneous and uncontrollable Gypsy spirit. This spirit is still lusted after by some 
scientists today. While digital nomads fantasize similar spatiotemporal transgression, 
there are important differences to be mapped. 
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Jensen does not posit Gypsies as possessing magic or chiromancy, but rather 
as a foil to the lack of freedom in scientific knowledge. Gypsies are not a threat to 
German ascendency, he infers, rendering them as dying and non-reproductive. As his 
scientist discovers, because of their nomadic ways, Gypsies have developed hybrid 
characteristics, like a maladapted species variant. Saul suggests that “they are a 
diaspora paradoxically without a homeland, adapted neither to their alienation (the 
Occident) nor their homeland (the Orient). They therefore cannot transmit their 
inheritance” (2007, 117). In this sense, Jensen pathologizes Roma to make them both 
intriguing and unthreatening to the longevity of the German Empire. Unlike Jensen, 
digital nomads and global technoculture alike understand technoscience not lacking in 
freedom, but saturated in it. The language of innovation and disruption ooze out of 
intimate digital nomad meetups and packed TED talks. In these cases, nomadism is 
both intriguing to and constitutive of techno-imperialism. 
Also distinct from their 19th-century predecessors, digital nomads and 
Gypsies have little reference for the human objects of their allegory. How many 
digital nomads know much about the racial dispossession that Roma culture bears? 
Not that Romantic Orientalists understood either, but there was at least a bit more 
geographic proximity. For instance, in Alexander Pushkin’s famous 1824 Orientalist 
poem “Tsygany (The Gypsies),” a non-Roma outlaw, Aleko, falls for a Gypsy 
woman, Zemfira, and the freedom that she embodies. The narrative arc parallels 
Jensen’s, as does its colonial influence. In his overlooked epilogue, Pushkin recounts 
that his inspirations to become Gypsy stemmed from his own brief encounters with 
Roma on the imperial frontier of newly acquired Moldovan lands. By cannoning and 
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cannibalizing Gypsy freedom, he charts imperial lust, racializing and sexualizing 
Roma. While Pushkin’s interactions with Roma were minimal, they are likely still 
more concrete than those of most digital nomads today. Thus, while the imperial 
fantasy is reflected in the former, distance and abstraction have rendered particular 
shifts. Today, the nomad is not something that one lusts after and kills; it is something 
that one already is. 
As a contradictory figure that both taunts settler desire yet remains fully 
irresolvable through the heterosexual, racialized logics of imperial reproduction, the 
Gypsy is repeatedly murdered within textual spaces—a death that represents the 
materiality of colonial landgrabs, but also the taboo of Gypsy-becoming. From the 
Gypsy’s death, different ghosts materialize. Today these specters reverberate within 
techno-imperial ontologies of location and time independence. The crystal ball of 
fantasy mythoi, coupled with perspicacious gaze of the extrasensory Gypsy, has 
migrated along the perambulations of Romantic imaginary into the present. 
Much as 19th-century writers allegorized imperial desires, digital nomads 
allegorize techno-imperialism. As Orientalist tales emerged from the heart of empire, 
so do those of today. In Kay’s words, “Digital nomads are unintentional pawns in a 
new wave of economic imperialism” (2015). Yet it is not tech entrepreneurs today 
lusting after and aspiring to become the nomad; they have already achieved this form, 
or so they claim. In a sense, their “Gypsyism” is both ontological, and comes about 
through practice. Digital nomadism thus highlights new geographies of dislocation 
and blurriness. 
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Questions of Comparativity6 
While nomadic fantasy is now being updated in the era of techno-imperialism, 
leading to contexts of racial technocapitalism in cities such as Cluj, gentrification 
scholarship often appears ill-equipped to map the upgrade. While, as a field, 
gentrification studies importantly charts contemporary dislocations and inequalities, it 
often fails to address the complex temporalities and fantasies upon with racial 
dispossession rests. Here I suggest that to map double dispossession and its routes, 
interdisciplinary approaches carves out new perspectives. 
This is not to disregard gentrification studies and its wider field of urban 
studies altogether. While I advocate for a connected approach to understand 
Siliconization processes, there is much to be learnt from how questions of comparison 
have animated debates in the social sciences over the last two decades. In recent 
years, urban studies scholars have attempted to make sense of new interurban 
connections across an emerging “world of cities” (Robinson 2011). Meanwhile, 
postcolonial urbanists have made great headway in contesting historically Anglo-
American geographies of theory (Bhan 2019; Roy 2017), which center certain 
Western European and US cities as the ground zero in comparative frameworks 
(Atkinson and Bridge 2005; Schafran 2014; Slater 2017). Informed by trends in 
postcolonial urban studies, new work has begun to center comparative work beyond a 
privileged constellation of “global cities” (Caldeira 2016; Hart 2006; Mbembe and 
Nuttall 2008), interrogating what Loretta Lees (2012) calls the “geography of 
gentrification.” 
Some of this work has begun to create nuanced accounts of how global flows 
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of capital come to matter through grounded histories and imaginaries, bolstering my 
own approach to theorizing Siliconization in postsocialist Cluj. Yet I remain attentive 
to a call made by Asher Ghertner that gentrification, as an analytic, may not pertain to 
“much of the world” experiencing racial dispossession and evictions (2015). This, he 
marks, is particularly true in the Global South and Global East, and in the in-between 
space of postsocialist Eastern Europe. 
Thinking from Siliconizing Cluj, here I share Ghertner’s concerns that the 
conceptual dominance of gentrification theory has caused it to become a “regulating 
fiction,” one that overwrites local understandings of racial/spatial politics (Robinson 
2002). As Silicon Valley imperialism and its nomadic avatars mold Cluj in novel 
ways, it is especially important to not only conceive of Siliconization through 
Western analytics and processes alone. There are deep histories of racism upon which 
contemporary forms of gentrification rest, locally but also transnationally. Ananya 
Roy suggests that “seeing from the South” does not mean producing knowledge from 
or about cities in the postcolonial world; instead, it means politicizing urban studies 
by continuously remaking it from its social and spatial margins, by studying “the 
crucible of racial capitalism on a global scale” (2018). Romania is not fully the South, 
but neither is it fully the North, East, or West. What does it mean to think from its 
interstitial geography, to see from it? 
For one, seeing from Romania necessitates deep engagement with temporality 
and dispossession. Time and displacement have everything to do with peripherality, 
complex relationships to the West, and with what Roy describes as “racial 
banishment.” Racial banishment, or processes in which subaltern people are pushed 
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to the far edges of urban life, invoke historically deep designations of racial 
disposability. It is upon these that contemporary neoliberalism rests, but that urban 
studies, as a field often is insufficient in understanding. Indeed, as recent work by 
Norbert Petrovici et al. argues, to understand anti-Roma racism in gentrifying cities 
such as Cluj, one must also attend to histories of Roma slavery (which lasted in 
Romania until 1856), subsequent 19th-century practices of serfdom and debt 
bondage, and modernization, industrialization, and agriculture – all of which fed 
earlier yet constitutive desires of Western capital (2019, 3-4). Roma labored and lived 
in pre-socialist Romania as doubly subjugated, racialized as surplus within a region 
read as exploitable by the West. The heterogeneous 20th-century project of state 
socialism in Romania in part sought to remedy this, and to combat the fascism of the 
mid-20th century which, in addition to Jewish people, sought to exterminate Roma 
(Achim 2004). While state socialism is now normatively read as pathologic, as a dark 
stain in Romania’s quest for modernity, its demise led to revisionist histories of 
racialized pre-socialist land and labor configurations. 
As Roy suggests, a framework of racial banishment is useful in understanding 
how evictions transpire, as well as how contemporary racial violence rests upon prior 
forms, from that of slavery to that of colonization (2017, A3). In her words, “If 
evictions are understood as an instantiation of racial banishment, then what is at stake 
is how the banished/dispossessed subject enacts a politics of property and how such 
struggles and claims inevitably entail a politics of personhood” (2017, A3). As such 
suggests, too often, housing struggles against dispossession enact what Libby Porter 
describes as “possessory politics,” in which ‘‘struggles against dispossession too 
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easily become struggles for possession” often through the assertion of rights (2014, 
3). Rather than possessory politics, how might struggles against dispossession enact a 
decolonial relationship to land, Roy asks. 
Racial banishment expels people to what Roy terms the “city’s end,” or a zone 
“constituted through mundane and individualized practices of property transactions 
and negotiations rather than spectacular processes of primitive accumulation” (2017, 
A3). By property transactions, she refers to the negotiations of space, ownership, and 
land that occur both on and off official registers. Roy’s formulation here hints at the 
limits of Harvey’s analytic of “accumulation by dispossession,” and perhaps more 
broadly of traditional Marxist understandings of gentrification saturating today’s 
urban studies. Instead, drawing upon scholars of racial capitalism, she invites other 
analytics that understand race and coloniality not as simply corollary with class, but 
as co-constitutive with it. For instance, once evicted to Pata Rât, residents are 
stigmatized not only as Roma, but also as literally living upon waste. This is a process 
of dispossession by the accumulation of racial property regimes.  
Understanding accumulative dispossession aligns with a growing push to 
move away from urban studies work that privileges class over race and 1960s-based 
Western urban displacement theory more broadly (Bledsoe and Wright 2018; Byrd et 
al. 2018). It also points towards the need to move beyond urban study’s disciplinary 
reliance upon sociology. Sociological traditions, while well-critiqued for positivism 
and the racist histories upon which they rest (Ferguson 2004), often maintain 
temporal myopias. These make it difficult to understand racial banishment as situated 
upon a thick palimpsest of racial capitalism. Clyde Woods, critical of social science 
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models that claim objectivity in their narrations of social death in US Black urban 
spaces, hopes that research might offer “new epistemologies, theories, methods, 
policies, programs, and plans” (2009, 448). For him, the social sciences are 
insufficient in theorizing communities impacted by urban neoliberalism, a 
phenomenon that sits upon a unique configuration of transatlantic slave trade and 
imperial legacies. What might new epistemologies look like in postsocialist Cluj, 
where deep local histories of anti-Roma racism collide with techno-imperial ones 
allegorized by the digital nomad? Instead of centering formal case studies and 
demographic statistics to determine what stage of gentrification an urban space might 
be in, what if instead one conducted an urban study from the city’s end, reading the 
space of the discard and debris of post-1989 techno-capitalism and Romantic 
Orientalism alike? This is not to deny the importance of also studying globalizing 
processes in comparative urban studies. Nor is it to deny that comparative studies are 
important in analyzing how neoliberalism differently plays out in various postsocialist 
contexts (Rofel 2019; Rofel and Moodie forthcoming). But is to supplement 
comparative approaches with those of inter-connection, refusing false reductions and 
simple metaphors. 
A connective rather than comparative approach helps theorize Silicon Valley 
imperialism, as well as what Matthew Hayes and Hila Zaban describe as transnational 
gentrification—or the gentrifying effects of “lifestyle migrations” (2019). While the 
gentrifying effects of digital nomadism in Cluj are real, they are discrepant within 
specific geographies, informed by inimitable contexts. Put otherwise, local contexts 
matter in scenarios of transnational gentrification. These are far from arbitrary, 
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having to do with prior property regimes, dispossessions, and technoscapes. Such 
historical contexts are connected to, yet distinct from, those of the West. Thus, a 
connected approach is aligned with work that studies technocultures from the South 
and East that interact with Silicon Valley fantasies and effects, but that remain 
irreducible to them (Amrute 2016; Chan 2013; Rai 2019; Švelch 2018). Unlike 
studies of globalization that track migration from the North to the South (Benson 
2015; Hayes 2014) and East, here I follow the trend of studies of digital nomads 
entering the complex space of Eastern Europe. Aligned with work critical of 1990s 
and 2000s cosmopolitanism and the neoliberal multiculturalism upon which it relied 
(Calhoun 2002; Spivak 2003), here I more directly look at global technoculture. 
 
Dispossession by Accumulation 
While the deracinated digital nomad drags former colonial histories into the 
Siliconizing present, in Cluj, it lands upon a palimpsest of anti-Roma racism. The 
mass eviction on Coastei Street that landed residents in the garbage dump isn’t the 
only case of IT and urban development being valorized at the expense of Cluj’s Roma 
communities. Instances such as this continually racially banish Roma to the maidane 
of postsocialist urban development. From the array of evictions in Mărăști 
surrounding the “rehabilitation” of socialist-era factories, to the development 
surrounding the tech company Endava near the Iulius Mall, it is clear that the 
development of office buildings and new residential spaces is on the rise, as are 
evictions. 
While displacement sometimes transpires so that new development can be 
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built, sometimes they are less direct—yet nevertheless real. For instance, there has 
been an ongoing eviction fight on Stephenson Street, right across from Liberty 
Technology Park, a space that brags about being “the first technological park in 
Romania, a park for creative ideas built in a revolutionary place designed to offer 
exceptional growth and quality environment for companies in the IT&C and R&D 
domains, all in one unique area both conceptually and architecturally” (Liberty 2018). 
Hosting tech companies from the German SIEMANS to the Austrian Impact 
Hub (the latter a well-regarded coworking space for digital nomads), as well as 
Romania’s own Spherik Accelerator, Liberty Technology Park galvanizes 
imaginaries of global IT success. Developed by the Swiss company Fribourg 
Development, the space champions innovation and entrepreneurship. Yet it is hardly 
new at all. Known as the Libertatea Furniture Factory during Communism, the 
building itself goes back much earlier, to 1870, when a Viennese craftsman had built 
pianos in the space. It was during Communism in the 1970s that residents moved in 
across the street, paying formal rents. Over time, the residents, mostly Roma, grew 
their families, and built informal structures. 
All was going relatively smoothly until Libertatea became Liberty in 2013. 
Suddenly, neighbors began calling the police on the Roma families who had been 
living there for decades, complaining about the laundry that they were hanging on 
their clotheslines outside. Washed as they were, the hanging clothes were rendered 
too unsightly for technofuturity. Meanwhile, rumors arose that Liberty Technology 
Park would soon be building a parking lot where the Roma were living.7 Clearly, 
differential understandings of mobility are wrapped up in postsocialist modernity in 
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Romania, where tech is given freedom of migration, but whereas Roma communities 
are forcibly pushed into the “exit zones of abandonment” (Tadiar 2007, 320). 
To better understand this process, in 2016, members of Căși, myself included, 
set out to create an interactive digital story-map, Dislocari: Rutele Evacuărilor spre 
strada Cantonului (1996-2016) / Dislocations: Eviction Routes to Cantonului Street 
(1996-2016). The map follows seven Roma residents, Ioanică, Leontina, Babi, Sandu, 
Ligia, Katalin and Gelu, all of whom have been multiply displaced, and who now 
reside in Pata Rât on Cantonului Street. There, in the maidane, 160 families live “fără 
număr,” or without official addresses. In each location on the map, residents share 
horror stories of banishment and gentrification. Some of their former homes have 
been bulldozed and redeveloped into IT offices; some have been razed and are now 
filled with a messy array of vegetation. For them, Cantonului Street is the end point 
of a longue durée of dislocation. 
In this section, I draw upon their stories to illustrate how racial banishment is 
haunted by former racial histories, such as the lack of post-1856 reparations. After 
slavery ended in Romania, numerous Roma migrated to Ukraine, Russia, Poland, and 
Western Europe (Achim 2013, 122-124). While many Westerners read them as a dark 
threat, others used them as inspiration for Orientalist tales of “Gypsy freedom.” Yet 
for those who remained in Romania, national racism accumulated. By the dawn of the 
20th century, most Roma still lacked property (Petrovici et al. 2019, 7). Positioned as 
“dangerous” for “the nation,” they were soon targeted for extermination by the 
Antonescu-led fascist regime. During this time, “nomadic” Roma were targeted for 
elimination before sedentary people (Petcuţ 2004). Thus, nomadism itself became a 
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racial signifier. 
Conversely, the Communist regime that afterwards came to power provided 
numerous Roma with labor-intensive jobs in heavy industry and agriculture, enabling 
upward social mobility (Petrovici et al. 2019, 7). Housing nationalization was part of 
a state effort to reduce housing inequality and under-occupied shelter. As many as 
241,068 dwellings were nationalized via Decree 92 (Florea and Dumitriu 2017, 193). 
After 1965, a series of laws regulated landlord and tenant relations and housing 
construction, interpreting housing as a field of consumption rather than production 
(Vincze 2017). During the late 1970s and 1980s, numerous Roma were moved into 
poor-quality nationalized buildings in city centers (Lancione 2018, 4). Thus, although 
racism endured throughout socialism, at least housing was provided. 
Everything changed after 1989. While laws enabled “sitting tenants” in 
buildings constructed during socialism to purchase their state-owned homes (Chelcea 
et al. 2015), things were quite different for tenants in nationalized properties, many of 
whom were Roma. A series of property restitution laws were written in the name of 
“transitional justice” (Law 112/1995 and its corrective Law 10/2001), which enabled 
the redistribution of nationalized homes to pre-socialist heirs. Incentivized by pre-and 
post-accession EU and Bretton Woods initiatives, restitution has been morally 
justified by reading socialism as a dark stain in national history. Over 202,000 court 
cases have been filed to date (Florea and Dumitriu 2017, 196). 
During this transitional period, urban planning was transferred from the state 
to local municipalities, the latter not provided incentive for social housing 
development. While 30 percent of the country’s housing stock was nationalized 
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during socialism, less than two percent of housing is public today (Vincze 2017). In 
Cluj, planning laws have changed at least sixteen times over the last thirty years, an 
urban planner described over coffee one 2018 summer afternoon after a new eviction 
in Mărăști. Often the city incorporates the private sector through the language of 
“participation,” but this only incentivizes gentrification, he sighed. “The City Hall is 
just using Pata Rât as its social housing; there is no incentive to provide anything 
else.” And, because the Antonia-owning mayor maintains a 70 percent approval 
rating, he can do as he pleases. Yet as Enikö Vincze—co-founder of Căși and co-
producer of Dislocari—notes, it was the prior mayor, Gheorghe Funar, who “created 
a favourable space for capital accumulation in the hands of local entrepreneurs 
without completely excluding foreigners” (Vincze 2017, 41). Between 1990 and 
2004, Funar averted regulations, preparing “the ground for the further development of 
Cluj – under neoliberal governance – as an entrepreneurial city or a ‘competitive 
city’” (ibid., 42). City centers, once rendered derelict, have now become sites of IT 
development, creative capital, and digital nomads, much to the horror of those 
racially banished, as participants in Dislocari describe. 
Ioanică, featured in Dislocari, lived on Turzii Street in the early 1990s, in a 
former state-owned building. Numerous Roma families were legally living there, 
most of whom were working in nearby factories, such as Clujana and Carbochim. 
Ioanică, now middle-aged, had been a streetcleaner. But his building was not 
maintained, and one day, he “woke up with the ceiling on the floor.” Rather than 
repair the building, which today remains an empty lot, the city moved Ioanică and his 
family to Croitorilor Street. The new apartment was nice, but soon, a man living in a 
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different city claimed it through restitution and evicted them without compensation. 
Similarly, Ligia, also featured in Dislocari, received a restitution notice on Eroilor 
Street in 2011, although her contract was good until 2014. She had been paying rent 
on time, but the new owners wanted hundreds of euro a month, which she could not 
afford. “So, they threw us out on the streets – we had no other choice,” she explains. 
“I asked how is this possible, and they said it was because these were their houses, 
and they wanted them back.” 
Not only was housing privatized; so too were nationalized factories. In 1999 
and 2000, the PSAL II act and national privatization strategy were adopted, 
privatizing and outsourcing large state-owned companies, including computer 
factories (Vincze 2017). Unbeknownst to many who now equate technological 
modernity with the West, Romanian maintained a rich IT history of computation, 
informatics, and cybernetics throughout socialism. After socialism, firms such as 
IBM and Hewlett Packard rushed in, eager to take advantage of the specialized 
workforce. Soon it was determined the land upon which factories sat was worth more 
than the factories themselves. Numerous IT workers who I’ve spoken with lost their 
jobs, as did workers from other privatized factories and laborers in heavy industry and 
agriculture, many of whom were Roma. 
As in post-industrial gentrifying Western cities (Zukin and Braslow 2011), 
former Romanian factories have become havens for creative capital. However, former 
residential units have also been transformed into offices. For instance, up the hill 
from Cantonului is a new Roma community, forced to Pata Rât in 2010 after the 
Finnish IT company Nokia speculated upon their Coastei Street homes to build an 
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office building. While Nokia soon after abandoned Cluj and migrated to China, where 
new tax breaks awaited their “nomadic” branch, the displaced residents remain, to 
date, stranded in the maidane. Meanwhile, the IT sector continues to be the largest 
driver of office development in Romania, most of which is foreign. IT generated 44 
percent of all leasing activity in 2017, indexing 80 percent annual growth (Colliers 
International, 2018 18). While coworking spaces (preferred by digital nomads) only 
take up 1 percent of office stock, 10 percent growth is anticipated over the next five 
years (ibid., 18). 
Ioanică’s former home now functions as a pharmacy, and the rest of the area 
has been converted to IT buildings. As he questions: 
 
I have no idea why more office buildings are built for companies, and not 
apartments for people. Years have gone by, and now you wake up with so 
many offices for rich people. The authorities care about one thing—to evict 
people without legal documents so that they can reclaim buildings, pushing 
people to the outskirts of the city.  
 
While the IT buildings that Ioanică speaks of are not necessarily for digital nomads 
alone, they do support the nomadism of Western tech companies to Cluj, a migration 
that often is accompanied by an influx of digital nomads and tourists (as I 
contextualize in the following section). 
Ioanică’s narrative is one of many critical of post-1989 socioeconomic shifts. 
Today, Romania maintains one of the EU’s highest poverty rates, with 37 percent of 
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its declining population of 19.6 million people experiencing poverty or social 
exclusion (Eurostat 2017; World Bank 2018). According to the UN, between 2007 
and 2015, after Syria, more people emigrated from Romania than any other nation 
(Alexe 2018). While the number of wage earners in formal and informal sectors 
decreased dramatically during socialism’s decline, the trend continued for the decades 
after, mostly attributed to migration to the West. In Cluj, the number of employees in 
2010 was 73 percent of what it had been in 1990 (Petrovici 2019, 41). Between 1991 
and 2011, the ratio of those who remained versus those who emigrated was 13 
percent for non-Roma, and 32 percent for Roma (ibid., 51), revealing racialized 
precarity within the city. 
But these statistics do not reveal the entire picture; the language of 
percentages can never fully describe the day-to-day horrors of racial banishment. For 
instance, after being evicted from Croitorilor, Ioanică moved to “the NATO block.” 
His building was smoky and derelict, and the ground floor was full of garbage and 
animals. “No one picked up the garbage because the people living here were Roma,” 
he explains. “The children named this block NATO. It was back when our country 
got into NATO, and we said, okay, this is the NATO block.” While entry into NATO 
and the EU has been heralded by anticommunists as progress, in the NATO block, 
residents lacked running water, electricity, and toilets. There, they formulated their 
own critiques of EU accession and its false promises, most prominently by naming 
the block NATO. “Instead of electricity, we used candles. We made fire with wood. It 
was very smoky. Some people had jobs, some people were picking up garbage, 
exactly as it is now,” Ioanică laments, referencing the informal labor that many in 
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Pata Rât partake in. Recalling Christmas, he recollects looking out from glassless 
windows, enviously watching people in other buildings watch TV. “Some people had 
cassette players, we had food, and used candles for light. Or we connected a small 
bulb to the car battery.” All of this in the burgeoning Silicon Valley of Europe. 
Because NATO residents had no formal contracts, the military police began 
raiding the block. While many in Cluj presume that Roma reside in Pata Rât because 
of poverty, Ioanică argues that instead he landed there because the City Hall never 
offered his community guidance on how to apply for social housing. Today he 
remains in Pata Rât with his two adolescent daughters, crammed into a sixteen-
square-meter barrack. Cantonului lacks a sewage system and only has two water 
hydrants. Many people don’t have electricity. In 2015, the community was granted 
two portable toilets, but before that, people had to use the train tracks. Meanwhile, the 
City Hall refuses to pick up their garbage, citing technicalities. As Leontina, also 
featured in Dislocari, bemoans: 
 
They didn’t bring us toilets, they didn’t bring garbage containers, they didn’t 
care about us. As if we were already dead, and they already put us under the 
ground, and that’s it. We were put in the garbage dump and that’s it. It’s 
worse for us than it is for the rats. 
 
For Leontina and others in the maidane of urban renewal, postsocialist transition and 
the influx of global capital has only meant heightened dispossession. That techno-
imperialism and its avatars fetishize nomadism simply adds insult to injury. 
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Techno-imperialism 
While neoliberalism preyed upon and destroyed socialist-era property and 
labor regimes, many middle-class Romanians nevertheless herald Western arrival, 
disavowing the socialist past. As the CEO of a software company articulated to me in 
the winter for 2017: Yes, 1989 was disastrous, but transition created new 
opportunities. “The multinationals, they really ended up saving us,” he proffered, 
suggesting that foreign investment was necessary for future development. While the 
IT percentage of Romania’s GDP is low today, the rate is steadily rising (Colliers 
International 2018, 7). 
In recent years, Cluj’s IT industry, not known to hire Roma, has upsized. 
According to a report by the Romanian IT recruitment agency, Brainspotting, the 
industry boasts over 20,000 companies, over 110,000 professionals, and up to 8,500 
annual graduates (2018, 1). In Cluj, one in three employees is a professional, and IT 
is the second largest sector. Yet exploitation abounds, with over 100,000 people in 
outsourcing (AT Kearny 2018, 14). As of 2016, foreign-owned companies generated 
40 percent of the country’s GDP, with up to 90 percent of banking owned by foreign 
capital (Ban 2016). According to Softech, a Cluj-based software development agency 
that provides outsourcing, the US and the UK are the top IT outsourcing countries, 
followed by Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, Switzerland, and then France (2017). 
Of IT graduates in Cluj, Google is the top desired employer, followed by Emerson, 
Endava, Bosch, and Microsoft (Brainspotting 2018, 6). 
As Cluj becomes Siliconized, its residential market has topped Bucharest’s. 
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This process has been accompanied by an influx of Western tourists, some of whom 
identify as digital nomads, many of whom become imbricated in processes of 
gentrification. This correlates with Cócola-Gant’s argument (2018) that gentrifying 
areas frequently become the objects of tourism consumption, so that gentrification 
and touristification become entwined in a cyclical loop. It further aligns with 
Gentile’s observation (2015, 139) that in Eastern European cities, gentrification was 
induced first by the closing of functional gaps and then by the migration of wealthy 
expat populations. Indeed, prior to 2008, “gentrifiers” in Romanian cities were mostly 
tied to local scenarios; after, they became imbricated in international dynamics 
(Chelcea et al. 2015, 127). These entangle with former racialized property histories. 
Digital nomads often find Romania attractive because of its technological 
prowess, Western firms, anticommunist values, English fluency, cheap housing, and 
exploitable labor. Citing Romania’s fast internet alongside its emergent EU status, the 
Nomad Capital website brags, “Romania is one of the top countries in Europe to find 
outsourced labor on sites like Odesk, and you should be able to easily find relatively 
qualified technical gurus for as little as several hundred dollars a month” (Henderson, 
2013). The Transylvania Hostel (2018) ranks the best wi-fi in coffee shops for digital 
nomads, describing Cluj as a “cheap destination for digital nomads who look for quiet 
places where they can sneak-in with their laptops and work on their revolutionary 
ideas.” 
Like fast wi-fi, digital nomads celebrate the availability of Airbnb 
accommodations and Uber transit. As one blogged, “The fact that we also landed a 
kick-ass Airbnb rental obviously helped us feel at home” (Backpack Me, 2017). Thus, 
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the more Romania Siliconizes, the more desirable it becomes for digital nomads. As 
has been observed in cities worldwide, the adoption of San Francisco startups Airbnb 
and Uber often sparks tourism gentrification. The tour guide Lonely Planet ranked 
Transylvania as the top “region” of 2016, promising: “Yes, horses and carts still 
rumble through the wooded countryside, but they’ll soon share the roads with Uber 
cabs ferrying visitors to chic Airbnb lodgings” (2015). 
In Romania, Uber usage not only enforces Siliconization, but also racism. As 
a French digital nomad developer blogs, “Before I arrived, I was told I would be 
chased by beggars and if I survived, all my belongings would be stolen by thiefs. The 
chief risk that you take by coming to Romania is to pay 5 times the real taxi fare. 
Before you learn how to spot a honest taxi, better use Uber” [sic] (Morin 2016). This 
fear of beggars and taxi drivers alike is rooted in classist and racist histories. Not only 
are many drivers Roma, but also, I’ve also heard countless tales of people losing their 
jobs after 1989, only to find refuge in taxi driving. For instance, Ion, trained to be an 
engineer during socialism. The industry shrunk after 1989 and he could not find 
work, igniting a deep depression. Today, Ion drives taxis by night, and watches 
pirated movies by day, barely able to afford food. Uber entered Bucharest in 2015, 
and Cluj in 2016. As of 2017, there were at least 250,000 users in the country 
(Romania Insider 2017). In 2018, it launched the food delivery service Uber Eats. 
There have been numerous protests by taxi drivers in Bucharest and Cluj, and 
even lawsuits, as there have been worldwide, from Barcelona to San Francisco. 
Nevertheless, Uber, itself a digital nomad of sorts, continues to prey upon tourists and 
local aspirational culture of Western recognition. Meanwhile, Romania’s own taxi 
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app, Clever Taxi, which allows users to hail taxis with smartphones, was acquired by 
a German company in 2017. When questioned, several digital nomads told me that 
they prefer Uber to Clever Taxi, particularly as one can order rides from airports 
without having to exchange currency. I’ve also heard Romanian developers laud its 
Western origins and integration with Google Maps. This falls in line with a longer 
postsocialist trajectory of using tourism and IT to affirm Western values. As Light 
observes (2001, 1057-1058), beginning in mid-1990s, Romania began disavowing its 
socialist past through tourism, “re-imaging” the country as “‘reborn’, ‘free’ and 
having shaken off its totalitarian past.” As underground technoculture was also 
endemic to both late socialism and postsocialist transition and often pathologized by 
the West, the celebration of Western technological tourism reifies anticommunism 
within and beyond Romania. 
Romania’s portrayal as both safe and exotic, as freed from its aberrant past 
and yet not fully Western, appeals to nomadic fantasy. During the winter of 2018, I 
sat down in a fancy coffee shop with a German digital nomad, Fabian, who founded a 
geospatial data firm in 2007 in Cluj, which has since expanded to San Francisco, 
Detroit, Berlin, and China. As he sipped a green tea latte, he described Cluj’s appeal. 
After college, he began dabbling in Berlin politics, but found it boring. He then 
realized that the one thing that would never bore him was entrepreneurship. Attracted 
to the “the wild east of Europe,” he considered Romania, Bulgaria, and the Ukraine. It 
became a tossup between Cluj and Sofia, as he wanted to remain in the EU and as 
Bucharest was “too political.” Cluj won because of its cheap Berlin flights. While his 
employees didn’t earn much at first, now they make three times as much as doctors in 
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the region, competing within an international market. His international travels are 
nonstop, and he even owns an apartment in San Francisco that he rarely visits. It’s a 
great life, but he’s thinking of selling his share and starting something new soon, just 
for fun. 
While Fabian’s office sits in a new IT tower called The Office (formerly a 
textiles factory), other digital nomads prefer cafes or coworking spaces. In the latter, 
Western entrepreneurs often lead trainings on project acceleration and incubation, 
while Western firms sponsor events such as Tech Fest, Techsylvania, 
StartupTransilvania, TEDxCluj, sponsored by Western firms. There are at least 
twenty-one coworking spaces in Romania today, mostly in Bucharest and Cluj. 
In the summer of 2016, I attempted to attend a “mingler” party in the 
coworking space, ClujHub, hoping to learn more. I already knew some of its nomads, 
such as Victor, who travels to Berlin weekly. He believes that IT is big in Romania 
because of foreign language skills, a sentiment often attributed to the influx of un-
dubbed US television in the 1990s. As television was restricted to state channels 
during socialism (although people often pirated neighboring countries’ stations), after 
1989, numerous people become obsessed with suddenly available programming, he 
explained. There was also the IT manager Danny, who grew up in London and works 
for a London-based company. With Brexit, he imagines nomads migrating from UK 
to Silicon Valley companies. Andre, who works for a Cluj startup partnered with a 
German Microsoft-funded company, builds smart home security devices. It is gaining 
popularity in the West “with this new immigrant problem,” he explained, failing to 
acknowledge that, especially since Romania’s 2007 EU accession, many of these 
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immigrants are Romanian Roma. 
My roommate, curious about ClujHub, decided to attend the event with me. 
But when we arrived, we were greeted by a 50 lei fee ($12 USD). While for 
Westerners, this isn’t much, for my roommate, it was laughable. “On a normal Cluj 
salary, that’s ridiculous. Most people could buy all the food that they needed for a 
week on that. It’s extreme,” she scoffed. Thus, we changed course for Fabrica de 
Pensule, a collective art space (once a paintbrush factory), which, over the last year, 
has been partly displaced by tech companies, aligned with classic gentrification 
teleology. Rather than a hefty fee, there we were greeted by a multimedia piece 
curated by Claudiu Lazăr, “?uropa’|‘?urope.” The piece highlighted the hostility that 
Eastern Europeans encounter when migrating west. This is only more extreme for 
Roma, as was the case during the 19th century. Yet, when Westerners migrate 
eastward, particularly digital nomads, they incite rather than face dispossession. This 
process is haunted by former imperial trajectories, aligned with other postsocialist 
technologies of installing Western dependence. Specifically, in times of postsocialist 
techno-imperialism, dispossession of home and identity are collapsed as Western 
nomads arrive. 
As Lazăr’s work evidences, when Eastern Europeans migrate to the West, 
they are treated as dangerous contaminants to Western purity, especially if they are 
Roma. But when Western Europeans migrate to the East, they enact new forms of 
transnational gentrification that then incites migration with dispossessive effects—
effects that lead many Romanians, particularly Roma, to move abroad and send 
money back home. For instance, my friend Marian, Roma and fluent in over a dozen 
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languages but unable to find steady work in Bucharest due to racism, sat down with 
me one sweltering August summer in an air-conditioned McDonalds café to describe 
his recent visit to France. He had been traveling there often, not because he enjoys 
traveling and the freedom that Romania’s EU accession offers, but because there are 
camps on the outskirts of Paris where he can work and make a bit of money, even 
though life there “is like hell,” lacking toilets, food, everything. And, there, he 
describes, he encounters not only anti-Roma racism but also anti-Eastern 
Europeanness, together miring him a bricolage of subhumanity. Being Romani from 
Eastern Europe is in itself, he describes, “a double crime.” But he went because he 
was able to take advantage of a racist French policy, whereby the government was 
giving Roma 100 euro if they would return East. He made the trip a few times that 
summer, but he was always relieved to return home. Although Roma, he, like 
hundreds of people with whom I’ve shared cheap European airplane flights to and 
from Bucharest, is far from a digital nomad or lifestyle migrant. Yet always scattered 
on these plane rides are also tourists, entrepreneurs, and digital nomads. Unlike 
Marian, they are driven by the mobility of IT capital rather than precarity, racism, and 
sheer survival. 
 
Thinking from the Maidane 
In his studies of “sekend-hend” Eastern Europe, Wlad Godzich argues that 
while Western imaginaries position the East as backwards, much of Western 
modernity is in fact based upon prior Eastern histories (2014). And yet, in Eastern 
Europe, the word “sekend-hend” is a distorted and imported term that when spoken 
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with Eastern European accents seems to ventriloquize foreign speech. However, “this 
voice does have authenticity, and the accent it proffers has primacy over the content 
of what it utters” (2014, 15). Otherwise put, Western Europe, and arguably also 
Silicon Valley, are second-hand projects, which sit upon Eastern European originary 
pasts. In the case of double dispossession, anti-Roma racism within 19th-century 
Romania led to numerous Roma residents migrating Western Europe. There, they 
encountered new forms of racism, including Gypsy fetishization. State socialism 
sought mitigate interwar fascism in the mid-20th century. The demise of state 
socialism has led to the reinterpretation of pre-socialist anti-Roma racism once more, 
justified in the name of transitional justice. Socialism’s demise has also incited the 
Western devouring of socialist-era IT infrastructure and techno-urban histories. 
Today, the arrival of the digital nomad in Cluj cannibalizes and enhances these 
histories in one fell swoop. Continuing, Godzich writes, “This may seem to be a 
meager consolation in a landscape of such desolation, but recycling requires that one 
wanders around dumps” (2014, 15). Disinterring the allegorical and material roots of 
digital nomadism from the dumps of the maidane sheds light on the constitution of 
double dispossession, as well as the formation of “sekend-hend” Europe. 
Yet, as Clyde Woods argues, there is more to do than simply render autopsies 
of racialized and subjugated lifeworlds (2002). In the wastelands of Pata Rât, there is 
more at work than simply survival alone. By only recording stories of death and 
dispossession, one obviates other futures, other iterations of leftover time that 
threaten the dominant end-of-history order. From work being done by Căși Sociale 
Acum to the analysis being produced in Cantonului barracks, other futures being 
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dreamt, all aimed to produce housing justice. On one hand, these degentrify the 
normative accounts of postsocialist end-of-times as being inevitable. On the other, 
they point to the need for epistemologies crafted outside of traditional urban studies. 
On the surface, it might appear that Cluj is indeed the new Silicon Valley of 
Europe, gentrifying much like its Western counterpart. While of course there are 
parallels, with rents rising and racialized evictions accumulating, there is more at 
work than simply replication. As the interconnected phenomena of racial banishment 
and appropriation reveals, racial histories haunt the materialities and allegories of 
techno-urban transformation. By reading across fields and narratives, and by thinking 
from the maidane, interconnection begins to crystalize. Digital nomadism is entwined 
with Orientalist onto-epistemologies built upon Roma slavery, failed reparations, and 
forced migration. Further, the Siliconization of Cluj rests upon prior techno-urban 
infrastructure and histories. Might it be a form of epistemological gentrification to 
only read Cluj as Silicon Valley, or to simply read material and allegorical 
dispossession as isolated phenomena? Rather, by reading across narratives, allegories, 
and routes of eviction and geoarbitrage alike, techno-imperialism and its Orientalist 
hauntings surface. These specters point to the need for a connected approach to 
theorizing material and allegorical dispossessions across time, space, and genre. 
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Chapter 2: Corrupting Techno-normativity in Postsocialist 
Romania: Queering Code and Computers 
 
Everyone is watching. It’s dark—it’s always dark—and Black is trying to 
escape unnoticed from the repressive regime that is socialist Romania. Black, a nuts 
and bolts factory worker, has to deceive guards, smuggle goods, and manipulate 
people—all without getting caught in the cold, industrial never-ending dystopia. 
Lonely, Black, a video game character in the Bucharest-based, Japanese-backed Sand 
Sailor Studio’s 2014 game Black the Fall, only has one friend—an abandoned robot. 
On screen, Black, a humanoid perhaps more machine than human himself, is hard to 
make out against rows of identical figures, either bicycling to power the machine that 
was state-socialism or listening to the censored Radio Free Europe. As he sneaks past 
a sea of coffins arranged in a half-collapsing building, an overseer blocks a forgotten 
room filled with old portraits, a vestige from the good old pre-socialist days when 
Bucharest was the “Little Paris of the East” (also a time of fascism). But to the game 
designers, writing code in postsocialist Romania—now known as the “Silicon Valley 
of Europe”—this aristocratic era is a fond historical memory, of a time when kings 
still meant something—a time before socialism and its aftermaths corrupted promises 
of Western enlightenment; a time before the country was run by corrupt parties 
politicians likened in popular media (and in the game) to socialist zombie-robots, 
refusing to vacate what should be the clean, capitalist, and Siliconized present. In this 
way, postsocialist techno-urban aspirations of “Siliconization,” exemplified by the 
game, merge with those of pre-socialist “Parisization,” erasing the fact that during 
socialism and the post-1989 transitional period, Romania was a rich space of 
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technological development—above and below ground. In this way, the 
anticommunist game, appealing to a postsocialist generation, mobilizes contemporary 
digital technology to disavow the “illiberalism” of socialist technology and its corrupt 
aftermaths. Like other technocapitalist creations of postsocialist Romania, the game 
thus attempts to redo the 1989 revolution, this time to get it right, this time to finally 
delete socialism and its corrupt ghosts once and for all. 
Here I don’t explicitly focus on robots or games per se in Romania, at least 
not in a traditional sense. Rather, here I am invested in the games that humans play 
with technology to differentially manifest anticommunist Siliconized futures on one 
hand, and corrupt futurity on the other. As I suggest, since 1989, Romania has 
experienced a growth of Silicon Valley imperialism, a postsocialist temporal structure 
in which post-Cold War Silicon Valley’s futurity hinges upon the reproduction of 
Siliconized fantasies in intimate and global spaces alike. This has transformed techno-
urban horizons drastically, which are now peppered with tall glass IT towers and co-
working spaces replete with Google-like interiors, and Western sci-fi Astrofuturist 
imagery. Rents have gone up around tech centers, with corresponding racialized 
evictions, much like in California’s Silicon Valley. Meanwhile, mass urban protests 
known as the Light Revolution, largely supported by tech corporations and workers, 
use Western technology to disavow the socialist past and gain Western recognition. 
These protests too featured at the end of Black the Fall, aligning the game with a 
ballooning Silicon aspirational movement. 
However, there are technological pasts and presents that either do things 
unrecognizable to Silicon Valley imperialism, or that Silicon Valley imperialism 
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attempts to delete by coding them as illiberal and unproductive. Yet infrastructurally, 
as I go on to explore, Silicon Valley imperialism depends upon these corrupt 
materialities for its own reproduction. In Romania, Western firms today sit upon the 
ruins of socialist-era factories, many of which were part of socialism’s own techno-
futurism. Western-endorsed startups coopt local hackers and developers, taking 
advantage of the technological prowess and skills of those who came of age during 
the latter socialist period and its transitional aftermaths. 
Socialist Romania after all excelled at hardware production, hacking Western 
computer models to manufacture the most third-generation computers in the Eastern 
bloc after the Soviet Union, along with an array of fourth-generation microprocessor 
computers in the 1980s. During this time, and continuing into the post-1989 
transitional period, underground practices of cabling, software piracy, game creation, 
and hacking proliferated, as it did in other Eastern bloc spaces, such as Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia, and Poland (Jakić 2014; Wasiak 2014). To game the Iron Curtain 
was to spatiotemporally corrupt it, to fragment normative temporal and spatial 
boundaries. Such cyber deviancy was only amplified after 1989, when hacking and 
bootlegging became more widespread than state-sanctioned practices (Alberts and 
Oldenziel 2014).  
Generally this form of gaming espoused what is called șmecherie 
(cunningness or a sort of street-smart cleverness), along with a desire of gaming, 
hacking, and corrupting the spatiotemporality of Iron (now Silicon) Curtain 
(Fiscutean 2018; Švelch 2018). Often (but not only) associated with Roma manele 
(Roma popular music), șmecherie implies knowing how to work a space or situation 
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to one’s benefit. While it might incite the accumulation of wealth (sometimes by 
corrupting the rules of the game), șmecherie is also a performative, playful coding act 
and a form of postsocialist excess, bestowing value unrecognizable to the state and to 
Silicon Valley imperialism alike. While Western IT firms pathologize “dark” șmecher 
practices, at the same time, they coopt them to expand. 
In postsocialist Romania, Black’s robot friend is coded as clumsy, tired, and 
dark, nothing like the Siliconized clean, light technology of today, manufactured upon 
the ghosts of socialist factories and infrastructure. In this way, Silicon Valley 
imperialism, an updated version of Radio Free Europe, reproduces its future through 
techno-normativity, straightening temporally corrupt, șmecher cyberculture, while 
deleting memory of it. Techno-normativity inculcates what Elizabeth Freeman 
describes as “chrono-normativity” (2010), or the temporality that capitalism inheres 
to reproduce its futurity. It also builds upon what Liviu Chelcea and Oana Druță 
articulate as “zombie socialism” (2016), an anticommunist genre of historicity that 
understands socialism to be simultaneously aberrant and abhorrent. As Shannon 
Woodcock suggests, “Just as the homosexual is born into his/her closet and needs to 
develop in order to ‘come out’ into the world of heterosexuals, the ‘post-socialist’ 
East exists in Western capitalist discourse in order for EUrope to benevolently bestow 
recognition on its other” (2011, 66). This framework of recognition understands that 
to escape its socialist-era ghosts, Eastern Europe must become techno-normative. 
This can be seen in the cooptation and erasure of socialist and transitional technology, 
as well as in contemporary mass anticorruption “Light Revolution” urban protests 
that have galvanized urban centers since 2017 in Romania. These, supported by 
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Western corporations from IT firms and McDonalds alike, utilize Western technology 
and light to disavow the socialist past and claim an enlightened space in the Western 
geopolitical body (Atanasoski and McElroy 2018). Techno-normativity thus indexes 
postsocialist aspirations of becoming Western in ways that also fuel the labor and 
resource needs of the West. Because technology informed the project of socialism 
and its collapse (Petrovzsky and Țichindeleanu 2011), it is worth examining in the 
postsocialist Siliconized present—techno-normative and otherwise. 
While corruption in computer programming and data storage refers to 
processes in which errors and malware alike compromise data integrity and lead to 
system crashes, in postsocialist contexts, techno-normativity codes socialism and its 
remnants as corrupt. In this way, corruption and its divergent meanings can be 
understood as what Jaroslav Švelch describes as a “coding act,” or a way of writing 
code that refuses “the rules or fictions of the games” and the “runtime behavior of a 
program” (2018, xli)? By foregrounding computer corruption and its șmecher coding 
acts, here I posture that it might be possible to queer and corrupt techno-normative 
fictions of corruption.8 How might reading techno-fictions unrecognizable to Silicon 
Valley imperialism corrupt the techno-normativity it inheres? 
To engage in such a queer reading practice, both ethnographic and speculative 
work is requisite. By speculative, I draw upon Aimee Bahng’s theorization that while 
finance capitalism depends upon practices of extrapolation and fiction-writing, 
speculation can also be queered to create anti-capitalist futures. As she suggests, 
“Pursuing alternative technocultural origin myths also means rejecting the progress 
narrative that Enlightenment thought encourages” (2018, 11). Turning to postsocialist 
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contexts, one might ask, what other techno-futures might manifest if we are to take 
seriously the socialist robot of Black the Fall, along with its strange kinship to its 
humanoid friend? How might methods such as what Saidiya Hartman describes as 
“critical fabulation”—or the writing of speculative histories marked by violence and 
institutions on one hand, but also “desire and the want of something better”—remap 
postsocialist technoscapes (2018, 470)? 
By queering, and aligned with queer theory, here I diverge from reading 
queerness as a simple identarian code or sexuality descriptive (Barad 2015), but 
rather as a field of inquiry and set of interpretative strategies that helps elucidate the 
relationality of socialist and transitional technoculture. Aligned with Bogdan Popa’s 
theorization of queer postsocialist politics, queerness here “emerges from desires that 
constitute a surplus in relation to the normal circuit of exchange value” (2019, 30). In 
other words, queering illuminates the excess of cyber and computational coding acts 
that transpired outside official state histories and Cold War victory narratives. 
Queering thus means reading the socialist computers, robots, and cables that haunt the 
present, perverting techno-normative imaginaries of postsocialist “common time” of 
Silicon Valley (Starosta 2014, 2005). Neda Atanasoski and Kalindi Vora offer, 
“Postsocialism marks a queer temporality, one that does not reproduce its social order 
even as its revolutionary antithesis” (2018, 141). Continuing, “Resisting the 
revolutionary teleology of what was before, postsocialism creates space to work 
through ongoing legacies of socialisms in the present” (ibid., 141). Siliconization, like 
the common time of history’s end, can thereby be read as a heteronormative event, 
one that reproduces teleological dreams of Western becoming in ways that fuel the 
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labor and resource needs of the West, and one that gentrifies socialist-era techno 
imaginaries and their corrupt postsocialist reverberations. As I question, how can 
queering refuse to engage in socialist nostalgics, while at the same time offer a much-
needed lens through which one can understand techno-entanglements of the present? 
In what follows, I queer postsocialist technoculture by scavenging through the 
corrupted past, digging out dismembered computer parts, salvaging discarded 
magazines, hacking together futures past and yet-to-come unrecognizable by, and yet 
intimate with, Silicon Valley imperialism. By way of beginning, I introduce a 
speculative future past written against that of Black the Fall techno-normativity. 
Istorie (Nu) Se Repetă (History Will Not Repeat Itself), led by artists Veda Popovici 
and Mircea Nicolea, and implemented by dozens of collaborators, weaves together a 
future past from Romania’s transitional period that imagines technocultural worlds 
that could have, and still may, transpire. I use this a point of departure in exploring 
socialist and postsocialist technology, drawing upon archival and ethnographic 
material, ushering them into a new possible future coded against Silicon Valley 
imperialism and its techno-normative means of reproduction. 
 
Istorie (Nu) Se Repetă 
There are about a dozen of us hovering around a table in the Macaz Bar 
Cooperative in downtown Bucharest on Moșilor Street, which over the last year has 
been marked by an array of evictions, mostly targeting Roma communities. Veda 
Popovici and Mircea Nicolae are convening one of several workshops in which we, as 
participants, are tasked with devising objects that can be used to depict a future past 
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from Romania’s transitional period—one that could have happened, but that never 
did. As the artists describe their project: 
 
From darkness to light, from authoritarianism to freedom, from communism 
to capitalism—these form the greatest narrative of the recent period. This 
narrative casts collective experiences of solidarity and resistance in the 
footnote of history. The dreams and projections of the 1990s and 2000s, the 
post-revolutionary desires of a truly better world for all, remain buried under 
charity, minerals, and migration. In Istorie (Nu) Se Repetă, these are returning 
fragments and imperfections in the narrations of possible but lost worlds: 
feminist trade unions, radical movements, collaborative economic projects, 
information campaigns on dangers of the new capitalism (translated by 
author). 
 
Those of us at the table are familiar with the counterfactual stories that Popovici and 
Nicolae have already crafted. For instance, there is the Coop Bank and public 
information campaign entitled “Money is Not Made Through Work.” There is the 
Union of Women Workers of Romania, who occupied their Suveica factory who now 
own their own homes in Floarea Albă. There are the small shop owners at the Obor 
and Vitan Markets, unscathed by the “mallification” that marks 2018 gentrifying 
topographies. And the list goes on, filled with places and stories that could have been, 
but that never were. One of the tasks of this project is to imagine these pasts, and to 
dream them into different futures yet-to-come. As Alexis Lothian puts it in her 
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formulating of queer speculative futures, “The end of the world as we know it seems 
continually imminent. Yet we live in the debris of many ended worlds, whose 
inhabitants continue to live on” (2018, 2). 
At the table, we are discussing what new objects we as participants might 
create to materialize these other worlds. A few of us are excited about one future past 
space in particular: the building on Calea Victoriei that in the mid-1990s 
headquartered both the Roma rights organization, Romania Criss, and the LGBT 
organization, Accept. Then, these two groups did indeed share space, forging what 
could have been rich and sustained space of queer of color critique, had liberal NGO-
ization not severed them. But in Popovici and Nicolae’s future past, the two groups 
continue to grow together and stave off capitalism, building international solidarities 
and a Free School. At the workshop, we opt to draft a syllabus for the school. 
Amongst other topics, hacking should be included in the curriculum. As one 
participant offers, “Yes, we all learned computer programming during the 1990s, and 
before that during socialism. And everyone hacked or knew someone who did. What 
would have happened if hacking could have really kept Romania from getting 
swallowed up by global capital?” Indeed, how could hacking and șmecher cyber 
practices have prevented Silicon Valley from corrupting postsocialism? Why is it 
instead that socialist technology and its aftermaths are read as corrupt? 
 
Socialism and its Computers 
Technological development was a crucial part of the state socialist project in 
Romania, as it was in other Eastern bloc states. The figure of engineer itself was 
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understood as a cyborg of sorts, intended to propel the country into socialist 
modernity, while socialist projects of electrification and industrialization spread 
throughout the region. These projects did not inhere assimilatory drives into liberal 
democracy, but rather the sustenance of a dialectical post-Enlightenment future, one 
premised upon industrialization, urbanization, and centralization (Buck-Morss 2002). 
As with other industries, official computer development was techno-normative in 
relationship to the socialist state (which endeavored to use computers to centralize 
industry, agriculture, and informatics), yet deviant in relationship to the West. During 
this time, Romania successfully produced and exported numerous third and fourth 
generation computers, largely by hacking and altering Western models. Having 
spoken with computer scientists involved in these early endeavors today, nostalgia 
and wistfulness characterize their memories, as does a form of paternalism for having 
been the first or best at this or that. However, and more my focus here, less normative 
IT worlds coevolved with official ones, hiding in the closet of official state history. 
Following World War II, Stalin led the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc in 
abstaining from Western trade, forming a socialist economic bloc, COMECON. 
Based on mass industrialization, its goal was to eliminate reliance upon capitalist 
machinery and products, and to limit economic dependence upon the West. 
Industrialization, it was theorized, would also help the East recover from war. 
Romania, then led by Gheorghiu-Dej, supported the plan, and as archives have since 
revealed, he even claimed authorship of it, indicative of a form of paternalism 
saturating national state history, technopolitical and otherwise (Dragomir 2012). 
However, within a decade of the plan’s implementations, tensions grew 
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between the two countries. Moscow had intended for different COMECON countries 
to have economic specialties, and Romania’s was slated as agrarian per its 
longstanding peasant culture (Mureșan 2008). But with futurist visions of 
technological growth and collectivization as precondition for industrialization, 
Romania, rather than exist only as a food supplier to Soviet states, wanted to develop 
technology. Soon, people were moved into cities undergoing rapid development, 
while dormitories were built around new factories to house workers, the cyborgs of 
the socialist future.  
Romania’s first computers were part of an early socialist generation made 
both to further mathematical and scientific inquiry, and to and to improve techno-
urban centralization. In Cluj, the first computers, robots of a different variety, were 
aimed at improving sugar beet harvesting and optimizing public transportation 
timetables (Farkas et al. 1963; Popoviciu 1969). Scientists at the Atomic Physics 
Institute built Romania’s first computer in 1957, CIFA-1, making Romania the 
eleventh country to manufacture a computer. Having visited the Institute in Măgurele, 
a suburb outside of Bucharest—which today is in the process of creating Europe’s 
largest laser, ELI (Extreme Light Infrastructure)—it is clear that pride of past 
technological advances runs deep. Similar immodesty is written on the walls of other 
computer and mathematical institutes and buildings throughout the country, 
particularly in Cluj and Timişoara. After the development of CIFA-1, an array of 
models erupted, from MARICA, DACICC, and CET in Cluj to MECIPT in 
Timişoara. Over twenty-five official computer models were crafted during socialism, 
as Romania became the second largest producer of electronic computing systems in 
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the Communist bloc after the Soviet Union, exporting machines to China, 
Czechoslovakia, Germany, Poland, Syria, Egypt, and Iran (Baltac 2015). 
Vasile Baltac, one of the early makers of the MICEPT models, today is a 
professor at Bucharest’s National School of Political Science and Public 
Administration, and the CEO/cofounder of two software companies, Softnet.ro and 
Novatech SRL. These are headquartered in the same building on Calea Floreasca that 
centralized national computer research during socialism. On one cold winter day in 
2017, he met with me there, eager to share photographs and memories of times past, 
when he and his colleagues led some of the country’s most valorized technological 
missions. Unlike software company headquarters in Silicon Valley, the building is old 
and cracked, worn but filled with technological futures past and present, entangled in 
concrete and cables. 
It was in 1967, he recounted, that the government launched a program to 
promote computational industrial development and to introduce computers into the 
national economy, forming a Governmental Committee for Computers and Data 
Processing. Although third-generation computers were imported from the West, 
significantly, Romania successfully produced and exported its own. This was done by 
hacking and altering Western models. France offered Romania the license for its 
IRIS-50 medium-sized computers, a model that Romanians soon hacked, creating 
FELIX C-256. Baltac led the operation of creating an entire FELIX family, birthing 
numerous models and over 650 mainframes, including many HCs (home computers). 
While Ceauşescu determined HCs to contravene Party ideology, their manufacturing 
continued. While HCs such as PRAE and CoBra were manufactured as part of state 
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projects, others, as I go on to explore, were developed underground, largely based on 
cloning the Sinclair ZX Spectrum. These had to be plugged into TV monitors and 
used audio cassette tapes as external program memory.  
Bogdan is a retro-computing expert now trying to create a computer museum 
in Cluj. One rainy afternoon, we sat down in an old bar, and he told me about how 
every Thursday midnight during socialism, the TV station would stop broadcasting 
normal programming and would instead emit code. It sounded like a fax machine, he 
grinned. Bogdan’s brother would fight the family for use of the television during this 
time, so that he could record the code on one of his floppy disks plugged into his 
cloned computer. He would then spend the week decoding it. “It wasn’t some fancy 
key to some government secret—nothing like that. Sometimes it was just information 
about the airport, sometimes an announcement from a big shop, sometimes games and 
free software. This how we began to learn BASIC programming,” he smiled. His 
friends would come over to play the games, often meaning ten adolescents would 
hover around one computer, to the chagrin of his parents. “We were so bored with the 
limited TV station, and so this was something new and fun.” 
Despite extended support by the Communist regime for computer 
development, it was less enthusiastic about actual robots. At first, robotics 
development was supported, as it was thought that robots would abet rapid 
industrialization. Robotics workshops were established in universities, but after the 
Party leader, Nicolae Ceauşescu, visited one in Timișoara, he became worried that 
industrial robots might displace the working class. Soon after, the word “robot” was 
banished from the press (Kovacs 1991, 942). Nevertheless, the research continued, 
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supported by local authorities who decided to turn their heads. These researchers 
were just one of many dissident actors in the underground of a maverick state. Was 
the robot of Black the Fall an underground entity made despite the socialist state, and 
if so, what was its relationship with its friend, Black? 
 
Perverting the Perverse 
Donna Haraway suggests, “The main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that 
they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, not to 
mention state socialism. But illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to 
their origins. Their fathers, after all, are inessential” (1987, 293). Indeed, the cyborgs 
of state-socialism were informed by the conditions of the state, as well as the West, 
yet at the same time, they defied both. The state itself was read as deviant through 
Cold War optics, and even by the Soviet Union. But the state and the idea of the state 
were still there, relevant and yet at times, “inessential.” As I continue to explore, the 
most interesting human-non-human interactions during socialism and its aftermaths 
transpired beneath the surface of official state history, queering techno-normativity 
and paternalism together. 
Tibi, who now lives in the US, where he works in a software company, grew 
up in Bucharest in the 1980s, where he learned programming from his cloned 
Spectrum. The ZX Spectrum was built in Britain in 1982, and soon copied and 
produced throughout Eastern Europe. The 8-bit HC ran a BASIC interpreter, making 
it relatively easy to use as long as you had a TV set and an audiocassette for storage. 
“If you pressed ‘i’ it would be ‘if,’ ‘e’ it would be ‘else,’ so you could type BASIC 
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pretty quickly,” he recounts. Most people that he knew with computers had Spectrum 
clones. While the Party cloned the Spectrum to create the CoBra, these were 
enormously expensive and difficult to obtain, fomenting an underground of DIY 
hardware assemblage. University students in Bucharest’s Polytechnic University soon 
began to clone Spectrums themselves, producing an array of machines, all unique and 
made from spare and smuggled parts. “We always joked that more CoBras were built 
in the dormitories than in the factory” a programmer friend joked. 
While Tibi doesn’t remember where his family bought their computer, he does 
recall it being an unusual purchase. At the time CoBras cost 35,000 lei, about half the 
price of a Dacia car. Black market clones were much cheaper (and therefore popular), 
sometimes going for 12,000 lei. Tibi does remember having to buy Russian 
audiocassette tapes so that he could store information and load programs, since the 
computer lacked storage. Underground markets emerged, with people trading 
cassettes and parts. Rather than playing games like his peers, Tibi used these to learn 
software and new programming languages. “I remember that at one point I was using 
my computer to read a very precise scale that was measuring the input of a drop of 
water to show how it evaporates – even with 32k of memory,” he reminisced. Tibi 
joined his high school’s computer club, unofficially organized by two professors who 
were into computers—a physics professor and a Russian language professor. There 
was one computer class taught in his school, but it was very simple, based on 
FORTRAN, a fast and efficient computer language developed by IBM in the 1950s. 
“You can still see traces of the past today,” he explained, referencing how 
FORTRAN and BASIC are still used. Specters from Spectrum times. 
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Back in Bucharest, Polytechnic University students engendered all sorts of 
deviant computer practices. Mihai Moldovanu, cofounder and lead Linux developer 
of TFM Group Software, did. As part of the Polytechnic cloning world, he and other 
students leveraged resources to buy Cobra motherboards, and then began to build 
computers upon them, creating an entire supply chain. Sometimes parts were 
scrapped from other computers; sometimes they were flown in with the help of airline 
pilots. Dealers would come to campus with electronics, parts, LEDs, and resistors, 
selling them at bulk to the students. Often, they would meet at a nearby campus pub. 
There was even this guy they called “The American” who sold transistors right in 
front of legitimate electronics stores, somehow getting away with it. “He might sell 
you a bag of 100 LEDs and only three of them would work.” Soon, everyone at the 
university had these șmecher homemade machines, each made with about 2,000 
solder joints and a sea of wires. 
While much of Mihai’s knowledge was developed through practice, he also 
remembers watching a Bulgarian TV show that taught circuit building. He hacked it 
by using an analog antenna, often skipping school to do so. He would study 
everything aired, quickly taking notes since circuit schematics were only broadcast 
for a couple of seconds. Then he would close his eyes and draw based on memory. 
About 90 percent of the Romanian computer industry was built on reverse 
engineering, he explained. Mihai recalled that of the computers that they produced 
(probably more than were produced at the factory), no two were ever the same. Even 
their cases varied depending upon what was available on the black market. And the 
keyboards all contained keys polished one-at-a-time with a nail file, upon which 
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professional-looking paper letters and numbers were placed, thanks to a friend’s 
paper business. The purpose was to learn and to have fun, șmecherie, never to 
capitalize. 
Might these cloned computers, derived from British and Romanian parts alike, 
some stolen, some smuggled – also be some of the robots of the socialist period, 
thereby queering anticommunist narratives that see socialist robots simply as poor 
benign accomplices to Black the Fall dystopics? This Spectrum hybrid, a perversion 
to the West, was not produced by the West, nor by the socialist state. Its past is 
muddled and unattached to pure origin tales. Its futurity depended upon illicit 
connections, disassembled motherboards, and forbidden border crossings. And, 
further queering techno-normative reproduction tales, it gave rise to new postsocialist 
underground futures. 
 
Casting Mimicry 
Sitting around the table at the Istorie (Nu) Se Repetă workshop, participants 
began recounting stories of 1990s techno perversity. As some speculated, what if 
these could have staved off the dawn of post-1989 technocapitalism? “Can it still,” 
someone asked. “Is it too late?” questioned another. After all, postsocialist 
neoliberalism dramatically disrupted Romanian technoculture, leading to the 
disintegration of state projects. Everyday life too was recast through transition, from 
media consumption practices to employment opportunities and lack thereof. In this 
way, transition led to new forms of techno-normativity but also techno-deviancy at 
the same time. 
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The December 1989 revolution which paved the way for neoliberalism in 
Romania, the first revolution televised, was crafted by technology, and materialized 
different technological effects. The Romanian national television station aired the 
revolution, which was then broadcast across the world with various interpretations. In 
the US, coverage focused on the horrors of Communism, highlighting images of a 
mass grave in Timișoara now believed to have been staged for the media using bodies 
from a local cemetery (Borcila 2009, 69). By representing Romania as a victim site, 
Western media mapped a future of salvific intervention. But while the US maintained 
that the grave was real, it suggested that the revolution was staged, led by a new 
generation of Communists, thereby doubly justifying future US intervention in the 
name of anti-corruption (Petrovszky and Țichindeleanu 2011, 34). Meanwhile, some 
Romanians, glued to TVs airing the revolution and subsequent the execution of 
Ceaușescu, were imbued with a new political subjectivity of having participated in 
both. As a cooperative member of the Macaz Bar Coop, where Popovici and Nicolae 
are leading the Istorie (Nu) Se Repetă workshop, and who was only a child during the 
revolution explained, “There is still the trauma—we were all accomplices in murder. 
We all signed a social contract that there is no going back. Whatever came next, we 
had to embrace it, because we destroyed the past, or the legitimating element of it. 
The past crumbled.”  
Ceaușescu’s execution wasn’t actually live; there was a 15-minute delay in its 
screening (Ujică 2010). A sense of delay became the dominant narrative that both the 
West and Romania subsumed about Romania. Western media inculcation was one 
purported antidote. When asked what she remembers most about transition, my 
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roommate described, “People just started watching TV. Western TV. Or Romanian 
TV modeled on Western programming. But either way, TV was the truth teller.” She 
recounts watching MTV with her parents throughout the 1990s for six hours a day. 
Even though MTV has since “gone to shit,” her mother, now in her 60s, still 
watches it daily, and has a television in every room of her home. Meanwhile, her 
father, is obsessed with bootlegging. During the 1990s, he would go to the flea 
market to buy black market videos every weekend, which he would then arrange 
alphabetically in his home library. What is now the famous McDonalds in Piața Uniri 
(the first “Mac” to planted after socialism, in 1995) was once steeped in bootleg CD 
stands. Because many of the programs were un-subtitled, and because people were 
fascinated with the new world that had just opened up to them, viewers learned 
English quickly, and also some Spanish due to the abundance of telenovelas. In this 
way, the post-Cold War spectral encounter between the East and the West became an 
asymmetrical geographic interplay. McKenzie Wark observes, “The territory of the 
East was maintained as an image of the other within the map of the West; the map of 
the West was the other put into covert circulation in the territory of the East” (1994, 
65). And yet, the circulation of the West in the East produced complex frictions and 
effects. 
For instance, English proficiency, along with the abundance of socialist-
trained informatics workers, became an inspiration for Western firms looking to 
launch a new Eastern European outsourcing market post-1989. This offered 
opportunities to some, but most people I’ve spoken with recount having lost rather 
than gained employment in the 1990s, or of having pieced together an array of 
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undignified gigs. For instance, Monica, who worked as a highly-trained engineer 
throughout the 80s, lost her job after transition. She found a new one as an 
accountant, but the salary was too small, pummeling her into a deep depression. And 
she is no exception. In 1988, computer production was valued at 10 billion lei, but in 
1991, it sunk to 3 billion, with hardware production ceasing (Docaș 2015). Florin, 
founder of an IT company, recounts the number of IT workers dropping rapidly, and a 
Canadian firm extracting a whole team of 200 people. As factories crumbled, malls 
appeared. As small markets vanished, Mega Image and Carrefour hypermarkets 
manifested. Gambling venues too erupted in the 1990s, in chain venues such as 
MaxBet scattered throughout neighborhoods. Between 2003 and 2014, the number of 
slot machines quadrupled in Romania to 62,000. In 2016, it was estimated that of 
Romania’s 20 million people, at least 98,000 are “problem gamblers,” though experts 
suggest the number is really in the hundreds of thousands (Meseșan 2016). Today, no 
longer do people wait in queues, lines that many now recount as places of sociality; 
instead, they gamble earnings in the betting rooms, trying to win at a capitalist game 
rigged against them (O’Neill 2016). 
Claudiu, who works for a multinational in Sema Park adjacent to the 
Polytechnic University, has a father who had studied cybernetics at the university. His 
father had a good job during socialism, which he lost after his position was made 
obsolete by Western firms. He began driving taxis and working odd jobs, and now 
feels as if his entire education has been made obsolete. Claudiu studied economics in 
the UK in the 2000s, and then managed to come back and get a job for Hewlett 
Packard. Now he does technical writing for a different firm in Sema Park. Unlike 
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Pipera, where computers were manufactured during socialism, Sema Park was an 
agricultural industrial center. But today it lives as a strange mixture of high-tech glass 
towers and old socialist-era warehouses. There are still canteens that serve the same 
traditional Romanian food that they served to socialist agricultural workers, but now 
they’ve rebranded their exteriors with brick and glass, having changed their names to 
hipster-sounding titles, like “Cactus.” “They’re just doing what they have to keep 
up,” Claudiu tells me, pointing out a large empty lot behind one of them that reminds 
him of the spaciousness and heavy industrial ruins of the 1990s. “This is what 
everything was like in the 90s—I miss it.” He used to come here in high school to go 
clubbing, back when it was cheap, and they didn’t check IDs. There are also new food 
trucks that have come in, mostly selling burgers and coffee, and a fancy café inside 
the glass building where he works that oddly resembles a tropical botanical garden. 
There’s also a sports center and bowling alley, IDM, with a logo mimicking IBM’s. 
But it’s been there for a while, and, having bowled there myself with Macaz members 
on a New Year’s retreat, I can attest that is far from bourgeois inside.  
Later that evening, back in my apartment having returned from Sema Park, I 
see a sticker attached to a closet placed by my roommate, reading, “When You Think 
You’re Adidas, But You’re Really Just Adibas.” In Romanian, adidas simply means 
“sneakers,” regardless of the brand. An anarchist, feminist theater company in 
Chișinău, Moldova, known as the Spălătorie (“Laundry”), crafted the Adidas/Adibas 
sticker. As I recalled being told at the Spălătorie when I first visited it in the midst of 
an earlier bone-chilling winter, there has always been a simultaneous adoration and 
abhorrence for Western brands. Their taboo during socialism created a fetish, but 
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now, in postsocialist times, members of Macaz and the Spălătorie alike understand 
Western capitalism as a colonial force, one that instigates forms of self-colonization 
by instantiating ongoing desires of Western recognition. IDM and Adibas will never 
be IBM nor Adidas, yet the desire of inversing that pesky, corrupt character lingers 
on. 
Across the city from IDM is Pipera, the neighborhood of socialist-era 
computing and FELIX manufacturing. After 1989, FELIX found itself in a messy 
relationship with the actual IBM, erasing FELIX’s own hardware production. And 
yet, IBM’s strategy failed, at least at first, as they had to compete with a new 
underground market in which Romanians would assemble their own computers with 
uncertified IT parts from Hong Kong to Taiwan in small garages. Tibi recalls, “In the 
early 1990s, I was interested in building my own PC. It was cheaper. If you wanted to 
do an upgrade with some parts, it was cheaper to build your own. I was building for a 
couple of friends, even my brother.” These were desktops, so it was easy, he explains. 
Tibi also remembers one of the first commercials to be released on Romanian 
television after 1989. It was a FELIX computer commercial, one whose slogan went 
viral: “V-am prins, vrăjitoarelor! (I caught you, witches!)” It was everywhere,” he 
remembers. “Everyone knew it.” But what might it actually mean? People have 
different interpretations of the satiric commercial, which featured a man walking into 
a cave filled with witches preparing some potion for him. Were the witches FELIX 
makers crafting socialist-era machines now liberated by capitalism, or were they 
Americans now trapping corrupt Romanian computer-makers with their end-of-
history alchemy? Then again, as witches are gendered and racialized in popular 
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imaginaries in Romania, often invoking anti-Roma racism, might socialism itself be 
coded as Roma-affiliated in this commercial, suggesting that FELIX was now on a 
new Western journey away from its corrupt past (although, unknowingly, it was in 
fact on a journey of predation by the West). But on the other hand, perhaps the 
commercial acted as a prescient satire from the future, aware that that despite the 
West’s bests efforts, Romanian computer perversion would continue to flourish—
though maybe in internet cafes and computer labs instead of caves. 
Not even capitalism’s best efforts could undo Romanian cyber deviancy. Of 
course, the West did try to erase Romania’s technological proficiency, and according 
to its own narratives, it was victorious. It immediately crafted the narrative of a 
backwards Romania needing technological salvation, one that over time, people 
began to believe. Anna Tsing warns that speculative enterprises such as software 
companies must always sell possibility of economic growth to investors before 
actualization. “The more spectacular the conjuring, the more possible an investment 
frenzy,” she suggests (2000, 118). Not only companies, but also regions must conjure 
themselves as spaces for future investment in order to attract investment, she writes. 
Utterances of Romania’s claim to having “become” Europe’s Silicon Valley are in 
this way conjuring acts built on mimicry speculation rather than reflections of reality. 
For instance, in 1990, a New York Times article proclaimed Romania 
technologically backwards (Greenhouse 1990). According to a specialist based out of 
the Institute for Comparative Economic Studies in Vienna, Romania was exactly “20 
years behind,” as it still counted inventory and performed accounting manually 
(ibid.). In 1995, Malcolm Penn of the British thinktank, Future Horizons, gave a talk 
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in Romania, encouraging Romanians to embrace a new market opportunity, while 
also warning of some potential “Key Issues” in a PowerPoint slide, namely: “Lack Of 
Capitalist Culture/Work Ethic; and Jealousy Risk When Sense Of Envy—Overtakes 
Sense Of Entrepreneurialship” (1995, 11). In other words, Penn suggested that unless 
Romanians catch up to capitalist ontologies, failure will abound—failure linked to an 
infantile Communist ethos. As he continued in his PowerPoint: “Capitalism Is Not 
Perfect But, Like It Or Not, That Is The Way Of The World. The Challenge Is To 
Learn How To Exploit Its Benefits & Make It Work To Your Advantage. . . Just Like 
Everyone Else Has To!” (1995, 12). Thus, in one fell swoop, Penn erased the history 
of FELIX, positioning Romania as technologically behind due to its anti-capitalist 
history. In 2003, FELIX was privatized by special state order. Five days later, a board 
of directors with no computer background was established. The next year, roughly 
half of the factory’s shares were auctioned and divided into joint stocks. Some went 
bankrupt in 2006, selling land and buildings to real estate speculators who determined 
the 20,000 square meters upon which the factory sat worth more than the fabrica 
itself. 
Today, hackathons in coworking spaces still resemble Penn’s slideshow, 
inculcating Romanian tech workers with ideas that to compete and become better 
entrepreneurs, they must adopt Western ways. I have sat in on countless of these 
sessions, and often after a while, the whole thing becomes dizzying. A German 
CyberGhost entrepreneur delivers talks on the benefits of “geoarbitrage” in Romania, 
thanks to its cheap living costs, outsourcing, and technological prowess (as I describe 
in Chapter 1). “My company could never have succeeded had I gone to Silicon 
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Valley,” he exclaims. Romania is where it’s at. Then Uber’s Pierre-Dimitri Gore-
Coty arrives to Romania for the first time and delivers a talk on the need to innovate 
old industries in Bucharest’s TechHub to a room packed full of nicely dressed 
workers. “Bus stops are too analogue!” he excitingly exclaims, promoting Uber’s new 
driverless cars. Pizza is delivered and free coffee aroma seeps through the air. Two 
days later, there’s TechFest in Cluj and an array of talks on the Internet of Things 
(IoT). 
One man from a small Cluj-Berlin startup markets their new security IoT 
device, one that he boasts is becoming especially popular in Western Europe with 
“this new immigrant problem.” No one in the room seems to mind, or to consider that 
Romanians are often perceived by the West as part of this problem. He goes on about 
how the device can detect the gender of voices, so that if you are a woman and ask to 
watch a move, it will go through “chick-flick and rom-com” options first. Applause. 
But the security device, while produced in Romania, only recognizes English and 
German. More artisanal coffee. The code is not open source as they must run a 
business after all. I could be in San Francisco. But I’m in Cluj, in a new IT building, 
“The Office.” Sitting upon the ruins of a socialist-era textiles factory, one would be 
hard pressed to imagine the former mode of production in the now glimmering glass 
building. Rents have gone up around it, and the food court and wine bar underneath 
boast prices comparable with Silicon Valley. 
Yet, the salaries of “Office” IT workers are not comparable with those of 
Silicon Valley. But still, as Maria, an IT worker and self-described digital nomad 
from Brăila living in Cluj and working for a Florida startup, describes, “Sure, we’re 
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paid less, but I’m still making more than any of my friends, and I can travel to these 
digital nomad meetups and work from home.” But others are not so optimistic. 
Alexandra, who once was a programmer, now can’t find a job nor achieve freelancer 
status. Instead, she bemoans that IT companies are so behind the West in 
understanding proper management. She is now looking to leave the country and find a 
job in Western Europe, “anywhere but here.” Andrei, on the other hand likes the 
stability his job working for a Silicon Valley company while living in Bucharest with 
his friends, but he’s forced to work night shifts answering calls, and finds his moods 
altered due to lack of sleep. Many people that I’ve spoken with in tech articulate 
aspirations of working for bigger and better Silicon Valley companies, either in or 
beyond Romania. As Megan Moodie writes, aspiration and imaginaries of upward 
mobility, when studied ethnographically, often reveal how particular groups of people 
weather “transition from an era of state-backed protections to an era of contract 
labor” (2015, 17). For instance, Oracle, now in Pipera, nearby FELIX’s ghosts and 
witches, seems to be the end goal for those who wish to remain in Bucharest. And in 
Cluj, the objective is entrepreneurship, or maybe working for Endava, NTT Data, or 
one of the other large companies. Yet tech workers that I’ve spoken with in large 
companies articulate boredom at work, interpellating it just as only a job, attempting 
to sneak in YouTube videos on breaks between monotonous tasks. 
 
Specters of Spectrum 
But the story doesn’t end here. Despite the best spells cast by capitalism, the 
specters of the Spectrum clone haunt the present. This endurance, bypassed in 
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Siliconized narrative structures, continues to bolster, touch, and pervert zombie 
socialist historiography. While IBM 2.0 was wreaking havoc in FELIX worlds, Tibi, 
Mihai, and others continued to produce machines underground. Meanwhile an array 
of computer magazines began circulating, all saturated with computer construction 
manuals, software installation guidelines, code, and instructions in how to set up 
satellites and LAN networks. From backtracking methods to articles on virtual reality, 
techno-skepticism, and the phenomena of the hacker, magazines such as Open 
Tehnologia Informației and PC World Romania flourished in the 1990s, fomenting 
new IT counterpublics. 
Florentin, who now is part of an independent free and open source software 
and hardware project, Ceata, remembers learning to program and build computers 
from the magazine Extreme PC, which got big in the 2000s and had online chatrooms 
and support. Gabi, who learned how to code in school during a once-a-week, hour-
long class, remembers learning more relevant coding in these chatrooms. “Some of 
the chatrooms are still active today,” she told me, “and you can still buy the 
magazines online.” Meanwhile, apartments began setting up “decoders” to steal HBO 
otherwise not available on their networks. “It was this funny little device that we all 
had on the back of our televisions,” Alexandra remembers. If it broke, everyone knew 
someone who would come and set up another, she told me one day, as we were 
walking through a slightly overgrown park, headed back to the city center from a 
Jewish senior home on the outskirts of Bucharest where we had been volunteering. 
Other volunteers walking with us chimed in, remembering their decoders, 
unsuccessfully trying to recall when then appeared and disappeared.  
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In 2014, Romania’s piracy rate was twice that of the EU at 60 percent, but in 
1996 it was as high at 86 percent (Fiscutean 2014b). At the time, there was little 
legislation protecting intellectual property, and the software market developed 
accordingly. MS-DOS was the first pirated operating system in the 1990s, and then 
OS/2, and later Windows, via Russia. At first, pirated software was not sold for profit, 
which only began after inflation skyrocketed to 151 percent in 1997. Nevertheless, 
software piracy was understood as education, building collective knowledge about 
coding, algorithms, and open source products. Raj, from Râmnicu Vâlcea, or 
“Hackerville,” remembers a zillion internet cafes springing up overnight. “It was hard 
to get into them because they were so crowded,” he recalls. One of his neighbors 
invented a VPN to mask IP addresses, and soon everyone started paying him for 
VPNs so that they could hack from home. Raj remembers that often people would 
make money fast from some internet hack and then use the money to pay for personal 
manele concerts. 
Counterpublics such as these soon began stringing internet throughout cities 
on telephone poles, building the backbones of what is now Europe’s fastest 
connection. This wasn’t the experimental project of state socialism intended to 
improve central planning and economics; it was more of an organic decentralized 
chaos intended to connect and share information, music, movies, tools, games, and 
software amongst neighbors. Because internet dial-up packages were expensive at 
first, and given the intense poverty that post-transition incited, generally, one person 
would buy internet and then share or sell it to people in their block, wiring cables 
haphazardly. As people had already been pirating satellite stations and were relatively 
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familiar with cabling, and as the magazines and chatrooms taught wiring techniques, 
stringing cables across apartments and blocks of flats “was really no big deal,” I’ve 
been told. Today still, telephone poles, from Cluj to Bucharest, are adorned in a 
massive array of cables from the early 2000s era, some still working, some just there 
on because they are too woven in to detach. The first time I pointed these out to a 
friend visiting from the US, she asked if it was an art installation. And yet, as people 
are always quick to remind me, the cabling today is nothing compared to the early 
2000s, when it became common place for telephone poles to crash with the weight of 
the cables, sometimes smashing cars parked beneath. 
Alex helped set up one of the first networks in Bucharest in the 1990s. He had 
seen his friends get plugged in to an existent network, and for him, it felt like his 
entire life was about finding his way into one. His first time plugging in was like 
“Christmas on steroids.” He had to purchase 40 meters of cable, which cost more than 
he thought he could afford. But he saved, bought the cables, and then he was in. Soon 
he started connecting neighbors. It was not uncommon to see cables of 70 to 80 
meters and even 100, and such a distance, the cable weight became tricky. “It was 
important to tie the cables to something solid,” he recounts, “like a radiator or firmer 
pipe.” Everything was connected, and everything was precarious. Back then, “If your 
mother vacuumed your computer, it could destroy the entire block’s network.” By 
2003, he and his neighborhood friends had 80 to 100 users, and the network itself had 
become “an organism that could not be controlled.” There were too many 
interconnected nodes to know how many existed, or even where they were. 
“Anything could expand the network in any direction desired.” Rareș, who was part 
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of the same network, recounts how their crew was well appreciated, with neighbors 
gifting them cakes, cookies, and drinks, and dinner invitations. In this way, their work 
wove together new analogue and digital communities, the latter often taking place on 
early social media such as Meet and hi5. Soon Rareș and Alex began trips to Regie, 
where Bucharest dorm students live, bringing empty hard drives. They would all sit 
down and trade things, mostly manele and porn, and then bring it back to their 
neighborhood to share. Alex recollects, “At that time, digital wealth was equivalent to 
material wealth in terms of șmecherie” 
Bogdan, who is in the midst of establishing a computer museum in Cluj, also 
set up one of these networks in Cluj, connecting 24 people in his block. It was 2004, 
and he had no internet cable, but somehow managed to use TV cable. “We all had 
486 computers then, the new generation,” he told me. They had 16 kilobytes, used 
routers, and it took five minutes to transfer a picture. You could never shut down your 
computer once it was connected because you didn’t want to be bumped off. Setting 
up this network was just one of his many DIY computer projects of the era. For him, 
it all began in grade school when he would cut class and hide in the attack. There, he 
discovered an old broken MII8B computer from the 1970s. Curious, he came back the 
next day with a screwdriver. It was the late 90s, and there was no Google or Yahoo to 
tell him how to fix it. But there were internet cafes in Mărăști filled with smoke 
where he could ask questions. So, he began. Two years later, he won a math 
competition and was awarded an old 486 computer that the National Television 
station was throwing out. Eventually, he saved up money from his job at the local 
newspaper to buy the parts to make it work and to install Windows. Hardware 
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became cheaper after 2002, he remembers, and it became easier to pirate the 
operating system. Soon began to visit the flea market at Oser every weekend to pick 
up older models being thrown out to fix them. Before long, his entire room was filled 
up with computers. It was then that he began to build his neighborhood network, 
eager to share and pirate new software for his growing computer collection. 
But then, in 2010, the internet monolith RDS (Romania Data Systems) came 
in, promising better and faster services, fiber optics even. Threatened by independent 
networks and wanting to avoid competition, they began bribing people to sell their 
networks, Bogdan reminisces. Sometimes they would threaten building 
administrators, citing technical illegalities about the size or length of the wire. 
Sometimes they just cut cables. “Everything went to hell.” Eventually, Bogdan’s 
network came down, but still, there’s one cable left that no one could remove. “No 
one says anything about it – I think people think it’s part of a spy network!” he 
laughs. Today, Bogdan maintains a day job with Amazon, but spends most of his time 
finding discarded and broken computers, cleaning and repairing them, turning them 
into specters of their former selves. Some he finds in industrial waste yards, some in 
the dusty shelves and basements of academic institutions, some in Oser. Now hos 
whole house, as well as his mother’s, is now filled with refurbished machines. 
Despite the destructive power of the large network monopolies, Romania’s 
fast internet exists today (the fastest in Europe) not because of Western salvation, but 
because of the queer palimpsest upon which Siliconization rests. Of course, 
capitalism absorbs all that it can, and these transitional networks were swallowed up, 
but their infrastructure is still there, weighting down telephone poles and bolstering 
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the wires now controlled by larger firms. Florentin from Ceata also remembers RDS 
sweeping in, in part because his own father worked from RomTelecom (now Telecom 
and connected to T-Mobile, based in Germany). RomTelecom and C-Zone were 
bought up by RDS while, UPC, another large corporation, bought up Astrid. Florentin 
got his first computer in 2000 before this consolidation, but he never got use an 
independent network because he lived in this part of Drumul Taberei in Bucharest 
where he couldn’t seem to find one, maybe because everyone there was old. There 
was a really cool one in Crângași and even some neighborhood network wars around 
its control, he remembers. Florentin wanted to set one up too, but he had no money to 
buy cables. His father had some extra telephone cables, so he tried to stretch them and 
use them in a ramshackle way, but it never worked. He recollects how slow the dial-
up was in his block between 10pm and 2am, as this was when all the downloading 
and uploading would begin. He had wanted to start assembling computers that could 
operate outside of Microsoft operating systems, but part of the problem was that to 
download other operating systems you needed a fast connection. Microsoft had also 
set up an update on his computer so that he couldn’t download certain things—a 
techno-imperial move. 
Maybe it was this that got Florentin thinking about the importance of moving 
away from Silicon Valley and private software. He began selling computers in 2004, 
but they still were still based on proprietary software. Now finally he’s selling 
computers again with Ceata, but this time with free hardware and software. This 
allows the best kind of encryption, he told me. “It’s really the only way that you can 
maintain security—to have the right hardware.” Today, Florentin now creates new 
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machines from spare parts, much like he and others did a decade earlier. But his goal 
today is to ensure that the computers he makes aren’t hacked by Silicon Valley-driven 
data colonization and spying. Yet on the other side of the world, post-Cold War 
Silicon Valley maintains fear of “dangerous” and “illiberal” Romanian, Russian, and 
Eastern European hackers and more broadly. And this imaginary becomes 
internalized in Romania, from Black the Fall to Light Revolution protests and 
beyond. 
Romanian and other Eastern European hackers excelled at virus fabrication in 
the 1990s. In Bulgaria, Todor Todorov, who also went by Commander Tosh, 
designed the global Virus Exchange bulletin board so that virus geeks could trade 
information. In Romania, most viruses at first were written just to do something cool, 
something șmecher. Costin, who now runs Kaspersky Lab’s Analyst Summit, 
recounts the days in which viruses that would simply show images or play songs. 
Some embedded secret messages and puzzles, for instance the Tequila virus, which 
simply revealed a Mandelbrot fractal on a user’s screen. Sometimes virus writers 
would steel users’ data, forcing users to win games to retrieve their data back. There 
was Vienna.648, and Cascade, the latter encrypted to disable reverse engineering. 
Some were more political, just as Jabber, which would make it so that if a user typed 
the name of Romania’s president at the time, Iliescu, the word jos (down with) would 
follow (Fiscutean 2015). An early iteration of Dark the Fall, perhaps. But unlike 
today, “No malware was written for financial gain, unlike nowadays, when most of 
the malware is written for some kind of financial profit,” Costin remembers. 
For instance, there was Lari from the ED011 lab at the Polytechnic University, 
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who simply wanted to write a “+” character on the European Organization for 
Nuclear Research website address (Fiscutean 2018). He carefully wrote malware that 
could propagate on Unix operating systems without detection. The code itself would 
change after every replication, and after the job was done, the server would become 
irrelevant and the worm would completely erase itself. His hacking developed, and 
eventually hitting the US—first UCLA and then the Pentagon. His exploits were 
developed out of curiosity and not maliciousness, he recalls. Meanwhile, his 
colleagues, some known as “Ender,” “Vampi,” “Zombie,” would stay up for nights in 
a row writing malware, fork bombs, and more. Eventually some hacked into NASA 
and executing commands on army.mil, accessing supercomputers from the US to 
Japan. As Costin remembers, back then, 99 percent of all hacks were just kids playing 
around and challenging each other. Today, it’s just the opposite; 99 percent are 
executed by governments and corporations, he posits. Meanwhile, Costin’s own work 
has been bought out by Microsoft, which attempts to pervert his perversion itself. 
Countless former hackers have recounted the same story—antivirus firms 
buying up their work in order to capitalize upon it, much like RDS bought up 
Bogdan’s cables. In these strange Silicon landscapes, one might wonder, who is the 
virus and who is the zombie? Who is the witch and who has been hexed? Might the 
witches themselves be embracing a form of șmecherie, one that corrupts Silicon 
Valley imperialism and its end-of-history coding acts? Postsocialist hackers and 
retrocomputing experts, from those who created viruses to those still profiting from 
antivirus technologies, are all part of or touching upon what Bogdan describes as the 
“X86 Generation”—a reference to Intel’s microprocessor and the generation wedged 
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between Gen X and Millennials—those who were born predigital but who created the 
contexts for digital times to become what they are. Bogdan argues that it is these 
people who have created complex, entangled, and often contradictory Romanian 
technospaces. “Unlike what everyone thinks, it’s not Silicon Valley—it’s these 
people that are leading the current tech wave,” he told me firmly. Silicon Valley may, 
like RDS and antivirus tech firms, absorb existent infrastructure, from computer 
factories to wires to malware. But whether set up by the state or by underground tech 
networks, it wasn’t Silicon Valley that established these materialities. Thus, while 
Silicon Valley imperialism today rests upon, touches, and corrupts socialist era 
computing worlds, it remains bolstered by cyber undergrounds and their transitions. 
And yet, other than the relatively small amount of explicitly anti-capitalist tech 
projects, such as Ceata, computer hackers and programmers in Romania today seem 
to have become largely absorbed by Silicon Valley imperialism. How can 
counterfactual historiography and objects, such as the hacking courses designed by 
the Free School of Istorie (Nu) Se Repetă, corrupt and queer techno-normative means 
of reproduction? 
 
Space Invaders 
In Black the Fall, even after “the wall” comes down in what is understood to 
be 1989, blackness persists. According to game creator, Cristian Diaconescu, this is 
due to the dark specters of corrupt socialism. Thus if one makes it to the end of the 
game, a photo of Diaconescu’s design team at an anticorruption “Light Revolution” 
protest appears. In the spring of 2018, during one of these protests and also a far right 
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homophobic “Normality” demonstration, a third march crawled through Bucharest’s 
streets. For the first time, the annual LBGT pride parade was granted access to march 
through Bucharest’s city center, rather than being confined to urban outskirts. Also, 
for the second year in a row, IBM, Google, and Accenture pinkwashed the event, not 
unlike their pride pinkwashing in California’s Silicon Valley. 
However, this year, a small group of anti-capitalist protestors, many of whom 
were part of the Istorie (Nu) Se Repetă workshop, were prepared. They came 
equipped with large banners against pinkwashing, racial capitalism, and fascism. 
“Fuck Off Google” stickers were brought from a solidarity action in Berlin, where at 
the time, Google was attempting to establish a campus. Activists replicated the 
messaging during the Cluj pride that took place a week later, along with a “LGBT and 
Space Invaders Against Gentrification” sign. Referencing the 1978 Cold War video 
game, the sign overtly corrupted the Cold War 2.0 to reclaim robotic space invaders. 
Unsurprisingly, liberal technocapitalists chastised the queer dissidents in both 
cities, reminding them that Romania was now finally free from socialism. How dare 
they corrupt that! When a photo of one of the anti-pinkwashing banners began 
circling in a forum monitored by the LGBT NGO Accept, rather than defending it, the 
organization just deleted the image. It was “too far of a step to take, the anti-Google 
stuff,” someone from the organization later told me. A far step away from the 
speculative future woven by Istorie (Nu) Se Repetă participants, who imagined how 
Accept and Romani Criss worked together to corrupt Silicon Valley imperialism. 
José Esteban Muñoz writes, “To want something else, to want beside and 
beyond the matrix of social controls that is our life in late Capitalism, is to participate 
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in this other form of desiring. Thus, the connection between queerness and utopia is 
most salient at this precise point–the desire for a new world despite an 
emotional/world situation that attempts to render such desiring impossible” (2009, 
278). Queerness, as both perversion to capitalism and desire for something else, is not 
confined to spaces of explicitly queer activism alone. Postsocialist analytics 
themselves are a queering of techno-normative end-of-time imaginaries. But queering 
postsocialism and corrupting techno-normativity is not simply recasting socialist 
nostalgia either. Unattached to origin stories and their paternalisms, queer corruption 
looks to other utopias, futures past and present technologically entangled. Futures 
committed to speculative worlds beyond Silicon Valley imperialism and the zombie 
socialism that it techno-normatively reproduces. Futures that corrupt anticommunist 
fictions in order to code something new. 
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Chapter 3: The Light Revolution, Blood Gold, and the New Times of 
IKEA: Impossible Spaces of Dissent in the Dawn of Techno-fascism 
 
This chapter examines postsocialism as an emerging theoretical concept to 
assess the contestations of liberalism in post-Cold War spaces of protest. Rather than 
fall into stereotypical invocations of Eastern Europe as a historical and geopolitical 
site from which to theorize the preﬁguration of illiberalism and totalitarianism in a 
post-Brexit and post-Trump-era West, I instead ask, what can Eastern European 
postsocialist politics of protest, development, and renewal teach about the perils of 
liberalism? By attending to political action and imaginaries in postsocialist Romania, 
here I highlight how the reorganization of public and private space undergirds the 
conditions of forgetting that enable postsocialist disaster capitalism, which speaks not 
only about Eastern European speciﬁcity, but also more broadly about the 
contradictions of Euro-American liberalism made apparent in its recent crises. By 
disaster capitalism, I refer how neoliberal policy, privatization, austerity, and 
deregulation are differentially deployed in particular aftermaths, in this case the 
aftermath of state socialism (Klein 2007; Moodie and Rofel forthcoming). 
In the wake of Trump, the West increasingly looks to the East for illiberal 
prefiguration, and at anti-corruption and anticommunist protests as a roadmap for 
taking down corrupt politicians. As I argue here, while the West might better find 
“darkness” in its own Silicon Valley backyard, there remains much to learn in the 
East about the violence that liberalism produces, particularly in the realms of public 
protest and private property. For instance, in 2013, the antimining Save Roșia 
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Montană protests emerged, in which tens of thousands of Romanians took to 
the streets in protest of extractive mineral technologies being enacted by a Canadian 
gold mining company—a controversy that I elaborate upon in detail in this chapter. 
As I show, the Canadian company, rather than lodge a counter-protest against the 
protestors, began justifying its presence as antidote to “dirty” and “backwards” 
socialist-era state mining practices. While initially anti-capitalist in nature, the protest 
movement became increasingly liberal and neoliberal, adopting what might be 
understood as an “all protestors matter” ethos, failing to attend to the raciality of the 
mining project and the racial technocapitalism upon which it rested. By racial 
technocapitalism, I refer to the modes in which global technology capital inheres 
raciality, as well as anticommunism. Racial technocapitalism, along with its twin 
concept of techno-imperialism, or the imperial desires and materialities undergirding 
Western technological growth, here allow me to think through the contours of the 
political within a particular postsocialism-liberalism nexus. 
Over time, the Roșia Montană protests grew into the Light Revolution, Rezist, 
and Muie PSD protests of 2017 and 2018. These movements, largely lodged against 
remnants of socialism (interpreted as stymying Romania of Western recognition and 
promises), also draw upon liberal and anticommunist imaginaries of a return to the 
pre-socialist fascist “Golden Era.” In invoking earlier understandings of space, these 
protests, the largest since the 1989 collapse of socialism, have become increasingly 
racist, classist, anticommunist, and heteromasculine in nature. In looking at this 
reinterpretation of the past, I introduce the idea of technofascism, or the endurance of 
fascist promises in the moment of postsocialist techno-imperialism. Might it be that 
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liberalism and fascism are twin concepts inextricably entwined in this postsocialist 
moment? 
For instance, during the Light Revolution of early 2017, nearly one million 
Romanians took to the streets, demanding an end to political corruption. Likening the 
ruling political party to the “dark” socialist past, an ongoing postsocialist trope, 
protestors appealed to the West for salvation. Utilizing smart phone displays and 
lasers, protestors gained recognition for their technological prowess, understood now 
as a sign of Western becoming (despite that technology was also a rich part of 
socialism’s official and underground histories). Demonstrators also adopted an 
explicitly heteronormative aesthetic, troubling post-Cold War framings of socialism 
as deviant and queer (Popa 2018). While these aspirational politics can be traced back 
to the Enlightenment, referencing peripheral subjectivities of being never quite 
techno-normative enough, protestors expressed a speciﬁcally postsocialist 
spatiotemporality, framing state socialism as a void, something to be ﬁnally overcome 
by returning to pre-socialism. In doing so, demonstrators effectively straightjacketed 
ideas of Communism upon those of fascism, forgetting that state socialism emerged 
as an antifascist project in Romania long before authoritarian rule emerged in the 
1970s and 1980s. In this way, techno-normativity draws upon Elizabeth Freeman’s 
“chrononormativity,” or the use of time to meld human bodies into maximum 
productivity (2010). Techno-normativity however implies the use of technology to 
position “illiberal” geopolitical spaces and the people within them as desirous of 
becoming chrononormative. Techno-normativity hinges upon the promise that Silicon 
Valley and the West will save Romania from its dark, technologically backwards 
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socialist past that continues to haunt the present. 
The Light Revolution, informed by Roșia Montană organizing and Western 
desires, is also deeply entangled with the Romanian architectural heritage movement. 
This movement seeks to preserve interwar era buildings and public space, going far 
enough as to produce Bucharest’s second-largest political party, the Union to Save 
Romania (USR). Significantly, the creative capital values that this movement inheres 
are aligned with both anticommunist protests and restitution eviction politics. 
Heritage and restitution practices, deeply racialized, are steeped in anticommunist 
politics, and zombie socialism (Chelcea and Druță 2016). Zombie socialism, as I 
describe in the introduction, is a neoliberal postsocialist hegemonic form that 
interpolates Communism as a backward deadened void—one that threatens to return 
and consume the inevitability of liberal democracy, zombie like. In the case of the 
Light Revolution, Zombie socialism has laid the groundwork, promising to rid 
corruption with transparency, light, and techno-normativity. 
In addition to studying anti-corruption protests and pushing forward the twin 
analytics of Zombie socialism and techno-normativity, in this chapter I also study 
forest restitutions and destruction by the Swedish IKEA corporation, particularly as 
they, like the mining company, destroy Romania’s ecosystem. As with other forms of 
techno-imperialism, forest dispossession is coated as liberal progress under the veneer 
of anticommunist techno-urbanism, particularly as IKEA becomes involved in 
Bucharest information technology (IT) office development. Why is that so few people 
come out to defend the forests or protest IKEA, but hundreds of thousands continue 
to protest government corruption and communist ghosts? How does the fantasy of 
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intimacy with Western modernity incarcerate and obliterate real possibilities of 
dissent? How do postsocialist protests index the racist, capitalist, and fascist contours 
of liberalism and techno-imperialism, or techno-fascism? Postsocialist analytics, I 
argue, offer a unique lens into these questions and conjunctures. 
Interestingly, on the “liberal side” of the Cold War 2.0’s “Silicon Curtain,” 
liberal and leftist media alike was quick to venerate the large-scale nature of 
Romanian protests, positing that if only Americans could learn from their Romanian 
compatriots, perhaps the fascistic Trump too can be taken down. From Al Jazeera to 
The New York Times, articles venerated the large crowds gathering outside of 
Romania’s parliament. As such, two parallel fantasies exist, with the East and the 
West each differentially vying to become the other, each reifying a timeline in which 
liberal progress means overcoming fascism and corruption. But why does this also get 
written as overcoming Communism? What does this say about liberalism, 
postsocialist temporality, and the public space in which these demonstrations 
transpire? 
Here I consider how in postsocialist contexts, liberalism, or in this case 
technoliberalism, can be understood as co-constitutive of racial technocapitalism, and 
in more extreme forms, technofascism. Neda Atanasoski and Kalindi Vora write that 
technoliberalism can be understood as “a reinvigoration of the historical imbrications 
of liberalism and fascism—the twin pillars of US economic, social, and geopolitical 
supremacy” (2019, 24). As they offer, “Rather than posit a break between the liberal 
and fascist logics of automation, we insist on their codependence.” (ibid., 24). This, 
they suggest, can be tracked “through Cold War discourses of automation as 
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mediating the distinction between democratic liberalism and totalitarianism as the 
prehistory of contemporary discourses around robotics and white loss in the era of the 
Trump presidency” (ibid., 24). Here I map technofascism’s enfolding with 
technoliberalism in postsocialist space, looking to the reinterpretation of Cold War 
anticommunist imaginaries. 
In the three empirical sections that follow, I first study the Roșia Montană 
protests in more length, looking to the liberalism and racism inherent in both protests 
and extractive mining. I then turn to the Light Revolution protests, focusing upon the 
use of Western technology to index Western becoming, as well as the architectural 
heritage movement upon which the protests rest. The third section then looks at 
IKEA, as connected to both deforestation and urban renewal, questioning why there 
has been so little opposition to the Swedish megacompany amongst the left. But first, 
I explore why there has been a resurgence of the Cold War as a descriptor of present-
day geopolitics in the West. In doing so, I remain critical of the explanatory logics of 
the Cold War as it positions Eastern European socialist histories and their remains as 
augurs of growing technofascist possibilities, eliding the violence that liberal 
democracy and disaster capitalism have wreaked in postsocialist contexts. 
 
Postsocialism: Re-evaluating Liberalism and Authoritarianism and the Cold 
War 2.0 
In their now canonical article, “Thinking Between the Posts: Post-colonialism, 
Postsocialism, and Ethnography after the Cold War,” Sharad Chari and Katherine 
Verdery argue that “ethnography must … employ a critical lens on the global [and 
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epistemological] effects of Cold War thought throughout the twentieth century. It is 
time to liberate the Cold War from the ghetto of Soviet area studies and post-colonial 
thought from the ghetto of Third World and colonial studies. The liberatory path 
proposed here the jettisoning of these two posts in favor of a single overarching one: 
the post-Cold War” (2009, 29). Chari and Verdery understand the Cold War as an 
epistemological limit to how the world could be known in the second half of the 20th  
century. 
While Chari and Verdery’s interest is in the critique of area studies paradigms, 
one might also consider another epistemological impasse brought on by the Cold War 
paradigm—that is, the positing of liberalism and illiberalism (for instance, fascism, 
totalitarianism, and antidemocratic tendencies) as paradigmatic opposites in the 
political-ideological spectrum. This Cold War opposition mapped the free and unfree 
worlds—a cartography that remains intact today upon a palimpsestic atlas. However, 
through continued reliance upon geohistorical Cold War maps, one fails to understand 
how their dialectical contours enable fascism to grow uncharted, and how fascism and 
techno-imperialism become co-constitutive, informing technofascism. One also fails 
to theorize the messy post-Cold War techno-entanglements that manifest in spaces 
not often centered in Cold War antipodal geographies (Barad 2017; Hecht 2011; 
Masco 2006; Voyles 2015)—spaces such as Romania. Thus, by theorizing 
postsocialism as entangled with liberal and fascist conjunctures, imperial-
technocapitalist forms can be understood in new ways. 
Postsocialism marks not only a temporal but also a spatial orientation toward a 
possible politics in a post-Cold War world. Here, I think of spatiality not only in 
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terms of the maintenance of East/West imaginary antipodes, but also as it deﬁnes the 
locations, limits, and temporalities of revolutionary imaginaries. As such, post-Cold 
War framing is a useful conceptual lens with which one can track how public space 
works to avert (and erase) the crises in liberalism through the afﬁrmation of concepts 
that bolster technocapitalist and techno-imperial proliferation (including transparency 
and anticorruption). As I observe, contested spaces are about an afﬁrmation of 
Westernness or Europeanness that is dehistoricized and, therefore, uncritical of the 
politics of privatization and dispossession. 
Postsocialism emerged as a term in academic writing in the 1990s after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the USSR. As Chari and Verdery note, 
unlike postcolonialism, which entered academic discourses years after the 
decolonization movements began and was even at its inception a theoretical concept, 
postsocialism, initially at least, was a descriptor of what came after the end of formal 
state socialism. It portrayed, Verdery argues, “reorganization on a cosmic scale,” 
redeﬁning and reordering “people’s entire meaningful worlds” through processes of 
privatization, lustration, “democratization,” and “transition” (two modes of liberal-
democratic governance)—in other words, the remaking of persons from socialist to 
capitalist subjects (2005, 35). Initially, however, it was limited as a descriptor and 
applied mostly to Central and Eastern European nations, and at times, when modiﬁed, 
to China and Vietnam (Atanasoski and Vora 2018; Chari and Verdery 2009; Buck-
Morss 2000; Rofel 2019; Zhang 2008). Thus, following the 1990s, postsocialism 
increasingly appeared less relevant to theorizations of social and cultural life within 
global capitalism. After all, if simply a depiction of economic, social, or 
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governmental transition, that transition had to reach an end at some point—a point 
from which one could ask, “What was postsocialism and what comes next?” Yet, as 
recent years have shown (particularly during Obama’s presidency and now during 
Trump’s), the Cold War seems to be alive and well as a revived framework for 
apprehending the world, at least in the US. From Russia’s ban at the 2016 and 2018 
Olympics, to accusations of spying and hacking attributed to both Russian and 
Romanian illiberals, the contemporary moment invites us to revisit the theoretical 
place of postsocialism. Amidst the so-called “cosmic ruptures” of today (Dunn 2017), 
postsocialism becomes an important theoretical concept with which to investigate not 
only formations of illiberalism as they are iterated by Cold War ghosts, but also 
liberalism, its purported antidote. Postsocialism becomes an analytic through which 
one can question why it is that the Cold War other maintains a position of enemy in 
the liberal imaginary, while Silicon Valley imperialism is rendered benign and 
salvific. 
When not ghettoized within area studies, postsocialism (as related to but 
separate from the post-Cold War) is, as I assert, relevant as a theoretical concept 
suited for assessing the time and space of political action. It is particularly useful in 
moments when revolution either seems impossible or, when it happens, as inevitably 
ending in either in totalitarianism or liberal democracy (Buck-Morss 2002; Scott 
2013). As Atanasoski and Vora have argued (2018), when apprehended as theoretical 
ground, postsocialism marks not the end of all socialisms, but the end of state 
socialism as a dominant discourse overdetermined by Cold War knowledge 
production about the world. Conceptually, then, postsocialism enables an exploration 
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of socialist legacies on multiple scales, expanding beyond state socialism and the 
Communist International, and how these have (or have not) remained constitutive of 
contemporary radical and decolonial imaginaries of collectivity and political action. 
Put otherwise, postsocialism facilitates an assessment of ongoing socialist legacies in 
new ethical collectivities and networks of dissent opposing state and technocapitalist 
military, economic, and cultural expansionism since the end of the Cold War. 
Given the revival of the Cold War as a geopolitical frame, postsocialism also 
offers an important corrective to the dehistoricizing, decontextualizing, and limiting 
binary framing of democracy and authoritarianism as the only (and opposing) 
political forms. The so-called “Cold War 2.0” takes place in a moment when state 
socialism has receded into the past, but in which the model of antagonistic battle for 
imperial control of “satellite” states between the US and Russia seems alive and well, 
written as a contest between liberalism and illiberalism, and between democracy and 
authoritarianism (Lemon 2018). Sorin Cucu has questioned why the Cold War is the 
ghost that the contemporary conception of world history (or world politics) needs 
(2017). Taking on both the understanding that we are experiencing a resurgence of 
the Cold War, and the notion that the Cold War never ended, he argues instead that 
“Even if we accept that the continuity of the Cold War trumps the pattern of change 
experienced by the world in the last few decades, we still need to accept that the Cold 
War today has none of its former power and that, in spirit, it allows for contradictions 
in so far as these contradictions are enabling reconﬁgurations of its discursive make-
up” (2017). In other words, Cold War discourse accommodates its own contradictions 
to create various geopolitical conﬁgurations and fantasies as historical inevitabilities. 
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The historical inevitability engendered by the framework of “Cold War 2.0” 
resuscitates the oppositional tension between terms like democracy and 
authoritarianism with no existing critique of capitalism. According to Alexei 
Yurchak, “the opposition of ‘democracy’ and ‘authoritarianism,’ … instead of 
providing analytical clarity, in fact, contributes to decoupling ‘democracy’ from 
‘capitalism’ and thus concealing and depoliticizing the real conditions” (2017, 1). Yet 
capitalism and liberal democracy have been historically entangled, as has been the 
case in numerous postsocialist contexts. Together, they were violently injected in the 
aftermath of socialism in order to destroy its legacies and possibilities of endurance. 
For instance, in the case of Romania (as in many other formerly state socialist 
nations), the transition to liberal democracy meant privatizing, fragmenting, and 
restituting state-owned land, housing, technology, and factories, leading to rampant 
dispossession (often racialized), and a return of pre-socialist wealth (Florea 2016; 
Verdery 2003). At the same time, transition installed a regime of elites who 
transformed late-socialist power relations into new forms of crony capitalism backed 
by Western ﬁrms and interests, razing many of what had been successful and 
independent sectors (O’Neill 2016; Pusca 2016; Vincze 2017). Today, Romania 
remains an extractive space for Western capitalism, from Silicon Valley IT ﬁrms to 
Austrian lumber companies, maintaining the highest material and social deprivation 
rate in the EU (Eurostat 2017). 
Yet on both sides of the former Iron Curtain, liberal democracy, rather than 
reﬂecting upon the destructive powers of its capitalist incarnation, makes its object of 
critique authoritarianism, which, in the era of the Cold War 2.0, is increasingly 
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conﬂated with Communism. Both the Light Revolution and Colorful Revolution 
protestors, rather than blaming global capital for post-1989 devastation, blame 
treasonous politicians who they render unpatriotic, un-European, and Communist. As 
Yurchak elaborates, the liberal reduction of the political ﬁeld informs the resurgence 
of “‘patriotism’ versus ‘treason’ and of ‘patriots’ versus ‘foreign agents’” (2017, 3). 
In the US, this discursive strategy divorces Trump’s victory from US political 
contexts, which have everything to do with the endurance of neoliberal hegemony, 
technocapitalism, and white supremacy (Kelley 2016), instead impugning illiberal 
outsider interference. As such, “Real politics becomes displaced onto the stereotyped 
ﬁgures of ‘foreign agents and patriots who oppose them’” (Yurchak 2017, 3). 
Given the resurgence of the “Cold War” as a paradigm to assess geopolitics in 
media venues, and, given Cucu’s and Yurchak’s incisive critiques about this revival 
as a reductionist move, it seems that postsocialism may be more useful than the post-
Cold War in allowing for a nuanced assessment of contested political terrains. These 
contested terrains often concretely have to do with struggles over place. Yet in 
Romania, mass demonstrations for such places enact liberal democracy and 
capitalism as the inevitable future, from the Light Revolution’s anticommunism to 
Roșia Montană’s demonstrations which increasingly displaced anti-capitalist politics. 
In this context, the recirculation of “Cold War” as a frame of reference for geopolitics 
rehearses the terms of Cold War liberalism in its binaristic logics to conﬂate 
capitalism with democracy, transparency, and accountability. Kristen Ghodsee writes, 
“Just as the popular stereotype of communism is rarely uncoupled from the state 
repression of the twentieth-century experience of it, today . . . the democratic ideal is 
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becoming inseparable from the social chaos neoliberal capitalism has wreaked in its 
name” (2016, xviii). However, here I push this further to question how “the 
democratic ideal” in fact necessitates the grotesque coupling of socialism with state 
repression. 
Really since 1989, proponents of liberal democracy on both sides of the 
former Berlin Wall have read state socialism through an anticommunist lens, 
inhering, often with and through technology, what Konrad Petrovszky and Ovidiu 
Țichindeleanu describe as postsocialist colonial subjectivities amongst Eastern 
Europeans (2011). These subjectivities rely upon an asymmetrical interplay between 
the East and the West. The East was mapped as the “other” within the West, while the 
West was “put into covert circulation in the territory of the East” (Wark 1994, 65). 
Thus, while the West imagines the Eastern other as a necessary yet backward 
ﬁgure within its own dialectical cosmology, postsocialist coloniality incites the East 
to entwine Western cosmological imaginaries with its own. This uneven interplay 
foments zombie socialism, dehistoricizing the past, thereby paving the way for a 
neoliberal future. For instance, in 2008, conservative Eastern European politicians 
and intellectuals signed the Prague Declaration, equating the victims of Communism 
with the victims of Nazi Germany, demanding justice from EU governing bodies. 
Here, Communism and fascism are interpreted as one and the same—the evil, 
fascistic monster that liberal democracy will save us from. Always lurking behind the 
curtain, zombie socialism threatens to turn people already presumed and subjectiﬁed 
as backward further back. Liberal democracy not only fears socialism's existence but 
also hinges upon its realness to justify its own. 
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According to Nikhil Pal Singh, “totalitarianism” was both the “primary 
explanatory terrain concerning the post-World War II division of Europe,” and a 
reassertion of “racist and colonialist divisions of the world and its peoples that had 
allegedly been left behind in the U.S.-led break from the logics of fascism and 
empire” (2009, 68). As he elaborates, “the theory of totalitarianism became the hinge 
connecting the frame of U.S. global power to the teleological door of modernization 
that opened and closed on new nations according to a more deeply embedded set of 
norms and assumptions about obedience, deference, emotional ‘maturity,’ 
trustworthiness, rational capacity, and ﬁtness for self-government” (ibid., 68). The 
binaristic opposition between democracy and totalitarianism, and between liberalism 
and fascism, marks the entanglement of these post-Enlightenment ideological 
formations. Democratic liberalism imagines fascism as its “monstrous Other,” as its 
“doppelganger or double.” This is why liberalism needs to maintain a fascist threat 
especially when its legitimacy is called into question. 
Because postsocialism takes the demise of state socialism as the occasion to 
highlight the entanglement of capitalism with liberal democracy, it is as theoretical 
ground aligned with Singh’s call to theorize liberalism as a violent, racial, colonial, 
and expansionist ideological form. Postsocialism calls attention to the violence of 
economic and political liberalization even as it asks to make legible other socialist 
legacies and new modes of envisioning politics. It also calls to attention new modes 
of entangling geographies of theory and spatiotemporal subjectivities, in which it is 
not only “the East” interpreting Western cosmologies and cosmic ruptures, but also 
now Western scholars gazing eastward for illiberal preﬁguration. 
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In this sense, I take a slightly different approach to postsocialism from those 
who, since the election of Donald Trump, have begun to wonder whether 
“postsocialism,” as theoretical ground, ﬁnally has something to offer the so-called 
“West” because it can theorize illiberalism. In an earlier moment, some scholars 
argued that because the postsocialist condition reiﬁed a homogenized idea of Europe 
and liberal capitalism to which post-state socialist nations (at least in Central and 
Eastern Europe) aspired, postsocialism had no critical insights to offer scholarship 
engaged with Marxist and decolonial thought (Lazarus 2010). Yet in a post-Brexit 
and post-Trump world, postsocialism ﬁnally seems to have something to offer that is 
new and not belated—a knowledge of a totalitarianism and illiberalism that has now 
arrived in the so-called West. These ideas often hinge upon zombie socialist media 
stories and popular hype. As Dace Dzenovska and Larisa Kurtović argue, “A quick 
overview of interventions made by or on behalf of (post)socialist subjects in the 
Western media at the moment reveal that there are at least four dimensions to the 
new-found public audibility of the (post)socialist subject: (1) knowledge of 
totalitarianism/authoritarianism; (2) knowledge of fascism/nationalism; (3) 
knowledge of Russia; and (4) preﬁguration of the future of the West” (2016, 3). As 
they elaborate, it is precisely that which made the postsocialist subject irrelevant in 
the past to Western knowledge production that today makes the same subject 
relevant. Today, the postsocialist subject is finally able to elucidate something about 
the present in places like the US and the UK. However, as I suggest, it is not because 
the postsocialist subject understands the perils of fascism that makes postsocialism 
relevant in the current moment, whether in the media or in contemporary scholarship. 
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Rather, postsocialist critique is a rich space within which to theorize the perils of 
liberalism, and the fascism that it enables. If there is any future preﬁguration to be 
done, liberalism rather than illiberalism might be the more politically salient object of 
critique. In what follows, I turn to liberal manifestations in Romania—not necessarily 
to preﬁgure the future of the West but rather to provincialize liberal geographies of 
theory and contemporary manifestations of the Cold War 2.0, zombie socialism, and 
techno-normativity. 
 
Blood Gold 
While there are many origin stories to the anti-corruption protests that have 
taken over the streets of Bucharest and Cluj in recent years, many people site the Save 
Roşia Montană (Salvați Roşia Montană) demonstrations of several years earlier as 
integral in building praxis of large-scale collective organizing in Romania. The 
demonstrations erupted in 2013, in response to an extractive gold mining project in 
the Apușeni Mountains being conducted by a Canadian mining company, Gabriel 
Resources. Throughout the summer, each Sunday, thousands of Romanians took to 
the streets, mostly in Bucharest and Cluj, protesting Gabriel’s exploitative and 
speculative practices, demanding that the state halt all joint business dealings. Unlike 
the Light Revolution protests, those of Roşia Montană were initially positioned 
against Western imperiality and global capital. But nevertheless, they too became 
absorbed by zombie socialism. Further, while they can be read as a widescale 
demonstration against capitalism and its Anthropocenic impacts, for the most part, the 
protests failed to address the raciality of capitalism, historically and 
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contemporaneously. By theorizing Save Roşia Montană through postsocialist 
analytics, the raciality of liberalism comes into focus—a structure that set the tone for 
the Light Revolution protests to follow. 
From Save Roşia Montană to the Light Revolution, Romanian protests over 
the last decade have increasingly understood Western corporations as salvific, coming 
in to rescue Romania from its backwards socialist technology. Gabriel Resources, in 
its techno-imperial drive to absorb Romania’s minerals, speculates upon future 
growth by pathologizing the darkness of socialist mining practices. While it demands 
Romania’s gold, it also suggests that the loss of minerals to the state is insignificant, 
as rocks have “no soul” in the language of liberalism. Meanwhile the antimining 
movement, as it has become increasingly liberal as well, has banished space for anti-
capitalist and antiracist alterity, thereby making dead the possibilities of revolutionary 
futures past. In this way, Roşia Montană has become a site of deadness and deadened 
resistance. 
Roşia Montană (Red Mountain), long scarred and rendered “bloody” through 
extractive mining technologies going back to the Roman Empire, the mountain 
contains the largest gold deposit in the European continent. Since 1989, restitution 
and privatization have poised the mountain and much of the country as newly 
exploitable, often in the name of “cleaning up” the debris of socialist property 
nationalization and as well as industrialization. This of course has been supported by 
the projection of Europeanization, heralding post-1989 shifts to “cleaner, lighter” 
industry as liberation from the heavy industry and grey polluted landscapes of the 
Communist past (Pavlínek and Pickles 2000, 9; Vincze 2017). In November 2006, 
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when the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee voted on reports 
concerning EU enlargement, included was this statement: “Also, Romania should 
speed up the processing of claims relating to the restitution of properties confiscated 
by the communist regime and should make further efforts in protecting the 
environment, with special reference to the mining in Rosia Montana” (European 
Parliament 2006). 
State socialism did indeed contribute to regional ecological devastation. The 
Communist regime took control of Roşia Montană in 1948, maintaining underground 
and open surface operations into the 1970s. During this time the Party sought to 
reduce debt and foreign dependency (such as copper imports from Poland and 
dependency upon the Soviet Union led Comecon economic assistance), and extractive 
mining was one of many means to this end. As many of the gold bearing veins had 
been exhausted by the 1970s, and as the regime tripled its debt between 1974 and 
1979, the state turned to strip-mining, destroying two mountains, forever altering the 
landscape. Nearby is the abandoned village of Geamăna, a ghost town physically 
under red water. In 1977, 400 residents of Geamăna were displaced after the state 
discovered a massive copper deposit at Roşia Poieni, deciding to create an artificial 
catch-basin for the mine’s contaminated cyanide sludge. This was one of countless 
rural-industrial spatial rearrangements accompanying the Communist project. It 
lingers to date, having subsumed the local houses, church, and cemetery, pooling 
toxic cyanide into domestic spaces and the graves of former miners. A church steeple 
still floats above the crimson waterline like a tall, thin sailboat upon the horizon, 
defying complete submergence. 
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But projects such as these pale in comparison to those speculated upon by 
Gabriel. Romania, once dubbed “the granary of Europe,” has been discovered by 
technocapitalism hungry for a new type of grain. In 1998, Gabriel Resources Ltd., 
through a joint Romanian government venture, began exploration of the mountain. 
Despite ample evidence of dire contamination (Manske et al. 2006), its newly formed 
entity public-private enterprise (80 percent private), Rosia Montana Gold Corporation 
(RMGC), proposed opening four mines forty times the size of the state socialist 
operation, exacting billions of US dollars in profit. Since inception, it has worked to 
obtain permission to exploit 300 tons of gold and 1,600 tons of silver, and to destroy 
three villages and four mountains by annually employing 12,000 tons of cyanide to 
obtain precious metals. Sodium cyanide solutions are used to leach gold from ore, and 
it is extremely toxic. For instance, in 2000, 3.5 million cubic feet of cyanide was 
spilled after a tailings dam ruptured in the Romanian city of Baia Mare, killing 1,400 
tons of fish and leading disastrous health and environmental impacts along the 
Danube and Tisza Rivers all of the way into Hungary for years (Beyerle and Olteanu 
2016). In addition to jeopardizing public and environmental health, the proposed 
project at Roşia Montană would also lead to the destruction of ancient patrimonial 
monuments, much to the chagrin of heritage preservationists. Even the Ministry of 
Justice argued the project unjust, violating articles 44 and 136 of the Romanian 
Constitution on the right to private property and modalities of state expropriation. It 
was also observed that Romania would only benefit from six percent of the project’s 
profits (Project RISE 2013). 
As soon as Gabriel landed in Romania, local activists began fighting back. In 
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2000, village farmers formed the NGO Alburnus Maior to fight the company in court. 
Two years later they launched the campaign, Salvați Roşia Montană (Save Roşia 
Montană). Then in 2004, environmental activists began holding the annual summer 
Fân Fest festival in the mountain, building up collective ecological solidarity. So, 
when in September 2013, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) led government acceded 
to Gabriel Resources intense lobbying and permitted them the ability to begin mining, 
there was already a large base from which to build resistance. 
A series of local and national protests took place in September 2013 under the 
banner of Salvați Roşia Montană and United We Save (Uniți Salvăm). These 
amounted to the largest series of protests since 1989 at the time (now trumped by 
Rezist). Each Sunday, thousands of protestors took to the streets, demanding that 
Romania sever all ties with Gabriel. Solidarity actions were held in numerous 
Western cities as well, from Brussels to Chicago. In October, over 5,000 residents 
and activists gathered in Câmpeni, Romania, presenting an eleven-point declaration, 
which included the prohibition of cyanide and hydraulic fracking, investigations into 
the funding activities of RMCC, declassification of government relations with Gabriel 
Resources, resignation and criminal investigations into supporters of the project, and 
inclusion of Roșia Montană on Romania's tentative list for UNESCO world heritage 
sites. They also alleged a media blackout, pointing to Gabriel Resources buying 5.4 
million dollars in ads and campaigning (Forbes 2013). Meanwhile then PSD Prime 
Minister Victor Ponta accused those in the camp of extremist behavior. In return, 
protesters cited Ponta’s corruption. 
While one might imagine that RMGC would, in its campaigning, position 
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itself as against the antimining movement, instead it mostly denounced “dirty” 
socialist-era mining practices, using the language of “sustainable development,” 
“environmental sustainability,” and “corporate social responsibility.” Corporate social 
responsibility, or CSR, has become a catchphrase amongst numerous multinational 
corporations in Romania, used to posit new “light” industry such as IT as salvific 
against the backdrop of socialist-era technology. Often CSR is used in bluewashing 
and pinkwashing campaigns alike, from McDonald’s giving of coffee during Rezist to 
Google, IBM, Accenture, and IKEA’s use of the Bucharest LGBT pride in 2018 for 
advertisement purposes. CSR, in Romania, is used to create an imaginary in which 
politicians are corrupt and backwards, but in which corporations are salvific and the 
way of the future. 
While the early Save Roşia Montană campaign was led by anti-globalization 
activists attentive to the deadly effects of disaster capitalism, as the protests grew, 
they became increasingly liberal and nationalistic, inching away from the tenor of the 
2008 anti-NATO protests and anti-austerity demonstrations of 2012. Today, the 
antifascist and anarchist community in Romania often traces their own consolidation, 
but also their being targeted, to the 2008 anti-NATO protests, even though only a few 
of those active today were part of the 2008 organizing. It was then that Between April 
1st and 4th, 2008, a police regime was established in Bucharest in order to secure 
conditions for the NATO anniversary summit at the Palace of the Parliament. Police 
searches for anti-NATO activists in homes and residential buildings became routine. 
As Razvan put it in a 2009 retrospective documentary about the “Anti-NATO days” 
by Joanne Richardson and Nadia Len (that members of the original protests presented 
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in a ten-year anniversary in the basement of a punk bar in Bucharest in 2018 that I 
attended), “I was shocked by the atmosphere of the city . . . Flags everywhere, 
Romanian flags, NATO flags, flags of other NATO countries, and the streets 
deserted, empty of people, empty of cars. It was as if a theater play was being staged. 
It reminded me of Gorbachev’s last visit to Romania in 1987, when people weren’t 
allowed to stroll casually on the streets.” Or, in Rodica’s words, “The fear of being 
followed and spied on continued for many months. Those things we wanted to keep 
secret, we never said out loud. We whispered to each other even when we were alone 
in the room.” International solidarity against NATO was heavily thwarted by the 
Romanian government as well. For instance, on March 20th, six German activists 
were stopped at the border and held in secret service custody for fourteen hours. The 
only justification for this refusal was the possession of anti-war informational 
materials. According to the border police “anti-native and anti-violence brochures 
were found in their luggage” (Redacția 2013). In the end, dozens of Romanians and 
Germans, as well as a handful of other activists from other countries detained by the 
police. Some people had been severely injured by armed forces who attacked the 
factory warehouse building where they had been organizing. But the 60 or so people 
that were part of the anti-NATO dissent were able to engage in a series of 
discussions, workshops, and film screenings in a hall they had rented in order to offer 
“a critical alternative to the formal paradigm of NATO’s existence, mission, and 
expansion” (ibid. 2013). 
Yet he organizing that took place to dissent NATO’s April 2008 presence in 
Romania lasted well after the initial dissent, in part leading to the formation of the 
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feminist, anarchist social center, Biblioteca Alternativă, in Bucharest. I first visited 
and stayed at the social center in 2011, after having returned from an international 
anarchist “Space Camp” in Moldova, where a few Romanian friends of mine studying 
at the Central European University in Budapest had convinced me to hitchhike with 
them to across Romania. After the space camp, we headed to the Biblioteca in 
Bucharest. The social center, nestled within a quiet residential neighborhood, was 
structurally falling apart a bit, yet warm and cozy on the inside, contained an actual 
library filled with zines and feminist-anarchist texts, some bedrooms and a kitchen, 
and a courtyard where events, meetings, and parties were held. Texts were organized 
in categories such as sociology/anthropology, anarchism/social movements/direct 
action, gender/sexuality/LGBTQ, colonialism/militarism, repression/political 
prisoners, literature, and art/photography. 
The original Biblioteca Alternativă moved locations within Bucharest shortly 
after my stay there, and then, a couple years later, the second iteration experienced 
political infighting over matters of the merits of US feminist and antiracist theory, as 
well as due to conflict around Roma feminism in Romania. Those who strove to keep 
the Biblioteca Alternativă open after formed then formed Clacă, a similar social 
center that also housed the library, this time hidden in a large, abandoned factory 
building. As with the Bilblioteca, workshops, events, and clothing swaps took place 
there. During my first time there I led a workshop on mapping evictions and anti-
eviction struggles in San Francisco, launching what would become an ongoing anti-
eviction solidarity connection between the two locales. It was there too that the 
Frontul Comun pentru Dreptul la Locuire (the Common Front for the Right to 
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Housing / FCDL) was formed—the Bucharest-based anti-eviction group that I am a 
part of in Romania. Unfortunately, the space that housed Clacă was adjacent to the 
Colectiv Nightclub, which accidentally caught on fire in October 2015, leading to the 
deaths of 64 people (as well as massive street protests and the resignation of the 
Prime Minister, which I explain more later in this chapter). The entire area 
surrounding the fire on Tăbăcarilor in Sector 4 was left uninhabitable, and the wary 
and exhausted members of Clacă had to find yet another space. 
Soon after, the Macaz Bar Coop was formed on Moșilor in the city-center, a 
collectively owned bar, social center, theatre space, and library known for its late-
night parties, public events, and political theatre plays. As of 2019, the space, situated 
amongst a handful of buildings undergoing restitution evictions, is having to dissolve 
due to landlord pressures. The area, once the heart of the Jewish community before 
socialism, and which then was left abandoned and derelict during socialism, became 
an area filled with Roma families. Many, post-1989, are now squatting in their former 
homes without formal rental contracts from the state. In 2014, one building on 
Vulturilor Street filled with over 100 Roma people underwent a restitution eviction, 
leading to a massive street protest encampment that lasted over two years (Lancione 
2018). Members of the FCDL heavily supported the Vulturilor encampment, in part 
informing their moving into the Moșilor spot to begin with. Today, due to the impacts 
of restitution in the Sector 3 neighborhood, the entire area is undergoing rapid 
gentrification. Nevertheless, the Macaz collective plans to open one to two parallel 
spaces on the other side of the city-center, one of which will also house other leftist 
activist collectives. 
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It was during the transition from the Biblioteca to Clacă that the initial Roșia 
Montană protests were taking shape. It was also during this time that the sister 
anarchist social/space, library was forming in Cluj, A-casă. Located in the heart of 
what it now the tech-led speculation and racial dispossession accumulating in the 
Măraști neighborhood (that I describe in Chapter 1), A-casă too is now is facing 
impending displacement. But in 2013, before the contemporary displacements were 
envisioned, members of both the Bucharest-based Biblioteca and Cluj-based A-cacă 
joined forces in protesting Gabriel Resources. Since members of both groups had 
direct ties to the anti-NATO organizing of a few years prior, many saw Gabriel as the 
newest iteration of the capitalist globalization that they had initially organized to fight 
against. After all, the head of Gabriel, Frank Timis (an Australian-Romanian), was 
already known for his devastating iron ore mining operations in Sierra Leone. This 
had led to the displacement of local villagers, earning him the nickname, “Emperor of 
African Resources” (Beyerle and Oteanu 2016). For the anti-capitalist, anarchist 
organizers, Gabriel Resources stood in for a new technocapitalist imperial form—a 
techno-imperial one. 
However, instead of being targeted by the police as these anarchists had 
grown accustomed, increasingly in the Roșia Montana organizing spaces, they were 
targeted by more liberal organizers. Increasingly, antifascist and anti-capitalist 
organizers were made marginal, as those with more liberal and “all-protestors-matter” 
rhetoric took the reins. One friend of mine, upon asking why it was suddenly okay for 
far-right nationalist groups to attend marches, was told by a lead organizer that it 
helps with the numbers. Naturally, when far-right protestors began attacking 
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antifascists, the latter retreated, thereby decreasing numbers. Another group of anti-
capitalists were evicted from a Roșia Montană summer camp for espousing “too 
much ‘Down with Capitalism’ (Jos Capitalismul) messaging. When an antifascist 
organizer publicly confronted a protest leader about the increasingly cramped space 
from which to articulate anti-capitalist politics at the camp, she was told, “the beauty 
of the movement is that you’ll see a homophobe holding hands with a homosexual.” 
Put otherwise, the protests embraced a form of liberalism in which both homophobes 
and homosexuals “matter.” Yet, while capitalists were welcomed, anti-capitalists 
were explicitly not—thereby revealing the limits of liberal notions of inclusivity. 
Meanwhile, journalists such as Dan Tapalagă dismissed anti-capitalists in the 
movement as incomprehensible to the generation which overthrew the Communists 
(2013), while Marius Ghilezan blamed the parents of anti-capitalist youth for “failing 
to give their children a pro-capitalist view” (2013). One good friend of mine from the 
then Clacă space remembers being kicked of the summer camp. She now works in 
Macaz, and she is disgusted that some of the very people who kicked her out now try 
to hang out in the Macaz bar as if nothing happened. 
In the 2018 documentary film Portavoce (Megaphone), directed by Ruxandra 
Gubernat, Marcel Schreiter, and Henry Rammelt, the Roșia Montană, Colectiv, and 
Rezist protests were positioned together to make sense of the political and collective 
ethos tethering them. Debuted in Romania’s 2018 One World Romania film festival, 
the film is highly skewed. Of fourteen people interviewed, thirteen are men. Prior 
anti-capitalistic protests are ignored altogether, and instead interviewees are largely 
either DJs or musicians in rock and alternative bands such as Luna Amară and the 
154  
Amsterdams. Others are engaged in creative capital ventures such as Street Delivery. 
Street Delivery, formed in Bucharest in 2006 by the Cărtureşti Foundation and 
the Romanian Architects Order, is a project aimed at “delivering” culture to the city’s 
streets. Having had different iterations, such as Train Delivery and Rahova Delivery, 
gentrifying neighborhoods are often preferred. As Veda Popovici (the only female 
voice featured in Portavoce) critiques, “Artists, by making use of their symbolic and 
social capital, as well as their ability to translate the cultural phenomena of 
underprivileged groups for the middle class, are the first who can indicate to investors 
and the said middle class that areas such as Gara de Nord or Rahova have a certain 
something which can be converted into capital with very little investment” (2014). 
While Rahova is a Roma working-class neighborhood now being redeveloped 
as the site of Rahova Business Center and AFI tech park, the area surrounding the 
train station at Gara de Nord is adjacent to Matache and the Berzei-Buzesti 
development. As Popovici argues, Train Delivery, funded by the state, Cărtureşti, and 
Sony, was part of a larger attempt to demolish homes “associated with poverty and 
provincialism and ‘clean up’ the area,” establish tech offices, and then finally 
culture—classic gentrification teleology. Also delivered as part of the festival were a 
series of “workshops” —one organized by law enforcement on how to avoid being 
pickpocketed, and one by local heritage architects on Matache. Per Popovici, “The 
‘pickpockets’ are symbolic representations of the local population: a poor one, 
plagued by lawlessness. The middle-class, led by its ‘creative’ avant-garde, ‘the 
citizens,’ will learn how to guard their possessions once they venture into the area” 
(2014). 
155  
Instructively, Portavoce posits organizers of events such as Street Delivery as 
the architects of Romania’s more recent Rezist protests. As Gubernat suggests in an 
interview, the film effectively defines Romanian protest culture as “recreational 
activism” (Călinescu 2018). When comparing protests with those of the surrounding 
region and Western Europe, they find lower levels of commitment, increased 
flexibility in ideology, and less importance placed upon formal groups and 
organizing. Many of these recreational activists work for multinational corporations 
or are engaged in creative capitalism, and fully take on zombie socialist imaginaries. 
Many protestors desire to disaggregate their “patriotism” from Communist 
nationalism, wearing flags to represent themselves as the “new Romania.” This new 
Romania maintains one common enemy, Gubernat says: that of corrupt Communist-
era elites. Also important amongst protestors is the “concept of a scene,” she explains, 
aligned with others who have described Salvați Roșia Monatană as the “protest of 
hipsters” (Ruse 2013). This analysis speaks to how mainstream the protests have 
become in Romania, a far cry from the events organized by the 60 anti-NATO 
protestors of 2008, as well as from the ongoing anti-eviction organizing taking place 
in Macaz and A-casă. 
While the hipsters of these large protests, to their credit, have been effective in 
building powerful movements, importantly, critiques of capitalism and its racist 
underpinnings are displaced by zombie socialism. And yet, residents living in 
Gabriel’s wake who have refused buyout offers to vacate their homes often enough 
look back to the days of Communism with nostalgia. As a local farmer Eugene 
described, “If they try to forcefully relocate me, I’ll go to Ceausescu’s grave, light a 
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candle, and say: ‘Comrade Ceauşescu, you were a dictator, but I’m sorry we killed 
you. You were right and we were wrong’” (Kenarov 2012). Eugene speaks to 
RMGC’s determination to not only destroy to valleys, but also to dispossess over 
1,800 people living in 740 homes, and even exhume the dead. As an employee of the 
Catholic Church paid by RMGC to recruit locals to work for the corporation 
frustratingly explained of her job after being interrogated by local activists from Cluj 
in the dusty summer of 2013, “I toll the bells for the dead.” Such sentiments 
destabilize anticommunist notions of anti-capitalism being the domain of aberrant 
urban youth, and of zombie socialism. 
As Roşia Montană increasingly becomes ghostly, despite ongoing resistance 
from the Save Roşia Montană movement, not all people, and not all dead, are equally 
impacted. Disproportionately Roma people are faced with contaminants. Unlike other 
villagers in Roşia Montană, many Roma live in Gura Roşiei at the bottom of the 
valley. Many once worked for the state mine, but now live in abject conditions, 
unemployed, lacking sewage and running water. As an older woman from the region 
explained during a visit to Cluj, yes, the cyanide tailings from the dam outside her 
house, a result of socialist practices, are toxic, at least during socialism, she and other 
Roma there had jobs. While many Roma would work for RMGC in a heartbeat, 
institutional racism denies them jobs. Further, everyone around her is sick, or in Julie 
Sze’s words, “technologically polluted” (2006). In 2012, a Roma man and former 
miner, Uasile Mocioiu, died after a ten-year battle with cancer, having had no access 
to employment since socialism. Not only are Roma foreclosed recognition as human 
by postsocialist racial technologies, but further they are rendered as contaminable by 
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global capital. For instance, RMGC wants to convert the nearby Corna Valley into a 
giant cyanide tailing pond, right above Gura Roşiei. Effectively, Gabriel is thus 
attempting to convert both ecological lifeworlds but also human lives into what Tracy 
Voyles describes as a wasteland, an undesirable space but also a “racial and spatial 
signifier that renders an environment and that bodies that inhabit pollutable” (2015, 
9). In this sense, postsocialist technological projects have seen race and space become 
tethered in the social construction of whose lifeworlds are rendered contaminable, 
allocated to become the maidane (wastelands), and whose are not. This is another of 
technofascism’s material effects. 
Despite the Roșia Montană movement’s increased liberalism and failures to 
address the deadly effects of racial capitalism entangled in the postsocialist 
neoliberalism, after months of protesting and successfully overcoming what was a 
media blackout, in the spring of 2014, public pressure worked. Thus, despite its 
problems, the protests did instigate change. Namely, Romania decided not to vote 
upon the law that would allow Gabriel to continue as planned. In return, the company 
threatened to take Romania to an international arbitration court. Represented by the 
global law firm White & Case, in 2015 Gabriel filed a complaint against Romania in 
the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. In 
2014, White & Case defended a different Canadian gold mining operation in 
Venezuela. This–coupled with the sheer fact that nearly half the cases settled by the 
World Bank champion corporations, and that nearly 95 percent of known awards go 
to companies with at least one billion USD in annual revenue or to individuals worth 
over 100 million USD in net worth (Ciobanu 2015; Corporate Europe 2017, 4)–paints 
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a grim forecast of Romania’s ability to successfully combat global mining capital and 
its plantation logics. 
By plantation logics, I refer to what Anna Tsing describes as ecological 
simplifications in which living things and lifeworlds are converted into assets, 
producing virulence along the way (2016). Her metaphor, used to describe uneven, 
patchy conditions in the age of the Anthropocene, is especially important to also 
theorize alongside Robinson’s conceptual apparatus of racial capitalism (1983), 
which understands that from its origins, capitalism (plantation-like as it may be) has 
always depended upon the endurance of racism. Following Robinson as well as 
Wendy Chun’s call to think race and/as technology (2012), here I argue that 
plantation logics are only possible through the application of racial technocapitalism. 
This applies to all contexts described as the age of the Anthropocene, from urban to 
rural contexts alike. Writing about plantation logics, its temporality, and its 
geographies in and beyond US contexts, Katherine McKittrick suggests: 
 
The plantation thesis uncovers the interlocking workings of modernity and 
blackness, which culminate in long-standing, uneven racial geographies while 
also centralizing that the idea of the plantation is migratory. Thus, in 
agriculture, banking, and mining, in trade and tourism, and across other 
colonial and postcolonial spaces—the prison, the city, the resort—a plantation 
logic characteristic of (but not identical to) slavery emerges in the present both 
ideologically and materially (2013, 3). 
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In postsocialist Romania, plantation logics invoke earlier slave histories and their 
racial geographies, along with current contexts of global exploitation and techno-
imperialism. 
The debates coming out of the International Geological Congress as to when 
the Anthropocene—the geological era in which humans have incited irreparable harm 
upon the earth, forever altering its course—is now determined to have begun in 1950 
with the birth of the Cold War, nuclear testing, and plastics. Yet others have been 
arguing that the era began with the onset of Western colonialism, which destroyed 
Indigenous worlds irreparable, not to mention the planet’s carbon dioxide levels. 
Karen Barad asks, “Is there a sense of temporality that could provide a different way 
of positioning these markers of history and understand 1492 as living inside 1945, for 
example, and even vice versa?” (2017, 57). I bring this question up here to suggest 
that a post-Cold War framing of the Anthropocene, or what Jason Moore describes as 
“the Capitalocene” (2015), needs to attend to the racial and colonial elements of 
postsocialist transition, which live inside 1945, but also 1989. In the case of Romania, 
the imposition of Western capital and liberal democracy in fact reinterprets pre-
socialist understanding of space and race. Prior to socialism, Roșia Montană was 
mined by the Romans, the Germans, and the Austro-Hungarians. That it is now being 
mined by the imperiality of Canada, enabled by free trade mechanisms, should be of 
no surprise. 
Roşia Montană protests largely died down after 2014, with many activists 
considering their work successful. Yet Alburnus Maior organizers knew that the 
struggle was not over, and soon they drafted a petition to include Roșia Montană in 
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the UNESCO World Heritage. This, they suggested, might help in ongoing World 
Bank-level disputes. While Victor Ponta ignored their petition, after he resigned 
following the Colectiv fire, the new government decided to back the UNESCO 
application. In February 2016, the Roșia Montană region was added to Romania’s 
tentative list for new World Heritage sites, with support from the Union to Save 
Romania (Uniunea Salvaţi România/USR) heritage movement and Western Europe 
alike. However, in June 2018, news erupted that Romania had stymied heritage status 
allocation, arguing that inclusion might negatively impact the lawsuit against Gabriel. 
Small demonstrations ensued, with the objects of critique not the corporation and free 
trade, but rather corrupt politicians arbitrating on behalf of the state. While perhaps 
this is in part because protestors have now in their back pocket the knowledge that 
targeting politicians can be effective, nevertheless, their consolidating of a corrupt 
“Communist” enemy perpetuates zombie socialism. 
Organizing against Gabriel has nonetheless proved effective in curtailing the 
Canadian speculative project from materializing. This is not something to be taken 
lightly as it is no easy feat to pressure a government into standing up against a 
Western mining company. However, in blockading a form of financial speculation 
endemic to postsocialist times without critically examining them as postsocialist, 
other speculative futures emerge. These reify Romania’s backwardness and the need 
to exorcize all Communist specters from the aberration of socialist hauntology so that 
Western values can be finally be fulfilled. Protests are thereby more concerned with 
governmental corruption than the corruptive nature of racial technocapitalism, its 
plantation logics, and its largest beneficiaries—those of multinational zombie 
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socialist corporations and foreign investors. Indeed, postsocialist Romania is an apt 
space from which to theorize liberalism, late and otherwise. 
 
The Light Revolution 
In February 2017, Romania’s streets and cities lit up as nearly one million 
protestors gathered for days at a time, demanding an end to political corruption. 
Bigger than but building upon Roșia Montană organizing, demonstrators affiliated the 
ruling Social Democrat Party (Partidul Social Democrat/PSD) to the Red Scare” of 
socialist endurance, protestors organized what quickly became the largest collective 
protest since those that dismantled state socialism in December 1989. Referred to as 
#Rezist, vernacularly dialoguing with anti-Trump #Resist protests concurrently 
transpiring in the US, demonstrations also became known as part of the “Light 
Revolution,” referencing widespread utilization of digital, smart, and light-emitting 
technologies. For instance, hundreds of thousands of smartphones lit up Bucharest’s 
Victoriei Square on February 6th, nationalistically choreographed to display the 
country’s red, blue, and yellow ﬂag. Lasers projected gimmicky GIFs on the 
government building, depicting the ruling party as old, dark, and corrupt, and its 
leader, Liviu Dragnea, as poor and full of bad teeth. Millennial technology could now 
Trump the backwards, “socialist” party still in power, it was suggested. As one 
protestor’s sign read, in English, “FEAR OF THE DARK(nea).” Above him, EU and 
US ﬂags waved in the air, ﬂying above professionally printed signs appealing to the 
West for salvation from the Red Scare continuing to haunt the country. Signs with 
pictures of the EU flag and the English words “Save Us” and “Help Us” were held, 
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while hashtags circulated on social media such as #Rezist and 
#Worldagainstcorruption. Romania’s technological prowess, protestors demonstrated, 
was light years ahead of the decrepit backwardness that still occupies the government. 
By expunging the last remaining Communist specters, Romania could ﬁnally catch up 
to the West. 
Such aspirations of Western becoming can be traced back to the 
Enlightenment if not earlier in Romania, referencing peripheral subjectivities of never 
being quite modern, European, and technologically advanced enough. However, by 
framing Communism as a void, the Light Revolution expressed a speciﬁcally 
postsocialist temporality, one that understands history as written by Cold War victors. 
Telescoping zombie socialism, its mode of historiography ﬂatly elides other readings 
of state socialism in Romania, a project that was far from monolithic, one that for 
many offered housing, health care, employment, and education for the ﬁrst time in 
national history. For the country’s racialized poor, these have provisions that have 
been blown to the wind with post-89 injections of shock capitalism, leading to new 
contexts of racial dispossession. This is not to glorify state socialism either, as of 
course, there were numerous horrors, especially in the 1980s as Nicolae Ceaușescu 
became more authoritarian, but it is to question how Communism gets repeatedly 
framed and internalized as backward. It is to ask why the socialist period gets written 
as fascistic and behind liberal progressivism, ignoring its explicitly antifascist and 
anti-capitalist underpinnings. Why does the consolidation of postsocialist historical 
time hinge upon the integration of the East into Western order, yet at the same time, 
maintain what Petrovszky and Țichindeleanu describe as an Eastern “ontological time 
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lapse behind the authentic present of the Free World”? The West needs the East to 
remain abnormal, and so thus begins, they write, “the long durée of ‘transition,’ the 
transition to ‘normality’” (Petrovszky and Țichindeleanu 2011, 42). 
Straightjacketing the horrors of Ceaușescu onto the Communist project, a 
Cold War narrative structure endures, imposing a continual need for Romanians to 
prove they have moved beyond their backward socialist past. In the case of the Light 
Revolution, by appealing to the West for salvation, and by utilizing new forms of 
technology, #Rezist protestors attempted to restage the death of Ceaușescu, imagining 
that this time, they could effectively lustrate their backwardness and thereby enter the 
global time of postsocialist neoliberalism. Yet this was not the ﬁrst restaging of 
Ceaușescu’s death in an attempt to reach the vanishing point of normality. In 2003, 
the artist Dumitru Gorzo famously stenciled images of Ceaușescu across Bucharest 
with the text, “VIN ÎN 5 MINUTE (Back in 5 Minutes),” inferring fear that the 
former leader would return despite his ’89 execution (Pusca 2016, 32). In 2010, this 
phobia manifested in the Ceaușescus’ bodies being unearthed for DNA testing, just to 
make sure that they were truly dead. As such, the Light Revolution can be read as part 
of longer lineage of anticommunist restaging. 
However, unlike past reenactments, the Light Revolution brought young 
people into the physical spaces that their parents stood in 1989. As one man’s placard 
in Piața Victoriei spelled out, also in English, “WE WILL STAND OUR GROUND 
LIKE OUR PARENTS DID IN ’89.” This mimicry, strongest amongst the young 
aspirational middle class, presumes that contemporary government corruption is 
linked to failed post-1989 lustration. This framing erases the role that the West has 
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played both in Romania’s contemporary economic hardships vis-a-vis postsocialist 
disaster capitalism, and in the formation of Romanian middle-class aspirational 
subjectivities (Țichindeleanu 2017). It also undermines a rich history of post-1989 
protests, from those against crony capitalism of the 1990s, the 2008 anti-NATO 
organizing, the 2012 anti-austerity protests (sparked by outrage against a healthcare 
reform), and the anti-globalization Roșia Montana demonstrations of 2013. 
Anticorruption framing in Romania is important to theorize alongside that 
within other postsocialist countries, from Slovenia to Bosnia. While in some 
postsocialist contexts, anticorruption protests align with anti-authoritarian and anti-
capitalist politics, in others, they have stymied movements by positing conservative 
regime change as solution. As Yurchak argues, narratives of corruption also have the 
power to divorce a country from its geopolitical contexts, “reducing it to a zone that is 
subjected to its own internal logic of authoritarianism” (2017, 3). The fascination with 
corruption is endemic to postsocialist Romania, where more politicians have been 
jailed for corruption over the past decade than in all of Eastern Europe combined, 
often rounded up by the Direcţia Naţională Anticorupţie (DNA), a body founded in 
2005 by an EU directive. In fact, the Light Revolution erupted after Dragnea’s 
government introduced a bill that would decriminalize bribes up to £38,865, a 
political move that sparked outrage among a corruption-obsessed population. 
However, what is of interest here is less ongoing governmental corruption, but 
rather the obsession with cleansing the nation of corrupt politicians (rather than of 
multinational corporations) to collectively advance into the European body (imagined 
as anti-corrupt). As Alexander Clapp articulates, 
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One of the great successes of the DNA has been its ability to use middle-class 
protests to control Europe’s vision of Romania today. Those who join the 
street movements admire it out of a mixture of naivety and fear of what 
Romania has been. It is a generation whose memory of communism is that of 
the austerity decade into which they were born, and who were raised in the 
wild-turf capitalism of the 1990s. Not only has their prosperity come from the 
inﬂux of multinationals, whose CEOs now take to the streets with them in 
protest; so have many of their progressive values (2017). 
 
Yet while the DNA, supported by NATO, rounds up politicians in the name of 
European liberalism, its jurisdiction does not extend to multinational corporations, 
which arguably are most responsible for contexts of postsocialist economic 
devastation. As CrimethInc authors contextualize, “Anti-corruption discourse has 
served to rally people to coordinate their own colonization and exploitation by 
Western capitalists in the name of anti-communism” (Anonymous 2017). 
Romanian protests of the last ﬁve years have witnessed not only an increased 
neoliberal fervor among participants, but also an increased anticorruption politic 
pivoted against the Red Plague of the PSD. This sentiment grew in 2015, when 
protests broke out after an accidental and deadly ﬁre in the nightclub, Colectiv. 
Protestors blamed the government for dodging the regulating of permits and incited 
the resignation of then PSD Prime Minister Victor Ponta. Anti-PSD sentiment was 
further ﬂamed in early 2017 after the party won the national election. While the PSD 
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is undoubtedly corrupt, maﬁaistic, and neoliberal in its core, so is the rival party that 
many #Rezist protestors support—the National Liberal Party (Partidul Național 
Liberal/PNL). If anything, the main difference between these two dominant rival 
parties—the PSD the party of the current government, and the PNL that of the current 
president—is that the PSD enjoys most of its support from rural, poor, small-town, 
and senior populations, and the PNL from millennial urbanites. This is not to say that 
the PSD represents the poor—far from it—but at times, it has worked for a patriarchal 
system of redistribution that at least partially beneﬁts them (Poenaru 2017). 
Meanwhile the PNL is understood as “more European,” parading a president, Klaus 
Iohannis that many speculate won the election based upon his ethnic German 
heritage, supposedly signifying his “inherent Western superiority.” While PSD 
supporters did organize counter demonstrations outside of the main stage of police-
protected protestors, many of whom were likely paid, they nevertheless were met 
with violence by #Rezistors, who launched anticommunist virulence against them.  
Yet #Rezistors were largely praised for their positivity in the media, also 
enjoying support from multinational corporations who gave their employees time off 
to attend. The Jandarmeria, Romania’s military police, was made famous for holding 
heart-shaped balloons at the protests, and even the head of Raiffeisen Bank attended a 
demonstration in Cluj with his family. Meanwhile, McDonalds offered protestors free 
tea so that they could stay warm and rehydrate, and Iohannis himself participated in 
the demonstrations early on. At one point, a US state department representative 
described the protests as a “sea of humanity” to a cohort of US students new to 
Romania, praising that there was nothing anarchistic or antiglobal about them. As he 
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extoled, even though Piața Victoriei is surrounded by big banks, none of them had 
their windows smashed, and everyone respected the police. 
Romania’s Light Revolution, while creating a safe space for police, banks, 
nationalism, and even the president, did not create any semblance of safety for 
antifascist organizers, who have been increasingly marginalized in anticorruption 
demonstrations over the last ﬁve years. Often when antifascist and anti-capitalist 
groups attend contemporary these protests, they are scoffed at by more liberal 
protestors and told to take down their banners—a far leap from the anti-NATO and 
anti-austerity protests of years earlier. By barring antifascist and anti-capitalist 
protestors, the space of protest becomes safer not only for banks and police but also 
far right members of the Nouă Dreapta (New Right) and the homophobic Coaliția 
pentru Familie (Coalition for the Family). As such, arguably the liberalization and 
depoliticization of public space enable the growth of fascism and its 
homophobic/techno-normative ethos. 
This trend is deeply connected to Romanian urban property history, one that 
preceded the Communist socialist era, yet that today is reinterpreted through zombie 
socialism liberalization of and shifting understandings of private and public space. It 
was during the interwar era that Bucharest saw the “golden age” of urban 
development, becoming known by many as the “Little Paris of the East.” This was 
also the age of intensiﬁed fascism, marked by intense anti-Roma and anti-Semitic 
racism. The Communist regime arose to squash the fascist movement and the 
classism that backed it. Soon after, the party initiated an intensive urbanization 
project, including a housing nationalization policy. Mandating that owners of multiple 
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properties give up excess units, the state moved new residents in, including the 
racialized poor. Most of this occurred in older city centers, while new socialist 
modernist buildings were erected in the semiperipheries (Chelcea 2012). Decades 
later, after transition, EU-supported urban housing restitution policies were 
implemented to return formerly nationalized buildings to descendants of prior 
owners. Interpreting Communism socialism as aberration, retrocession laws have 
thereby facilitated the reclamation of former wealth. Signiﬁcantly, this has incited a 
widespread trend of racial evictions in urban centers (Vincze 2017). 
As postsocialist restitution signiﬁed a technofascist return to pre-socialist 
wealth and the valorization of private property, so did an emergent architectural 
heritage movement, one that initially rose against capitalist interests, but that soon 
became absorbed by them, as well as by veneration of fascist times. By glossing 
through the movement here, I speciﬁcally aim to highlight the modes in which it 
preﬁgures the liberalism of the Light Revolution. By the late 1990s, real estate 
speculators discovered Bucharest, wrecked by transition, as an easily exploitative 
space, and unofﬁcial development became orchestrated outside of ofﬁcial city plans. 
As Ioana Florea ﬁnds, architects, planners, and proponents of urban beautiﬁcation 
understood this orchestration as part of “derogatory urbanism,” fearing that new 
development would destroy golden era architecture. Relatively small protests 
emerged in 2005 and 2006 to protect old buildings, led by architects and students, 
some of whom soon formed NGOs. Expressing pre-socialist nostalgia, these groups 
framed themselves as a cultural movement backed by expert knowledge. Soon 
conservative and nationalist groups desirous of reinstalling pre-socialist urban 
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identity joined in, and by 2008, the Association to Save Bucharest (Asociatia Salvaţi 
Bucureştiul/ASB) Party emerged. 2008 and 2009 saw frequent small protests outside 
of the parliament, which included mock funerals mourning the loss of historic 
buildings while mocking corrupt ofﬁcials. However, rather, than mourn those being 
dispossessed from their homes through property restitution, this growing heritage 
movement was more concerned with pre-socialist buildings and symbolic capital. In 
2015, the ASB grew into the Union to Save Romania (Uniunea Salvaţi 
România/USR), led by mathematician Nicușor Dan, an increasingly public ﬁgure. 
The party has established itself as one of the strongest in the administration, and now 
is the second most popular in Bucharest, after the PNL. Anti-corruption is one of its 
central tenets, and numerous USR supporters made up Light Revolution constituents. 
The interests of this heritage movement grew visibility in 2010, when the City 
Hall obtained the right to construct a “North–South middle line” through Bucharest—
a throughway project ﬁrst conceived of in the 1930s intended to connect the 
Government at Victoriei to the Parliament further south, widening the streets along 
Buzești-Berzei. When implemented, this project led to the destruction of 98 buildings 
and the evacuation of 1,000 people in the Matache neighborhood, most of whom were 
Roma. While anti-eviction protests did transpire, most of the resistance to the project 
was instead led by the heritage movement, upset about the destruction of the 100-
year-old Matache market.  
For instance, in a ﬁlm made Dragoș Lumpan to commemorate the loss, those 
displaced by the development project were only mentioned peripherally. Instead, 
most prominently featured were architects and planners bemoaning the corruption of 
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the former and corrupt major, Sorin Oprescu, who saw the project through. As several 
architectures argued, the problem is that Oprescu and the planners that implemented it 
are just “little Ceaușescus” who think that they can redevelop and cut through the 
city, however they like, destroying historical value. In a screening of the ﬁlm, 
Lumpan made similar remarks, grieving the loss of the market while referring to 
those displaced with overtly anti-Roma, anti-queer, and anti-sex-worker language. In 
the words of Ann Stoler: 
 
There are resurrected ruins, like those . . . part of the World Bank–UNESCO 
cultural heritage projects designed to “harvest the economic value” and 
capitalize on the allure of partially restored people and things. Such 
restorations disperse and redistribute people, making their ways of being vital 
to national development and productive of new inequalities. Then there are 
those ruins that stirred Jamaica Kincaid’s derisive and angry view of Antigua, 
marked with buildings whose faded placards note “repairs pending” for 
decades, while damaged but “splendid old buildings from colonial times” are 
well maintained in carefully tended disrepair (2008, 198). 
 
This aligns with Yukiko Koga’s understanding of “colonial inheritance” of Japanese 
imperialism in China, what she describes as the “capitalization of colonial remnants” 
such as architecture and factories (2016, 3). As Lumpan’s film well reveals, pre-
socialist and socialist-era ruins are bestowed differential values, inferring different 
futures of inheritance. 
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The tension between pre-socialist aesthetic value and the livelihood of those 
dispossessed by postsocialist the installation of such value came to a head in 2012, 
when an old building in the city center, Carol 53, was bestowed historic value and 
granted both restitution and restoration. The heir, a famous architect and senior 
member of the heritage movement, evicted a large Roma family who had been 
squatting there for years. He then handed the building over to a collective of young 
artists and architects, who began a “cultural” co-living/working project, describing 
themselves as “squatters,” giving presentations and tours within and beyond 
Romania. Florea argues that Carol 53 perfectly represents the violence of the heritage 
movement: “With ‘Little Paris’ being negotiated as its identity symbol and its vision 
of what is valuable, the movement found itself in a process of excluding all those 
groups not ﬁtting into or not adhering to this cultural value system—such as the poor, 
the Roma, the uneducated, the less educated, the less urbanized dwellers” (2016, 74). 
This cultural value system is often shared by those protesting the Red Scare in Piața 
Victoriei, a plaza incidentally now more connected to the Parliament, thanks to the 
Buzești-Berzei development, and more well known to the West, thanks to the sea of 
smartphones lights beaming outward. 
Indeed, the Western liberal media received Light Revolution light-wave 
transmissions instantaneously. Uncritically, outlets ranging from Al Jazeera and 
Democracy Now to the New York Times reported on the sea of humanity bearing its 
face across Romania. Focusing on the massive show of force against the corrupt 
government, the media was not shy in implying that if Romanians could take to the 
streets in such strong numbers, surely US Trump dissenters could as well. If Rezist 
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was initially inspired by Resist, now Resistors should, it seemed, gain inspiration 
from Rezistors. This aspirational dialecticism marks an emerging paradox in liberal 
teleology, one endemic to its anticommunist condition. How, if postsocialist Romania 
has been conditioned by the West to be inherently behind, can its cultures of dissent 
be suddenly read as more progressive? 
Of importance here is that both Rezist and Resist protests pin down a timeline 
that understands progress as a move from authoritarianism toward liberalism, per 
Singh’s analysis. In the case of Romania, allegations of authoritarianism are used to 
directly scapegoat the Communist past as source of blame for current conditions of 
austerity, corruption, and “backwardness,” rather than the violence and failures of 
disaster capitalism. To reverse this postsocialist retrograde, a return to Little Paris 
golden era is posited as one solution, while adaptation into the contemporary Western 
body is offered as another. Both of course ultimately link back to longstanding desires 
to become Europe. Meanwhile, in the US, liberal democrats blame Russian 
interference for Trump’s victory, often borrowing Cold War grammars and projecting 
neo-McCarthyistic hysteria to pin down their case against illiberal hacking 
interference. Massive street protests backed by technological prowess in public space, 
proponents of liberal democracy allege, are one means of moving away from 
authoritarianism and toward liberal futurity. As Bruce O’Neill suggests, “But as those 
standing in the squares across Romania maintained, there is a deeper threat that can 
all too easily get lost amid the rhythm of everyday life: corruption kills. Rather than 
wait to be swept up in the collateral damage, those in the West would be wise to 
follow Romania’s lead and demand rigorous accountability” (2018). Light 
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Revolutions, in other words, are part of a larger neoliberal arsenal determined to 
militate against postliberal possibilities by enticing post-Enlightenment dreams. 
Further, they entangle with pre-socialist, fascist “Golden Era” imaginaries, harkening 
to the postsocialist advent of technofascism. 
 
The Timpuri Noi (New Times) of IKEA 
In this last section, I delve into the liberal logics undergirding rural forest 
restitutions, teasing out how the zombie socialism that they rest upon is also tethered 
to urban renewal processes. I focus upon the role of the Swedish IKEA furniture 
company/real estate investor in rural and urban space alike. By disentangling its web 
of connections, and by reading the language of postsocialist restitution and renewal 
together, I question why Roma and Communist specters alike are interpreted as 
zombies by zombie socialist protest movements, while companies like IKEA are seen 
as means to Western modernity. Why is it that IKEA, while just as “corrupt” as 
Gabriel, and perhaps even more technocapitalist in both rural and urban spaces alike, 
it maintains the veneer of “progressive,” “modern,” and salvific in the popular 
imaginary? Why have protestors rushed to condemn Gabriel and the PSD, but IKEA, 
a techno-imperial monolith with fascist origins, is left alone? It seems that in 
postsocialist liberal times, the logics of technocapitalism, what is understood as a 
means to “development” remains “unprotestable.” Romania contains two-thirds of 
Europe’s virgin forests and the continent’s largest brown bear, lynx, and grey wolf 
populations. In 1984, it was determined that Romania contained 400,000 hectares of 
old-growth trees; twenty years later, in 2004, there were only 218,500 remaining 
174  
(Veen et al., 2010). A major wave of destruction took place after 1995, and then 
another later, after 2005, correlating with the passing of restitution laws. As of 2009, 
up to 45 percent of previously national forests were restituted and therefore 
privatized, and it is predicted that soon two-thirds of all forests will be privatized 
(Abrudan et al. 2009; Ioras and Abrudan 2006). 
As in urban spaces, Roma residents bear the brunt of rural restitution far more 
than non-Roma. Like mining and Siliconization alike, forest clearcutting too is a form 
of racial technocapitalism. Not only were Roma dispossessed from collectivized 
agricultural and industrial projects after 1989, but further, under the pretext of land 
shortage, many Roma were denied the half a hectare of land otherwise gifted to 
socialist collective farm employees (Stewart 2002, 135). In forested regions such as 
Dragomiresți in Dâmboviţa County, despite that Roma had been working in the 
forests for generations, including during socialism, they received neither agricultural 
nor forest land after 1989 as they had not owned the land beforehand (Sikor et al. 
2009, 183). Thus in 2003, they began illegally cutting large timber (rather than simply 
gathering underbrush for broom making and firewood as they had been doing 
previously), selling it to wholesalers in southern Romania for profit. In response, new 
forest owners have mobilized anti-Roma racial stereotypes, declaring that Roma 
“should be killed since they are not good for anything else but stealing our forest” 
(quoted in Sikor et al. 2009, 184). Thus, as with urban restitution, the racist histories 
that preceded 1946 have been invoked after 1989 to pathologize Roma for never 
having been pre-socialist landowners – punishing and further racializing them for 
slavery and its after effects. While large lumber companies, the Orthodox Church, 
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and real estate mafia collectives benefit from privatization, buying up small plots 
from former owners, many of whom are poor, for profit, the Swedish IKEA furniture 
company profits most. 
IKEA, one of the planet’s largest furniture suppliers, is said to use one percent 
of global wood supply each year to produce roughly 100 million pieces “smart” 
furniture (Bojin et al. 2016). IKEA was founded by the then 17-year old Ingvar 
Kamprad in 1943. Kamprad passed away in early 2018 as one of the world’s 
wealthiest people. The same year that he founded IKEA, naming it after his initials as 
well as his childhood farm (Elmtaryd) and village (Agunnaryd), he became Member 
No. 4,014 of the Swedish fascist party, Socialist Unity. There, he emerged as an 
enthusiastic Nazi sympathizer, contributing to party meetings even after World War II 
ended, recruiting and fundraising for it (Asbrink 2018). He also maintained ties with 
the Swedish fascist leader Per Engdahl, who he publicly supported even in 2011.9 
Since its 1943 origins, IKEA has expanded across the globe, today owning 
and operates 415 stores in 49 countries. It also owns TaskRabbit, the San Francisco-
based gig-economy platform known, like Uber, to exploit workers and deny them 
benefits. Aimed to “revolutionize the world’s labor force,” the company, a 2008 
startup founded by a former IBM software engineer, not only exploits its own 
“Taskers,” but further has been shown to racially discriminate against potential clients 
(Butler 2017). In this way, the roots of the company, laden in fascism, have laid the 
bedrock for its techno-imperial present. Like other tech companies, IKEA offshores 
its financing through complex networks, allegedly avoiding paying one billion euro in 
taxes between 2010 and 2016 (Chee 2016). In addition, it is part of entangled 
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property networks, some of which are also designed to maximize profit and exploit 
Romanian forests, which I elaborate upon here. 
While IKEA sets the bar for chic modernist smart home décor, racial 
technocapitalism, and techno-imperial practices, Harvard University also stands in for 
US political and academic superiority, having produced eight US presidents. And 
somehow, both IKEA and Harvard became embroiled in Romanian courts for illegal 
forest restitution investments. The business dealings between the two mega entities 
are muddy and complex, endemic to the age of property financialization, but also to 
postsocialist restitution schemas and what Verdery describes as post-1989 “fuzzy 
property rights” (1999). While today blame is placed upon corrupt individuals 
involved in the dealings, here I argue that it is more productive to focus upon how 
restitutions are processes designed to benefit the West and Western aspirations while 
reinstating fascist relations, coded in the language of technoliberalism. 
Investigative work by Daniel Bojin, Paul Radu, Hans Strandberg (2016) has 
found that Harvard and IKEA began their tryst in 2004, when Harvard designated a 
Romanian man from Sohodol, Dragoș Lipan, as its land purchasing business 
representative. On the same day that Harvard employed Lipan in Sohodol, a 
commercial company Oriolus Limited, came into being, established by four Swedes 
who authorized Lipan’s first land purchase. In 2010, Harvard became the largest 
private owner of forests in Romania, managing over $100 million of Romanian 
investments through the Boston-based tax-exempt Phemus Corporation. Eventually, 
some of Lipan’s dealings surfaced as illegal, and so to extricate itself, Harvard set up 
a new business scheme, funneling transactions through Delaware, Luxembourg, 
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Sweden, and Romania. Then, in 2015, after Lipan was sentenced for corruption, 
Harvard brusquely sold the majority of its property to IKEA in what became its 
largest transaction in raw forest, valued at $62.6 million (Bojin et al. 2016).10 Today, 
IKEA owns 90 forests in 21 Romanian counties, totaling 33,000 hectares. The trees in 
these forests are now slated to become smart furniture, sold around the globe, 
including in Romania. 
Bucharest is currently in the process of building its second IKEA store, and 
Timișoara already has one. But nevertheless, most of Romania’s forests are not slated 
to be transformed into Romanian furniture, unlike during socialism when furniture 
production and sales largely remained domestic affairs. Bojin, Radu, and Strandberg 
attribute the Harvard-IKEA phenomenon to corruption, in which “crooked 
businessmen and dirty politicians seized the moment, forging documents and 
claiming forests that had never belonged to them or to their ancestors. In many cases, 
fake relatives armed with piles of forged paperwork claimed some of the last standing 
old-growth forests in Europe and quickly sold them to foreign companies who poured 
tens of millions of dollars into such deals hoping for great returns” (2016). However, 
arguably the Harvard-IKEA transactions are not so out of the ordinary and rather, as 
with Gabriel, indexical of techno-imperialism in postsocialist contexts. 
However, even during socialism, IKEA and Romania maintained a complex 
relationship. Declassified files at the National College for Studying the Securitate 
Archives have shown that IKEA had made an agreement in 1981 with the Romanian 
state-run timber company, Tehnoforestexport, to be overcharged for products 
produced in Romania (Rosca 2014). The Securitate utilized a special foreign trade 
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company, ICE Dunarea, to skim capital from the transactions. A 1986 memo from the 
“Ministry of Interior, Department of State Security, Military Unit 0544,” marked 
“Top Secret, sole copy,” elaborates that the “Scandinavica currency collection 
operation" emerged "with the aim of receiving foreign currency through over-billing 
the payments made in the contract between ICE Tehnoforestexport with IKEA of 
Sweden, valued at 97m Swedish crowns (13.6m US dollars).” In addition, “IKEA 
transferred in our transitory account the sum of 163,005.201 Swedish crowns.” Other 
documents show overseas payments made to a bank in East Berlin, where, during the 
Cold War, IKEA forced East German political prisoners to produce and assemble 
products (Connolly 2012). Allegedly, per Scandinavica, Operation Securitate would 
pay IKEA back, accruing large interest sums along the way. IKEA claims to have 
seen the transaction as a sort of commission (Rosca 2014), a practice today that 
Rezist protestors would rally against as corruption. 
However, unlike resistance to Gabriel via Salvați Roșia Montană, there have 
been no massive urban street protests to challenge techno-imperial forestry and 
postsocialist rural restitutions. While Greenpeace is actively fighting back, as is the 
smaller activist-based Eco Ruralis Association in Cluj, and while investigative 
journalists from projects such as RISE are documenting forest corruption, there is no 
massive movement aimed against IKEA. Several environmental activists have told 
me that lack of widescale organizing around forest restitutions and land-grabbing 
more broadly can in part be attributed to a dominant narrative that understands 
restitutions as a means of postsocialist transitional justice, and in part to the large 
concentration of anti-capitalist activists in urban centers too removed from rural 
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contexts. 
Others have described the love affair that Romania has with IKEA, in which 
the company’s smart furniture is read as a means of urban modernity and 
technological savviness. While there was no natural affinity to Gabriel or its mineral 
products, IKEA is a different story, friends have described. Even if IKEA is not 
offering Romania reparations for stolen trees and consequential ecological 
devastation, IKEA still offers the aesthetic dream of Western modernity, now 
available online and in urban retail stores. Having spent days in IKEA’s branch near 
the Bucharest airport observing transactions and talking to customers in the store’s 
relatively affordable canteen, I’ve heard countless tales of people taking the long trip 
there on the 783 bus just to hang out and eat a meal, and maybe to buy something 
small downstairs. One middle-aged man told me that he loves going to IKEA because 
his family had no furniture options during socialism, and now he can transform his 
socialist-built flat into any interior style that he so chooses, as long as the components 
are in IKEA. Yet most people can’t afford IKEA’s furniture products, but still enjoy 
being in their proximity. “It’s like going to the mall,” several people mentioned, 
alluding to the array of malls that sprung up in Bucharest in the early 2000s. Filled 
with Western clothing stores, Starbucks coffee shops, Belgian-owned Mega Image 
grocery stores, and more, the malls themselves have become postsocialist and at times 
gentrifying spaces that people go to for proximity to unaffordable products and 
lifestyle fantasies. Many malls also have World Class gyms, also founded in Sweden, 
which have aggressively targeted the Eastern European market after socialism. 
While IKEA’s techno-imperialism in Romania’s forests may be rendered non-
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threatening through the company’s urban aesthetic appeal, it has found more material 
ways of rendering itself as salvific in Bucharest’s postsocialist urban renewal. 
Beginning in 2008, Interprime Properties the investment fund, which is part of IKEA, 
fixed its eyes on socialist-era industrial sites that it hoped to redevelop into high-end 
office buildings, mostly for tech. In 2010, the 53,000 square meter plot that was once 
the Timpuri Noi (New Times, also New Age) Industrial Platform and Metal Works, 
was purchased by Interprime Properties for 34.6 million euro. First established during 
the second half of the 19th century, the Timpuri Noi factory was an industrial 
stronghold during socialism, producing compressors, pumps, plant materials, and the 
country’s only small and medium capacity compressors (Moga and David, 2010). To 
facilitate worker transport, Bucharest’s first metro line opened in 1979 to connect 
Timpuri Noi with Semănătoarea (now rebranded as Petrache Poenaru), then the city’s 
industrial agricultural hub. Today, Semănătoarea mostly functions as Sema Park, an 
IT office complex. Like Semănătoarea factories, Timpuri Noi Metal Works struggled 
to survive post-1989. There were 2,700 employees working for the company in 1990; 
in 2011, there were only 130 remaining (Cojocar 2011; Moga and David 2010). 
Withering, in 2010, it relocated to Jilava, 40 kilometers outside of Bucharest, placing 
the land and crumbling buildings on the market. 
Like with forest restitutions, the financial mechanisms behind IKEA’s urban 
redevelopment are complex and entangled, characteristic of global capital 
technologies of ownership. Interprime Properties, owned by the Inter-IKEA Group 
and the Inter-IKEA Property Division, was founded Kamprad in 1989. Since then it 
has been conducting real estate transactions in Europe, in both postsocialist and 
181  
Western countries, offshoring capital in the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, Curaçao, the Virgin Islands, and Cyprus (The Local 2011). In 2014, 
Interprime became Vastint Romania S.R.L., a subsidiary of Vastint Holding B.V., the 
latter the holding company of the holding company of the Inter IKEA Property 
Division. “Vastint” is technically an abbreviation for “Vastgoed Internationaal,” 
which means “International Real Estate” in Dutch. The Swiss Interogo Foundation 
now owns both Vastint and the IKEA group, which Kamprad secretly created in 1989 
to hold his company’s assets (The Local 2011). 
Today, what was once the Timpuri Noi Industrial Platform has been 
demolished and redeveloped into Timpuri Noi Square, flashing the Vastint logo on 
one of its tall glass towers. Everything took a bit longer than planned in part because 
three buildings from Timpuri Noi Metalworks could not be demolished due their 
heritage status (Chelcea 2015, 194). Soon enough though, the heritage buildings 
vanished, presumably “collapsing in on themselves” as is often the case in such 
scenarios. Two of the site’s three buildings were inaugurated in 2017, and by 2018, 
they had reached a 90 percent occupancy rating. Mostly rented by IT companies, 
financial services, and professional services, companies include Go Pro, Sephora, 
VWR International, Phoenix Contact, Kruk, Kiss FM, Fratelli, Impact Hub, DCS 
Plus, Netcentric, Tremend and Zitec. Roughly 3,000 IT specialists now work there, 
and more will join soon after the third office building is completed. Meanwhile, 
Vastint has launched two other development projects in the city—the Bucharest 
Business Garden and a new site in Şişeşti. 
Having lived nearby the Timpuri Noi complex for over two years during my 
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fieldwork in Romania, I saw it transform dramatically. Numerous residential 
buildings have been modernized in the otherwise working-class neighborhood 
between Timpuri Noi and Vitan. Seemingly overnight, in 2018, numerous food trucks 
began showing up during lunch offering sushi, burgers, and more. It is not working-
class factory workers queuing up for expensive truck food as with the surrounding 
canteens of the former Metalworks. Meanwhile rents have gone up in the 
neighborhood, while the lawn across Timpuri Noi Square maintains a manicured 
aesthetic otherwise out-of-joint in the region. 
Even though there is ample evidence of IKEA’s “corruption” in Romania, 
both pre and post-1989, in both rural and urban spaces alike, protests and cultures of 
dissent have been minimal at best. The heritage buildings that collapsed were not the 
site of heritage preservation protests, and the forest dealings between IKEA, Harvard, 
and the state are largely under the radar. Outside of a handful of housing and 
environmental justice activists, I’ve never heard any critique of IKEA, its history, or 
its involvement in urban restructuring and gentrification. Why is it that Roșia 
Montană protests arose to mobilize the urban masses, and why did those same people 
not rise up in the name of forest defense? Why are Rezistors targeting corrupt PSD 
politicians but not techno-imperialism, which depletes the country’s resources leading 
to economic contexts in which corruption becomes one of many responses? Singing 
of corruption in Nigeria, the artist Falz (Folarin Falana) suggests, “We operate a 
predatory, neo-colonial capitalist system, which is founded on fraud and exploitation. 
And therefore, we are bound to have corruption institutionalized” (qtd. in Ogundoro 
2018). As much as this holds true in Nigeria, so does it in Romania. And arguably, so 
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does it in the United States. However, when looking to cultures of protest and 
“Rezistance,” it is important to theorize the ways in which liberalism and zombie 
socialism operate to keep revolution a distant fantasy, one increasingly 
incomprehensible in Piața Victoriei and beyond where anti-capitalist sentiment is read 
as retrograde in Romania’s modernizing project. 
Stoler suggests, “Globalization may account for the dumping of toxic waste 
on the Ivory Coast but not the trajectory of its movement and the history that made 
west Africa a suitable and available site. Again, there are ruins of empire that are 
called ‘ruins’ as well as those that are not” (2008, 204). What are the ruins of 
postsocialist disaster capitalism as it entangles with Western techno-imperialism? 
Why is it that Romania has been slated as a place of extraction for the West, and why 
is it that Western fantasies keep possibilities of dissent at bay? Unlike Gabriel, IKEA 
after all is transforming Romania’s techno-urban landscapes along with rural ones. 
And yet, IKEA has also entangled with people’s domestic spaces and 
imaginaries in aspirational forms, engendering new forms of intimacy with the West. 
While Timpuri Noi Square, the alleged new heart of Bucharest, is undoubtedly 
connected to contexts of urban racial technocapitalism, instantiating new forms of 
gentrification, racial banishment, and socialist-era technological dispossession, 
zombie socialism holds the transformation in place, promising techno-utopic futures 
and new forms of what we might understand as a form of intimacy with the West. By 
this I mean promises of proximity through technological forms and fantasies, from 
pilgrimages to IKEA’s store to the placement of its products, many of which are 
made of Romanian lumber vis-à-vis IKEA’s own techno-imperialism, in one’s home, 
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dreams and materialities run deep. These fantasies and furniture worlds obviate the 
violence that the company produces, locally and globally. 
 
Impossible Spaces 
During the summer of 2018, a new wave of Rezist protests began to percolate 
in hot Bucharest streets. These, while supported by Rezistors, also became known as 
the Diaspora protests, or the Muie PSD. Provoked by ongoing PSD policies and laws 
deemed corrupt, these protests embraced Western values and Western technology 
even more so than the original Light Revolution protests of a year earlier. They were 
in part incited when a Romanian living in Sweden, Razvan Stefanescu, drove his 
Swedish-registered Audi to Bucharest with a license plate reading Muie PSD, slang 
for PSD cocksuckers. Muie technically comes from Romani, meaning mouth or to 
deceive, but non-Roma Romanians have been using it for decades as a perversion, 
often deracinated from its Roma origins. I’ve seen graffiti on numerous trains spell 
out Muie țiganilor, or “Gypsy cocksuckers,” racist, racially appropriative, and 
homophobic all at once. 
Upon arriving in Romania, Stefanescu was pulled over by the police, who 
confiscated his license plates claiming their invalidity. As they were valid throughout 
the EU, according to Sweden, this sparked an outrage, and a new resentment towards 
the police amongst the aspiring middle-class. The Diaspora protest, also marked by 
light shows and laser displays, took place on August 10, 2018, organized as an 
invitation for Romanians living abroad to return to Bucharest and demonstrate their 
dismay at the country’s corruption and more specifically, at the Muie PSD. The 
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protest of what was estimated to be roughly 70,000 people began non-violently, 
though I counted dozens and dozens of people with signs in Piața Victoriei depicting 
protestors raping the government, all hypermasculine and heteronormative. Others 
waved flags from their new countries, from the UK to the US. Others denounced the 
Red Plague, and someone even held a poster showing an evolution of socialists from 
Marx to Lenin to Dragnea. The only anti-police banner that I saw framed the police as 
corrupt for having confiscated Stefanescu’s license plate. Meanwhile, as in other 
Rezist protests, images circulated of Dragnea and PSD members in white and black 
striped jail suits, reveling in carceral aesthetics. 
The jandarmerie (military police) did begin spraying tear gas and protesters 
early into the night, and by 10pm, tensions erupted with the riot police throwing 
canisters into the masses, injuring up to 450 people. The internet subsequently 
exploded, mostly with people chiding the now violent PSD. En masse, people flooded 
the Gendarmerie’s Facebook page, giving it one-star ratings, displaying their 
disapproval. However, other observers were sure that the violence was an inside job 
orchestrated by the PNL or even USR to take down the PSD, as in the past the PSD 
had always supported protests such as the Diaspora. Regardless of conspiracy 
theories, what is significant here is that the protestors, framed as good Romanians 
working abroad, were again portrayed as technologically advanced, while the PSD 
was framed as backwards, homosexual, and corrupt. Images erupted of smartphone 
displays spelling out Muie PSD to mark the technological prowess of Romanians. 
Another image circulated on Facebook of screenshot of Google’s Waze mapping 
application, in which somehow the tile of the web-map itself had been hacked to read 
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Muie PSD outside of Iași. The caption read, in Romanian, “So I’m discussing with 
the Taxify taxi driver about tomorrow's protests outside of the government, and he 
invites me to look up Carrefour in Iași with Waze. I zoomed in upon the map. 
Priceless. Here’s how Romanians are good at IT.” Techno-normativity is expressed in 
numerous ways. 
While Muie PSD/Diaspora is the latest incantation of Rezist in Bucharest, 
there have been other eruptions in other Romanian cities since the first Light 
Revolution protests of early 2017. And repeatedly, these brush up against antiracist 
and anti-capitalist organizing, at times working against it. In December 2017, for 
instance, a small group of anti-eviction organizers gathered in Cluj to mark the seven-
year anniversary of a mass eviction that displaced over 300 Roma residents from the 
city center and forcibly relocated them to the local garbage dump outside of town. 
Gathering outside of Piața Unirii, the 75 or so protesters, many of whom had 
made their way back to the city from the waste site to advocate for antiracist social 
housing policies, were swallowed up in a mass of 3,000 Rezistors, still chanting 
against thievery, corruption, and Communism. While the housing justice protestors 
endured, eventually crawling out from the “sea of humanity” encompassing them, 
questions emerge as to what futures public space may hold when absorbed 
postsocialist neoliberalism. If liberal-oriented public square demonstrations have now 
become absorbed by light, colorful versions of zombie socialism, Western 
aspirational politics, and dissent against politicians rather than global capital, what 
liberatory future does public space still hold, if any? Unlike the public square that 
captured radical hopes a decade earlier across the globe, from the Indignados 
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movement to Tahrir Square, the contemporary postsocialist square has become one 
not of emancipatory politics but of neoliberal futurity. While Francis Fukuyama’s 
“end of history” never arrived after the collapse of the Berlin Wall—due to the 
proliferation of anti-capitalist alterities that have refused the time and space of post-
Cold War neoliberal globality—it seems that, just as capitalism endeavors to absorb 
all that it can, public space protests now are ﬁghting to ﬁnally materialize 
Fukuyama’s post-Cold War vision. 
In the Western left, public space, or the commons, is still largely understood 
as an anti-capitalist geography worth ﬁghting for. Theorized as a symbolic and 
material remnant of pre-capitalism, occupying and maintaining the commons is 
understood as a radical and necessary gesture in resisting the gentriﬁcation of urban 
space and the forces of privatization. But what happens when these very forces 
occupy the public square, protesting socialism’s endurance rather than heeding to 
calls made by those dispossessed by the ravages of postsocialist neoliberalism? As 
has been evidenced in Eastern Europe, particularly in Romania, both the public 
square and the mass protest have increasingly become coopted by Western 
aspirational fantasies of privatization and pre-socialist “golden eras” rather than those 
of anti-capitalist and antifascist futures. It is this that paves the way for fascism to 
take hold. If the West is to look toward the East for illiberal preﬁguration, it is 
imperative to look at the conditions than enable fascism rather than fall into the 
ahistorical trap that understands fascism as endemic to socialist/postsocialist Eastern 
Europe. And in Eastern Europe, if the liberal fantasy of public space and mass protest 
liberates nothing except global capital and fascism, perhaps it is time to imagine 
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dissent outside of the impossible space of the commons, refraining from dreams of 
transparency and enlightenment and instead embracing more covert, obscure, and 
commonist tactics. 
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Chapter 4: Postsocialism, Technofascism, and the Tech Boom 2.0: 
From Technologies of Racial/spatial Dispossession to the Dark 
Enlightenment 
 
It was in the midst of what in retrospect has been described as the “Battle of 
Berkeley,” or intensified conflicts between fascists and antifascists in Berkeley, 
California, in 2017, that the San Francisco Bay Area became a central spot on the 
map of growing right-wing organizing in the US. Following the presidential electoral 
victory of real estate mogul Donald J. Trump in 2016, numerous far-right, “alt-right,” 
“alt-light,” and other fascistic groups stockpiled white supremacist momentum far 
and wide. Berkeley, but also other Bay Area cities such as San Francisco and 
Oakland, emerged as key nodes in a growing constellation of far-right organizing but 
also antifascist resistance. Just as many people in the US, particularly those espousing 
more liberal politics, never expected Trump to actually win the election given the 
overt racism and sexism that he spewed throughout most of his campaign, very few 
people anticipated that the post-Cold War Bay Area would become a hub of fascist 
organizing. After all, while conflicts are nothing new in the region, particularly in the 
midst of the contemporary tech boom and the contexts of heightened racial 
dispossession that it incites, the region remains an area largely dominated by one 
liberal political party, where skirmishes between liberals and the radical left are 
presumed more likely than those between fascists and antifascists. 
Rather than spectacularize the unexpectedness of the Bay Area upon an ever-
shifting map of right-wing centralities here, rather I theorize the Bay Area, as post-
Cold War Silicon Valley’s urban backyard, as in fact constitutive of the rise of racial 
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technocapitalism and technofascism. By these, I refer to the ways in which racism 
and fascism materialize Silicon Valley technocapitalist urbanity. Here I accord with 
Mark Forman’s analysis that “The capital-F Fascism of authoritarian government is 
possible because of the lower case-f fascism that thrives in everyday life under 
capitalism” (2017). By this, he points to state-centered bureaucracy manufactured to 
produce obedience. But also, as he suggests, “Fascists march to war down roads that 
were paved by centuries of European colonialism and imperialism. The fascist 
discourse of national greatness is nothing more than a continuation of the nationalism 
of the imagined community constructed by the bourgeoisie.” Yet with imperialism 
now alive and well in the heart of post-Cold War Silicon Valley (Silicon Valley 
imperialism) and its landscapes of racial technocapitalism, fascism is being 
reconstituted in novel ways. Further, as Chris Wright observes (2017), in the 1930s, it 
was the power of labor organizing that kept the New Deal US from taking a fascist 
turn. Corporate-ruled governance gives way to new fascist possibilities, he warns. 
Such warnings of intimate futures between capitalism, imperialism, and 
fascism are important to take heed of in contexts of Silicon Valley imperialism, a 
condition in which Post-Cold War Silicon Valley’s growth is necessitated by its 
ongoing penetration into geographically global and intimate spaces alike. In post-
Cold War and now seemingly “postliberal” times, Silicon Valley imperialism 
strategically masks the racial dispossession and violence that it inheres under the veil 
of liberalism. At the same time, technofascism appropriates liberal and leftist 
language in order to galvanize power and space, invoking what Jodi Byrd, Alyosha 
Goldstein, Jodi Melamed, and Chandan Reddy describe as “propriation” (2019, 3). 
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By this, they refer to the inextricability of both expropriation and appropriation. 
Through propriation, fascist and racist collectives uniquely recycle Cold War enemies 
in order to maintain Silicon Valley’s imperiality, locally and globally. 
While other chapters in this dissertation specifically study Silicon Valley 
imperiality and its recoding of racial and fascist imperatives in formerly socialist 
space, here I am more interested in how it functions “at home.” At home, in the midst 
of the Bay Area’s ongoing crisis of racial dispossession most recently aggravated by 
the current tech boom, or the Tech Boom 2.0, and amplified with Trumpian 
technofascism, understandings of liberalism, fascism, socialism, and imperialism 
entangle in novel ways. This process in part invokes with what Neda Atanasoski and 
Kalinda Vora describe as technoliberalism. Technoliberalism, they suggest, points to 
contemporary reinterpretations of liberalism and fascism—twin pillars of US 
supremacy (2019, 24). The foundational fantasy of technoliberalism hinges upon 
postracial imaginaries, they observe, and can be traced through Cold War and now 
post-Cold War trajectories. As socialism emerged in order to combat fascism in 
Europe, as the Cold War hinged upon reifying illiberal socialist threat, and as the 
post-Cold War common time of Silicon Valley imperialism depends upon the 
supremacy of liberalism now suddenly threatened in the dawn of postliberal Trump, it 
makes sense that these concepts would be stirred up today. Here I look to how 
reinvigorations liberalism and fascism, as well as racism and imperialism, entangle in 
the post-Cold War Silicon moment. In particular, I assess how these entanglements 
inform the ongoing development of techno-urban space. 
This chapter centers upon the postsocialist spatiotemporality of Bay Area 
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gentrification, postracial liberalism, techno-utopics, technofascism, and antifascist 
dissent in the post-Cold War Bay Area. Postsocialist temporality here envelops the 
Tech 2.0 period, which follows the racial booms and busts of the late-1990s Dot Com 
Boom and the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis. The Cold War and its cessation, I 
argue, are key events in understanding the Bay Area’s tech booms. At the same time, 
Bay Area Siliconized geography is an apt spatiotemporality from which to theorize 
postsocialism. In this way, I read postsocialism as a heterogeneous and global 
condition, as well as an analytic entry point for understanding contemporary political 
rearrangements, continuities, and discontinuities that inform whiteness and liberalism 
in the Bay Area. Sharad Chari and Katherine Verdery offer, “A central task of 
ethnographies of imperialism and neo-colonialism today lies in apprehending the 
traces of the past as they emerge, not as hostage to the overarching power of 
‘capitalism,’ ‘colonialism,’ or ‘socialism’ qua fixed entities, but as signs of the 
tenuous re-workings of twentieth-century capitalist empires and their twenty-first-
century successors” (2009, 30). In reading contemporary Bay Area techno-urban 
transformations ethnographically, it becomes clear that regional racial, fascist, and 
liberal imaginaries today are not only haunted by, but also co-constitutive of, Cold 
War ghosts, posts, and updates. 
Racial dispossession in the Bay Area, popularly described as gentrification, 
has in large part ushered in by proponents of liberalism (McElroy and Szeto 2018). 
Yet new iterations of technofascism in the Tech 2.0 wake of Trump—from alt right 
websites and rallies for “free speech,” to fascist ideologies such as neoreaction (NRx) 
and the Dark Enlightenment—have shocked leftists and liberals alike. While the rise 
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in racist violence following Trump’s victory is real, here I am interested here in how 
liberal imaginaries position growing formations of fascism as equivalent to 
McCarthyistic constructions of illiberalism. Put otherwise, within liberal imaginaries, 
this moment of heightened fascist organizing in the heart of the techno-imperial free 
world collapses the imagined indestructability of Francis Fukuyama’s “end of 
history” following the disintegration of state socialism (2006). In the wake of Trump, 
Cold War battles for liberalism’s triumph are conjured anew, as has been particularly 
evidence by the liberal fears of Russia and Eastern European illiberalism emergent 
from liberal media and technocapitalist cyber security firms alike (Lemon 2018). Yet 
what is rarely acknowledged is that racial capitalism and fascism, while foundational 
to far-right onto-epistemologies and Cold War contexts alike, have dominated Bay 
Area landscapes long before the “Trumpocalypse” and the post-Cold War temporality 
that shelters it (Chung 2016; Maharawal and McElroy 2017; Ramirez 2017; Self 
2003). How can one trace these continuities and discontinuities through the Cold War 
and into its various posts? How is gentrification, as a mainstream descriptive of 
techno-urban change in the Bay Area inadequate in understanding this uncanny 
spatiotemporal conjuncture? 
Judith Butler suggests that the “new fascism” of the US marks a novel 
technology of liberal and leftist discursive appropriation by the right (2019). Indeed, 
from the 1960s free speech movement coopted by the alt-right on the University of 
California Berkeley’s campus to the language of antiracist housing justice struggles 
now vernacularly appropriated by the Bay Area’s racist pro-luxury development 
YIMBY (Yes in My Backyard) movement (funded by tech), there have been distinct 
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cannibalizations of Bay Area liberal and leftist Cold War discourse by proponents of 
white supremacy. While these appropriations transpire in parallel with broader Cold 
War national trends of absorbing antiracist politics into what Jodi Melamed describes 
as racial liberalism (2006), there are distinct cultural and geographic processes that 
inform their movements locally. As I argue, this is intimately wrapped in the unique 
space that the Bay Area and Silicon Valley have played throughout the Cold War and 
its liberal aftermaths. 
This chapter proceeds to frame Bay Area technologies of racial dispossession 
and resistance through postsocialist analytics, studying Silicon Valley Cold War 
techno-urban histories, as well as the impact of postsocialist transition upon the 
spatiotemporality of technocapitalist and anti-capitalist futures alike. By way of 
beginning, I introduce the landscape of Bay Area Tech Boom 2.0 techno-urban 
change, suggesting that postsocialist analytics offer a well-needed antidote to the 
myopic lens that gentrification theory often maintains. Then, commencing with the 
Cold War, I chronologically traverse through the Dot Com Boom and the 
postsocialist present, paying attention to how the cessation of the Cold War impacted 
Silicon Valley temporal and spatial reconfigurations. In addition, I study how 
technoliberalism is deployed by racial technocapitalism and technofascism, 
particularly in the case of YIMBY and alt-right technofascist ideology. How does this 
discursive appropriation mask the raciality of technocapitalism and Silicon Valley 
imperialism in post-Cold War times? I conclude by theorizing struggles against 
Silicon Valley imperialism and racial technocapitalism through postsocialist 
analytics, looking to spatiotemporal paralysis in the wake of technoliberalism and 
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fascism alike. But first, I begin by theorizing how postsocialism, as an analytic, offers 
key insights into the conceptualizing of what is otherwise today described as Bay 
Area gentrification. 
 
Gentrifying Postsocialism Studies or Postsocializing Gentrification Studies 
I could barely see the punches being thrown in front of me. The backyard of 
the East Bay Rats motorcycle club arena was beyond its saturation point with eager 
witnesses of the ‘Nihilists vs. Marxists” boxing match slowly unfolding, a 
complementary event to the annual East Bay Anarchist Book Fair. Another Saturday 
evening in West Oakland, emblazoned with rickety spotlights, tattered ropes, sweat, 
black leather, and cigarettes. Some moaned and others cheered as opponents were 
knocked to the ground in repetitive blows, indicating the ideological rise or fall of 
some semblance of an anti-capitalist future, of some mutation of an older logic 
intended to encapsulate and make sense of the contradictions, struggles, and sinkholes 
of a landscape entangled in broad strokes of disinvestment, reinvestment, 
deterritorialization, and reterritorialization, popularly discoursed today as 
“gentrification,” but also bearing other names and analytics (McElroy and Werth 
2019; Ramírez 2009). In this section, I ask how postsocialism, as an analytic, might 
supplement gentrification studies in order to assess techno-urban transformation in 
the midst of Bay Area Silicon Valley imperialism. 
It was just months before the boxing match, in late 2013, that an outburst of 
actions erupted intended to highlight the violence of Silicon Valley Tech Boom-
induced dispossession. Famously, many in boxing match crowd, but also many 
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others, set to task the blockading of tech buses (colloquially known as “Google 
Buses”) in San Francisco and Oakland—private shuttles from multiple tech 
corporations viscerally understood as agential in eviction and rental increases 
(Maharawal and McElroy 2018). While Silicon Valley impacted San Francisco’s 
urban landscape during the Dot Com Boom that followed the collapse of the Cold 
War and tech companies shifting from full reliance from the government to more 
consumerist-based models, it has been with the new era of the Tech Boom 2.0 that 
technocapitalist forces have found ways to penetrate Silicon Valley techno-urban 
peripheries in novel ways. While not conflating Bay Area urban centers with each 
other (McElroy and Werth 2019), and while not eliding the deeper and uneven 
histories of racial disposability upon which contemporary gentrification rests (Roy 
2017), it is worth noting that there have been novel shifts in Silicon Valley’s reach 
into both cities, with Google buses one of many technologies of infiltration. 
Disproportionately, young white men ride these buses, contributing to 
contexts of racial dispossession in Silicon Valley’s urban outposts. This spatial 
strategy is emblematic of Silicon Valley imperialism and its twin concept of racial 
technocapitalism alike. As I question here, why is it towards the post-Cold War Bay 
Area—a space that Richard Walker describes as home to a combination of “many of 
the largest and richest corporations astride the globe,” some of the leading political 
and cultural movements, and “a host of persistent problems, such as wildly gyrating 
growth, shamefully unaffordable housing, [and] ghastly homelessness” (2018, 1-2)—
that we must turn our analysis in order to understand the contemporary contours of 
white supremacy and its bizarre techno-entanglement with liberalism? Why is this 
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shift in purview especially important in the wake of what scholars of postsocialism 
are marking as the renewed “crisis of liberalism” (Dzenovska and Kurtović 2017), or 
a post-Cold War moment in which liberalism’s supposed immorality is thrown into 
question? And why might both Marxist and neo-Marxist accounts alike of 
gentrification fail to illuminate the raciality of the current moment, as well as the 
raciality upon which it rests? 
Postsocialist analytics allow for new conceptualizations of the Bay Area 
present, facilitating a particular unearthing of spatial, racial, and temporal 
technologies of dispossession in modes that traditional Marxist and neoliberal 
scholarship alike on gentrification rarely does, especially not outside of formerly 
state-socialist space. Such a utilization of postsocialist analytics, in the words of 
Atanasoski and Vora, must “dehomogenize the ‘socialism’ in postsocialism,’ while 
concurrently unmooring ‘(post)socialism from a particular geographic location” 
(2018, p. 5). This call aligns with Chari and Verdery’s provocation to consider how 
post-Cold War ethnographic practices might help make sense of myriad shifts in race 
and empire following the cessation of the Cold War on both sides of the former Iron 
Curtain (2009). As Shu-mei Shih argues, the Cold War and its collapse led to a 
remapping of the entire world and the formation of the Global North and South from 
the prior tripartite cartography, and thus postsocialism, as a condition, needs to be 
thought of as a condition affecting the entire globe (2012). Applying postsocialist 
analytics in theorizing dispossession and resistance in the Cold War and post-Cold 
War Bay Area unmoors techno-urban mutations from increasingly well-rehearsed 
gentrification studies debates (c.f. Bernt 2016; Werth and Marienthal 2016), offering 
198  
supplementary temporal and spatial frameworks.  
Ananya Roy suggests that current conversations on gentrification in urban 
studies often elide deeper histories of racism and raciality upon which contemporary 
transformations rest, or what she describes as racial banishment. As an antidote to this 
elision, Roy advocates for practices of “seeing from the South” (2018). This does not 
simply mean producing knowledge from or about cities in the South; rather, it means 
politicizing urban studies by continuously remaking it from its social and spatial 
margins. In this way, “the South is not a location,” but instead “a structural relation of 
space, power, and knowledge produced and maintained in the crucible of racial 
capitalism on a global scale” (2018). She writes of how, when beginning to critically 
engage with the field of urban studies as an undergraduate student at Mills College in 
East Oakland, it quickly became clear that the liberal and later neo-Marxist theories 
that she encountered in were unable to grasp both her native India, but also the 
impoverished Black and Latinx neighborhoods just beyond the campus. “The south 
was, I realized, never just Kolkata,” she writes. Instead, “It was all of those places 
that the canon of theory could not make sense of except in quite dystopian ways” 
(Roy and Bhan 2013). Inspired by her re-spatialization of the South in order to 
understand racial banishment in Oakland, here I remap postsocialism in order to 
understand techno-imperialism and racial technocapitalism in the Bay Area. 
This is aligned with ongoing explorations that I have conducted with Alex 
Werth (McElroy and Werth 2019) in order to consider how gentrification theory 
deracinates deeper histories of racial disposability in Oakland, as does transposing 
San Francisco-based understandings of housing injustice upon terrain from “the other 
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side” of the Bay. While we find postcolonial urban studies to offer important 
frameworks for rethinking the spatiality of contemporary Oakland and the palimpsest 
of racial capitalism upon which urban change rests (often deracinated by Silicon 
Valley descriptives), here I want to consider how postsocialist theory might be useful 
in framing the Bay Area and Silicon Valley more broadly. Postsocialism here is not a 
geographic descriptive and stand-in for examinations of transformations in formerly 
socialist space, just as postcolonial theory is not a substitute for theory emergent in 
the formerly colonized Global South. Work emergent from postsocialist urban studies 
is of course often confined to Eastern Europe and East Asia, and frequently worries 
about the epistemological impasse imposed by transposing Western and even 
postcolonial understandings of spatial transformations imposes upon the Global East 
(Ouředníček 2016; Shin 2016). But here in decentering the normative cartography of 
postsocialism, I want to push these concerns one step further. Why should 
postsocialist urban studies be confined to formerly socialist space if postsocialism is a 
global temporal event? How has the postsocialist temporal disjuncture in global 
history transformed urban space across the planet, from Bucharest to Berkeley? 
To read the spatial, racial, and temporal transformations constitutive of (and 
constituting) the Tech Boom 2.0 through a postsocialist lens begets focus upon the 
material impact of the Cold War and postsocialist transition as they have inhered 
Silicon Valley imperialism and racial technocapitalism. It was during the Cold War 
that Silicon Valley was birthed as a military/educational hybridity designed to 
engineer the “free world.” As it attempted to craft the ideal scientific hero of the 
pastoral suburbs, it positioned the Valley landscape as antithetical to that of San 
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Francisco and Oakland, the latter home to anti-capitalist dissent, racialized urban 
immigration, and grey, industrial density. It was following socialism’s collapse that 
the Dot Com Boom began, and that the suburban geography of the Valley techno-
hero shifted towards urban peripheries. It was then that IT began catering towards 
consumer use, inciting new forms of labor and liberalism, as well as mobility. The 
bleeding of Silicon Valley into postsocialist urbanity cemented conditions of 
contemporary tech-driven racialized dispossession. Urban sublation was thus a 
laboratory practice for global spatial incorporation, producing what J.A. English-
Lueck (2002) nominates as “silicon places.” 
This is not to say that all “silicon places” are even or equal. While there have 
been pushes to make West Oakland, a historically Black and working-class 
neighborhood the new frontier of Silicon Valley, West Oakland is not nor never will 
be Silicon Valley. Neither will it ever be San Francisco, which has been more 
enfolded into the Valley during the Dot Com Boom and now the Tech Boom 2.0. To 
render flat comparisons and simple metaphors, I argue, deracinates deeper and non-
fungible histories of racial dispossession. This is not to say that Oakland was free 
from technological impact during the Cold War and its subsequent tech booms. On 
the contrary, it was experimented on by Cold War technologies of curbing dissent, 
such as the “anti-poverty” Gray Area program. 
Urban studies, and gentrification studies in particular, runs the risk of 
rendering flat and ahistorical comparisons in studying cities and urban change, often 
divorced from non-fungible histories of race and coloniality (Roy 2017). For too long, 
it has also focused so much on space that temporality itself left a footnote. 
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Postsocialist analytics, along with critical races studies and postcolonial studies, can 
supplement gentrification studies in generative ways. They help illuminate, for 
instance, that Silicon Valley imperialism is only made possible through emergent 
postsocialist technologies of time. These proliferate techno-utopic fantasies of 
eliminating of both space and time, enabling its real-time global reach. 
At the same time, dissent against Silicon Valley imperialism too is of a 
particular postsocialist temporality. These protests call for alternative futures, some 
past, some yet-to-come, as well as differential frameworks with which to 
conceptualize the present. By framing the Nihilist and Marxist boxers sunken into the 
drunken, dirty backyard stage through postsocialist analytics points to them being, as 
in David Scott’s words, stranded in the present, bereft of future hope amidst a 
“melancholic silence” and paralysis, yet also clinging on to something, some futures 
past, worth fighting for (2013, 116). Accordingly, we might consider their punches as 
responsive to the dominance of neo/liberal horizons routed into what Scott describes 
as the postsocialist “ruin of time and the accompanying loss of futures” (2013, 125). 
Haunting their punches are “ghosts chained to ghosts” (Derrida 1994, 3) refusing to 
be vanquished, dwelling in the spaces of riot, rot, and irreverence. And these two 
conditions—that of nihilistic despair and that of being haunted with some semblance 
of hope for revolutionary futures past – when compounded upon local and global 
theaters of racial technocapitalism, fashion something new. And this, I suggest, has 
everything to do with postsocialist temporality. 
 
Silicon Valley and the Cold War 
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Haunting postsocialist temporality in the Bay Area is Cold War Silicon 
Valley. Silicon Valley imperialism bears well-established roots in local Cold War 
technological infrastructure. In this section, I trace the Valley’s Cold War constitution 
and its techno-urban effects, many of which inform Tech 2.0 racial technocapitalism. 
Following the Second World War, the US set to task employing scientists and 
psychologists to study possibilities of global dissemination of the democratic mind, 
merging science and politics to script new notions of a universal humanism. For 
instance, MIT mathematician Norbert Wiener, theorist of human–machine interaction 
who coined the term cybernetics, and Columbia professor Lyman Bryson, a champion 
of what he described as a “scientific humanism,” argued that democratic nations must 
utilize science and technology to construct social spaces in which individuals could 
obtain maximum freedom (Turner 2013, 159–160). This would assure global peace 
by “containing” Communism. In the words of N. Katherine Hayles, “Deeply 
connected to the military, bound to high technology for its very existence and a 
virtual icon for capitalism, the cyborg was contaminated to the core, making it 
exquisitely appropriate as a provocation” (2006, 159). While cyborgs are not my 
focus here, the same assemblage of force that gave birth to the cyborg gave rise to 
early Silicon Valley technologies, along with the romanticized techno-human of 
whom such modernization both reflected (and to whom it benefited). It is this 
assemblage that I focus upon in this section. 
Although relationships between the science and military developed during 
World War II, it was as the Cold War came into fruition presaged by the 1947 
National Security Act, along with the actual US wars in Korea and Vietnam intended 
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to prevent Communist growth, that US science gained increased federal funding and 
freedom, strengthening relationships between higher education, military defense, and 
scientific research. While the Cold War demanded a strong state to fight the structural 
enemy, American political traditions demanded a weak one. To reconcile such 
contradictions, universities and scientific industries were effectively empowered as 
federal agents, redefined to engineer national and economic security. While East 
Coast universities such as MIT could make short lobbying trips to Washington, DC, 
geographically distant Stanford University realized that setting up a DC office would 
be expeditious, and so they did; Stanford’s own geographic distance incited its 
governmental centrality (O’Mara 2015, 27). 
During this time, US pro-development urban planners began advocating to 
decentralize post-industrial urbanities, denigrating the social unrest accompanying 
what planner Tracey Augur pathologized as “near-slum environments” (1948, 312). 
In San Francisco, these ideas were intimately linked to the racialization of Filipinx 
and Black migration, facilitating “white flight” to suburban spaces like Silicon Valley 
while redlining segregated landscapes (Hartman 2002).11 In San Francisco, for 
instance, the redevelopment of the predominantly Black neighborhoods of the 
Fillmore and Western Addition between the 1940s and 1970s saw thousands of the 
city’s Black community become displaced, as the city became a testing ground for 
“urban renewal.” This coincided with President Harry Truman’s post-World War II 
notion of “slum clearance,” aimed to weaponize racist development. In 1945, the San 
Francisco Chronicle published an op-ed, proclaiming, “bluntly, nothing can be done 
to improve housing conditions here until a lot of people clear out” (qtd. in Thompson 
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2016). That same year, the California Community Redevelopment Act of 1945 was 
implemented as a technology of urban renewal, benefitting developers. Just a couple 
of years later, the Planning Commission submitted a proposal to raze and rebuild a 
36-block zone in the largely Black neighborhood of the Western Addition. In the end, 
over 30,000 people were displaced. A Planning Commission report justified 
redevelopment on the basis of public health and “safety.” Officials admitted that 
people would be displaced and that many would be unable to afford new rents in the 
region, eliding that due to earlier redlining histories, many had already been 
precluded from receiving loans that would have enabled them to buy their buildings. 
SoMa, Chinatown, and Japantown were also targeted by redevelopment, often 
through overly racist language of blight. The redevelopment of the SoMa, according 
to the city, required the displacement of 4,000 residents and over 700 small 
businesses (Rubin 2002). This was not met without protest. In 1969, local residents 
created the Tenants and Owners in Opposition to Redevelopment, filing lawsuits that 
helped delay development. Meanwhile, the Mission Coalition Organization (MCO) 
formed in 1968 for similar reasons, refusing to see their neighborhood befall a similar 
fate as that of Western Addition. Mayor Alioto had hoped to utilize Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s racist “War on Poverty” Model Cities program to raze the neighborhood, 
but the MCO successfully pushed back. In this way, urban racial dispossession is 
nothing new in Bay Area. Nor are community-driven fights against it. And yet, 
redevelopment continued throughout San Francisco elsewhere, spanning the tenures 
of five mayors (Hartman 1984, 22). 
During this Cold War time, the federal government worried that large urban 
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centers would become easy Soviet targets. Thus, ideas of dispersal became popular, 
and led to renewed development in the suburbs. As Brian Chung argues, these 
contexts led to the heightened status of the scientist as the ideal suburban resident of 
the public imaginary, one welcomed by Stanford (2011). The US Army erected 
prefabricated housing for this new ideal resident, crafting new spaces for white 
scientific flight to land. Thus, it was both Bay Area racialized geographies and Cold 
War spatial imaginaries that impelled millions of dollars to be funneled into military 
defense research on sub-urban high-tech firms (Chung 2011, 39). Valorizing this new 
Cold War hero, Stanford University built its campus-adjacent research park, 
solidifying the “iron triangle,” or the triangular partnership between the Pentagon, top 
rank research universities, and defense industries (Adams 1982). Government support 
for scientific freedom and the ‘Cold War multiversity’ only bolstered post-Sputnik as 
the Eisenhower administration endeavored to not fall behind in the great space race. 
Silicon Valley, which after the Gold Rush had emerged as the orchard capital 
of California, or “The Valley of Heart’s Delight,” mutated with the settlement of 
technology companies. In 1956, inventor William Shockley established the first 
semiconductor laboratory in Mountain View, and the next year, Lockheed Missile 
and Space moved to Sunnyvale. Shockley, Professor Emeritus in electrical 
engineering at Stanford, and Nobel prize winner in physics for his creation of the 
transistor, was also a known proponent of scientific racism. A supporter of the idea of 
“retrogressive evolution,” he believed Black people to be less intelligent than White 
people. A eugenicist, he went as far as to advocate for sterilization of the “genetically 
disadvantaged” (Saxon 1989). As I go on to explore later in this chapter, Shockley’s 
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racial technoscientific vision has been reinterpreted in Silicon Valley today. 
As Shockley was developing a name for himself at Stanford, companies such 
as IBM and FMC, along with other Cold War military defense industries. In 1971, the 
Valley of Heart’s Delight was reconstituted as Silicon Valley, referencing the mineral 
relied upon by semiconductor companies. Stanford’s first dean of engineering, 
Frederick Terman, or the “Father of Silicon Valley,” pushed to transform the research 
behemoth into a regional high-tech corporate magnet. For instance, he convinced his 
former students William Hewlett and David Parker to start their own company (Leslie 
2000; Rosenberg 2002, 15). This saw the emergence of what Nick Dyer-Witheford 
describes as “futuristic accumulation,” or “the commodification of publicly created 
scientific knowledge, which via copyright and patent, becomes privatized as 
intellectual property for the extraction of monopolistic technological rents” (2010, 
487–88). Otherwise put, iron triangle formation utilized extractive mechanisms of 
technological rent to speculate upon the future. 
While the Valley of Hearts Delight relied upon immigrant labor to build 
racialized geographies, these became further transformed as silicon chips replaced 
prune trees. New high-tech companies heralded an imaginary of a cleaner, lighter, 
post-agricultural utopia—racialized, classed, and gendered. Stanford’s Board of 
Trustees heralded the emergence of a post-Fordist “light industry of a non-nuisance 
type” that would “create a demand for technical employees of a high salary class that 
will be in a financial position to live in this area,” or in other words, “a better class of 
workers” (qtd. in Findlay 1992, 132). “Anti-factory” pastoral parks and residential 
worlds became poised against San Francisco and Oakland and their antiracist 
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social/political movements, such as the Black Panther Party, the Brown Berets, La 
Raza Unida, and the San Francisco State strike of 1968. 
During this time, Oakland became the first of six sites tested by the Ford 
Foundation’s Grey Areas program. Aimed to disrupt social unrest, the program 
discursively replaced “race” with “poverty” to mitigate “juvenile delinquency,” gang 
violence, and “human problems in the city” through assimilatory projects of “human 
engineering” (Roy, Schrader, and Crane 2015, 294). Domestic pacification, the 
program proffered, was a means of what Robert McNamara would later describe to 
the World Bank as “defensive modernization” (Ayres 1983). What such grammar 
elided was that social unrest was quelling in Oakland not because of juvenile 
delinquency, but because white homeowners were anxious about the rise of Black 
homeownership. 
Also woven into histories of race and racism within the Valley are also those 
of Cold War-driven assimilation. For instance, Cold War conditions inspired the 
region’s white communities to win the hearts and minds of Cold War Asia. This led 
to the sublation of some Asian American collectives into white geographies 
differentially than for others (Cavin 2012). During this time, the Cold War suburb 
mutated into what Chung describes as a “trans-Pacific hub of Chinese high-tech 
business,” in which it is commonly ridiculed that “‘Silicon Valley is built on ICs”—
not integrated circuits but Indian and Chinese engineers” (2011, 4, 45). Of course, 
this obviates differential experiences of heterogeneous Asian collectives impacted by 
varying racist, colonial, socialist, and national contexts. Nevertheless, it has been 
upon a backdrop of Cold War geopolitics that Silicon Valley Asian American 
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subjectivities have differentially crystallized. 
Such contexts of Cold War subjectivity helped fuel myths of Silicon Valley 
culture as one of meritocracy, multiculturalism, and postraciality towards the end of 
the Cold War and into the postsocialist era. As Apple’s former CEO and visionary 
Steve Jobs suggested in 1997, racial difference does not matter in Silicon Valley, 
“what matters is how smart you are” (qtd. in Reinhardt 1997). In 1997, Business 
Week asserted that Silicon Valley was the “immigrant gateway,” or “the quintessence 
of the American Dream,” where “any good idea in a garage can turn into a gold 
mine” with “no pedigree required” (Reinhardt 1997). Of course, such imaginaries 
endured in myth form only throughout the Cold War and its aftermath. When Iron 
Curtain disintegration led to job cuts at defense divisions of tech firms, regional press 
suggested that with layoffs of white suburbanites, Asian domination “doomed” the 
future. Articles titled “No More Mr. White Guy” and “War Surplus Job-Market 
Misfits” index such fears, pointing to conditions of postsocialist racialization in the 
Valley (Chung 2011, 31). Silicon Valley Cold War-era racial liberalism therefore can 
be read as constitutive of, yet distinct from, the era that followed. 
 
Postsocialism Spatiality 
With defense cutbacks following 1989, questions arose as to the direction 
Silicon Valley would take in the now postsocialist era. When the Internet developed 
in 1993, proceeded by the creation of the Web, it became clear that their 
commercialization by consumer-based technology companies would impel Silicon 
Valley forward. Companies such as Netscape, Cisco, Hewlett-Packard, 3Com, and 
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Intel exploded software job growth, leading to the Dot Com Boom (Hughes and 
Cosier 2001). This is the era from which Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri wrote 
their seminal Empire (2000), describing the replacement of local territorial rule with 
global flows, decentering and deterritorializing, effacing the tripartite geography of 
second and third world divisions. The Web and Silicon Valley were theorized as 
intricately part of this new social order, constituting the US’s “soft power,” led by the 
internet business sphere—the offspring of Cold War informatics. The internet was 
supposed to be, as William Mitchell suggested, “anti-spatial,” comprised of a 
“negative geometry” (1996). However, as evidenced in the spatial/racial 
infrastructural transformations that accompanied postsocialist technologic growth, 
utopian dreams of immateriality themselves dematerialize. During the last quarter of 
the 20th century, the Valley’s housing prices rose more rapidly than anywhere else in 
the US, totaling a 936% increase (Cavin 2012, 12). Thus, in this section, I study how 
post-Cold War Silicon Valley transformed its urban peripheries in novel ways. 
The financialization of the technology realm excited real estate developers 
upon the Valley’s urban borders as well, inciting what Stephen Graham and Simon 
Guy describe as the ‘“dot-com invasion” of IT entrepreneurs and internet industries to 
downtown San Francisco,” an invasion clearly classed and racialized (2002, 372). As 
Richard Walker chronicled: “Obscure little South Park (near the foot of the Bay 
Bridge), once a refuge for a small black residential block, is now a popular eating 
spot for the denizens of Virtual valley, the new hot spot for multimedia electronics 
and computer magazine publishers” (1995, 39). During this time, evictions grew by 
400 percent, and as Nancy Mirabal suggests, displacement was linked to the 
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preservation of whiteness (2009). Graham and Guy further offer, “renewal” was also 
gendered: “Ideologically driven and utopian discourses of corporeal, territorial and 
urban transcendence, based on the fantasy of perfect IT systems, can thus be 
understood as a series of (largely masculinized) “omnipotence fantasies”’ (2002, 
369). 
Yet, it was pre-1989 that these omnipotence fantasies first coalesced. For 
instance, it was during the Cold War that Steve Jobs first visited the Soviet Union, 
desirous of breaking through the Iron Curtain. Along these lines, a caption below a 
1977 photojournalistic piece on Intel, the world’s largest producer of semiconductor 
computer chips, reads, “The Sun Never Sets on Intel,” indexing early Silicon imperial 
desire (qtd. in Marez 2013, 87). Yet, these early imperial fantasies proved difficult to 
realize until after the Cold War, when cluster-cloning Silicon Valley became viable,12 
and increasingly normalized (Rosenberg 2002). Today there are “little” Silicon 
Valleys throughout the globe, from India to Romania and beyond. Yet none of these 
places, saturated as they are with aspirational desires of recognition, are Silicon 
Valley. 
Post-Cold War Silicon Valley imperialism has been an era in which 
neoliberalism, or what David Scott describes as “smugly confident liberalism,” has 
accumulated momentum by “re-territorializing power to roll back what was now 
perceived as the ‘moral evil’ of communism” (2013, 4). While early liberal 
conceptions of the internet growing out of non-consumer-based networks imagined 
the internet as a freedom vehicle to those from repressive regimes, Communist or 
otherwise, this imaginary became muddied through Dot Com corporatization. These 
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liberal imaginaries were often Cold War figments themselves, tethered to one 
conception of freedom while eliding others. For instance, early Romanian hacking 
culture fantasized technological freedom from Silicon Valley imperialism, as I 
explore in other chapters of this dissertation. 
The Dot Com Boom busted shortly after it began due to overconfident 
investment. While the ensuing crash led a decrease in rental and home prices in the 
Bay Area, it also impelled the restructuring of surviving companies into more robust 
capitalist machines, constituting the emergence of mega-tech companies such as 
Apple, Cisco, and Intel. These laid the foundation for the sharing economy and app-
based industries that constitute the Tech Boom 2.0, in which racialized spatial and 
temporal IT materializations are haunted by those of the Dot Com Boom era. Today, 
heralding the imaginary of clean, light industry, and imbricated in the grammar of 
liberal democracy, Silicon Valley corporations now penetrate the former Second 
World, often exploiting a technologically inclined labor force and cheaper rental and 
production costs. While Silicon Valley corporations promulgate their new forms of 
knowledge production and artificial intelligence, often obscured is the outsourcing 
that they still rely upon. I have numerous friends working the nightshift for Silicon 
Valley company call centers in Romania, for instance, where fantasies of landing jobs 
in actual Silicon Valley, along with the economic impacts of disaster capitalism, glue 
people to their extractive jobs. Silicon Valley imperialism therefore does not only 
penetrate Bay Area urbanities through new technologies of transit, but also former 
socialist landscapes. This signals new imperial spatiality endemic to the age of 
Silicon Valley imperialism. The phenomenon of producing Silicon space beyond 
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Valley confines is thus one of postsocialist spatiality, mobility, and global liquidity. 
This is not simply because prestidigitation has outgrown Silicon Valley space; 
postsocialist relations inhere imperial spatiality. 
While numerous technology companies themselves have existed in San 
Francisco since the Dot Com Boom (and new ones have landing their headquarters in 
the City with the Tech 2.0, for instance Uber, Twitter, and Airbnb)—it has only been 
during the 2.0 era in which Valley companies have facilitated urban dwelling for 
suburban campus workers. Not only have Google buses appropriated public bus 
stops, leading to delays in public buses and even elementary school children getting 
to school. But also, evictions percolate in proximity to these bus stops. As work by 
the Anti-Eviction Mapping Project – a critical cartography, data analysis, and digital 
humanities project that I cofounded in 2013 to document dispossession and resistance 
struggles in the wake of Tech 2.0—has shown, 69 percent of San Francisco’s 
evictions have occurred within four blocks of tech bus stops, as speculators capitalize 
on property that can be advertised as adjacent, thereby increasing value (Maharawal 
and McElroy 2018). Further, Black populations, along with Black and Latinx 
household income levels, have been shrinking in both San Francisco and Oakland, 
demographics underrepresented in Silicon Valley technology corporations outside of 
service worker positions (Stehlin 2015). 
Disproportionately, this workforce composed of young, white men, 
colloquially reified as “tech bros.” In 2014, real estate speculator Jennifer Rosdail 
mapped this newly venerated human as a “quadster,” or those “under forty [who] like 
to hang in the sun with their friends,” and prefer to live in “The Quad” —an emergent 
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real estate geometry covering much of San Francisco’s Mission District. Allegedly, 
quadsters “work very hard—mostly in high tech—and make a lot of money” (Rosdail 
2014). While the labor performed by this new techno-human is imagined as existing 
immaterially, spatial/racial effects materialize. Further, the appropriation of the 
Mission neighborhood into the quad, the appropriation of public bus stops into 
Google ones, is emblematic of post-Cold War toponymic practices of renaming 
space, meanwhile appropriating leftist and liberal language alike. 
This toponymical incursion not gone without protest. Denigrating Silicon 
Valley imperialism and racial technocapitalism alike, there have been numerous 
protests against the incursion of quadsters and Google luxury transportation 
(Maharawal 2017; Stanley 2018). Some protestors have weaponized vomit upon tech 
buses in repugnance, while others offered tales of their past, present, and future 
eviction struggles. As one banner outside an early bus blockade read, “Capitalism is 
the driver; Gentrification is the Vehicle; Techies on the Bus.” Meanwhile, members 
of the anarchist collective Defend the Bay pleaded for “all Bay Area residents to take 
action against the tech takeover’s many manifestations: increased rents, exclusive 
access to transportation, and the intensified police repression that accompanies 
gentrification, which is literally killing Black and brown residents in their own 
neighborhoods” (qtd. in Tiku, 2014). Increased police violence has been further 
linked to imbrications between technocapitalist companies with military surveillance 
partnerships bearing global impact, from Google’s military robotics contract with 
Boston Dynamics, to Facebook’s facial recognition software and artificial intelligence 
utilized by Oakland’s Domain Awareness Center to suppress illiberal “threat.” 
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While Google does contribute to military robotics designed to kill racialized 
collectives of people “elsewhere,” it is also now working to “cure death” for others, 
celebrating a transhumanist acceleration into cyborgian immortality. As Google’s 
former CEO Eric Schmidt triumphantly proclaimed in 2010, Google’s actual goal is 
to engineer the “age of augmented humanity” (Gannes 2010). Facebook, while 
developing tools used for racial profiling, now also aims to cure all disease, 
emblematic in the rebranding of the public San Francisco General Hospital into “The 
Zuckerberg” (McElroy 2019). Thus, in the postsocialist era, racial technocapitalist 
and Silicon Valley imperial interests hide beneath the language of liberalism in novel 
ways. 
For instance, tech conferences such as “Wisdom 2.0” occur around the clock, 
often featuring Orientalist panels led by entrepreneurs on how to “become one” with 
technocapitalist growth. After interrupting Google’s panel during a 2015 version of 
Wisdom 2.0 with a banner that read “Eviction Free San Francisco,” activists, myself 
included, were pushed offstage and our banner snatched. Google higher-ups leading 
the event then ushered the crowd into a silent meditation in order to assess how they 
felt about the tension that they had just witnessed. This meditation elided the tension 
that the company imposes on a daily basis, in the realms not only of local racial 
dispossession, but also the data colonialism, racial surveillance, and military robotics 
(Crampton and Miller 2017; Thatcher, O’Sullivan, and Mahmoudi 2016). This 
process, emblematic of technoliberalism, can be understood, per Atanasoski and 
Vora, as a “political alibi of present-day racial capitalism that posits humanity as an 
aspirational figuration in a relation to technological transformation, obscuring the 
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uneven racial and gendered relations of labor, power, and social relations that 
underlie the contemporary conditions of capitalist production” (2019, 4). By 
“applifying” liberalism, the most gentrifying of technology companies and processes 
in the Bay Area today hide beneath a shiny (and often Orientalist) veneer of techno-
salvifics. 
 
Postsocialist Temporality 
The logics of post-Cold War Silicon Valley constitute and are constituted by 
accelerated logics of mobility, techno-utopics, and freedom, but also a solidification 
of postsocialist temporality. As Silicon Valley itself temporally changed form and 
consciousness after 1989, postsocialist temporal analysis is requisite. The Cold War’s 
collapse solidified a new global order of time in which, in the words of Susan Buck-
Morss, ‘“we’… may have nothing more nor less in common than sharing this time” 
(2002, 68). As Buck-Morss illuminates, while the capitalist project has long been one 
in which land has been acquired and exploited as quickly as possible, the socialist one 
aspired to accelerate time in contained space per a Marxian evolutionism. 
Extrapolating upon this logic, two ratios simultaneously emerge: capitalist 
space/time, and socialist time/space.13 With the disintegration of the Cold War came 
the imposition of time/space into the triumphalism the of space/time, forging the 
figment of a new, in the words of Anita Starosta, “common time” (2014). This 
incorporation required translation, or “a process of never-finished synchronization 
among multiple temporalities—and by the same token, the process of forging the only 
possible authentic ‘we’” (2014, 205). Silicon Valley Time, having abdicated that of 
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Greenwich, was first made possible with Dot Com Boom. Now, in the time of Tech 
2.0, it has even more robustly centralized itself, governing the virtual and material 
means through which information is absorbed. Returning to time and space ratios, if 
postsocialist time/space indeed has been incorporated into capitalist space/time (in 
other words, space/time over time/space), all that remains are capitalism squared. 
Time has been reduced to nothing, so that accumulation of space and/through 
capital can transpire in absolutely no time at all. This new postsocialist Silicon Valley 
temporality and its fantasies of immaterial temporality augment under the rubric of 
technoliberalism. Technoliberalism disseminates the imaginary that digital 
technology can and will remedy the world’s maladies, spread real-time freedom of 
information to all, and telescope the “backwards” and “uninformed” parts of the 
globe into techno-utopic futurity. For instance, in 2014, a lengthy article in Time 
featured a story detailing Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s new project, 
Internet.org, designed to supply even the most ‘remote’ spaces of the planet with 
internet. The cover image depicted a tall, white Zuckerberg surrounded by grave-
looking children from the rural town of Chandauli, India. The cover, along with the 
project’s mission, was critiqued for its overt coloniality, and as Kentaro Toyama 
chastised, “Internet.org is a form of colonialism that whitewashes Facebook’s techno-
imperialism under a cloak of doing good” (2014). As a form and extension of 
capitalism, technoliberalism protracts both race and racism into new domains in the 
name of future freedom. Reliant upon the racial and the spatial, it disseminates the 
imaginary of spatial difference now antiquated and immaterial. Its capitalist logics 
celebrate on-demand mobility over private property, so long as mobility is paired 
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with access to capital and space. 
For instance, both Eastern European and Bay Area urban landscapes are now 
peppered with digital nomads, avatars of Silicon Valley imperialism, as I describe in 
Chapter 1. Consequently, the mobility of capital and information, fiber-optically 
transmitted in real time, facilitates and is facilitated by the proliferation of highly paid 
Valley technology workers into global space. For instance, anytime an Airbnb host or 
guest interfaces with Airbnb in any of its 190 operable countries, the startup gains 
capital. Yet, Airbnb is one of the leading causes of evictions in both San Francisco 
and Oakland, as long-time tenants are displaced to create more profitable short-term 
housing. Thus, as technoliberalism superficially dissolves longstanding Lockean 
intimacies of freedom with private property and the heteronormative household, it 
still relies upon capitalist systems of value, facilitating real displacement. But through 
the logics of Tech 2.0, value is rendered abstract in novel ways. Despite fantasies of 
omnipotence in which spatial difference disintegrates in real time, space still exists, 
unevenly penetrated by postsocialist technologies. And despite the post-1989 
absorption of formerly unobtainable spaces into Silicon Valley (from Eastern 
European to Bay Area cities), there also remain, in Starosta’s words, “perverse 
tongues” that defy the logics of universality in unlikely places, sometimes in 
backyard Marxist/Nihilist boxing rings, sometimes elsewhere (2014). These perverse 
tongues cry out against the spatial and temporal magnetism of Silicon Valley across 
the globe, and against its authorial place in the creation of local cartographies. 
Repudiating the authority of postsocialist Silicon Valley Time, their obdurate voices 
call for futures other than those being rendered by technoliberalism, while also 
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demanding other analytics with which to theorize the present. 
Yet, it is liberalism and the politics of rights that are dominantly galvanized in 
the Bay Area as antidote to conditions of gentrification, particularly by non-profit and 
reform-based visionaries under the rubric of “housing is a human right.” Upholding 
the inclusive genre of the rights deserving human, these formations understand rights 
as universally applicable given the collapse of the Iron Curtain. However, as Sylvia 
Wynter’s work teaches us, throughout modernity, the mono-humanist universal Man 
of humankind has claimed universality while utilizing race to script the elision of the 
racialized into the domains of the non-human, or not-quite human (Wynter and 
McKittrick 2015). This pattern makes suspect human rights-based calls for universal 
application. While the mono-humanist Man attempts to absorb everything possible 
into his domain, asserting that those not recognizable as him assimilate, there remain 
cultural and political formations outside of his world, offering alternative versions of 
humanity, whether this is theorized as Wynter’s “demonic grounds” (1994), the 
perversion of tongues, or vomit-splattered tech buses. As Alexander Weheliye 
questions, “What different modalities of the human come to light if we not take the 
liberal humanist figure of Man as the master-subject but focus on how humanity has 
been imagined and lived by those subjects excluded from this domain?” (2014, 8). 
The rancor of Marxist vs. Nihilist boxing match therefore emerges as one of 
countless responses to such a question. On one hand, this match indexes a desire for 
futures other than those ascribed by both the invisible hand of global capital doing its 
thing and reifications rights-based universalisms. On the other, it calls for differential 
epistemologies with which to theorize dispossessions of the present. In the words of 
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Atanasoski and Vora, “The dominance of present-day liberal politics, which collapse 
political notions of freedom with the unrestricted spread of free markets, and justice 
with liberal rights-based outcomes, beg for an extended exploration of the aftermaths 
of the social, political, and cultural disappearance and subsequent reconfiguration of a 
socialist political imaginary” (2017, 14). Such explorations, through a postsocialist 
theoretical approach, are needed to disinter the spatial/racial/temporal ramifications of 
technoliberalism as it subsumes the political. While technoliberalism extends Man’s 
domain locally and globally, it also protracts libertarian ontologies that understand 
tech corporations as more effective than lethargic government. Accordingly, 
technoliberalism seeks to vaccinate against the sluggishness of regulatory liberal 
democracy, creating a new system of smart city governance. 
For instance, San Francisco’s former mayor Edwin Lee’s election campaign 
was bankrolled by Silicon Valley venture capitalist Ron Conway, one of the primary 
investors of numerous tech companies, from Google to Airbnb. It was Lee who 
established the Twitter Tax Break Zone in 2011 to encourage tech to relocate from 
the Valley to San Francisco tax-free, fomenting heightened eviction rates. 
Meanwhile, Conway’s public-private hybrid companies such as sf.citi attempt to 
override public decision-making bodies to benefit tech and tech-friendly politicians, 
privileging anti-regulatory legislation. This structure invokes what Paul Carr 
describes as a “cult of disruption,” or the disruption of non-Silicon Valley space/time 
with techno-utopics (2012). As a 2016 signage campaign by the San Francisco 
datacenter Digital Reality promulgated in Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) trains, 
“Your Next Stop, West Oakland Station. The New Edge of Silicon Valley: Disrupt 
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Your Industry from our Data Center.” Below its text was a streamline map of the Bay 
Area, pointing out West Oakland’s proximity to both San Francisco and the Valley. 
In response, stickers manifested upon signs, proclaiming, “Keep Hoods Yours: By 
Any Means Necessary,” invoking Cold War-era Panther resistances to racialized 
technologies of dispossession. Nevertheless, the datacenter was erected, now visible 
from the BART train in West Oakland, appropriatively adorned with its new motto: 
“Hella connected.” 
The disruptive cult of Silicon Valley has been made famous through events 
such as Disrupt SF, in which startups compete for the Disrupt Cup and the $50,000 
accompanying cash prize. The 2014 champion of Disrupt SF went to the makers of 
Alfred, a sharing economy application that manages other on-demand apps, and 
further, comes equipped with a human being—one’s very own Alfred—who delivers 
products and laundered clothing, and who even cleans houses, performing duties such 
as replenishing paper towel on paper towel holders, all for $99/month. The idea is not 
only “to cut into the 30 average hours/week that people spend on household chores, 
but to relieve some of the mental strain of dealing with multiple apps and services . . . 
coordinating them together” (Crook 2014). Alfred serves as an allegory for the 
contradictions between techno-utopic fantasy and racialized/gendered materiality 
constitutive of Silicon Valley disruptions. Who becomes an Alfred, conscripted to 
exploitative service labor, and who wins $50,000, or has the luxury of enjoying the 
surplus labor that Alfred performs? This was what organizers, me included, 
questioned in 2014 as we held a protest outside of Alfred’s ceremonious awarding in 
San Francisco. But before we could disrupt the event for long, we were shoved out by 
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a private security firm determined that the event was “undisruptable.” In a global 
economy in which time remains valuable, yet in which capital circulates timelessly, 
some lack the time to perform the drudgery of service labor, or to be disrupted by 
protest for that matter. Yet others have no option but to replace paper towel rolls upon 
a sharpened backdrop of increased rental prices and income disparity, draped in the 
smokescreen of “hella connected.” 
 
“All Housing Matters” 
In the post-Cold War Tech 2.0 era, technoliberalism masks the raciality of 
capitalism as well as urban planning. Techno-urban development projects, 
particularly those supported by YIMBYism (Yes In My Backyard-ism), appropriate 
the language of the commons, social good, and even housing justice in order to 
expand racial technocapitalism. As I explore here, this exploitation of the social is 
endemic to the post-Cold War times of Silicon Valley imperialism, although it rests 
upon older Cold War planning histories. In this way, Silicon Valley imperialism 
maintains its imperiality both by masking its racial effects with liberalism, while also 
by appropriating what once emerged from socialist organizing within the Bay Area. 
The primary assertion of YIMBYism is that slow growth reduces available 
housing stock, thereby driving up property values. Yet, when it comes to 
development, YIMBYism advocates “all housing matters,” and that the 
unencumbered neoliberal market will take care of the housing crisis. Creating a 
strawman to amplify their luxury development desires, YIMBYs liken their 
opposition with racist, wealthy NIMBY (No In My Backyard neighborhood) 
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preservationists—generally white homeowners. As a phenomenon, NIMBYism 
emerged during the Cold War in order to preserve pre-Cold War redlined racial 
geographies. YIMBY advocates promote a discursive strategy that conflates wealthy 
white NIMBY property owners determined to maintain the “traditional character and 
culture of their backyards” with housing justice advocates fighting against luxury and 
development in poor and working-class neighborhoods. Much like tech companies 
have appropriated public space and liberal language to mask their racial impacts, the 
YIMBY movement has usurped antiracism to push for their liberal “right” to build 
luxury housing. In this way, despite YIMBYism’s framing of housing justice activists 
as NIMBY, both YIMBYism and NIMBYism support racist urban planning. What I 
want to work through here though is how this appropriation of leftist discourse is a 
uniquely post-Cold War imperial technology. 
While those weathering racial dispossession in San Francisco know that 
building luxury condos does nothing to mitigate lack of available housing (a fact 
verified by San Francisco’s General Plan), YIMBYs frame their opposition as 
uneducated (Marti 2019; Meronek and Szeto 2017; Redmond 2017). For instance, 
during a San Francisco Planning Commission hearing on the deceptively titled 
Affordable Housing Density Bonus program, a YIMBY initiative to push for a 
citywide up-zoning measure for more market-rate development, YIMBY Policy 
Director, Brian Hanlon argued that without development, he would be “complicit in 
displacing even more vulnerable populations . . . When I move to East Oakland, I will 
most likely be replacing someone who does not look like me.” Hanlon’s ultimatum to 
poor communities of color is thus to accept luxury housing construction or else be 
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displaced by this white YIMBY man. This echoes the paternalism of pro-
development forces during the post-Cold War Dot Com Boom. 
While tensions between pro-development, anti-development, and slow-
development movements are nothing new to the region, it is not random that the Bay 
Area is the birth place of the YIMBY movement. Largely evolving from the smaller 
San Francisco Bay Area Renters Federation (BARF), which was founded in 2014 by 
Sonja Trauss, it now encompasses numerous housing groups, holds nationwide 
conferences, and has the support of pro-development politicians. From its beginnings, 
it has disproportionately enjoyed support from Silicon Valley workers and funders 
including Yelp’s CEO, as well as from developers, politicians, and pro-growth urban 
thinktanks. Trauss, who pretends to be a housing justice activist, is well-known for 
her racism. From writing a blog post in which she wrote that low-income public 
housing tenants “usually can’t read or write,” to a 2016 tweet in which she claimed 
that gentrification is “the revaluation of black land to its correct price,” her words 
repeatedly anger those being dispossessed in the context of techno-urban 
transformation. She has also publicly likened herself to Machiavelli in order to justify 
capitalist interests. In a Google slideshow that she sent out to BARF members in early 
2014, her main objectives were to: “Connect pro-density, pro-building individuals to 
each other; Continue to testify in favor of large projects; Disrupt the alliance between 
rent-control advocates and affordable housing advocates” (IndyBay 2015). And yet 
Trauss frames herself as an anti-eviction activist. 
The neoliberal analytics embraced by YIMBY and NIMBY groups alike have 
precursors in the Bay Area Cold War and post-Cold War geographies. It was during 
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the white flight of urban centers that the “spatial fix” of the Bay Area suburban 
“white noose” concretized (Self 2003; Walker 2004). As Richard Walker and Alex 
Schafran suggest, “The Bay Area’s liberal reputation belies the degree to which 
blacks lived in segregated neighborhoods, especially during the first wave of postwar 
suburbanization” (2015, 24). It was against this racialized spatiality that San 
Francisco’s slow-and anti-growth movements emerged. Yet with the Dot Com Boom, 
cities too began to be invested in by technocapitalist interests. This led to new 
enactments of racialized exurbanization, pushing poor and working-class 
communities of color into the suburbs through racialized practices of subprime 
lending and foreclosure (Schafran 2013; Wyly et al. 2012). Since the 1980s, of all US 
cities, San Francisco has experienced the fastest declining Black population with 
neighborhoods such as Western Addition decimated in the name of urban renewal 
(Brahinsky 2012). 
San Francisco saw large protests against racial technocapitalist planning of the 
1990s and 2000s, particularly against the development of lofts and towers. Housing 
activists for instance successfully opposed the Planning Department’s decision to 
develop Trinity Plaza apartments, which would have led to the eviction of 360 rent-
controlled tenants for the construction of 1,400 market-rate condominiums (Corburn 
and Bhatia 2007, 329). As the anti-and slow-growth movements illuminate have 
emphasized, while it is one thing to oppose all development, it is quite another to 
oppose the development of luxury housing for the rich, particularly when 
development induces racial dispossession. And this is precisely where the 
NIMBY/YIMBY dialectic falters. Instead of embracing a NIMBY politic, housing 
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justice advocates fighting to curb evictions and the construction of luxury 
development organize against racial capitalism. Yet YIMBYs construct a NIMBY 
antagonist who equates public and affordable housing with luxury condos. But this 
antagonist simply does not exist; it has never existed (McElroy and Szeto 2018). 
Beyond reliance on enmity fictions, pro-growth supply and demand formulas 
fall short in their ameliorative attempts. Walker suggests that to understand 
contemporary drivers of the housing market, rather than buying into the Economics 
101 myth that development will solve gentrification, we need to study capitalism and 
credit, boom and busts, and elite special preferences (2016). It was, after all, 
mortgages and financial institutions and incited the country’s most overheated 
mortgage markets during the housing bubble. These have yet to be sufficiently 
reformed. For instance, with companies such as Uber, Lyft, Slack, Postmates, 
Pinterest, and Airbnb about to enter public markets and a “coming I.P.O.-palooza” as 
of 2019, real estate speculators have predicted that there will be ten thousand new 
millionaires within the year (Bowles 2019). Thus, the real estate industry is 
recommending that people considering selling their homes wait until this IPO (initial 
public offering) transformation, as properties will sell for more. When Google went 
public, millionaires erupted throughout the Bay Area, it is estimated that this new 
wave will particularly hit San Francisco. Already within the city, where an average 
one-bedroom costs $3,690, fifty percent of home sales are going to software 
engineers. Unlike the Dot Com Boom, which busted, this boom is showing no sign of 
breakdown. In part this is because Tech 2.0 has found a new way to appropriate of the 
public, via IPOs, in order to bolster security. 
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IPO publics do nothing to solve the lack of affordable housing in the Bay 
Area. Instead, they raze room for YIMBY development. One of YIMBYism’s 
primary arguments is that increased development, regardless of the type, will 
ameliorate the lack of Bay Area housing, and thus mitigate displacement pressures. 
However, building 50 percent affordable housing will only ever keep the ratio of 
affordable to unaffordable what it currently is, and this presumes that affordable 
housing is not continually lost to evictions—which is not the case. For instance, 
between 2016 and 2017, 4,697 units were removed from protected affordable status 
due to condo conversion, evictions, buy-outs, and demolitions (San Francisco 
Planning Department 2017; Redmond 2017). San Francisco’s own General Plan calls 
for 60 percent affordable development to maintain an equitable housing climate, but 
on average, the city only builds 21 percent (Redmond 2017). According to the 
Planning Department, by the third quarter of 2016, the City had approved 181 percent 
of projected market-rate housing for 2022 (San Francisco Planning Department 
2017). Yet, the City only rubberstamped 16 percent of its low-income requirements 
(San Francisco Planning Department 2016). Even between 2007 and 2014, the City 
authorized 109 percent of requisite market-rate housing, yet only met 27 percent of its 
low-income requirements (Welch 2017a). In this way, new market-rate construction 
creates more of a demand for affordable housing than the market supplies, thereby 
worsening the crisis. While YIMBYs maintain that high-density development 
produces cheaper rents as more units can be built per acre, as of 2017, the city’s 
neighborhoods with the highest rents are also the neighborhoods with the most high-
rise, high-density buildings. Unlike YIMBYism’s “all housing matters” rhetoric, the 
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type of new construction does matter. 
As research conducted by the University of California, Berkeley’s Urban 
Displacement Project (UDP) has determined when analyzing impacts of market and 
subsidized housing developed in the 1990s on displacement during the 2000s, there is 
no evidence that market-rate development is effective mitigation (Zuk and Chappel 
2016, 3). Further, the project found subsidized housing to be twice as effective as 
market-rate development regionally (2016, 10). Proponents of market-rate 
development are determined that a process known as filtering leads to older market-
rate buildings becoming affordable as new units are constructed. But as the UDP 
shows, while filtering may work in some cases, it takes generations. Filtering, as a 
stand-in for “trickle down,” remains in Calvin Welch’s words a “Reagan-era supply-
side fiction” (2017b). Further, Miriam Zuk and Karen Chappel of the UDP offer, “in 
many strong-market cities, changes in housing preferences have increased the 
desirability of older, architecturally significant property, essentially disrupting the 
filtering process” (2016, 3). 
Indeed, filtering would only work if areas such as the quad or those 
surrounding tech bus stops were not desirable to those with deep pockets. Perhaps this 
is why, as investigative research by Darwin BondGraham and Tim Redmond has 
revealed, 39 percent of 5,212 condos in 23 buildings primarily built after 2000 have 
been purchased by absentee owners (2015). In come condos, absentee ownership is 
over 60 percent, with primary residences concentrated in Silicon Valley suburbs such 
as Los Altos Hills, Sausalito, and Lafayette. Further, new units were listed on Airbnb 
for as much as $6,000 per night, clearly doing little to ameliorate dispossession. 
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Meanwhile, SRO (single residency occupancy units), which throughout the 
Cold War housed the region’s most precarious tenants, are now being converted into 
tech dorms. Real estate speculators Danny Haber and Alon Gutman, the latter a 
Google software developer, have evicted SRO tenants from both San Francisco and 
Oakland in order to create cohousing for those in tech. After migrating away from 
Airbnb to list now-evicted units, they developed an online “property tech” interface, 
OWow, in order to match technologist roommates based upon users’ Facebook 
profiles. These spaces, favorites amongst YIMBYs, are exclusionary forms that, like 
Airbnb, mobilize the grammar of “sharing” and “community” in order to advance 
technocapitalist interest, as explored in Chapter 1. Yet these are just some of many 
examples of public space and social good being extracted and transformed by Silicon 
Valley imperialism. The Anti-Eviction Mapping Project has, for instance, mapped 
over twenty examples of such occurrences in San Francisco alone, which encompass 
playgrounds, streets, parking lots, and even City Hall (2016). 
By engaging in a YIMBY verses NIMBY geographic understanding, it is easy 
to miss that same logics of racial capitalism constitute each. To think beyond the 
fictive NIMBY/YIMBY binary is also to think beyond liberal understandings of 
freedom. YIMBYism, as a phenomenon, reminds us that the violence of racial 
capitalism has always been obscured under the liberal banners of “progress,” 
sometimes coded as “renewal” or “redevelopment.” This language continually fails to 
reckon with the racial dispossession required for growth, but also with the deep 
history of racial liberalism fueling discursive appropriation. Freeing the market will 
never lead to housing for all; racially dispossessive logics will always haunt the 
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present, despite the proliferation of postracial neoliberal imaginaries. 
Both NIMBYism and YIMBYism live within the same liberal tradition of 
racialized/spatialized appropriation. This technique is unique to post-Cold War times 
in that the interests of empire, in this case Silicon Valley imperialism, appropriate the 
language of antiracism and housing justice in order to accumulate space. Silicon 
Valley imperialism, as a post-Cold War phenomenon, relies upon encroaching into 
the space and language of anticapitalism in order to expand. Public space, once an 
output of anti-capitalist organizing for the public, has been territorialized in the name 
progress. YIMBYism, an epistemology of Silicon Valley techno-urbanism, is abetted 
by the absorption of the public, from IPOs to SROs. 
 
Free Speech and the Battle of Berkeley 
Racial technocapitalist urban planning in times of post-Cold War Silicon 
Valley imperialism has only been aggravated in the Trump era. As Melissa Valle 
argues, with the rise of right-wing populisms in the US and beyond pushing agendas 
of ethnic and racial cleansing, there is no such thing as race-neutral urban 
development and planning (2017). It was because of this that the national Right to the 
City movement contextualized the new president as the “Gentrifier In Chief,” a man 
who has made no hesitation about pushing a white real estate agenda on the national 
platform. After all, the supremacy of white inheritance enabled Trump to grow into 
the real estate mogul and luxury golf course owner that he is today (Maharawal and 
McElroy 2017; Stein 2019). Not only has he accrued his capital through real estate, 
but also, he quickly appointed key positions to people like white supremacist Steve 
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Bannon, anti-public housing doctor Ben Carson, “foreclosure king” of California 
Steve Mnunchin, and slumlord Jared Kushner. 
It was this desire to accumulate property through whiteness (a foundational 
fantasy of US settler colonialism and empire) that also led to an August 2017 far-right 
“No to Marxism in America” rally in Berkeley. In response, a counter-march erupted 
in San Francisco. Crawling through the city which itself seemed quiet in anticipation 
of potential racist violence, demonstrators made clear that racist violence was nothing 
new to their cultural and political lives. As the march edged towards the Mission 
District, one of its leaders, Ben Bac Sierra, recited a story to protestors of the 
whitening of the Mission over the last decade in the wake of the Tech Boom. 
Decrying that while city officials are finally censuring the rise of Nazism, many of 
these same officials have been largely silent about racialized dispossession and police 
violence for years now. Not coincidentally, the march stopped at 16th and Mission 
Streets, where a market-rate development project, “The Monster in the Mission” was 
slated for construction. This project has been pushed the YIMBY movement and 
explicitly racist, anti-homeless coalitions, such as Clean Up the Plaza Coalition. In 
this way, YIMBY and fascist-leaning forces have aligned to reproduce racial 
technocapitalist spatiality. But these forces also align in their appropriation of liberal 
and leftist language, a phenomenon that Judith Butler marks as unique to these times 
(2019). This has been particularly evident on the University of California Berkeley’s 
campus (UCB), during what became known as the 2017 “Battle of Berkeley” protests. 
It is this that I focus upon in this section, attentive to how discursive appropriation 
indexes postsocialist temporality. 
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It was during Trump’s campaign trail that new iterations of far-right populism 
began to appear across the US, as well as antifascist counter-protests. California was 
not immune, from a Ku Klux Klan rally in Anaheim to scuffles outside of the 
California Republican Party’s convention in Burlingame in 2016. During this time, a 
new fascist youth organization, Identify Evropa, held its first demonstration at UCB. 
As the group claimed, their objective was to create a “safe space” for white 
nationalism on the campus. The following month, a large anti-Trump demonstration 
in San Jose took place, largely led by young South Bay people of color, upon which 
far-right activists vowed vengeance. In response, neo-Nazi groups stabbed antifascist 
counter-demonstrators in Sacramento, which then led to new moves amongst Bay 
Area antiracist and antifascist collectives to join forces in self-defense. The evening 
of Trump’s electoral victory, thousands of demonstrators flashed throughout Oakland 
in outrage, haunted by fears of what might follow. Molotov cocktails were thrown at 
banks, tear gas filled the air, and fires broke out outside the impending Uber office 
building downtown—a glaring symbol of Bay Area racial technocapitalism. 
In response to growing antifascist organizing, Milo Yiannopoulos, former 
senior tech writer at right-wing Breitbart News, began his “Dangerous Faggot Tour.” 
As newfound leader of the supposedly more moderate “alt-lite,” yet schooled by 
Nazi-sympathizer Steven Bannon at Breitbart, Yiannopoulos followed Identity 
Evropa’s lead in targeting liberal university spaces. Although the tour began at the 
University of Washington, during which a Trump supporter shot an antifascist activist 
in the stomach, the tour arrived at UCB a week later. 
UCB first emerged on national cartographies in the 1960s for far-left political 
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activism championing civil rights. In 1964, it birthed the Free Speech Movement 
(FSM) and waves of antiracist and anti-Vietnam War civil disobedience in the midst 
of the Cold War (DeGroot 1995; Nguyen-Vo and Hong 2018). Concentrated in 
Sproul Plaza, the movement conducted teach-ins and demonstrations, some of which 
police and the National Guard attacked. Despite these radical roots, as soon as the 
FSM became part of official campus geography in 1960s, it was faced with attempts 
of pacification and neutralization (Mitchell 1992, 159-161). Yet very few could have 
anticipated in 2000 the bizarre ways that the FSM would become appropriated not by 
the neoliberal university, but by the far-right. 
Yiannopoulos’s speech organized by Berkeley College Republicans and 
supported by the Proud Boys—a new “Western Chauvinist” fraternal organization of 
the alt-lite—was scheduled for February of 2017. Fear seeped through the air as 
reliable sources had gone public that the tech reporter was planning to out numerus 
undocumented university students during his speech (Oppenheim 2017). As tensions 
rose, counter-demonstrators gathered, soon reaching 3,000 people. But it wasn’t until 
a smaller anarchist troupe of 150 people engaged in civil disobedience that the event 
was canceled. While these organizers had enacted what the larger group could not, 
nevertheless, liberal and fascist media alike denounced the anarchists and defended 
Yiannopoulos’s free speech, from UC Berkeley professor Robert Reich (and former 
Secretary of Labor under Clinton) to Trump. Even the American Civil Liberty Union 
filed a lawsuit on Yiannopoulos’s behalf, much to the benefit of technofascist power. 
As authors of CrimethInc contextualized, “From organizing ‘white safe spaces’ to 
pretending to represent a new free speech movement, the ascendant fascists 
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understood that the hollow rhetoric of liberalism utilized by hacks like Reich could be 
weaponized against anyone opposed to white supremacy and patriarchy” 
(Anonymous 2018). In this way, by chiding antifascist direct action, liberals in fact 
supported the alt-right. This left antifascists with the burden of countering 
technofascism on their own. 
This liberal defense of the First Amendment reflects what Lisa Lowe has 
accurately described as the economy of “affirmation and forgetting” that accompanies 
enfranchisement (2015, 3). When assimilating into whiteness, or from oppression to 
freedom from violence, particular forms of forgetting may transpire. But some 
differences are unassimilable, leading to what Chandan Reddy describes as “the pre-
mature ‘burial’ of the racialized and undifferentiated deaths,” for instance, those 
undocumented (2012, 277). Those who stood in defense of Yiannopoulos’s First 
Amendment right may have once been targeted by racism. But having achieved 
security and freedom from violence, they seem to have forgotten the political urgency 
of fighting violence and assaultive speech. As Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor observed, 
“It is only with the Right that this idea of unchecked free speech arises. . . For 
everyone else on campus, speech is regulated, monitored and surveilled. This is core 
to the myth of the liberal campus. It does not exist” (quoted in Luu 2018). As much as 
free speech has benefited Leftist movements, it has also been used by the Right to 
benefit its own, right within the heart of the liberal university. 
Following the UCB event, a long series of protests endured throughout the 
spring and summer in Berkeley. During these, members of numerous far-right and 
fascist groups continually joined forces to take over public space, and antifascist 
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organizers rose to meet them. Largely the fascist groups had never organized in 
person together, having only known each other through internet platforms such as 
4chan. Many had US Army training, and they were often led by a series of hetero-
masculine men with internet celebrity status. For instance, Kyle Chapman, known as 
“Based Stick Man,” became a neo-Nazi hero at the Berkeley protests, forming what 
he called the “Fraternal Order of the Alt Knights.” Some of these knights wore pro-
Pinochet shirts and chanted about dropping antifascists from helicopters. Others 
brought bagels to fling in anti-Semitic expression. Queers were doxed, and Black-
owned spaces such as the Alchemy Collective Café were vandalized. 
At one point, while being assaulted by bagels, a friend turned to me and asked 
the fascists could have possibly come from. Some Antifa began yelling at the Nazis 
to, “Go back to Europe.” Yet contrary to popular belief, many of these fascists hadn’t 
travelled far to attend the protests at all. In a mapping project conducted by the 
Southern Poverty Law Center of Hate Groups, of 954 within the US in 2018, 75 are 
located in California. Of the 71 groups labeled “racist skinhead” in the US, 11 are 
located in California alone (Southern Poverty Law Center 2018). Hate crimes 
committed by these groups became more frequent and emboldened in the wake of 
Trump’s victory, with 867 cases reported the first ten days of his presidency (Petulla, 
Kupperman, and Schneider 2016). The Bay Area was not immune (America’s Voice 
2018). Lowe cautions that free speech is part the “modern liberal project,” one that 
promises rights, emancipation, and more, but yet which upholds global divisions and 
asymmetries (2015, 3). Modern liberalism, stemming from Western European 
political philosophy, understands political emancipation as achieved through state 
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citizenship. In the case of first amendment rights, liberalism upholds freedom of 
speech for all citizens, including Nazis, but not for non-citizens, such as those who 
Yiannopoulos was planning to out. The playing field, while premised upon liberal 
notions of equality, is not equal. As Lowe puts it, “In the very claim to define 
humanity, as a species or as a condition,” liberal universalism’s “gestures of 
definition divide the human and the nonhuman, to classify the normative and 
pathologize deviance” (ibid., 5). 
In order to fight the violence of liberal universalism, struggles cannot be 
premised upon assimilatory aspirations and fictive equalities, but rather upon 
antiracist politics that understand the modern racism and liberalism to be co-
constitutive. This is particularly true when considering the paradigmatic sea change in 
racial epistemologies and politics that occurred after the Second World War, not 
coincidentally during the height of the Free Speech movement and the beginning of 
the Cold War when US state racism changed in novel ways. During this time, 
anticolonial and antiracist movements gained momentum, highlighting US racial 
contradictions, both on US soil but also in Vietnam and other imperial sites. To 
manage these contradictions, antiracism became absorbed into US governmentality. 
Melamed describes this as racial liberalism, in which, “in contrast to white 
supremacy, the liberal race paradigm recognizes racial inequality as a problem, and it 
secures a liberal symbolic framework for race reform centered in abstract equality, 
market individualism, and inclusive civic nationalism” (2006, 2). Official antiracism 
became sutured to US liberal freedom, welcoming some people into the realm of the 
human, but not all. Melamed charts that since the 1990s, racial liberalism mutated 
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into the post-Cold War neoliberal multiculturalism, which affixes official antiracism 
to state policy while deracializing “racial reference into a series of rhetorical gestures 
of ethical right and certainty” (2006, 16). This new racist form recycles the liberal 
multicultural hype of the 1980s and 1990s of freedom and diversity—shibboleths for 
global capitalism. 
Yet neoliberal multiculturalism, while alive and well under Obama, fails to 
completely explain how white supremacist capitalism has shifted under the 
plutocratic Trump. Both eras rely upon the logics of racial technocapitalism, but 
something has shifted. Byrd, Goldstein, Melamed, and Reddy offer, “As dominant 
racializing and colonizing procedures shift between Obama-era reformism, upwardly 
redistributive neoliberal multiculturalism, and the taking and abuse of land in the 
name of austerity, on the one hand, and Trumpist repertoires of criminalization, 
renewals of the wages of whiteness, crony capitalism, and white settler ‘blood and 
soil’ claims to place and land exploitation” (2019, 4). On the other hand, “the logic of 
propriation itself remains naturalized, while the renewal of white supremacy’s 
relevance to capitalism reveals the thinness of capitalist civil rights (cum property 
rights), thoroughly shaped by and shaping propriation since the 1970s” (ibid., 4). By 
propriation, they study the racially dispossessive expropriations and appropriations 
that technologies of liberalism, colonialism, and capitalism espouse. 
By adding free speech into the domain of propriation, it becomes clear that the 
appropriation of free speech functions to embolden white supremacist expropriative 
violence. In the fight for their freedom of hate speech, the alt-right fought for the 
space of the liberal university and the streets and parks surrounding Berkeley. But 
237  
also, they have fought to instate the blood and soil genre of racial technocapitalism 
and all the dispossession that it inheres. In other words, if capitalism can absorb 
everything in its wake in the name of liberal freedom, from SROs to IPOS, it should 
be no surprise that fascists can as well. This mode of propriation is of a particular 
post-Cold War moment, in which, per Chari and Verdery, “Forms of biopolitical 
debris of capitalism, colonialism, and nationalism . . . become key sites of struggle” 
(2009, 28). This becomes particularly evident when looking towards Bay Area racial 
dispossession struggles amidst the ascension of technofascism. 
 
The Dark Enlightenment 
Just as both the alt-right and YIMBYism have recycled prior liberal and leftist 
forms for their own purposes, post-Cold War temporality has seen US national 
tendencies make consistent efforts to recycle the Cold War inimical. It was after 1989 
that new hunts for the enemy began to replace the hole left behind by “the Cold War 
Communist” and thereby maintain semblance of Cold War identity. In understanding 
the contours of this hunt, it is important to think through post-Cold shifts in race and 
geopolitics. On one hand, as Chari and Verdery presage, “The Cold War is not yet 
over” (2009, 30). How else do we understand the perpetual US “casting about for new 
enemies, new sites of danger, to take ‘Communism’s’ place” (ibid., 28). But on the 
other, as they also note, in post-Cold War times, colonialism, socialism, and their 
various aftermaths employ novels forms of racial technologies to affix life and death 
in unique ways. Here I focus upon the construction of the inimical in the heart of 
racial technocapitalism. 
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Following Trump’s victory, liberal pundits and media outlets alike were quick 
to blame outsiders rather than homegrown white supremacy and the failings of the 
Democratic Party. These included poor people, millennials, to the most infamous of 
them all—the “dangerous Russians hackers who hijacked American democracy.” In 
other words, rather than attending to the longevity of racism that US white inheritance 
reproduces (and is constituted by), and rather than acknowledging that increased 
neoliberalism within the Democratic Party had in fact repelled leftists from it, the 
Party appropriated Cold War grammars to Russophobically scapegoat Russian 
hackers. These figments have supplanted the bomb in the longevity of Cold War 
nuclear culture (Masco 2011), with Eastern Europe reproduced as the Cold War 
illiberal. Yet it has mostly been liberals and not conservatives recycling Cold War 
McCarthyism, indexing a strange discursive rearrangement emblematic of post-Cold 
War times. Today, as Alexei Yurchak writes, “Western liberalism rejects 
‘islamophobia’ but embraces ‘russophobia’” (2017, 3). In this way, liberalism, he 
suggests, frames Trump supporters as “a motley cast of Euroskeptics, Islamophobes, 
Russophiles, and neo-Nazis” (ibid., 3). Post-Cold War times thus reinvigorates the 
“temporarily forgotten, figure of ‘Red under the bed’” (ibid., 10), but crosses the 
wires slightly. 
Despite this, in March 2018, a news story broke that in part shattered the 
geography of liberal-illiberal geopolitics. It was revealed that a British stealth 
political technology firm, Cambridge Analytica, had in part rigged the elections, 
maybe more so than the elusive antipodal Russian hackers. An undercover 
investigation by the UK’s Channel 4 depicted Analytica executives scheming how to 
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effectively inject propaganda into the internet’s bloodstream. As was revealed, the 
firm was partly owned by Steve Bannon, and had previously worked on Republican 
Ted Cruz’s 2016 campaign before Trump’s. Cambridge Analytica alleged possession 
of 230 million American voters’ profiles based upon 5,000 detailed data points 
largely obtained from Silicon Valley’s Facebook, with Facebook’s consent (Kroll 
2018). Of course, much of this data is available to anyone through processes of what 
Jim Thatcher, David O’Sullivan, and Dillon Mahmoudi refer to as “data colonialism 
through accumulation” (2016). Promises of “‘big data’ within the utopian imaginaries 
of digital frontierism” inhere new forms of unfettered racial technocapitalism (2016, 
990). Yet Cambridge developed unique micro-targeting techniques to pair consumer 
information with psychological data extracted from social-media platforms. This was 
used by the Trump campaign to target people with custom images, messages, ads, 
mailers, and even in-person interactions – a recipe that the company’s CEO, 
Alexander Nix, called the “secret sauce” (quoted in Kroll 2018). Chris Wylie, who 
helped start the company, described how they the company was built to harvest 
millions of people’s Facebook profiles “and built models to exploit what we knew 
about them and target their inner demons” (ibid.) In 1992, Nigel Oakes, who crafted 
the psychological laboratory that would eventually grow into Cambridge Analtyica, 
explained, “We use the same techniques as Aristotle and Hitler” (ibid). 
While Cambridge Analytica harvested Facebook’s data through new methods, 
it has been Facebook that has extracted data on its 1.65 billion users, comprising the 
largest biometric database in the world (Dishaw 2015). This database is used by local 
police officers upon their discretion (Coleman 2016), particularly to track protestors 
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and threats to democracy. As has been uncovered, of 63 police departments 
interrogated in California, 20, including those in Oakland and San Jose, have acquired 
social media surveillance software (Wong 2016). Thus, when any of Facebook’s 
users upload and tag a photograph, users assist its facial recognition algorithm and its 
DeepFace monitoring program, as well as local police departments (Rosenblatt 2016). 
As of 2016, the company has estimated that it can accurately identify a tagged person 
98 percent of the time, better than the FBI’s own Generation Identification software, 
which only boasts a 50 to 85 percent accuracy rating (LaChance 2016). 
While big databases such as Facebook’s ignite techno-utopic fantasies for 
some, facial recognition “datafies” the human into profitable parts, dissecting, 
extracting, quantifying, and selling others’ digital selves. These violent mechanisms 
of data participate in modes of what Jeremy Crampton and Andrea Miller define as 
“algorithmic governance” (2017). This refers to “the manifold ways that algorithms 
and code/space enable practices of governance that ascribes risk, suspicion and 
positive value in geographic contexts.” Algorithmic practices, derived from 
psychological data-mining to biometric surveillance, often replace human decision-
making processes with machine-based learning, pretending to be objective through 
their techniques of distancing. And yet, these technologies have been constituted 
through human-made fantasies and prejudices, coded and spatialized to produce 
desired results, protocols, predictions, and borders. Further, they have been designed 
by humans deeply enmeshed with older racist onto-epistemologies, from settler 
colonialism to Cold War Silicon Valley informatics. 
The Cambridge Analytica scandal erupted broke while I was in Bucharest. 
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While many people there didn’t seem to notice, others heaved sighs of relief, hoping 
that finally the US might stop stoking Cold War flames and instead look at its own 
Silicon underbelly where technofascism is alive and well. For instance, Peter Thiel, 
Facebook investor and PayPal co-founder, became part of Trump’s transition team 
shortly after his election, and Uber’s former CEO, Travis Kalanick, entered but then 
shortly exited Trump’s advisory council, inciting protesters to barricade Uber’s San 
Francisco headquarters amidst January inauguration protests. During Trump’s 
inauguration, the DeploraBall (attended by far-right activists and Thiel) was 
organized by software investor and former Stanford Review editor, Jeff Giesea, who 
also once worked for Thiel Capital Management. As was later revealed, Giesea had 
partnered with far-right blogger Mike Cernovich on MAGA3X in 2016 to wage 
meme warfare for Trump. Together, they worked with former BuzzFeed employee 
Anthime Gionet, “Baked Alaska,” and the right-wing troll Jack Posobiec, 
disseminating Breitbart memes (Harkinson 2017). 
Thiel, Giesea and other technocapitalists are responsible for coding a 
technofascist ideology and onto-epistemology that some call the Dark Enlightenment. 
Inspired by the philosopher and science fiction writer, Nick Land, the Dark 
Enlightenment and its subsects of neo-reactionary (NRx) and right-accelerationist 
philosophies, “leads us to the fever swamp of alt-right culture wars and the anti-
democratic urban imaginaries of billionaire libertarian investors in technology in the 
USA” (Burrows 2018, 1-2). One of NRx’s primary concepts is that democracy does 
not work, and that nations should be fragmented and broken into tiny CEO-ruled 
states. It promotes gated off-world communities, as well as eugenicist hyperracism, 
242  
not so different from Silicon Valley’s William Shockley’s “retrogressive evolution” 
of years past. NRx also espouses the aesthetic vision Post-Anathema, based upon a 
technofuturist, hyper-masculine visual culture saturated with soldiers, guns, 
cathedrals, tanks, spaceships, smart cities, and Greek gods (Gray 2017). 
Land’s “philosophy-fiction” long-form text, The Dark Enlightenment, was 
written in 2012, and is regarded as the NRx bible (MacDougald 2015). It features the 
work of a Bay Area blogger, Curtis Yarvin, founder NRx (Haider 2017). Funded by 
Thiel and an inspiration to Bannon, Yarvin writes on race and history, and has gone 
from questioning, “What’s so bad about the Nazis?,” to aligning himself with the 
Scottish philosopher Thomas Carlyle’s defense of slavery (Burrows 2018, 10; Gray 
2017). Yarvin also believes that the Soviet Union in fact won the Cold War because 
the US is now “a communist country” (2016). Extrapolating upon Yarvin’s entwining 
of libertarianism and Victorian Social Darwinism, Land embraces the work of Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, opening NRx up to many who might not otherwise 
engage in technofascism. 
NRx enthusiasts also point to the 1991 Dot Com Boom technolibertarian 
manifesto, The Sovereign Individual: How to Survive and Thrive During the Collapse 
of the Welfare State, as a source of inspiration. Thiel cites this text as his greatest 
textual inspiration, as do Silicon Valley figures such as Netscape founder and venture 
capitalist Marc Andreessen, as well as entrepreneur Balaji Srinivasan, known for 
pushing for Silicon Valley’s US secession (O’Connell 2018). The 400-page book 
portrays a post-democratic future analogous to the medieval collapse of feudal power. 
The book eerily predicts certain strains of the Tech Boom 2.0’s landscape, for 
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instance the rise of the internet, the birth of cryptocurrencies, and the emergence of a 
new class of “cognitive elite” more powerful than nation-states. These allegedly will 
triumph in the wreckage of democracy’s collapse. 
In preparation for the wreckage, in 2011, Thiel purchased 477 acres of land in 
New Zealand. In 2016, the famous Silicon Valley entrepreneur Sam Altman 
announced that “he had an arrangement with Thiel to retreat together on a private jet 
together to New Zealand in the eventuality “of some kind of systemic collapse 
scenario–synthetic virus breakout, rampaging AI, resource war between nuclear-
armed states,” and so forth (O’Conner 2018). The following year, a scandal broke out 
when Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg purchased 700,000 acres in Kauai, Hawaii, 
potentially displacing Native Hawaiians of their Indigenous claim to that same land. 
And then in 2018, a group of blockchain and cryptocurrency entrepreneurs bought an 
“eternal boy playground” in Puerto Rico, their own private crypto utopia playground 
upon the deadly and life shattering wreckage of the 2017 Hurricane Maria. These 
technofascist utopias index the settler colonial and Silicon Valley imperial logics that 
shelter the techno present and future. And, as they suggest, the differences between 
speculative fiction and the present have always been fictive. 
NRx has been widely supported by the alt-right, notably having been featured 
in a Breitbart article in which Yiannopoulos and Allum Bokhari identified NRx as the 
intellectual vanguard of the movement (2016). As they observed, NRx appeared quite 
accidentally at first, on a debate on LessWrong.com, a site dedicated to the 
“advancement of rationality” overseen by Eliezer Yudkowsky. For years, 
Yudkowsky, cofounder of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute, worked 
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alongside Michael Anissimov, a strong believer in Ray Kurzweil’s concept of 
singularity (the merging of AI and humans through biotechnology) and 
accelerationism (the speeding up of computer technology and capitalism in order to 
automate singularity). Anissimov is also an avid reader of Julius Evola, the Italian 
fascist philosopher also found on Bannon’s bookshelf (Beckett 2017). Many also cite 
Nicholas Wade’s bestseller A Troublesome Inheritance, which makes the case that IQ 
differentials are based upon race. 
LessWrong and Anissimov’s now defunct MoreRight sit amongst a 
constellation of sites, from the alt-right 4chan to the neo-Nazi Daily Stormer. 
Together, they have been used by the alt-right in organizing. These sites are, as 
Angela Nagle writes, the product of the “creative energy” of the alt-right, in which 
“amoral libertine Internet culture” congeals with white, male resentment (2017)—an 
affect and demographic not uncommon in Silicon Valley. And notably, the Daily 
Stormer, while existent, enjoyed the largest percentage of its traffic from Silicon 
Valley. This group maintain heroes like Yiannopoulos, along with the neo-Nazi 
hacker Andrew Auernheimer, or “Weev,” a tech support worker for Daily Stormer 
and The Right Stuff. They also love the video gaming vlogger Felix Arvid Ulf 
Kjellberg, who maintains a “Pewdiepie” YouTube channel with 54 million 
subscribers, featuring Nazi-themed jokes. In an investigative piece on alt-techies, 
Josh Harkinson (2017) found that many are quick to explain the dominance of 
white men in the tech industry (main actors in Bay Area gentrification) through 
overtly biological racism and sexism. As computer chip designer in Berkeley who 
goes by the screenname of “White Morpheus” on the Daily Stormer writes, The 
245  
history of nearly every field of science and engineering was driven by white 
Europeans . . . Nobody will say their real feelings [about the alt-right] because a mob 
of fat blue-hair complainers will drive you away from your career forever. Peter Thiel 
coming out [for Trump] was a joy to us all, because he could show his support for the 
Trump train where we could not (qtd. in Harkinson 2017). White Morpheus chastises 
South Asian immigrants working on H-IB visas in Silicon Valley, as do many of his 
peers. As Roger Burrows cautions, “In a world where Silicon Valley (white male) 
billionaires attracted to the ideologies of Ayn Rand curate the rise of the alt-right, the 
new populism, and the mainstreaming of, inter alia, misogynist, racist and fascist 
discourses, those interested in urban futures” should take the rise of NRx seriously 
(2018, 13). 
Bay Area techno-urbanism, supported by technofascist visions, does make it 
appear that the NRx future has already arrived. “Whatever the analytic 
worth(lessness) of NRx philosophy,” Burrows suggests, “it is important to recognise 
its ideological function and the powerful actors supporting its propagation; not least 
those investing in myriad technologies in Silicon Valley who have seemingly been 
convinced by Land’s idea of hyperstition – the creation of fictional entities that can 
make themselves real” (2018, 4). Similarly, Shuja Haider, in an expose on the Dark 
Enlightenment, ventures, “If the builders of technology are transmitting their values 
into machinery this makes the culture of Silicon Valley a matter of more widespread 
consequence” (2017). In other words, in NRx is already being written into urban 
technologies and smart cities, not to mention practices of data colonialism and 
algorithmic governance, we cannot simply ignore it. Hyperstition, it turns out, may be 
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nonfiction that theorizes fiction becoming realty. 
While the cessation of the Cold War arguably led to the birth of the Dot Com 
Boom and the consumer-oriented liberalism of Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, and more. 
California ideology of the 1990s was characterized by a dialectic of New Left 
utopianism and Ayn Randian individualism (Barbrook and Cameron 1996). But this 
has given way to a new California ideology, a technological authoritarianism marked 
by figures like Thiel and Elon Musk. As Haider observes, “If Ronald Reagan and 
Margaret Thatcher had served up an all-you-can-eat shit buffet in the 1980s, 
promoting the free market at the expense of the majority of their citizens, [Land] 
responded by taking laissez-faire economics to a perverse extreme” (2017). Racial 
technocapitalism has become the protagonist history, with humans simply cogs in the 
machine. As he elaborates, “Forget time-traveling killer robots or ancient beasts. NRx 
has simply exposed the operations of the capitalist machine in the present. 
Mainstream apologists for neoliberalism have a decision to make: whether to embrace 
the pseudo-science of Silicon Valley hyperracism, or to reject the vast economic 
inequalities generated by market society” (2017). 
Technofascism is nothing new in the Bay Area. It has long been constitutive 
of Silicon Valley technoscapes, from the dawn of the Cold War to its contemporary 
post-. The rise of the alt-tech exposes this longevity. Yet technofascism, as Haider 
notes, defended by neoliberal economics and liberal politics. As liberalism enters a 
period of crisis, saturated by apocalyptic visions and the potential collapse of “the 
free world,” rather than supporting antifascist organizers, its proponents often defend 
the tradition of free speech—one now appropriated by the coders of fascist futures. 
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Meanwhile, there are designers of luxury urban futures espousing the identity of 
“housing justice.” Yet, these YIMBYs might be more aligned with those modeling 
off-world techno-utopias in outer space (or Puerto Rico for that matter) than those 
fighting for shelter on earth. Postsocialism, as an analytic, is a helpful tool in 
theorizing these continuities, discontinuities, and propriations. But postsocialist 
theory is also useful in analyzing resistance. How else can we make sense of 
emergent Bay Area news articles entitled “Anti-homeless robot covered in barbecue 
sauce, given well-deserved ass-kicking” (Worgaftik 2017)? 
 
Nihilisms 
Protests enacted outside of the Alfred Disrupt Cup, Google buses, and anti-
homeless robots (that do indeed exist) are frequently critiqued as neo-Luddite, “anti-
tech,” and out-of-joint. However, such disapprobation assumes that postsocialist 
racial technocapitalism and fascism alike are both the unavoidable future, and that 
they are entirely new. Not only are Silicon Valley disruptions dependent upon Cold 
War spatial/racial/temporal logics and their postsocialist turn, but beyond that, they 
hinge upon capitalism, itself an older technology predicated upon reducing every 
“thing” into the spectral abstraction known as money, dissolving diverse ontologies 
into value form. As was once written in the Communist Manifesto, “All that is solid 
melts into air” (Marx and Engels 1967, 3). It would thus be an unjust assertion that 
anti-tech demonstrations have been simply directed towards the novelty of new 
technologies abdicating older ones, for instance, in the case of Alfred, servitude. 
Rather, protests pivot against a moment in which all that is assumed to be air, to be 
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immaterial, calcifies into solidity, into the shrapnel and debris left in the wake of a 
new iteration of racial techno capitalism on steroids, or technofascism. Weaponized 
vomit and boxing ring punches can instead be read as perverse tongues calling for 
something other than the presumed common time of post-Cold War Silicon Valley 
imperialism, yet they are paralyzed by the gravity of its dispossessive weight. These 
tongues critique racialized forms of eviction, surveil-lance, and consciousness that 
have newly drawn Silicon Valley into urban and global space. 
This contradictory despair and hope, mired within the sinkholes of the leading 
global industry, can be understood as both reflective and productive of a postsocialist 
condition. Silicon Valley renegotiations of space are only made possible through 
post-Cold War circuits of capital, knowledge, and fantasy. Silicon Valley globality 
can be theorized as a world-historical conjuncture which, in Gary Wilder’s words, 
produces a “politicotemporal paralysis” whereby imaginaries of freedom have been 
collapsed with those of markets, diffused across a global space in which alternatives 
to liberal capitalist democracy appear foreclosed (2015, 196). And this collapse has 
been abetted by the very technologies that it creates. In this way, postsocialism, as an 
analytic, is useful in indexing not only epistemologies surrounding the phenomenon 
today discoursed as Tech Boom-induced gentrification and its global condition, but 
also, of the social worlds emerging to combat it. For it is those social worlds, those 
bodies ensconced within boxing rings, bruised in supernova, perhaps bloody, perhaps 
not, that the hegemony of Francis Fukuyama’s celebrated telos of liberal progress 
falls short, becoming “only gospel” (Derrida 1994, 56). Postsocialist analytics help 
explain this strange spatiotemporal conjuncture in ways that gentrification does not. 
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Throughout the summer of 2014, the San Francisco Mime Troupe toured the 
Bay Area region with its satirical musical comedy, “Ripple Effect,” written by 
Eugenie Chan, Tanya Shaffer, and Michael Gene Sullivan. The performance stewed 
with familiar tensions upon the Bay Area tech-driven gentrifying landscape, 
allegorizing a world in which revolutionary potential is swallowed by Silicon Valley 
surveillance infrastructures, inciting economies of gentrification and loss. But during 
its enactment, something else transpired too. Much of the Mime Troupe’s 
performance takes place aboard a small vessel called the Distant Horizon, traversing 
the waters surrounding San Francisco. The captain/tour guide, Deborah, played by 
Velina Brown, enacts recursive paranoia, illuminating that she does not trust anything 
invented before 1988, the year before the end of the Cold War that, she makes clear, 
also witnessed the birth of both Prozac and cell phones. Onboard her ship sits two 
passengers. Jeanine (Lisa Hori-Garcia) is an app developer from Nebraska working 
for a tech giant, Octopus. Anxious and over-stimulated, Jeanine explains that she has 
trouble focusing when beyond the confines of her office cubicle. And then there is 
Sunny (Keiko Shimosato Carreiro), a Vietnamese immigrant and defender of the 
American dream, yet simultaneously traumatized by the US invasion of Vietnam, 
now overprotectively raising her daughter and running a beauty salon in the 
predominantly Black neighborhood Bayview. As it turns out, Sunny is monitoring her 
daughter with a surveillance app invented by the uneasy Jeanine, who had originally 
conceived of the technology to oversee her disabled grandmother who was prone to 
wandering. Further, Sunny is facing eviction because Jeanine’s company is acquiring 
new office space in the gentrifying neighborhood. But the plot does not end here. 
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As the story unfolds, we learn that the distrustful captain Deborah had been an 
active member of the Black Panther Party, and that since the 1960s, she has been 
searching for a lost partner disappeared by COINTELPRO operations. Seamlessly, it 
unravels that her partner was not actually disappeared, but instead went underground, 
only to reemerge as the CEO of Octopus, Jeanine’s boss, now a staunch defender of 
capitalism. The play reaches its apex as the women realize that the only way to 
dismantle the Octopus and its various tentacles surveilling all intimate space while 
controlling information flows, is for all three women to collaborate, dismantling 
Octopus’s technology through a backdoor that Jeanine had coded into the surveillance 
app. At first Jeanine is reticent, complaining to the adamant Deborah that she is not 
political, and that she does not know how to fight the new technocratic empire. To 
this, Deborah dramatically retorts, “There is no such thing as not political!” much to 
the crowd’s delight. In other moments, Deborah undoes Sunny’s identification as 
being middle-class, vehemently shouting, “There is no middle-class; there is only the 
working-class!”, and the rich. As Sullivan later explained, the performance 
intentionally hinted that the conjoining of different working classes is integral to fight 
a common enemy: that of the gentrifying tech giant empire (qtd. in Schiffman 2014). 
The performance concluded with the women acknowledging that together, though 
direct street action, they can keep Sunny and her daughter housed. 
Months before the performance, I was asked by the Mime Troupe to 
participate in their 2014 debut in Dolores Park in San Francisco by rallying the 
audience after the protest. Just a block away from the performance was the site of a 
seven-unit household fighting an eviction notice issued by Google’s then head of e-
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Security. The Mime Troupe had envisioned that following the uplifting performance 
and rallying cry, that audience members would be inspired to join tenants and march 
to their home in an act of solidarity. But following the performance, upon the park 
sprinkled with artisanal picnics, few people joined our picket as we crawled up 
Dolores Street. 
While larger and more successful anti-eviction protests have occurred since 
then, the inability to rally even a dozen people in a crowd over 500 seemed indicative 
of postsocialist despair. Is the Distant Horizon approaching a new working-class 
collectivity in which the defeat of the high-tech empire and its global penetrations is 
possible? Or, does it harken to something else, some other horizon haunted by, to 
conjure Scott’s work, “a wound that will not heal,” a wound that takes over, 
disrupting the linearity of historical time (2014, 13)? A wound scarred upon global 
imaginaries following the supposed evacuation of socialist alterity. A wound that 
suggests, by the anonymous author of the anarchist text Desert, “the world will not be 
‘saved”’ (2011, 6). If not more than a dozen people would take fifteen minutes to 
walk up the street to help a neighbor fight an eviction being implemented by a Google 
employee, and if liberals censure antifascists for disrupting technofascist free speech 
acts, then what future might endure outside of the post-Cold War rearrangement of 
liberalism, fascism, and anti-capitalist alterity? 
In the wake of technofascism and its racially dispossessive propriations, it 
seems imperative to break from post-Cold War time in order to configure 
“unappropriable” futures. After all, the revolutionary time of protest, of romance, is 
of the same making as global capitalism—ideologies of universality conscripted 
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through Marxist-Hegelian timelines of global overcoming. Fighting a universal, that 
of postsocialist Silicon Valley imperialism and its attendant forms of racial/spatial 
dispossession, will only result in failure if another universal is applied to dismantle it, 
leading to recurrent catastrophes and paralysis. In the case of such universal 
application, perhaps failure, following the work of Jack Halberstam, is revolutionary. 
To disrupt racial technocapitalism and its propriations, we do not need one perversion 
of tongue to triumph; neither the Nihilists nor Marxists need emerge victorious. To 
disrupt the disruption, it would take the endurance of multiple and incongruous 
perversions, visceralities, and failures. It would take revolutionary imaginaries 
uncoded through liberal teleologies, unbound by the common time of Silicon Valley 
imperialism, yet irrevocably tethered to a postsocialist condition. As such, it seems 
that postsocialism is one of many necessary analytics needed to theorize the present, 
the past, and the heterogeneity of futures both already here, and yet-to-come. 
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Chapter 5: Hacking the Inimical of Post-Cold War Time: Mr. Robot, 
the Dark Army, and the Doomsday Machine 
 
This chapter continues to theorize postsocialism as an analytic to make sense 
of growing entanglements between Silicon Valley imperialism, racial 
technocapitalism, and fascism. By reading Sam Esmail’s American television series, 
Mr. Robot, and by ethnographically engaging in hacking practices in Romania, my 
mapping of the US and Romania as postsocialist continues. During the first season of 
Mr. Robot, the anti-capitalist hacking collective, F Society, succeeds in taking down 
the world’s largest megacorporation, E Corp. Nominated as Evil Corp and resembling 
a hybridity of Enron, Bank of America, and Google, the conglomerate owns 70 
percent of the global consumer credit industry, stored in its database. After a season 
of scheming, F Society initiates what’s called in hacking as a DDoS attack, inciting a 
financial revolution and an era subsequently referred to as post-5/9, collectively 
referencing date of the hack, the 2008 financial collapse, and the post-9/11 era. 
To celebrate the hack’s success, F Society holds what they describe as an 
“End of the World” party, advertised by posters mirroring the original theatrical bill 
of Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 Dr. Strangelove: Or How I Stopped Worrying and 
Learned to Love the Bomb. Kubrick’s Cold War film, a satire on American and Soviet 
politics in the nuclear age, culminates in the detonation of the Doomsday Machine, a 
mechanism that once set in place destroys all of humankind despite government 
attempts to thwart it. Mimicking the red, black, and white color schema and 
composition of the original poster, F Society hacks the original text, replacing it with, 
“No Bomb, Just the End of the World.” For the hacktivists, a celebration of what is 
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known in computing as “zero day,” or the exploitation of a computer software 
vulnerability that upon detonation is unstoppable (doomsday), is both haunted and 
constituted by Cold War ghosts. 
Today, the world is as divided as it was throughout the Cold War, but the 
divisions are differently striated, the “dystoptics” newly arranged. While the 
composition of Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove poster detailed a Soviet hammer and sickle 
on one side, and the US flag on the other, F Society’s party announcement displaces 
Soviet imagery with E Corp’s logo, as for them it is corporations rather than 
governments that need to be destroyed. And conversely, for contemporary 
technocapitalism and the US imperialism that enables it, or techno-imperialism, anti-
corporate hacktavists pose bomb-like threat. From the F Society to Anonymous (the 
latter a model for the former, also famous for their DDoS attacks), to hackers such as 
Guccifer and Guccifer 2.0 (known for having hacked Democratic Party emails, now 
pathologized by liberal media and pundits as “dangerous Romanians” and “Russian 
bears”), cybersecurity threats have reached the level of the bomb in US security 
discourse. As Joseph Masco observes, this landscape remains mired in “Cold War 
nuclear culture” tethered to “deep structural investment in the atomic bomb” (2014, 
18), framed upon a “utopian-apocalyptic circuit” (2016, 312). Reflecting upon these 
troubling times, Karen Barad offers, “With fascism on the rise around the globe and 
the threat of an accelerated nuclear arms race at hand, tied to a perverse sense of the 
usability of nuclear weapons, the false security of global strategic deterrence based on 
MAD (the military doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction) left exposed and 
undone by madness, compulsiveness, and hubris, the 20th century is anything but 
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past/passed” (2017, 57). Aligned with her call to consider the entanglement of 20th-
century temporal forms with those of today, here I specifically focus upon hacking 
culture. Entanglement calls into question presumed geometric understandings of scale 
and topology, and instead foregrounds connectivity and boundary as more 
analytically salient (Barad 2007). 
While assessing Cold War ghosts entangled in Western interpretations of 
Eastern illiberal technoculture, here I also read hacking imaginaries from the other 
side the updated Iron Curtain. There, hacking culture remains embedded in a different 
circuit, one nevertheless entangled with the West. Developed through an 
accumulation of socialist informatics histories and technoscience, it is also informed 
by the impacts of the disaster capitalism let loose in the aftermath of 1989. Romania, 
once a center of socialist-era computing, is today a hotbed of hacking, malware 
development, fast internet, and attempts to scam techno-imperialism. While defiant to 
the West, it also becomes absorbed into Cold War 2.0 geopolitical imaginaries, the 
latter determined to maintain the “common time” of liberal democracy against all 
technological threats. Just as Eastern Europe technoculture becomes recoded as 
inimical in the Cold War 2.0, so does anti-capitalist cyber deviance within the borders 
of the West, updating McCarthyistic hysteria. In this way, groups such as F Society, 
based in the West, are still read as the Cold War 2.0 enemy in liberal imaginaries. By 
conflating the enemy as anti-democratic, illiberal, authoritarian, and even fascist, 
liberal politics here script anti-capitalist technologies within the West as threats to 
global liberal democracy. In this way, liberal politics are ill equipped to map actual 
fascism and its postsocialist resurgence. 
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To understand this inimical entanglement, it helpful to engage what Ovidiu 
Ţichindeleanu describes as a decolonial approach to postsocialism (2010), attentive to 
the homogenizing subject effects of the Western Cold War dystoptics as they render 
both state socialism and anti-capitalist projects of the present as an illiberal 
aberration. Hacking culture (at least the kind unrecognizable in now normalized 
technocapitalist “hackathons”) becomes coded as backwards in this process, with 
liberal grammars interpreting it against the interests of Western liberal democracy 
(Coleman 2013). In this process, an array of cybercultural forms from diverse locales 
become conflated as the technological enemy. This sloppy politic elides the violence 
that liberal techno-imperialism produces, much of which is racial and reliant upon 
racial technocapitalism. It also obscures the ways in which Western imperialism and 
technologies embolden new connections between technocapitalism and fascism, or 
technofascism. In this way, liberalism, by pointing its finger to the illiberal Cold War 
2.0 enemy, enables racial and at times fascistic violence to grow in novel ways. 
Postsocialist analytics are helpful in understanding this mechanism, particular 
when freed from their oft assumed geographic, epistemological, and temporal 
boundaries. As Neda Atanasoski argues, postsocialism itself can be read as “a global 
condition that produces a social, economic and cultural ethic that builds on and 
disavows previous racial and imperial formations” (2013, 23). Also helpful in 
assessing techno inimical forms in postsocialist times is Sharad Chari and Katherine 
Verdery’s provocation to produce post-Cold War ethnographies that connect past and 
present imperial forms (2009). Post-Cold War ethnographic methods foreground 
imperial connections and discontinuities before and after socialism, especially when it 
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comes to racial technologies. For instance, and as I explore here, Western techno-
imperiality was alive and well on both sides of the former Iron Curtain before 
socialism, engineering the attempted annihilation of Roma and Jews. What does it 
mean that it has been updated today? What does this update do to understandings of 
race, technology, and the future? 
In this chapter, I focus upon postsocialist temporality, postsocialist 
technoculture, and the crisis of liberalism, particularly as the latter reinterprets racial, 
fascist, and imperial configurations. Reading hacking imaginaries from both sides of 
the Iron Curtain 2.0, I question how understandings of enemy and temporality have 
become, and continue to be, hacked anew. By this, I ask if hacking the inimical 
within the utopian-apocalyptic circuit board can do anything but reinterpret an older 
inimical form, and if instead, hacking time might offer a way out of the post-Cold 
War tendency to reproduce the enemy. In what follows, I supplement ethnographic 
work conducted in Romania with readings of fiction and politics, particularly as the 
lines between them continue to blur. As David Scott suggests, fiction offers insight 
into different modes of and relationships to time, be out-of-joint or apocalyptic, 
successive cyclical, orienting us towards conjunctures of temporal crises (2013, 68). 
By bringing together fiction with archival and ethnographic work conducted in 
Romania, I wire together a postsocialist analysis of techno-imperialism and 
technofascism, of disjunctures and cyberghosts, of aftermaths and circuit boards. 
 
Postliberalism, Technofascism, and the post-Cold War Imaginary 
In Mr. Robot, an FBI agent chases poster images for the End of the World 
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Party to find the now terrorist “F Society.” At one point, in both desperation and 
loneliness, she asks her Amazon Echo AI, Alexa, “Alexa, when is the end of the 
world?” To this her robotic machine dispassionately replies with an anthropocenic 
forecast of portended planetary destruction, unless something else destroys the world 
first. Will the “End of the World” be caused by the anti-capitalist F Society, the 
monopolist E Corp, or impending planetary destruction? Whose dystopia will 
prevail? Alaina Lemon observes that during the Cold War, technology was used to 
feed superstitions on both sides of the Iron Curtain in two ways. First, “both 
superpowers cast enemies alternatively as manufacturers of ideological robots or as 
slaves to suspicion superstition” (2018, xvii). Second, both sides launched enormous 
efforts to use technology to shape imaginaries, opinions, and everyday life. What 
technological continuities and discontinuities must be excavated to understand the 
post-Cold War condition in which hacks replace bombs as technological threat, and in 
which paranoia lingers on and accumulates? What other rearrangements must be 
examined, particularly amidst contexts that scholars of postsocialism are marking as 
the rearticulated crisis of liberalism? 
By this, I refer to what Dace Dzenovska and Larisa Kurtović (2017) describe 
as a global crisis in which what had been presumed to be the unilateral Western 
liberal endpoint of history following the collapse of Eastern European state socialism 
has been called into question with Trump’s electoral success. This era, what many 
liberals have glossed as the “Trumpocalypse,” unravels post-Cold War presumptions 
that the United States, the so-called “leader of the Free World,” would lead liberal 
internationalism into Fukuyama’s “end of history” (2006). While Trump espouses 
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neoliberalism like his predecessors, he does so by performing what Nikhil Pal Singh 
marks as a form of “racial nationalism,” restoring “native ‘American capitalism’ to its 
place in the sun” (2017, 33, 170). Invoking what theorists have warned as the rise of 
an “inverted totalitarianism” (Wolin 2008), or the renewal of “imperialism beyond the 
liberal variant” (Mazower 2008), Trump’s victory materially threatens immigrants, 
people of color, anarchists, women, queers, socialists, and more, as well as common 
time. 
As liberalism’s mortality is thrown into question, Cold War battles for its 
triumph are newly conjured. Revolution has long been a founding structure for 
organizing modern political time, tethering old endings to new beginnings, futures 
past, and futures still being dreamt, while sparking arrays of aftermaths haunted by 
past political possibilities (Scott 2013). As the Cold War is bookmarked by 
revolutions, beginning with those of antifascism and ending with those of liberal 
democracy, the dawn of “postliberalism” is haunted by an entanglement of antifascist, 
socialist, fascist, and neoliberal fantasies. As the Cold War was also marked by 
techno revolutions, from the bomb to cybernetics, techno-utopics and dystopics are 
also conjured anew. 
To understand the recoding of liberalism in the technological present, 
Atanasoski and Vora offer the analytic of technoliberalism, or the reanimation of 
liberalism and fascism (2019, 28). These, they mark, are codependent twin pillars of 
US imperialism, rooted in Cold War discourses of automation and robotics, mediating 
the tension between totalitarianism and democratic liberalism. In the wake of Trump 
and the white loss that his presidency organizes against, Cold War fears of socialist 
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robotics are summoned. And yet, automation, as practiced within techno-imperial 
geographies, espouses racial capitalism and technofascism. 
Here I am particularly interested in how racial technocapitalism functions to 
Orientalize and pathologize Eastern European postsocialist technoculture. In this way, 
Romania—as geographically a part of but not quite a part of Europe—is read, as 
Maria Todorova elaborates, as Europe’s “incomplete self,” perpetually awaiting 
enlightenment (1997, 18). Post-Cold War readings of Romania, and of Eastern 
European hackers more broadly, hinges upon prior Orientalist forms which both 
fetishize and disparage Eastern European racialized illiberalism. Orientalism, while 
alive and well before and during state socialism, has shifted in unique ways in 
postsocialist times. Technoliberalism masks the raciality of this process today, as well 
as a resurgence of fascism valorizing pre-socialist techno-urban imaginaries. 
Technofascism can thus be understood as a postsocialist politic and fantasy 
garbed in technoliberal forms that updates pre-socialist racial values. Judith Butler 
argues that in these strange times, there has been a novel trend in which fascism 
appropriates leftist language and identity (2019). Here, I suggest that in parallel, 
fascist tendencies become sheltered by liberalism to pathologize anticapitalism. While 
hacktivist groups such as F Society rearrange both Cold War and communist 
technological imagery, racial technocapitalism’s own fiction writers continue to 
mobilize Cold War apocalyptic visions, as without the existence of a Cold War 
inimical, their own teleology remains unhinged. However, in actual US Cold War 
contexts, these enemies were largely framed by rightwing McCarthyism and 
Reaganism; today, liberals have taken up the charge, conflating Communist, Eastern 
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European, and hacker as the illiberal harbinger of liberalism’s potential collapse (as I 
go one to show in this chapter). Meanwhile the far right continues to pathologize all 
who aren’t male, white, and capitalist, much as it always has done. How do we 
understand this rearrangement, one in which Cold War optics have become 
technologically scrambled in new ways upon Masco’s utopian-apocalyptic circuit 
board? Decoding this encryption is essential in order to theorize the technological 
crises of liberalism and fascism in postsocialist temporalities. 
Postsocialist methods are helpful tools in doing so, particularly as they 
facilitate examination of allegorical breaks and continuities, as well as what Scott 
describes as “the temporality of the aftermaths of political catastrophe, the temporal 
disjunctures involved in living on in the wake of past political time, amid the ruins, 
specifically, of postsocialist and postcolonial futures past” (2013, 2). In techno-
imperial contexts, aftermaths of political catastrophe are haunted by Cold War ghosts, 
now transforming bombs and anti-capitalist hackers into terroristic communists. Of 
course, individuals hack into private email and bank accounts regularly to extract and 
exploit information-capital with no attached political manifesto, but nevertheless 
hackers remain divided in the liberal post-Cold War imaginary as either good 
(organizing hackathons funded by or benefiting entrepreneurs, startups, and 
governments), or as malignant (illiberally coordinating attacks against capitalist 
interests, whether explicitly political or not) (Coleman 2013). But there is more at 
work than simply the reconfiguration of the weaponry and enemy, as their 
transformation specifically coincides with a postsocialist rearrangement of race, class, 
and geopolitics. 
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Speculative Fictions of Zombie Socialism and Cybersecurity 
Just months after the release of Mr. Robot’s second season featuring the FBI’s 
search for F Society, a new End of the World imaginary began circulating the liberal 
imaginary. Rather than the 5/9 or 9/11-era, this one became known as that of the 11/9, 
that of the Trumpocalypse. Largely ignored was that Trump’s rival, Hillary Clinton, 
also ran a campaign built on Wall Street ties (Walsh 2016), and that throughout her 
political career, she has detonated apocalyptic conditions upon countless people 
within and beyond the US (Shulte 2016), in turn severing her from much of the left. 
Although Esmail was a Clinton supporter, F Society is positioned against the 
corporate Wall Street ties that both the Democratic and Republic Parties have 
amassed. For instance, they cut off the brass testicles of the Wall Street bull during 
what is portrayed as Obama’s presidency, dropping the severed metal detachment 
through the skylight of the Capitol dome during session. Yet while E Corp is run by 
CEO Phillip Price, who denigrates Trump (the latter depicted as running for office in 
Seasons 2 and 3), much of E Corp’s architecture was intentionally modeled on New 
York’s Trump Tower. Further, Esmail contextualized that he had Trump in mind 
during the first season’s epic opening monologue about the top one percent of the one 
percent, or “the guys that play God without permission.” Here Elliot, F Society’s 
leader whose split personality is also Mr. Robot, chastises not just the Prices/Trumps 
of the world, but the very technological infrastructure constituted by (and 
constituting) liberalism. As he spews to his therapist upon being asked, “And what is 
it about society that disappoints you so much?”: 
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Oh, I don't know. Is it that we collectively thought Steve Jobs was a great man 
even when we knew he made billions off the backs of children? Or maybe it's 
that it feels like all our heroes are counterfeit. The world itself is just one big 
hoax. Spamming each other with our burning commentary bullshit 
masquerading as insight. Our social media faking as intimacy. Or is it that we 
voted for this. Not with our rigged elections but with our things, our property, 
our money. I’m not saying anything new, we all know we do this, not because 
“Hunger Games” books make us happy, but because we want to be sedated. 
Because it’s painful not to pretend, because we’re cowards. . . Fuck society. 
 
It is thus fair to venture that F Society opposes the Trumps, Prices, and Clintons of 
the world, along with their attendant landscapes—geographies that while discursively 
and materially different, are nevertheless constituted by veneration of similar things, 
property, and money, sewn together through technologies of fake intimacy and 
exploitation. Such worlds have been grown out of the premise of post-Cold War era 
in which the triumph and inevitability of neoliberalism endures. And, until recently, it 
had been presumed that this globality would continue to signal its reign with the flag 
of democratic liberalism. 
After Clinton’s defeat, the Democratic Party began blaming outsiders rather 
than its own failings, from poor white Americans to social media, from the hacker 
Julian Assange to “the Russians” who hacked Democratic Party emails, revealing a 
Democratic Party plot to undermine the Party’s populist socialist candidate, Bernie 
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Sanders. The hack was claimed by moniker Guccifer 2.0, who asserted Romanian 
origin. The original Guccifer, the 1.0 so to speak, was the Romanian Marcel Lehel 
Lazăr, fashioning his portmanteau to conjure “the style of Gucci and the light of 
Lucifer.” He first made headlines in 2013, after hacking into the accounts of nearly 
100 American politicians and celebrities, including that of Clinton’s former advisor, 
revealing that Clinton had been illegally using her private email server while in 
office. Guccifer was caught and extradited to the US. Since then, he has admitted to 
having executed his hacks in Romania while using proxy servers in Russia. 
But Lazăr was not behind the 2016 hacks; this time it was “Guccifer 2.0,” who 
claimed Romanian origin, but who cybersecurity firms, contracted by the Democratic 
Party, found to be Russian. Based on flimsy evidence and brazen clues written in 
Cyrillic referencing the Soviet secret police, the cybersecurity firms connected 
Guccifer to Russian hacking groups named by the firms as Fancy Bear and Cozy 
Bear—bears being Russophobic stereotypes.14 While more evidence has subsequently 
been produced, what I note here is the speculative nature of original allegations 
mobilized Cold War grammars. For instance, the CIA described the cyberattacks as 
cutting into “to the heart of our free society” (McCain et al., 2017), projecting what 
WikiLeaks described as neo-McCarthyite hysteria (Feliks 2017). 
Regardless of the veracity of Russian coordination, what interests me here are 
the anticommunist fictions saturating the “Case Against Russia.” For instance, 
cybersecurity firm ThreatConnect, who also analyzed the hack, concluded their 
investigative report by invoking George Lucas’s Star Wars’ prequel, “Episode III: 
Revenge of the Sith,” another Cold War speculative fiction (ThreatConnect 2017). 
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First released in 1977, the space opera chronicles the struggles between good and 
evil, the former epitomized by the enlightened Jedi knights, the latter by the Empire, 
its Death Star, and the dark figures of Darth Vader and the Emperor Palpatine. 
ThreatConnect focuses on Palpatine, an evil Sith lord disguised as a “good” politician 
who attempts to influence Senate members, highlighting his proclamation that all 
remaining Jedi will be hunted down and defeated. Embedding an image of a Star 
Wars poster in their analysis, ThreatConnect mobilizes against “Dark Side” 
propaganda, conflating Putin with Palpatine and his Death Star. 
Not only has Star Wars been argued to reference Cold War space battles, but 
also growing racism within Silicon Valley, today’s heart of cybersecurity. As Curtis 
Marez observes, Lucas was influenced by his childhood landscape which, at the time, 
was being mobilized by a Latinx farmworker socialist movement largely led by Cesar 
Chavez (2013). Cold War rhetoric and ongoing McCarthyism read this and other 
nearby social justice movements from the Black Panthers to the Brown Berets as 
threats to US liberalism and to the white pastoral landscape of Silicon Valley (Chung 
2016). By studying Lucas’s influences and oeuvre, Marez argues that Darth Vader 
can be read as demonological rendering of Chavez himself, attempting to lead a 
socialist rebellion within the heart of a growing technoculture. In the telescoping of 
the galactic tale into the present, ThreatConnect positions their enemy as the dark 
socialist other. 
And yet Putin, like Trump, is a white capitalist man, squashing social justice 
movements left and right. Similarly, as Lemon observes, during the Cold War, both 
the US and the Soviet Union “pressed for dismantling colonial orders that had 
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produced slavery, resource extraction, and white nationalism.” Yet both superpowers 
“continued to build upon colonial institutions and imperial infrastructures” (2018, 
xvii). Arguably, this reliance and construction has endured into the current post-Cold 
War moment. But then, how is it that Putin/Palpatine becomes read as a racialized 
socialist, and why is it that Russian/Romanian cyber threats are still racialized as 
“bears” by the West, much as they were centuries ago? 
Alexei Yurchack suggests that “if Trump’s win is reduced simply to his 
alleged collusion with a foreign power, real politics become displaced onto the 
stereotyped figures of foreign agents and patriots who oppose them” (2017, 3). These 
stereotyped and upturned figures become central characters in the scrambling of 
anticommunist fiction upon the circuit board of the postsocialist present. They rely 
upon reading socialism from the side of the post-Cold War victors, so that, in the 
words of Konrad Petrovszky and Ovidiu Țichindeleanu, the 1989 “revolutions” are 
read as “the conclusion of a natural process that brought about the demise of the 
second pathological ideology of the 20th century (communism, following fascism),” 
with the postsocialist era written “as the beginning of a global transition towards 
‘normality’” (2011, 40). This liberal mode of historiography effectively 
straightjackets socialist upon fascism, positioning both as antithetical to neoliberal 
normality, deleting historic and contemporary entanglements of antifascist and 
socialist politics. As Liviu Chelcea and Oana Druță suggest, “Socialism—as a zombie 
and ghost—is important in the production of neoliberal monoglossia and guilt by 
association for those who challenge the dominant wisdom of trickle-down economics, 
thus supporting the worldview and, ultimately, the interests of the winners of post-
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1990 transition” (2016, 522). This anticommunism, or “zombie socialism,” not only 
positions socialist projects (and their endurance) as a void, but also obscures the 
violence of capitalist injections into former socialist spaces. 
Ethnographic practices are helpful in thinking beyond the reproducing and 
scrambling of zombie socialist stereotypes upon the utopic-apocalyptic circuit board. 
In the words of Chari and Verdery, “As important as post-Cold War ethnographies 
are to perceiving continuities, they also help us understand discontinuities in the 
making of post-Cold War enemies” (2009, 26). These ethnographies help interrogate 
how, in the aftermath of state socialism (as well as numerous colonialisms), the 
enemy is reconfigured through the employment of “racial technologies and expertise 
to differentiate spaces and populations through their contrasting propensities to life 
and death” (2009, 27). By reading the allegorical tactics of liberalism’s defenders 
ethnographically, it becomes clear that both new and old modes of racializing threat 
entwine, facilitating the pathologization of Eastern European hackers. 
The zombie socialism employed by cybersecurity firms like ThreatConnect 
illuminates the racial technologies and expertise they rescramble to ultimately sell 
products and knowledge that will somehow save liberal US democracy from. These 
scrambled imaginaries, informed by the Cold War allegorical, embed older fictions 
into new scripts. For instance, in 2015, Norton Security, a Silicon Valley firm most 
known for their Symantec security product, released an 18-minute documentary titled 
“The Most Dangerous Town on the Internet,” directed by Sean Dunne. The film, 
embedded on their site, focuses on cybercrimes emergent from Râmnicu Vâlcea, the 
Romanian city infamously known as “Hackerville” by the West (Bhattacharjee 2011). 
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Featuring an interview with Guccifer 1.0 conducted in a Romanian prison prior to 
extradition, the film is set in dark, grey frames, summoning Cold War imaginaries of 
dystopic Communist Romania, aligning Communist-era materialities into pathologic 
landscapes (Fehérváry 2013). Also featured is hacker Tinkode (Răzvan Manole 
Cernăianu), ill-famed for having hacked the Pentagon, the US Army, YouTube, SUN 
Microsystems, Google, NASA, Facebook, and more. While Guccifer stands by his 
cyber activity, driven by anti-US imperial and anti-corporate politics, Tinkode, after 
being apprehended was offered a plea bargain to work for the “other side”—
cybersecurity experts. 
The film, shot in the cold, stark winter, and stylized to sensationalize the 
bleakness of Romanian cyber-criminality in postsocialist Râmnicu Vâlcea, appeals to 
US Cold War sketchy and illiberal dystoptics. Some characters are filmed against 
crumbling Communist-era buildings and icy ground, wearing hoodies that obscure 
their identities—something akin to Cold War ruinous ghosts, both materially and 
virtually haunting the “free world.” Yet viewers are offered redemptive liberal hope 
by Kevin Haley, a “global expert in the fight against cybercrime.” Haley advertises 
Norton’s own Symantec Global Intelligence Network. Viewers can easily navigate to 
Norton’s page from the video, thereby ensuring that their digital life will never be 
hacked by a Romanian cybercriminal from “the most dangerous town on the 
internet.” In this sense, the Silicon Valley security firm both creates a Cold War 
narrative and product-based remedy—the ultimate technocapitalist plot. 
 
Hacking Transition 
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To pathologize underground Râmnicu Vâlcea hacking culture without 
critically examining the deployment of zombie socialism is to replay and scramble 
Western Cold War ghost stories. It is also to, like a zombie, feed off the living dreams 
of anti-capitalist alterity with the deadness of capitalist omnipotence. After all, 
capitalist injections upon the local Râmnicu Vâlcea economy have been largely 
disastrous, with former state-owned factories such as Râmnicu Vâlcea Chemical 
Works collapsing, leading to widespread unemployment and hacking evolving as one 
of many means of postsocialist survival. But also, informatics and hacking have a 
long history in Romania, ones instructive to gloss through here in understanding the 
IT present. 
It was during socialism that desires of technological modernity were in part 
what drove Romania to partially separate from Moscow’s bloc trade agreement. 
Rather than producing food for the bloc, Romania wanted to develop heavy industry 
and technology, landing it a dissident status that would only grow after Ceaușescu 
took over. Determined to excel in informatics, polytechnics, and cybernetics, he 
developed research centers throughout the state. These specialized in hacking 
Western products and licenses, so that by the time of the regime’s collapse, Romania 
was exporting the most computers in the Eastern bloc. However, after transition, the 
previously state-owned Felix computer factory was divided into joint stock 
companies and sold, much like Râmnicu Vâlcea Chemical Works, and real estate 
speculators determined that the land that the factory sat upon was worth more than the 
factory itself. Buildings and land were sold, and Felix became a ghost, haunted by 
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futures past. Meanwhile, Western companies came in to take advantage of the new 
market, and IBM absorbed Felix workers, meanwhile delivering messages to 
Romanian managers about the technological merits of capitalism and the 
backwardness of socialism. 
And yet, despite these early attempts to draw Romania into the global time of 
neoliberalism, resistances and refusals ensued, some more intentional than others. For 
instance, despite IBM’s early imperatives on Felix and its attempts to build a market, 
it failed and was forced to retreat at first because Romanians preferred to assemble 
their own computers from imported parts. As I’ve learned through dozens of 
conversations, this practice of hacking hardware and soon software too became 
everyday practice. People would collect Romanian computer magazines that 
instructed readers on how to backtrack, develop DIY radio, pirate software, theses on 
virtual reality and techno-skepticism, and even “the phenomenon of the hacker.” In 
1996, according to the Business Software Alliance, 86 percent of Romania’s software 
had been pirated, given that there was little legislation protecting intellectual property 
(Fiscutean 2014b). At first, pirated software was not sold for profit, a phenomenon 
that only began after inflation skyrocketed in the late 1990s. Still today, Romania’s 
piracy rate is twice that of the EU, and ideas of paying for films, music, and software 
is considered relatively ludicrous amongst the public. As one hacker contextualized 
while telling me of her own forays into hacking in the 1990s, “We were just 
downloading things because we couldn’t afford anything. In the US, you pay $15 for 
a CD. No big deal. But here, that’s more than lots of people in the 90s were making in 
one day alone. It’s not like CDS are less expensive here. It’s the same.” This is also 
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the case with software, books, and games, he told me. 
By the time the internet emerged, DIY practices grew even stronger. Inspired 
by television sharing practices of the prior decades, many Romanians bought internet 
packages from state companies, and then set up independent networks in their blocs 
to sell to neighbors. Because internet dial-up packages were expensive at first, and 
given the intense poverty that post-transition incited, generally one person would buy 
internet and then share or sell it to people in their block, wiring cables haphazardly. 
As people had already been pirating satellite stations from bordering countries during 
Communism, defying the Communist Party’s restrictive one (and briefly two) 
national television channels, and as the magazines taught wiring techniques. Stringing 
cables across apartments and blocks of flats “was really not so fancy,” I’ve been told. 
LAN networks and soon fiber optics came in to remedy the slowness of dialup (which 
would get even slower every night when the downloading would begin en masse), 
again strung haphazardly. Today still, telephone poles, from Cluj to Bucharest, and 
adorned in a massive array of cables, mostly fiber optics, invoking a sort of organic 
chaos. 
Writing of jugaad, or hacking practices in India that exist outside of the 
organized sectors in India, Amit Rai theorizes hacking and DIY infrastructure 
creation as “an everyday practice that potentializes relations that are external to their 
terms, opening different domains of action and power to experimentation sometimes 
resulting an easily valorized workaround, sometimes producing space-times that 
momentarily exit from the debilitating regimes of universal capital” (2019, 6). These 
practices become part of urban metabolic processes that permit certain bypasses, 
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patches, and workarounds. Over time, they become stabilized into the official 
network, yet their existence remains obscured and only known to those initiated into 
the system. DIY wiring in Romania performed a similar function, although unlike in 
India, today most wires have become absorbed into corporate networks, or left 
hanging abandoned.  
In 2018, Bucharest-based playwright David Schwartz debuted Portofele 
Virtuale: Proiect Generația Y (Virtual Wallet: Generation Y Project) in Râmnicu 
Vâlcea, based upon hacking accounts of the city’s youth during the transition period. 
Several acts entangle, in which it becomes clear that hacking in the most dangerous 
town on the internet was derived through malice, but rather through play and attempts 
to profit despite techno-imperialism. Most people that the Western world might label 
“hackers” are just those trying to survive in a faltering economy, who engage in 
scams and schemes devised in internet cafes and bedrooms alike. As David told me 
over coffee one evening after the play’s first debut, he was amazed at how many of 
hackers he interviewed were just kids whose parents worked abroad, and who were 
able to use their foreign language skills to deceive Westerners online. 
For instance, the opening act of the play (funded by and performed in 
Râmnicu Vâlcea’s National Theater), “Primul Jaguar (The First Jaguar),” begins in 
2004, and features two then ten-year-old friends, Ștefan and Cătă, from a quiet 
neighborhood known as Tic Tac. Ștefan’s mom works at the TricoTextil factory, 
owned by an Italian firm. His dad is a bodyguard at the Coca-Cola factory. 
Meanwhile, Cătă’s father works on a construction site, and his mother is living in 
Italy, sporadically sending money back home to her poor family. It was during that 
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period that internet cafes began popping up in Tic Tac. Then, overnight, hordes of 
fancy cars, from Jaguars to BMWs, manifested. The audience that I was viewing the 
play with were mostly high school students on a Tuesday evening class trip. As 
Ștefan and Cătă offered detailed explanations of Tic Tac, the youth surrounding me 
began laughing hysterically, perhaps somewhat familiar with the accounts that the 
young actors were offering. 
As kids, Ștefan and Cătă were excited about the prospect of playing internet 
games such as Counterstrike in the cafés, and so they sheepishly began to hang out in 
them. They also romanticized the expensive vehicles sprouting up out of the streets, 
especially the Jaguar that appeared one day, owned by Ștefan’s upstairs neighbor, 
Viorel. Soon, Viorel began asking Ștefan to translate for him online in the internet 
café. Ștefan barely knew how to, but called upon another friend, who helped him get 
the job done. Before long, Ștefan was making more money than he ever had seen in 
his life. Yet, as Ștefan notes, he had no idea what a hacker even was. “I know the 
word, in English, but what is a hacker?” he questions. 
The play then fast-forwards to seven years later, as Ștefan recounts drinking a 
Radler beer one summer evening in Tic Tac. The neighborhood had fallen apart, 
despite the presence of scattered Mustang cars and mega-luxury possessions. And all 
of a sudden that evening, police swarmed into the neighborhood, looking for Viorel. 
Ștefan felt like he was in a really bad videogame, filled with machine guns and 
masked officers. After Viorel had been jailed, Ștefan discovered that his upstairs 
neighbor had been one of the first hackers in the city. Somehow, through an online 
scam that Ștefan had unknowingly assisted in, Viorel had profited from the sales of 
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two million helicopter without having ever really ever sold one. 
One of my friends, Vlad, a former “hacker” and currently unemployed, 
remembers this transitional period well. Soon, he recounts, people began moving out 
of internet cafés and into their own home networks. “It was super easy,” he explained 
to me one evening, sitting in our friend’s cooperative underground anarchist bar in 
Bucharest where we met a couple of years before and where David also works. “And 
it was really good internet. You would just string the cables, and voila.” Also, 
because the networks were local and small, it was easy to share music, games, 
software, and more. Numerous people have recounted this era to me, often with slight 
grins on their faces. There were also tons of internet cafes. “Before internet cafes, in 
the 1990s, Bucharest was a pretty dangerous place to just be walking around,” he 
remembered. “It was sketchy. But then the internet cafes popped up, and suddenly the 
hooligans who were roaming the streets jumped into the internet cafes to play games 
and hack.” It was because of cafes that he recounts the streets becoming less sketchy. 
Maybe he himself was sketchy too though, he laughed. “And then eventually 
everyone got internet in their homes, and the internet cafés dwindled. But a lot of 
hacking in the 1990s and early 2000s took place in them,” he reminisced, as a local 
DJ friend began amplifying queer techno music in the back of bar. 
Vlad and his friends did their hacking through a home network and not in the 
internet cafés. They discovered a burgeoning market, he explained, talking above the 
beats. Video chatting. While today video chatting is a huge source of employment in 
Romania and the Ukraine, in 2000s, Vlad and his friends, after much studying, had 
found a way to hack porn video chat services in the US. “The porn industry is divided 
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between the US, Germany, and Japan,” he explained matter-of-factly. “They have the 
monopoly. US porn watchers don’t know anything about German or Japanese porn 
models as those worlds are contained and separated.” And so, he and his friends 
found clips of a German porn model, broke the clips into various segments. They then 
pretended to be a Romanian video chat sex worker for in US chat room, where they 
would play clips of the German model and pretend to be her. “Back then, a lot of 
people didn’t have microphones in their computers, so it was possible to just tell a 
client that the mic was broken and only use the text chat function. So, we could really 
pretend to be the model.” Vlad didn’t text himself, but rather was in charge of making 
fake ID cards for the operation on Photoshop. “I’m really good at this,” he laughed. 
His friends would text with US clients, often suggesting that the client might 
want to see them do a certain thing, and then they would play the clip of the German 
model doing just that. But of course, they weren’t her. “See, hacking isn’t so much 
about technology,” he told me. “It’s about deception. Guccifer only made it to 8th 
grade, after all,” he recounted, grinning. One of Vlad’s buddies was really into US 
basketball, and so sometimes he would talk about basketball with the clients, who 
were always so impressed that a Romanian woman knew so much about the subject. 
“He’d get paid to type about basketball for hours,” Vlad smiled. They would get 
caught a lot, because there was this “screenshot thing” that would monitor the chat 
room sites to see if the same images were used repeatedly. But then they’d make a 
new IDs and do it again. They made a ton of money. In fact, the US was forced to 
change laws around video chatting because of what they did, he explained. “I think 
the US was obsessed with us because they’re obsessed with vampires. They think 
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we’re sucking the blood out of their businesses.” Eventually, Vlad and his friends 
were forced to stop hacking, in part because people have stopped typing in video 
chats, and they couldn’t find a way to adapt their technique. 
That was not the only technological development that impeded Vlad’s brief 
hacking career. Soon enough, the independent networks became seen as an 
extractable commodity for larger networks. Seemingly overnight, larger firms started 
bribing everyone into selling their networks, Vlad remembers. He was the last one in 
his neighborhood to resist. Sometimes RDS, the large firm that bought the smaller 
networks, would work with building administrators to threaten people that if they 
didn’t take down their cables, they would get in trouble, citing small technicalities 
regarding the size or length of the wiring. Sometimes they would just cut cables. The 
buying up and consolidation of smaller networks, like the extraction of the Felix 
computer factory, points to the tenor of postsocialist IT exploitation. But specifically, 
it reveals that techno-imperialism in Romania is not the establishing of new IT 
infrastructure from scratch, but rather parasiting on what was already there. 
Following IBM and RDS, an array of Western firms swept into Romania to 
appropriate all that they could, from language to labor, from infrastructure to 
knowledge. While counter technopublics persist, today, it is more common when 
discussing IT with someone to hear tales of their exploitative labor working for 
multinational firms, and sometimes dreams of entrepreneurship. Despite that 
Romania maintains Europe’s fastest internet—an effect of the proliferation of wiring, 
most networks have now been bought up by larger firms, and most people still feel 
technologically behind. As a friend who worked for a small Romanian tech company 
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for four years told me, everyone in her office fantasized of one day working for 
Oracle, which has a branch in Bucharest’s Pipera neighborhood, haunted by the 
specter of Felix. But as another friend told me, after landing a job at Oracle herself, 
labor there is numbing, and all she does is answer calls and emails, managing to 
sneak in YouTube videos on ten-minute breaks in which her brain can’t do anything 
else. Another colleague explained that he is “no more than a slave” in his IT 
company, and that all the industry has ever been is a culture of masters and slaves. 
The country won’t even allow him to obtain freelancer status, so now he 
dreams of landing a job in the West. But is landing an IT job in the West really all 
that liberating? For instance, after Elliot obtains a position working for Evil Corp by 
day (while by night his alter-ego Mr. Robot tries to destroy the company), he 
describes his daily routine: 
 
Blend in. Look bored, broken. Get a blank office stare on my face. This is 
how they do it, isn’t it? How they’re able to watch the world fall apart around 
them? Because to them, this is normal. It’s all they know. Maybe I can learn 
from them. I wish I could see myself through your eyes. Don’t you wish you 
could see yourself through mine? 
 
If aspirations of becoming technologically Western mean becoming bored and 
zombie-like, perhaps illiberal hacking plots reveal a decolonial politic aimed to crash 
the system and engender a runtime error. Perhaps this is what F Society and anti-
capitalist hackers are trying to do – crash the system. Elliot suggests that runtime 
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errors sometimes occur due to corrupted memory. If those dreaming of working for 
Western IT firms could see Elliot’s life through their own eyes, perhaps their 
aspirations would shatter, corrupting memory programmed by zombie socialism and 
its unidirectional optics. In this way, anti-capitalist hackers might be understood as 
those who attempt to corrupt the newly configured memory of neoliberalism’s 
inevitability and globality, uncovering other memories still lurking beneath. 
 
Hacking Orientalism 
As Romanian scammers attempting to make some quick cash, are, in many 
ways, hacking transition and techno-imperialism, they also, at times, play the West’s 
ongoing Orientalizing of the East. Turning back to Schwartz’s play, we encounter two 
bored British IT workers, Paul and Dennis, who work out of a firm in England. In 
their five-minute break between monotonous tasks, they turn to eBay. Paul, excitedly 
landing upon a shirt for sale, asks Dennis if he’s ever heard of an “I-E.” When Paul 
explains that it’s a handmade traditional shirt from Romania, Dennis replies, “From 
Romania? I thought they only exported scroungers and cheap labor.” Paul protests, to 
which Dennis laughs, “What? Oh, I forgot I'm with Mr. Liberal at the office.” Paul 
goes on to explain that his girlfriend’s friend just came back from a Romanian 
business trip, where she picked up a lovely handmade blouse with red and blue 
flowers stitched around the neckline. It is this type of shirt that, in the play, two 
Romanian scammers, Roxana and Marius, are trying to sell on eBay. While one can 
buy a traditional Romanian blouse for less than a few euro in Romania (although 
handmade ones are indeed expensive), Roxana and Marius began selling them online 
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for 49 euro, noting that the organic objects are handmade from a tiny, traditional 
village, and that the pattern around the neck marks “the walk of life.” 
Enthusiastically, Paul exclaims, “Wow look at this, it’s proper fancy. I am telling you 
Dior has a collection inspired from these ‘yiaaahs.’ They say it’s from a northern 
village in ‘Mermoores’ . . . ‘Mairmures.’ They say this area of Romania, the 
Carpathians, benefits from one of the most powerful energetic shields of the planet.” 
Continuing, “Mate, I’m not joking. Apparently, there are places that have this kind of 
energetic charge, places where the earth vibrates.” Elated, Dennis then asks if Paul 
can buy ten, since they’re so cheap. By playing into the Western racialization of the 
East, Roxana and Marius are able to hack Orientalism and techno-imperialism alike 
to make some quick cash. Stories like these abound in Romania, as in many ways, 
hacking technoculture grew in order to resist the economic devastation that 
postsocialist transition sparked. Of course, hacking was alive and well before 1989, 
but it was really after 1989 that it flourished. 
Techno-imperialism today parasites upon the remnants of socialist 
technoculture and infrastructure. Or, if following Marxist critique, techno-
imperialism sucks the blood of dead socialist economics. After all, in Capital, Marx 
employs the allegory of the vampire to describe the violence of capitalist economics. 
“Capital is dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour, and 
lives the more, the more labour it sucks,” he writes (1976, 342). In this way, US 
capital is financed by the “capitalized blood of children” (ibid., 920). Comparing 
exploitation in the factory system with that of prior peasant appropriation by 
landowners, Marx looks to Romania for exemplification: “For Moldavia the 
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regulations are even stricter. ‘The 12 corvée days of the Règlement organique,’ cried 
a boyar, drunk with victory, ‘amount to 365 days in the year’” (ibid., 348). 
Interestingly, the “Wallachian boyar” in this text happens to be none other 
than 15th-century Vlad the Țepeș, otherwise known as Vlad the Impaler and Count 
Dracula (Neocleous 2003, 670). But what does this mean for blood-sucking US 
capitalism to be modeled on an infamous Romanian aristocrat, even before Bram 
Stoker’s 1897 gothic horror novel, the latter of which interpreted Vlad Dracul through 
British imperial tropes fearful of Eastern contamination? How does one make sense 
of the simultaneous Orientalism of the East by the West, as in the case of Dennis and 
Paul’s blouse fetish, and the racialization of it as illiberal and seeping with threat to 
US democracy? 
Although Western capitalism did not originate in Romania, it did emerge 
through colonial practices that both extracted from and racialized Eastern Europe, 
among many other places (Mark and Slobodian 2018). But that a Romanian medieval 
count is used to allegorize the violence of capitalism for Marx speaks to the West’s 
longstanding exoticization, paranoia, and squeamishness of the East (Lemon 2018; 
Wolff 1994), even in Marxist analysis. After all, per Marx’s own metaphors, we 
might understand technologies of extraction as employed in postsocialist Romania as 
vampiric. And yet, arguably, the very concept of “vampiric” is vampiric in and of 
itself, appropriating an already appropriated figure to articulate the violence of 
extraction. But perhaps this double figuration is helpful in understanding the 
appropriation of underground technoculture more fully, as well as the longue durée of 
Orientalist interpretations of the East. These, I find, are uniquely rearranged and 
281  
reprogrammed in postsocialist times. 
Although early DIY Romanian technoculture and infrastructure defied techno-
imperial imperatives after 1989, techno-imperialism did not give up so easily. In the 
2000s, Western firms began sweeping into outsource socialist IT knowledge and 
prowess, galvanizing upon legacies of informatics and cybernetics. Also preyed upon 
was Romania’s high English proficiency—a talent that many people attribute to the 
widespread dissemination of 1990s US television (subtitled and un-subtitled alike). 
Even hacking, which emerged to defy early postsocialist neoliberal impositions, and 
which built upon socialist-era technological prowess, is now fetishized by 
technocapitalism and its technologies of labor extraction, epitomized in corporate-
sponsored hacking parties, tech hub meetups, and the like.  
While many hackers such as Tinkode have become absorbed into capitalism 
and its zombie socialist interpretations, others have refused sublation. These, as a 
post-Cold War phenomenon, are now the Cold War enemy by the Cold War victors. 
This figure is said to suck the blood of liberal democracy, threatening invasion at any 
time, from my friend Vlad, to more infamous figures such as Guccifer. These figures 
are now rendered as parallel figures to Stoker’s Dracula, which was informed by 
British imperial literary invasion motifs. In these, the dangerous and contaminated 
Eastern European other might at any moment penetrate and destroy the purity of 
mainland England (Atanasoski 2013). As Vlad suggested, the US may be so obsessed 
with Romanian hackers because the West remains so transfixed with vampires. 
Yet at the same time, Dracula also represents capitalist accumulation, vis-à-vis 
Marx. As Franco Moretti suggests, “like capital, Dracula is impelled towards a 
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continuous growth, an unlimited expansion of his domain: accumulation is inherent in 
his nature” (1988, 94). This interpretation has informed an array of scholars, 
including Donna Haraway, who writes: “The vampire is . . . the marauding figure of 
unnaturally breeding capital, which penetrates every whole being and sucks it dry in 
the lusty production and vastly unequal accumulation of wealth” (1997, 215). In this 
way, the threat of the vampire, which gained influence in the West through Orientalist 
literary motifs, is combined with the threat of capital, vis-à-vis Marx. But in the case 
of postsocialist Romania, source of the originary vampire, it is capital threatening to 
destroy techno-imperial defiance. We can thereby see how much Orientalism, as a 
racial concept, has become rearranged in postsocialist times. Today, Orientalism 
saturates both capitalist manifestations of liberal democracy (which thereby 
pathologize the illiberal hacker), and in anti-capitalist readings of capitalism’s 
extractive and appropriative technologies. As Haraway suggests, as an undead 
figment, the vampire violates classifications and taxonomies, enabling categories to 
travel (1997, 214). This, she suggests, is particularly salient in thinking theorizing 
race, blood, and contamination. 
The contradiction of the vampire illuminates that in post-Cold War contexts, it 
is not enough to maintain an anti-capitalist approach in assessing the violence of 
techno-imperialism. One needs an anti-capitalistic approach that understands 
capitalism’s historic and ongoing reliance upon racism, as scholars of racial 
capitalism have well argued. In Robin D. G. Kelley’s words, from its origins, 
capitalism “was ‘racial’ not because of some conspiracy to divide workers or justify 
slavery and dispossession, but because racialism had already permeated Western 
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feudal society” (2017). As Cedric Robinson puts it, inter-European racialization was a 
colonial process, one that involved settlement, invasion, expropriation, and racial 
hierarchy (1983). The original European proletarians were racial subjects, and 
included Irish, Jews, Roma, and Slavs. These “were victims of dispossession 
(enclosure), colonialism, and slavery within Europe” (Kelley 2017). This has 
fomented the racialization of Eastern European people by the West, but also the 
double racialization that racialized people such as Roma within Romania experience. 
This raciality has long been enfolded into Orientalizing processes that can be traced 
by to Enlightenment contexts, if not earlier (Mark and Slobodian 2018; Todorova 
1997; Wolff 1994). 
The figure of the vampire and its contradictory roles in modern history is 
useful in theorizing an array of interpretations, all racial, of postsocialist Romanian 
technoculture. The contradiction points to the need of delinking understandings of 
socialism from Marxist interpretation alone, or at least from a form of Marxism that 
prioritizes class over race. While other chapters in this dissertation project study the 
ramifications of Marxist humanism and class-centric analyses upon Romanian Roma 
communities, here I point out that today, techno-imperialism functions by racializing 
Romanian technoculture. This is another form of racial technocapitalism. While 
vampirically exploiting all that might be absorbed by Silicon Valley, it also continues 
to exoticize Romania while also pathologizing its deviance. This travels beyond 
formerly state-socialist space, informing neo-McCarthyistic portrayals of anti-
capitalist hacking collectives within the heart of techno-imperialism, such as F 
Society. 
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IBM and Technofascism 
It was in 2011 that Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter, two of the game show 
Jeopardy’s most successful players, lost to IBM’s Watson AI supercomputer in a San 
Francisco tournament. Jennings had been showing momentum, but then, a question 
was asked pertaining to an author inspired by William Wilkinson's “An Account of 
the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia.” While all three players correctly 
guessed Bram Stoker, Watson AI wagered more money, enabling its victory and 
galvanizing its fame. Watson AI, named after IBM founder Thomas J. Watson, runs 
on a supercomputer powered by 2,880 IBM Power750 cores, or computing brains, 
and 15 terabytes of memory. It relies upon DeepQA, a software architecture that 
merges natural language with its own structured information. This is a huge 
improvement from IBM’s 1997 Deep Blue, which famously beat the chess master 
Garry Kasparov through mathematical calculations. Prior to the Jeopardy match, it 
had been developing its skills to assist in online healthcare services and banking with 
Citigroup, so that fraud and identify theft can be detected. As was joked after 
jeopardy, Watson may be on a path towards “HAL,” the computer of Stanley 
Kubrick’s other film, the 1968 2001: A Space Odyssey (Takahashi 2011). As many 
have since noted, it was no coincidence that HAL’s initials were just one letter in 
front of IBM’s. But how did Watson know about Romania and Stoker’s Orientalist 
novel? 
While Stoker wrote Dracula without ever having traveled to Romania, as it 
turns out, Watson had made the journey. As I suggest here, it wasn’t just financial 
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calculations that enabled this post-Cold War robotic AI to win at jeopardy; IBM has a 
deep history in Romania, one constitutive of both pre-and postsocialist technological 
worlds. So do histories of cybernetics and robotics, ones worth thinking through to 
assess how pre-socialist technological pasts are being updated in the postsocialist 
technofascist present. While IBM rushed into Romania after socialism ended in 1989, 
absorbing Romania’s technological workforce and its national Felix computer 
factory, leading to the factory’s disintegration, this was not its first visit. 
In Romania, the word “computer” has traditionally been calculator (although 
now people often just say computer). Thus when going through archives at 
Bucharest’s National Archives, I was surprised to find mention of calculatoare 
(computers) that predated normative narratives of Romania’s first computer, the 
CIFA-1, built by Victor Toma in 1957 in the National Physics Institute outside of 
Bucharest in Măgurele (today the Institute is home to the world’s largest nuclear laser 
project, ELI—Extreme Light Infrastructure, largely financed by the European 
Regional Development Fund, while provided parts from France). How could it be that 
there were calculatoare being used in 1938, I wondered? Were there other hidden 
firsts in the archives yet to be uncovered? 
Technically, the calculatoare that I found were written as mașini electrice and 
electrocontabila, what we might refer to as simple calculators. I would have assumed 
that they were just simple counting machines, but what confused me was that in 1938 
and 1941, they were being shipped to Romania’s National Institute of Statistics by the 
Compania Electrocontabila Watson S.A.R. headquartered at the International 
Business Machines Corporation at 590 Madison Avenue in New York – the 
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headquarters of yes, IBM. I found these records in the archives of Sabin Manuilă, 
who had been leading the National Statistics Institute in the interwar era, in creating a 
national census with which the fascist regime could target Jews and Roma. As a 
former student of the eugenicist Iului Moldovan, Manuilă claimed that Jews were 
“not a racial, but an economic problem,” but also a “sentimental” one (1934, 12-13). 
Meanwhile, he asserted that Roma, “Romania's racial issue,” people who he 
described as subversive and dysgenic, should be forcibly sterilized (Bucur 2005, 333; 
Thorne 2011, 185-187; Turda and Gillette 2014, 229). Meanwhile, wary of 
miscegenation, he supported Jewish segregation laws, and even proposed creating a 
“Superior Council for the Protection of the Race” (Turda 2007, 438). He worked for 
the criminalization of sex work, creating surveys to push his agenda. But how to 
implement his white heteronormative future? As he determined, a census was needed 
to determine where racialized bodies were, so that plans could be made accordingly. 
The 1930 census had showed 756,930 Jewish people in Romania, but in 1941, 
Germany claimed that half of Romania’s Jews were eliminated, but that still two 
million remained (Black 2001, 382). A new census was needed to verify how many 
Jew and Roma remained, but how? As it turns out, IBM was instantly ready to assist 
him. 
Creating machines for census counting is in fact part of IBM’s own “origin” 
story. In the late 19th century, US census employee Herman Hollerith came up with 
the idea of punch cards to be used to create reliable demographic census data. It was 
the German Deutsche Hollerith Maschinen Gesellschaft corporation, or Dehomag that 
created a license for such a tool, which it sold to the US industrialist Charles Flint, 
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cementing the Computing-Tabulating-Recording Company, headed up Thomas 
Watson (Black 2001, 33). Soon Watson took over the company, rebranding it 
International Business Machines (IBM), and making Dehomag as subsidiary (ibid., 
44). After Hitler rose to power in 1933, Watson was quick to establish a business 
relationship with him and the Nazi enthusiastic Dehomag, creating technology that 
could count Roma, Jews, queers, Communists, and more to help with fascist 
purification. Watson himself began what would be biannual excursions to Germany in 
1933, financing the country’s first IBM factory in the midst of increasing racial 
violence. In 1937, he even received a medal from Hitler (ibid., 243). As Edwin Black 
tracks in his book on IBM and Nazism (2001), Watson saw Nazi Germany as a 
business opportunity, and granted Dehomag powers in other Nazified countries. 
When IBM expanded to Poland as World War II started, its sole purpose was 
to provide Nazis with extermination technology and eliminate calculator competition 
(ibid., 107). Not only were IBM’s punch card machines used for censuses, but as 
Black reveals, also tracking and coordinating freight train routes to concentration 
camps, using up to 200 million punch cards in the process (ibid., 270). Archives 
reveal that IBM’s subsidiary, Compania Electrocontabila Watson, was established in 
Bucharest in 1938, claiming $240,000 in equipment, leasable machines, and punch 
cards. The subsidiary primarily worked with the Communications Ministry, statistical 
offices, census bureaus, and railroads. IBM Europe fulfilled Romania’s orders, with 
IBM New York closely monitoring all developments. Meanwhile, the Compania 
Electrocontabila Watson’s facility in Bucharest, with its own Swift Press, printed 
over twenty million punch cards annually (Black 2001, 387). In 1941, Manuilă began 
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his lofty new census project, which spanned ten days and employed 29,000 census 
takers, resulting in a complete inventory or all people, property, assets, and even 
animals in Romania. IBM designed questions and hired specially trained enumerators 
to specifically determine if someone was Jewish even if they were not overtly 
“Jewish-seeming.” Further, one report specifies that if someone perceived as Roma 
declined to admit Roma ancestry, the census taker should write “Țigan” (ibid., 384). 
This data was then used by the fascist Marshal Antonescu, who, right before Romania 
joined the war in 1941, demanded lists of all Jews, Communists, and sympathizers 
throughout the country. 
He also called for the shipping of all Jews between the Siret and Prut rivers to 
concentration camps on trains already scheduled, working with his Second Section 
intelligence unit and three statistical offices to monitor racial groups (ibid., 385). 
Continued census practices, or “the science of the state” (Foucault 2004), 
resulted in the deaths of at least 270,000 Jews and 10,000 Roma in Romania (Kelso 
2013). After the war, blame was placed entirely on Germany, obviating the role that 
Romanians played, but also that of the US IT company. Meanwhile, IBM filed 
compensation claims for machine damage. Obviated was the role that IBM played in 
Romania’s own sociotechnical imaginaries. As Sheila Jasanoff observes, while 
individuals and small groups may harbor sociotechnical visions, when the vision 
spreads, it becomes an imaginary, encoding “not only visions of what is attainable 
through science and technology but also of how life ought, or ought not, to be lived; 
in this respect they express a society’s shared understandings of good and evil” (2015, 
4). In this way, sociotechnical imaginaries are mobilized through technology to inhere 
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specific futures, in this case that of eugenics. By using human and non-human data 
collection, IBM and the racist state enumerated “commodification and dispossession 
through accounting” (McKittrick and Weheliye 2017, 32). 
One of the men working for the National Statistics Institute during Manuilă 
and IBM’s census was Sterian Pompiliu, who today, at the age of 100, is considered 
the oldest blogger in Romania (Matzal 2018). Mostly he writes about what is 
happening at the Moses Rosen senior center, a home for Jewish elders on the far 
edges of Bucharest (named after Bucharest’s chief rabbi during socialism). I’ve had 
the pleasure of meeting Mr. Pompiliu at the center, where today seniors collaborate 
with the Macaz Theatre Coop, making political plays about political futures past and 
those yet to come. Most members of the coop identify as antifascist and either 
anarchist or socialist, as do the Moses Rosen seniors with whom they collaborate. 
Pompiliu’s own politics grow out of his experiences growing up in 1920s 
Bucharest, when he enjoyed working on Abascus calculators in school. After, he 
enrolled ASE, but he was expelled after the banning of all Jewish students from 
university courses. Soon after, laws were passed to expropriate Jewish property, and 
Pompiliu, homeless, was forced to sleep on a straw bed in a make-shift lean-to. It was 
during this time that he began working at the National Statistics Institute on the 
1940’s census. But, unlike others working there, because he was Jewish, he wasn’t 
paid, his labor exploited. Little did he know that the Institute was part of an endeavor 
that was decimating his own community. 
Today, there are thousands of Romanians whose cheap labor is exploited by 
Western firms in the name of offshoring, many of whom are paid just fractions of 
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their Western counterparts, and many of whom have little idea about material effects 
of the technologies and companies of which their surplus labor enforces, from that of 
racialized surveillance to that of war. After all, as during the Cold War, in post-Cold 
War contexts, the US’s own imperialism accumulates power by entangling with IT, 
creating increasingly violent and racist machines. From Google’s contracts with 
Boston Dynamics and Project Maven, Apple’s with the Flexible Hybrid Institute, and 
Amazon’s with the CIA, the list of techno militarism is long. In the case of IBM, 
post-Cold War, the company has been issued 29 US military contracts, totaling 
$866,190,707 (Military Industrial Complex 2016). Also, in post-Cold War contexts, 
companies such as these have increasingly offshored their labor, in which, as the 
previous chapter revealed, Romania has become an offshoring antipode. 
However, Silicon Valley imperialism in Romania is not only a postsocialist 
phenomenon, as its template is pre-socialist fascism. Just as postsocialist property 
relations reamplify those of pre-socialist times in the name of property restitution (as 
I explored in previous chapters), so do they in the realm of post-1989 technological 
production and materiality. Why is it though that Siliconized narratives obscure the 
racial technocapitalist histories upon which they rest, not to mention those that they 
constitute in the present? Today, IBM boasts its Watson AI, a deep learning business 
artificial intelligence aimed at improving business efficiency worldwide. But where 
did this deep learning come from? Is its algorithm informed by what Watson himself 
learned in fascist Europe, a space that he found primed for economic growth? How 
much of this deep learning informs the company’s own calculi to offshore labor, 
including in Bucharest or Brașov, where it is not just artificial intelligence but actual 
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human labor filing the company’s techno-imperial coffers? These questions all point 
to the fact that in Romania’s postsocialist technological present (an era in part 
designed by IBM as it rushed in to capitalize upon socialist-era computing and the 
Felix computer factory), cannot be understood without understanding the ways in 
which postsocialist techno-imperialism updates a pre-socialist technofascist form. 
Watson AI might appear the updated Cold War HAL of 2001: A Space 
Odyssey. But it is not just that. Its materiality builds upon that of the interwar 
electronic counting machines and the attempted fascist imperiality that they mapped 
and calculated. Might it make sense, in assessing post-Cold War fears of the 
Trumpocalypse, to look towards the pre-socialist technofascist past (which did indeed 
attempt to annihilate entire populations) rather than that of socialism? 
 
Hacking Doomsday Time 
In Mr. Robot, F Society’s great opposition comes from Trump-like E Corp 
CEO, Phillip Price, a man who has always desired to be “the most powerful person in 
the room.” Elucidating his fantasy in monologue, while lounging in his Trump tower 
as protesters gather below, Price is framed by a satirical wall map of Europe. Drawn 
by Karl Lehmann-Dumont in Dresden in 1914, this cartography, “Humoristische 
Karte von Europa im Jahre 1914” (Humorous Map of Europe 1914), 
anthropomorphically displaces nations with twisted figures, elucidated in its 
footnotes. A propaganda piece made from the perspective of German nationalists, the 
map features a German soldier holding France by the throat while beating a Russian 
bear, the latter also being stung by a swarm of German bees. In Price’s office nearby 
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hangs a newspaper article of the same period, announcing the assassination of 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the event that sparked World War I and that instigated the 
demise of some empires and rise of others. These propaganda pieces articulate Price’s 
alignment with pre-War Germany/Austria, the hotbed of growing imperial strength 
and racial eugenics strong enough to displace prior imperial forms while attempting 
to wipe out entire populations. “The End of the World” as it had been known. 
Continuing his monologue, Price wryly suggests that while he has almost 
succeeded in becoming the most important person in every room, one or maybe two 
people still stand in his way. Although he doesn’t name his rival, viewers deduce that 
he is referring to China’s Minister of State Security, Zhang. Throughout the show, 
Zhang and Price battle for security powers and influence, but unbeknownst to Price, 
Zhang plays another key role on the show as well: Whiterose. Whiterose, a 
transgender hacker obsessed with time, leads a Chinese hacking collective, the Dark 
Army, in collaborating with F Society to take down Evil Corp. Always carrying a 
timepiece, which she uses to track the short amount of time she allocates to anyone 
she meets, Whiterose claims that her time is too valuable to be wasted. Meanwhile 
her Zhang persona is also obsessed with time, keeping a room in his home full of 
clocks. When the FBI agent who had been tracking the End of the World Party poster 
accidentally wanders into the room, Zhang politely approaches her, explaining that 
the clocks are kept as a ticking reminder of mortality. But also, he enticingly 
questions: 
Have you ever wondered how the world would look if the 5/9 Hack had never 
happened? In fact, some believe there are alternate realities playing out that very 
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scenario, with other lives we're leading, and other people that we’ve become. The 
contemplation moves me very deeply. Of course, Whiterose/Zhang live two different 
lives, one as a government official with ties to E Corp, one as anti-corporate hacker. 
But Whiterose’s obsession with time and alternative realities, a contemplation that 
moves her deeply, instructs a particular reading of postsocialist temporality. 
The ticking reminder of mortality that Whiterose is obsessed with points not 
to the inevitable end of one person’s life, but of entire worlds’ inexorable demise—a 
condition bound to both socialist and postsocialist contexts. As she tells Elliot/Mr. 
Robot, who frequently hacks into people’s personal accounts, “You hack people, I 
hack time.” To Whiterose, hacking means not simply rearranging one person’s life, 
but rather the beginnings and ends of eras and revolutions, rearranging entire worlds. 
Both socialist and postsocialist temporalities are marked by such ends and 
beginnings. Just as mid-20th century fascism was hacked by anti-capitalist and 
antifascist movements, leading to the dawn of the Communist era, state socialist 
temporality was hacked by Western liberal democracy, precipitating postsocialism. 
Today, it seems as though this liberal era is on the verge of becoming postliberal as 
fascist forces grow. 
In this postliberal moment, both people and time are being hacked. One can 
hack people, much like Elliot/Mr. Robot, who lives two different lives and 
understands two different timelines (one the self-destructive Elliot who hacks into 
people’s personal accounts to hold them accountable for abusive acts, the other, the 
bold leader of F Society endeavoring to destroy Evil Corp). One can even hack the 
inimical, rearranging enemy configuration. But also, one can hack time, much like 
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Whiterose, rearranging pasts, futures, beginnings, and ends. What happens when, as 
in Mr. Robot, these different genres of hacking occur simultaneously? What does this 
simultaneity say about postsocialism? 
It was at the beginning of the Cold War, in 1949, that global scientific 
standard of time materialized. The atomic clock, created by the US National Bureau 
of Standards, lead to the International Standard of Units establishing global criterions 
for the length of a second: 9,192,631,770 cycles of radiation correlative with the 
transition between two energy levels of the caesium-133 atom. In Mr. Robot, the 
same calculus of radiation used to measure each passing tick on Whiterose’s watch 
was used to gauge clocks on both sides of the Iron Curtain during socialism. Susan 
Buck-Morss has argued that Soviet modernity, as a twin project (even if failed) of 
Western modernity, is just as rooted post-Enlightenment taxonomies and 
temporalities as Western liberal democracy. As she writes, “Against the often-
repeated story of the West’s winning the Cold War and capitalism’s historical 
triumph over socialism, the historical experiment of socialism was so deeply rooted in 
the Western modernizing tradition that its defeat cannot but place the whole Western 
narrative into question” (2002, xii). For instance, both sides of the Cold War shared 
similar understandings of the second, of each atomic measurement of passing time. 
From the space race to competition between informatics and intelligence 
projects, technology was at heart of this antagonism, bifurcated around culture, 
politics, and economics, yet cohered around a similar understanding of progress. 
While Buck-Morss traces this back to the Enlightenment, materially it can also be 
traced to the cohesion of the second—a formation that transpired at the very 
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beginning of the Cold War. 
And yet, despite state socialism’s post-Enlightenment similarities with 
Western colonial modernity, socialist societies were differently organized around 
socialist understandings of techno-urbanism, community, equality, and public access, 
as well as legacies of antifascist and anti-capitalist organizing (Boatcă 2012; 
Țichindeleanu 2013). These solidified “intractable spaces, discontinuous histories, 
and resistant geographies that interrupted the flows of global capital as well as the 
continuity of West-European colonial orders of governance” (Karkov and 
Valiavicharska 2018, 25). In this way, despite the forward ticking of each second, the 
worlds that each second organized were different. Could it be that post-Cold War 
specters can’t escape this atomic-level tension – a tautness held in place by similar 
measurements of atomic time that upheld different, parallel, and nevertheless 
entangled worlds? 
We may not be able to escape the materiality of the atomic clock that, since 
1949, has been binding contradictory time globally. However, we may be able to 
experience different timelines simultaneously, as Whiterose mused, thereby 
engendering a runtime error. The possibility of this error holds different potentialities 
and imaginaries – from the apocalyptic to the utopic. Within this atomic era, there is a 
persistent revising of antecedent time, pulled by both inescapable atomic magnetism 
and repulsion. In Mr. Robot, Price, the embodiment of homo economicus, but also 
fascism, is kept in check by F Society/Dark Army’s hack, one that threatens to take 
down global capitalism. Sitting his Trump tower with his German nationalistic map 
behind him, Price invokes the eugenic logics of Nazi Germany and US white 
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nationalism. And, so does the actual doctor of Dr. Strangelove—the film that F 
Society’s End of the World Party poster is based. In the film, Doctor Strangelove is 
called upon by the US president to explain the impending zero day of “the Doomsday 
Machine.” The doctor, who has an uncontrollable tick that forces him to involuntarily 
enact what appears to be a Nazi-solute, suggests that for humanity to avert nuclear 
holocaust, able-bodied American citizens, along with male military and political 
leaders, should migrate underground with young women to breed a master race. 
The doctor’s ticking, along with the Doomsday Machine of which he utilizes 
to justify eugenic desire, stands in allegorically for a clock, one both real and 
symbolic at once. The Doomsday Clock was founded by University of Chicago 
scientists (who had developed the first atomic weapons of the Manhattan Project). 
After creating the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, in 1947, the scientists fabricated a 
nonmechanical ticking machine to warn of impending nuclear apocalypse. To 
countdown impending planetary doom due to nuclear threats and heightened 
US/USSR tensions, the minute-hand was set to seven-minutes-until-
midnight/Doomsday. Since then, the position of the hand is annually evaluated by the 
Bulletin’s Science and Security Board. The shortest countdown was recorded in the 
height of the Cold War in 1984. Much to Bulletin readers’ reliefs, the Doomsday 
Clock was reset in 1991 after the Cold War ended and US/Russia nuclear arsenal 
budgets were cut. Miraculous, the world was then 17-minutes-until-midnight. But 
then, the minute marker began moving towards doomsday once more. At first this 
was due to ongoing nuclear threats, this time not only between the US and Russia. 
Fourteen minutes, nine minutes, seven, five, six, and five minutes again. And 
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then, something shifted. In 2015, the Doomsday Clock returned to its 1984 position of 
three-minutes-until-midnight. This was due not only due to nuclear threats; climate 
change and anthropecenic disaster where also now being taken into consideration. 
The next year, the Bulletin described “advances in biotechnology, in artificial 
intelligence, and the cyber realm” to also be a factor (Mecklin 2017). In other words, 
temporal analysis of the post-Cold War end-of-time must also take into consideration 
the digital, which has now achieved a level of apocalyptic power on par with that of 
the Cold War nuclear. Barad offers: 
 
Doomsday Clock time doesn’t simply progress on its own, moving forward 
without fail, and it isn’t synchronized to one particular physical phenomenon, 
but rather to global politics and technological progress. A nonlinear device 
that is reset once each year, the Doomsday device clocks sociopolitical, 
technoscientific events, and its measure is marked by the distance from the 
endpoint – midnight, the apocalypse – rather than some origin point. Time is 
synchronised to a future of No Future (2017, 58). 
 
Thus, in the “post-atomic age,” present time is holding its breath for the 
apocalypse-to-come, still wired into Masco’s post-Cold War utopian-apocalyptic 
circuit board. Future No Future. 
In Dr. Strangelove, the greatest tension transpires when viewers learn that the 
future will either be one in which no one survives, or in which only the white master 
race does. While the apocalyptic motions are put into place by the materialization of 
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the Cold War inimical, in the end, possibilities for survival still hinge on Nazi 
fantasies. Today, in the era in which the hack has replaced the bomb in liberal 
imaginaries, and in which, at the same time, white supremacist movements grow at 
alarming rates, rather than remain stuck in atomic time and its many hacked 
rearrangements, perhaps it makes more sense to hack time itself. Doing so might 
illuminate that in postsocialist/post-Cold War/postliberal/post-atomic times, perhaps 
the greatest threat remains one that predates the Cold War—fascism. 
What might it mean to find the enemy in fascism and its various endurances 
rather than in anti-capitalist imaginaries? After all, cybersecurity threats rendered by 
anti-capitalist hacking collectives, while positioned against the presumed globalizing 
futurity of capitalism, are not imparting planetary Doomsday. The doom that they 
impart may disrupt corporate practices, but not all humanity. Yet the growing power 
of neoliberal Man, consolidated into Trump towers and inspired by older eugenic 
histories yet threatened by anti-capitalists and antifascists alike, endeavors the doom 
of all not absorbable into the white master race. On a material level, the hack is not 
the bomb as it does not attempt to wipe out entire populations. White supremacy and 
techno-imperialism, on the other hand, does. Thus, the question becomes, how, in 
addition to fighting fascism as socialists and antifascists have long been doing, can 
we also hack the liberalism undergirding zombie socialism that reads socialism as 
threat? How can we hack Cold War atomic time so that we cease scrambling inimical 
formations within it, and instead consolidate efforts against those who strive to 
eliminate entire populations—a problem that socialism endeavored to solve? By 
merely fixating on that which threatens to destroy capitalism and US imperialism, 
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liberalism aligns itself with fascist goals, masking white supremacist threat with the 
anti-capitalist hacker. 
In 1942-Nazi Germany, an intellectual resistance group known as the White 
Rose formed out of the University of Munich, led by students and professors. Printing 
thousands of leaflets and engaging in graffiti campaigns, members of the White Rose 
sought to inspire local resistance to growing Nazism. The students had been subjected 
to German youth movements growing up, to what activist Inge Scholl described as 
“the closed ranks of marching youth with banners waving, eyes fixed straight ahead, 
keeping time to drumbeat and song” (Scholl 1993). It was this temporal march of 
fascism and eugenics that the students diverted from, instead devising an antifascist 
struggle. Several of the core activists were medical students, having had been 
conscripted to serve time in the Wehrmacht medical corps on the Eastern Front, 
where they witnessed the horrors of anti-Semitic persecution. This led them to 
develop anti-Nazi politics and an imperative to act. In 1942, the White Rose produced 
four leaflet editions, which they hid in telephone books and public phone booths and 
mailed for distribution (Wittenstein 1997). They produced a fifth in 1943, utilizing a 
hand-operated duplicating machine to produce 6,000 to 9,000 copies, which were 
carried to numerous German cities, appealing to Germans to resist “national socialist 
subhumanism,” and imperialism “for all time” (White Rose 1943). Although the 
members of the White Rose were eventually caught, tortured, and killed, their 
aspirations to hack a fascist and violent system has lived on, with antifascist 
movements today inspired by early antifascist organizing in the heart of Nazi 
Germany. 
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Can learning from the White Rose of fascism’s mid-20th century zenith help 
us to stop scrambling the inimical to realize that white supremacy has long been the 
apocalyptic threat, from the first colonial projects and ghettos onwards? The 
Trumpocalypse does not invoke new substantial formations, but perhaps instead 
reflects a speeding up of fascist time. If liberalism simply relies upon remixing Cold 
War era enemies, hacking people rather than time, it merely twists allegorical 
structures that fail to articulate the real threat. If, as the hacker Whiterose speculates, 
there are simultaneous realities playing themselves out, rather than detaining these 
possibilities within an all-consuming logic by recycling the Cold War inimical, 
perhaps we are better served by studying the concurrent continuities and 
discontinuities as they reaffirm a heterogeneity of futures past, constituting alternative 
futures to-come. 
In the words of Barad, “In these troubling times, the urgency to trouble time, 
to shake it to its core, and to produce collective imaginaries that undo pervasive 
conceptions of temporality that take progress as inevitable and the past as something 
that has passed and is no longer with us is something so tangible, so visceral, that it 
can be felt in our individual and collective bodies” (2017, 57). Hacking time is one of 
many ways to respond to the urgency of troubling time. To hack time can mean 
dislodging liberal progress narratives that conflate socialism with illiberalism, and to 
instead pivot attention to materiality of fascist specters conjured anew in postliberal 
times. Hacking time can also decenter liberal accounts of postsocialist technological 
illiberalism. When read through a post-Cold War ethnographic lens, postsocialist 
hacking worlds appear as responsive to post-1989 techno-imperialism and 
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Orientalism rather than as vampiric threats to all of humanity. Yet liberal portrayals 
of illiberal hackers liken people such as Vlad, Viorel, and Guccifer as potential 
harbingers of doomsday. Yet in reality, they only threaten the longevity of techno-
imperialism and its liberal logics, meanwhile pointing to other technological futures 
illegible to Silicon Valley. Meanwhile, techno-imperialism and the racial 
technocapitalism upon which it relies consolidates pre-socialist imaginaries, updating 
fascist anew. In this way, by rendering the illiberal hacker as the threat to liberal 
democracy, technofascism is able to grow unhindered. But this pre-socialist update is 
only visible by hacking Cold War 2.0 circuit boards and dislodging its circular logics. 
In both the liberal case against Russia, now saturating US geopolitical 
imaginaries, and in the fictive world of Mr. Robot and the concurrent struggles to 
hack techno-imperialism—there is a deep need to hack time. By hacking Cold War 
temporality, the teleological logics of homo oeconomicus explode into nothingness, 
surpassing the allegorical strategies of zombie socialism and the dialectics of the 
vampiric. Instead what surfaces is new entanglements of techno-imperialism, racial 
technocapitalism, and technofascism—all updated Cold War versions of pre-socialist 
violence. But hacking these updates will only result in a runtime error unless attention 
is placed upon the very constitution of Cold War ghosts as they have been coded to 
replicate with each tick of the atomic clock, subsumed by the circular logics of the 
utopian-apocalyptic circuit board.  
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Chapter 6. Non-Alignment in Outer Space: From the Ruins of 
Postsocialist Astrofuturism 
 
“Before 1989, there were two visions about the possible end of the co-existing 
histories of communism and capitalism which could not possibly fit into the same 
world. One imagined a global deflagration, a post-apocalyptical world of Mad Max. 
The other focused on the conquest on space, which was a third neutral space where 
the two great superpowers and peoples could finally find peace. And maybe an ideal 
mode of co-existing. Twenty-eight years later, in places like this one here, of these 
two contemporary visions, memory retains only the apocalyptical vision. Yet it is 
very difficult to grasp, in what ruins are we here? What ruins are these? The ruins of 
which civilization? Of which historical period?” 
These words spoken in Romanian by Ovidiu Țichindeleanu, a philosopher of 
postsocialist decolonization, reverberate throughout the halls of what was once a 
socialist youth center in Chişinău, Moldova. Dark pink glass from now shattered 
windows, along with the deep forest green pines peaking in from outside, create a rich 
palette in an otherwise abandoned concrete building. As part of a video-based media 
piece by Romanian artists Mona Vătămanu and Florin Tudor, Gagarin’s Tree, 
Țichindeleanu’s words and slowly-panned footage of the former youth center weave 
together the ruins of two futures past, that of socialism and that of transition. Today, 
they are materially crumbling together in the former youth center named after the 
Soviet cosmonaut, Yuri Gagarin, the first human being who set foot into outer space. 
Once adorned with rainbowed mosaics dedicated to cosmological visions, the 
building is now a pile of broken cement and echoes. As Țichindeleanu suggests, not 
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only is the current state of ruination reflective of the material and imaginative 
destruction imposed by postsocialist transition, but also the destruction of the first 
wave of transition—itself now an aftermath in a new and more advanced phase of 
postsocialism. During that first wave, “the apocalyptic future from the Mad Max 
movies became the actual present in most of the neighborhoods and industrial cities 
from the former socialist bloc. The ruins that we are seeing here are not only the ruins 
of the communist dream. The signboard was put on the frontispiece of this building 
during the postcommunist transition, which was also the moment when the Gagarin 
Center was destroyed, when a new order and other forces became dominant and left 
their names on the building.” But even this first wave of transition could not last or 
sustain itself, and now lies in the wreckage of postsocialist disaster capitalism. 
As many friends in Romania and Moldova have articulated of early post-
1989/91 transition, the promises of Western liberalism were just mirages and 
mimicry; there was no infrastructure established in which the newly imposed 
consumerist culture could sustainably grow. This era is exemplified, for instance, in 
David Schwartz’s theater play, ’90, which weaves together stories of these false 
promises of the era, such as “anticommunist ‘moral purity,’ entrepreneurial 
enthusiasm and disappointment. . . illusions of freedom . . . the closure of mines in Jiu 
valley . . . the legal restitution of houses once taken by communists to the more 
‘correct’ people . . . the degradation of the lives of workers and state employees . . . 
lives played at caritas [the Ponzi scheme that took over Romanian lives between 1992 
and 1994 before going bankrupt and that led to US $450 million in debt], CAR [Casă 
de Ajutor Reciproc, the mutual aid assistance program of the socialist era that served 
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as a type of non-bank financial institution that lost its power with socialism’s 
collapse], pawnshops” (Miciu 2017). This era, crafted by empty promises and a 
certain genre of capitalist dreams, now is also mapped by rumbles and sarcasm. 
I first wandered upon Vătămanu and Tudor’s piece, Gagarin’s Tree, in a 2016 
exhibit in the Future Museum, an open platform catering towards uncharted futures 
and theories, organized in Bucharest’s Czech Center. The film engages themes of 
socialist space exploration, and socialist imaginaries in a postsocialist moment framed 
by protagonist Țichindeleanu as one of liberal colonization. Țichindeleanu is able to 
sort through ghostly messianisms in order to think through spatiotemporal 
“elsewhere” from the palimpsestic deserted space of the youth center. Glass tiles 
falling off a mosaic by Aurel David, featuring a socialist figure ploughing the 
universe, drop into Țichindeleanu’s hand as he caresses a future past. As he 
nostalgically describes of the moment in which the mosaic was crafted: “An entirely 
different history of the world was about to be written. The feeling and the memory of 
this divergence is still active and alive, and it is awakened in connection with those 
utopias that actually became daily life and are now the history of the people who 
grew up in the tradition of real socialism. But if the post-communist transition meant 
a colonisation, and if real socialism was partially an attempt to write a history 
divergent from that of Western modernity, then what is left of that, what is alive?” 
What do we make of a moment in which “the peaceful conquest of the future,” one 
more aligned with Marxist humanism that capitalist spatial accumulation, was 
destroyed? 
By colonization, here Țichindeleanu aligns himself with other decolonial 
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scholars of postsocialism who understand transition to not simply be metaphoric, but 
also material, installing new institutions, technologies, dreamworlds, and 
understandings of time and space (Boatcă 2006; Rodríguez, Boatcă, and Costa 2016; 
Țichindeleanu 2017; Tlostanova 2017). Indeed, the former youth center, once an 
experiment in communist social production, has been dramatically altered. The center 
had opened in 1972, built by money earned by Komsomol members on days of 
volunteer-based unpaid labor following the October Revolution, known as subbotniks 
and voskresniks. Its first stone was laid by Gagarin himself, who resided in in 
Chişinău in October 1966, when he also famously toured a local wine cellar, 
promising to fill it will metals from the moon (Nastja 2017; Stevens 2017). The 
center, an autonomous space of sorts, held a hall for political and cultural that could 
seat 800 people, a concert hall that could hold 400, a café-bar, a restaurant, and rooms 
for sports, meetings, and youth arts collectives. Its library archived 12,000 books. 
Everything was affordable for everyone, apparently, until the building was 
privatized following the collapse of socialism. It then became the “MALS” disco-
tech, housing concerts and fashion shows until 2000, when the ownership changed 
again. Since then, it has sat idle, weathering Moldova’s cold winters and hot summers 
alike. “Today, even the signboard placed in the 1990s is a ruin. And this is the ruin of 
the postcommunist transition of a second historical time, which is usually bypassed 
when we try to understand the collective past that made us what we are,” 
Țichindeleanu serenely offers. 
The setting of Gagarin’s Tree fits well within the ambit of what Ann Stoler 
describes “imperial debris,” the subsisting remains of protracted imperial processes 
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saturating “the subsoil of people’s lives” (2008, 192). In this case, it postsocialist 
neo/liberalism that decolonial scholars understand as an imperial form, one that 
evasively endures, vitally binding people to pasts and presences. Its various 
technologies might be understood a facet Western techno-imperialism, or the modes 
through which Western technology and technological imaginaries devour people’s 
intimate lives and even outer space imaginaries alike, nested within what Jodi Kim 
describes as the protracted imperial afterlives of the Cold War (2010, 4). Occupying 
multiple historical tenses, Silicon Valley imperial effects refigure uncertain futures 
and the conditional subjunctive, swallowing up, destroying, and abandoning 
unrecognizable technofutures past. Yet, as Stoler suggests, there is a useful analytic 
tension between the figurative effects of ruination and the violence of decay. “Making 
connections where they are hard to trace is not designed to settle scores but rather to 
recognize that these are unfinished histories,” she writes, “not of victimized pasts but 
consequential histories that open to differential futures” (2008, 195). While many 
today might sit in socialist ruins and construct anticommunist narratives focused upon 
state socialism’s violences, Țichindeleanu, in the ruins, offers a romantic reading. 
Refusing to be victimized by it, he hopes that by recovering socialist futures past, a 
way out of post-Cold War neoliberal violence might be imagined. 
While today, imperial debris is often considered a remnant of Western 
coloniality in the former Third World, what if we were to think of the Cold War 
tripartite separation of worlds as an active ruin in and of itself? As Shu-mei Shih 
suggests, “postsocialism ought to be considered as a condition affecting the entire 
world” (2012, 28). What if, then, we think of imperial ruins in post-Cold War 
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frameworks, as Sharad Chari and Katherine Verdery suggest (2009), while also 
thinking decolonization through an aligned (rather than unaligned) geopolitical 
purview? Projects of decolonization and nonalignment might then be read as 
nonaligned with the “first world,” but aligned with other second and third worlds 
spaces, now the Global East and South. If these non/alignments were in part 
organized in response to Cold War geographies, how might we also read, in the words 
of Jini Kim Watson and Gary Wilder, “the complexity of our postcolonial present as 
simultaneously configured by Cold War imaginaries and aftermaths” (2018, 21)? Or, 
how might we consider the vitality of Cold War and socialist ruination as informative 
of the project of contemporary decolonization? This framing might help pivot away 
from a more rehearsed move in postsocialist decolonial theory that seeks to borrow 
Latin Americanist decolonial scholarship and Wallersteinian world systems analysis 
in order to frame the coloniality of postsocialist transition (cf. Gagyi 2016; Kalnačs 
2016; Tlostanova 2012; Tlostanova and Mignolo 2009). Rather, decoloniality can be 
understood as deeply enfolded within socialist and postsocialist imaginaries. In this 
way, the project of decolonization can be mapped within spaces of vital socialist 
ruination. 
Reading from socialist ruins and their endurance, here I assess new modes of 
decolonizing the future. But also, I question why socialist astrofuturist and utopian 
projects were ruined to begin with. In particular, I am interested in the actuarial power 
of speculation. Speculation, as constitutive of astrofuturist imaginaries but also 
finance capital and techno-imperialism, bears multiple genealogies. In her brilliant 
project of decolonizing speculation, Aimee Bahng critiques, “The financial 
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colonization of the future builds on preexisting disparities of wealth held over from 
earlier histories of empire and neocolonial enterprises that break at the fault line of 
what has been the Global North and South” (2017, 5). As she suggests, those outside 
of Europe have long been left in the waiting room of the future. Yet, what would it 
mean to read the very formation of the Global North and South as an effect of the 
Cold War? And what would it mean to read the Cold War as a speculative future 
project antithetical to that of state socialism, even if both bear post-Enlightenment 
genealogies (Buck-Morss 2002)? Could decolonizing Global North/South 
cartographies open new possibilities in which other speculative dreams and alliances 
gain actuarial power? Bahng suggests, “Pursuing alternative technocultural origin 
myths also means rejecting the progress narrative that Enlightenment thought 
encourages” (ibid., 11). 
While committed to alternative technocultural origin myths of the socialist 
bloc, in this chapter, I also suggest that socialist astrofuturism’s ruination is in part 
due to the post-Enlightenment thought that it could never fully shake. While on one 
hand, socialist utopianism was based upon friendships with other second and third 
worlds peoples, as a project, state socialism never managed to fully resolve Eastern 
Europe’s own internal racism. Through a close reading of “Gagarin’s Tree,” I 
question, what might have happened if socialist astrofuturism could have learned 
from the rich work of Afrofuturist speculation? How might this friendship have been 
able to stymie the imperiality of racial technocapitalism, or the raciality that 
technocapitalist futurity inheres? What might such counterfactual and speculative 
historical alliances teach about decolonization in a particular postsocialist moment of 
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ruination? 
 
Socialist Endurance 
Gazing beyond the framing of the screen amidst the ruination portrayed in 
“Gagarin’s Tree,” Țichindeleanu seems to see a future past not yet dead. Sitting there, 
gently tugging at old mosaic stones now loose in the wall, is wearing the same black 
leather jacket that he often does when I’ve spent time with him in person, in cities 
such as Chişinău, Cluj, and Bucharest. For a couple of summers in a row, I’ve also 
attended a decolonial camp that he co-organizes with other decolonial scholars and 
rural cultural workers in the small Transylvanian village of Telciu. There, housing 
justice activists, queer theorists, antiracist organizers, performance artists, and more, 
have been gathering for several summers to think through futures past and present 
unrecognizable to Western coloniality. Slowly, he is helping develop a new 
consciousness amongst the left of the need to decolonize the future. Part of this, he 
suggests, revolves around understanding the socialist past and its utopian visions of 
antifascism and with nonaligned solidarity with other colonized peoples. 
During my first summer in Telciu, in 2017 (when Schwartz also first debuted 
‘90), Țichindeleanu took a small group of us into the county of Maramureș to visit the 
ruins of a sculpture built by Géza Vida. Géza, an antifascist Romanian–Hungarian 
sculptor, industrial worker, and communist militant, had “illegally” fought in the 
Spanish French civil war while engaging in antifascist work in Romania. He then got 
into socialist realism sculpting, mostly with support from the state (Bodea 1980). We 
had travelled to Maramureș in order to view one of his outdoor sculptures, 
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“Monumentul Eroilor de la Moisei” (“The Hero’s Monument of Moses”), situated up 
a hill and hidden away in the forest. The monument commemorates 29 Romanian 
antifascists killed by Hungarian horthyşti fascists in 1944. After asking a number of 
local villagers for the location, we eventually found the path to the sculpture, and 
solemnly made our way to the forest clearing, as if we were reaching a sacred object, 
or perhaps a space ship. The piece was originally designed as a soft of Stonehenge-
like circle made of twelve sessile oaks, each in the form of a god-like figure. It has 
since been reconstructed with stone, with the giant figures circling a large basin of 
water, aesthetically aligned with socialist modernist aesthetics. But also, the sculpture 
enfolds pre-historical imaginaries with a sort of outer space ceremonial setting— 
something akin to “indigenous” Dacian cosmology (without the nationalism) meets 
antifascist outer space. While these stones aren’t ruins today, they are largely 
forgotten, as is the rich history of socialist antifascists that helped engineer and 
aestheticize state socialism. 
Similarly, within the frame of “Gagarin’s Tree,” cosmological embellishments 
decorate the youth center. This is the case with countless socialist-era buildings 
constructed across the region, which often mix agricultural imagery with that of the 
socialist worker and cosmonaut. Even the emblem of the former Communist Party 
contained grains, trees, and industrial tower, and a sun. Today, many of these socialist 
structures have changed meaning, symbolically but also in use value. I always laugh 
when I come across the Crişul Shopping Center in Oradea, Romania, once a center of 
socialist commerce. It opened in 1979, with flower-like cosmological figures 
engravened into the columns of its concrete façade. Today, the building is home to a 
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number of new businesses and offices, mostly from the West. It also houses a 
McDonalds, or “Mac,” which obscures the agro/astrofuturist with its red umbrellas 
and banner, seemingly in obscene perversion. And yet, like many idiosyncratic spaces 
of postsocialist transition, socialist imaginaries endure, peaking out beyond the 
cheapness of McDonaldization. Etched into concrete, the flowers remain. In fact, the 
juxtaposition, if anything, points to the obscenity of the West. 
Or, take the numerous resorts erected along the Romania’s Black Sea coast, 
largely all divided into towns named after planets, constellations, and astral wonders. 
There had already been resorts along the coast before socialism, but they were largely 
for the bourgeoise. This changed in the 1950s when the Communist Party 
expropriated them. The idea was that every worker and their family deserved an 
annual trip to the seaside and/or to the mountains. Former resorts transformed and 
new ones were built, in towns that became known as Saturn, Neptun, Jupiter, Olimp 
(Olympus), Luna, Uranus, and Cap Aurora (Aurora’s Head) were formed. Some of 
the resorts shut down after socialism due to austerity, and to the erasure of guaranteed 
vacations. Yet others still function. Sculptures of Neptune, Venus, and Saturn’s rings 
are scattered throughout them, pointing to concrete futures past. 
These futures are of a particular socialist agro/astro-imaginary. As 
Țichindeleanu ruminates, “In Moldova, not even the dream of space conquest 
managed to distance itself too much from notions of plowing and sowing.” Pointing 
to the mosaic, he suggests that the ploughman’s territory was space, represented as a 
rainbow, a common motif. A friend of mine, Zsuzsa, has showed me the piles 
children’s books that her family still keeps in their home, filled with such imagery. 
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Țichindeleanu goes on, “The ploughman is thus directly connected to the land, but 
also to space. However, the dream is not situated in a spaceship, or within a space 
station from another planet – this new dream is about space itself, which is the 
territory on which the ploughman writes its history.” The communist dream, he 
suggests, was anchored by Gagarin’s cosmological journey. This was not because 
Gagarin was able to enter space before the US, but rather, because he was able to 
bring communist visions with him into it. There, legends say, he launched the project 
of cultivating communist utopianism in order to bring it back to earth. 
People surrounding the Gagarin’s Youth Center, during socialism and after, 
took the project of cultivating communist utopia very seriously. This in part was 
aligned with the project of Marxist humanism, the branch of Marx’s early thought 
that theorized alienation. More popular in the former Yugoslavia than in socialist 
Eastern Europe, which was more apt to engage in Marxist-Leninism and Stalinism, 
Marxist humanism did manage to find its way to spaces such as Romania and 
Moldova. There, it seeped with astral imaginaries. This is why, Țichindeleanu 
suggests, there are spaceship sculptures in the now abandoned children’s playground 
outside. But it is also why, throughout Chişinău, legends endure about “Gagarin’s 
Tree.” This tree, either planted or seeded by Gagarin himself, was evidently the 
offspring of an acorn flown into outer space on Gagarin’s mission. People in the city 
have told me that there are many of these acorns that visited the cosmos, and that now 
they’ve grown into tall oak trees throughout the former socialist world. While it’s true 
that after returning from space, Yuri planted a tree near the Cosmonaut Hotel in 
Baikonur, home of the Cosmodrome spaceport in southern Kazakhstan (that was then 
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the Soviet Union’s and that today is leased to Russia). The first satellite, Sputnik 1, 
was launched from the Cosmodrome in 1957. A few years after, Yuri was propelled 
into the galaxy. Since his return and his planting of the first “Gagarin Tree,” 
cosmonauts have carried on the tradition of tree planting, mostly before their Soyuz 
departures in the now “Cosmonaut Grove.” There, Gagarin’s first tree stands the 
tallest (Kluger 2016). 
While there, it is quite clear which is Gagarin’s tree, it is less clear where the 
Chişinău version grows, where Gagarin also allegedly planted a tree during his 
famous visit. As Țichindeleanu muses in the film, “Nobody knows exactly which tree 
it is. There are multiple versions of it, depending upon who you ask.” This is true, and 
rumors abound, even beyond Chişinău in other parts of Moldova. In the small village 
of Păuleşti, in Călăraşi County, Alexander Filip claims to have planted one of the 
acorns. But not everyone in the village believes this to be possible. Valery 
Demidetsky has reported in the local news, “I don’t believe in the history of acorns 
because of the conditions of the flight” (qtd. in Vladimirskaya 2018). For instance, 
Gagarin’s flight having abandoned the emergency rescue systems at the start, the 
ship’s soft landing, the removal of the duplicate brake installation, and other 
restrictions. “I also cannot imagine that in the first flight, which lasted only 1 hour 
and 48 minutes, that Gagarin managed to find time for fun with acorns,” she censures. 
Indeed, Yuri’s Vostok 1 trip only completed one orbit around the earth, which he 
described as fast and somewhat chaotic: “Everything was spinning. One moment I see 
Africa—it happened over Africa—another the horizon, another the sky” (1961, 10). 
While there were problems with his re-entry, he safely made it back into the 
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atmosphere and parachuted to earth, gently touching “the soft surface of freshly 
plowed dirt in an open field not far from the town of Engels” (Zak 2019). Demidetsky 
finds it absurd that he would have been able to recover acorns. “Yes, the experiments 
with seeds and plants in space were set as part of long-term flights . . . There was 
even a program in the USA in which tree seeds flown around the moon and then were 
planted. Maybe I'm wrong, but it seems that this is how legends are born!” (qtd. in 
Vladimirskaya 2018). 
Legends are born, yet Mr. Filip is adamant that his nearly sixty-year-old oak 
tree is beyond fiction. He planted it in a courtyard when he was employed by a local 
school, he says. “I was then working as a school director, I went to the department of 
education, and Mr. Timothy Chebrucha gave me a pot with a seedling. He brought it 
from Moscow. They planted roses there on the 100th anniversary of Lenin, and then 
they were given these acorns, which Gagarin had taken to space” (qtd. Noi 2018). 
Everyone knows where Filip’s contested outer space tree grows, including the mayor 
who sees it as a tourist attraction. But back in Chişinău, the location of Gagarin’s tree 
remains a mystery. 
Over half a century after Gagarin supposedly cultivated acorns with 
cosmological utopian futures, they enchantedly grow on, enveloped in speculative 
imaginings. In this way, socialist-era speculative futures can be read as vital, as still 
entangling cosmological visions with life on earth. This shatters the widespread 
fiction that socialism failed (cf. Ssorin-Chaikov 2016). Indeed, as Michał Murawski 
suggests, the narrative of “socialism failed” has become an overdetermined, 
“ingrained discursive form” (2018, 908). Amongst the ruins of Gagarin’s Youth 
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Center, birds melodically chirp outside, perhaps unaware of any failure. The Center, 
the trees, and the spaceship in the playground are, after all, still there. And the 
privatization that came after, the transforming of the complex into a disco-tech, was 
only short-lived. Géza Vida’s cosmological stones still stand tall back in Romania, 
reaching towards outer space, surrounded by old oak trees. And so, whose ruins are 
these? As Murawski suggests, “One hundred years after the 1917 October 
Revolution, in an era of unprecedented urban privation and inequality, we may, in 
fact, have a lot of to learn from the still-existing achievements and enduring legacies 
of built socialism” (2018, 910). Many of these exist within ethereal spaces of 
speculation and dreamworlds. For scholars of postsocialism to step beyond normative 
and recursive Cold War narratives mobilized around the liberal democracy’s victory 
and socialism’s failures, scholarship ought to be, Murawski suggests, “driven by the 
emic imperative to understand state socialist (or still-socialist) cities (or societies) on 
their own terms” (ibid., 912). This arguably needs to occur in the level of speculation 
as well. 
 
Chimeras 
Chimeras are biological phenomena in which single organisms are composed 
of cells with distinct genotypes. Chimeras can result from a number of factors, 
including an unborn twin sibling’s cells having fused and living on in one’s body, or 
the grafting of one plant onto another. Chimeras have been the makings of legends for 
millennia, described by Homer in The Iliad as a monstrous immortal hybrid roaming 
Lycia in Asia Minor (Lattimore 1951). Ancient Dacians too had chimeras in 
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Romania, the now nationalist symbol of Dracian Draco, a dragon-dog with several 
metal tongues. While not interested in the mythical or biological chimeras here, I am 
curious if state socialism and liberal democracy might be read as chimerical inverses 
of post-Enlightenment modernity. In particular, I am curious what this might tell us 
about divergent and entangled (or not) astrofuturisms. 
Susan Buck-Morss argues that during the Cold War, both the US notion of 
unlimited individual freedom and the Soviet dream of a classless community shared a 
genealogy of post-Enlightenment Western modernity (2002). Vasile Ernu, in writing 
of growing up in the Soviet Union, recalls the ways in which the two systems were 
dependent upon each other to be the dialectic enemy, while also maintaining strange 
simultaneous affinities for the other (2006). This chimerical entanglement has been 
well-mapped in the realm of astrofuturism and speculation. 
Even before the Cold War, desire for contact led to the transposing of science 
fiction across antipodal divides. Translators Cyrillicized Western science fiction 
works by Edward Bellamy, Jules Verne, H. G. Wells (who also wrote of chimeras in 
his The Island of Doctor Moreau), and more (Buck-Morss 2002, 45). These Western 
fictions narrated growing fascinations with Anglo-American outer space colonization. 
As critical race studies and postcolonial studies scholars have noted, as of 1893, the 
West had been conquered, and so new space was need to saturate colonial thirst. De 
Witt Douglas Kilgore writes, US “Astrofuturism posits the space frontier as a site of 
renewal, a place where we can resolve the domestic and global battles that have 
paralyzed our progress on earth” (2003, 2). In this way, it “mirrors and codifies the 
tensions that characterized America’s dream of its future” (ibid., 2). The Manifest 
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Destiny of California had been obtained; what new futures might exist beyond? 
Colonial science fiction blossomed in the 1950s as the Cold War began, with 
some writers leading more towards the neocolonial, and others more critical of the 
dangers of imperial expansion. Meanwhile, the space race saturated US political and 
cultural imaginaries, with Alan Shepard reading the cosmos shortly after Gagarin. 
Then came the US’s Apollo missions to the moon. Today, these moon trips are being 
looked back upon nostalgically in the US as the Trump administration prepares to 
fund the US space program like it hasn’t been since the Cold War, in part to protect 
US spatial and technological superiority from growing competition with China. As 
has been noted, outer space has become a US vulnerability, as so much of its 
infrastructure relies upon satellites and GPS (Bachman and Titten 2019). 
Leading up to state socialism on what would become the other side of the Iron 
Curtain, outer space also captured imaginations. Some of this was no doubt 
influenced by the West, but not all. Airplanes and bombers were named after Russian 
fairytale characters, and writers such as Aleksandr Bogdanov anticipated a Marxist 
Communist society on Mars. Nikolai Fedorov imagined a “moral universe 
transformed through social-utopian applications of science (cloud-seeding, solar heat, 
travel by electromagnetic energy” (Buck-Morss 2002, 45). Imaginaries such as these 
bore material futures. For instance, Konstantin Tsiolkovskii, the founding scientist of 
Soviet rocketry, was one of Fedorov’s greatest fans. Artist Vladimir Tatlin claimed 
that “events of 1917 in the social field were already brought about in our art in 1914, 
when material, volume, and construction were laid as its basis” (qtd. in Chilvers 
2017). Some of this material was more whimsical than other texts. Some was more 
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Marxist-Leninist, and some more enwrapped in anarchism and Marxist humanism 
alike. 
For instance, in 1921, the anarchist-socialist Romanian Iuliu Neagu-
Negulescu scribed his utopian Arimania sau Țara Buneiînțelegeri (Arimania, Land of 
the Goodwill) while in prison in Brăila. He had been working to organize trade 
unions, but with little success, and had been imprisoned by the new Communists. In 
Arimania, Neagu-Negulescu imagines a future in which property is socialized based 
upon cooperative models, and in which air, water, earth, and sun are worshipped as 
public spaces. No one can work for more than five hours a day, and everyone receives 
a month-long vacation. This is especially important for Arimanians, who love nature 
and who only use sustainable energy. Patriarchy does not exist in this sex-positive 
feminist society, nor does the bourgeois family, as people are supported by 
community. Children learn in communal schools, and he in particular recommends 
cinema as a technology of education. While Neagu-Negulescu was less popular than 
other speculative futurists of the time, his imaginary does reflect a growing anti-
capitalist planetary sentiment that was embraced by the socialist futurists, even 
though the early Communist Party was not his biggest fan. 
Indeed, astrofuturism and speculative utopianism came to play a large part of 
technological imagining throughout state socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
bloc. Several years after Gagarin’s cosmological trip in 1961, the Romanian Adrian 
Rogoz wrote his science fiction Omul și Năluca (The Man and the Phantasm), which 
depicted a society of human-plants growing on Venus. A visitor to the planet falls in 
love with one of these chimeras, and then goes about creating a fanciful new tongue 
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in order to communicate, to connect beyond terrestrial borders of human/non-human. 
Other texts abounded throughout the country, depicting various utopias and boundary 
crossings in outer space. Ion Cârje wrote Irene sau Planeta cea mai Apropiata (Irene 
or the Nearest Planet) about a social utopia in space, and Gheorghe Săsărman scribed 
his Cuadratura Cercului (Squaring the Circle: A Pseudotreatise of Urbogony) about 
twenty-seven urban utopias organized around a metaphysical axis. 
It was during the time that these plant-planet fantasies were being crafted that 
autonomous theoretical debates in the Eastern bloc began problematizing intensive 
growth—a Communist Party ideal. An idea began to circulate that the most 
developed socialist countries (Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, the German 
Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Poland) had reached certain limits of human and 
natural exploitation, and that it might be impossible to reach the cosmological year of 
2000 if the current course was maintained (Țichindeleanu 2017). People began 
looking to development strategies in Third World spaces as possible ways out. In 
1977, East German philosopher, Rudolf Bahro, proposed an alternative to state 
socialism, which would embrace a “cultural revolution” that would merge the 
socialist idea of social justice with indigenous visions that understood connections 
with nature. In 1975, Francisc Păcurariu introduced the term “cosmovision” into 
Romanian literature, inspired by Latin-Americanist cosmologies and understandings 
of social justice. 
In the Soviet Union, perhaps this eco/extraterrestrial speculative connection 
came to full expression in Andrei Tarkovsky’s famous 1972 film Solaris. Based upon 
Stanisław Lem’s 1961 novel, the film rotates around an interstellar journey to an old 
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science space station in order to study the fictive planet, Solaris. The planet, much to 
the surprise of the cosmonauts, exudes consciousness, and an ability to read the mind 
of the orbiting humans. The planet can somehow materialize their grief and loss, so 
much so that the cosmonauts come to believe that the planet is smarter than they are. 
The film’s last frame features a small houseplant that a cosmonaut had transported 
from Earth into space. Somehow, the plant can communicate with the planet in a way 
that the cosmonauts never could, causing Solaris’s gaseous materials to mutate into 
earthlike substances and colors. As Alaina Lemon writes, “Some viewers interpret 
these last scenes as occurring within the protagonist’s broken mind; others see real 
planetary changes imperfectly catalyzed by human memories of home. But what if it 
is the plant who finally establishes a channel with the planetary mind?” (2018, x). 
Lemon notes that unlike a lot of other science fiction of the era that emerged 
as a late-imperial genre, texts that warned of the dangerous alien other, this little 
houseplant offers alternative visions. These are of cross-border and posthumanist 
friendships, relationships that “sprout and thrive across borders, but that look like 
untidy weeds to the paranoid perspective” (ibid., xi). She suggests that Cold War 
imaginaries that speculate upon the danger of contact with others bear 19th-century 
imperial and xenophobic genealogies. Amidst the post-World War II pressures to 
dismantle colonial orders, the US and the USSR each continued to build imperial 
infrastructures, extending prisons and military practices into new terrains, shaping a 
carceral and bordered planet. How might the fusing of plants and planets in outer 
space point to certain utopian visions of decolonizing this imperial history and its 
Cold War accumulations? If plants and planets could become chimeras to the other, 
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what else was possible? 
This is not to deny that despite these utopic extraterrestrial visions of inter-
terrestrial connection, both Cold War superpowers concocted laboratories of 
paranoia. Enemies were cast, as Lemon suggests, “alternatively as manufacturers of 
ideological robots or as slaves to suspicion and superstition” (2018, xvii). Yet, these 
paranoias were differently crafted. It might be, Lemon suggests, that American 
paranoia blossomed over imagined blind spots, while Russian phobias were 
transfixed upon details. This differentially led each superpower to heavily invest in 
“technologies for intuition,” which included channeling information from the other 
side and even engaging in paranormal techniques, for instance astral projection (ibid., 
2). While Lemon’s project is far more concerned about the nuances of such contact 
and communication between the two worlds, here I am specifically interested in how 
and why outer space imaginaries evolved on both sides of the former Iron Curtain, 
and what their astral speculations index of socialist and postsocialist materialities. 
How could carrying acorns and houseplants into outer space help intuit contact and 
break free of imperial repetitions? 
As tension and paranoia came to a head within the Cold War US, 
Afrofuturistic speculative fiction began to offer other ideas, speculating upon spatial 
futures beyond those of imperiality. These futures, fashioned by speculative 
Afrofuturists such as Octavia Butler, open up paths for theorizing racial 
technocapitalism, but also emancipatory futures in and with space. The cosmos 
emerged as a place in which the violence of anti-Blackness could be unpacked, but 
also in which antiracist possibilities could be cultivated. Alondra Nelson defines 
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Afrofuturism as African American narratives of “culture, technology, and things to 
come” (2002, 9). Building upon this, Reynaldo Anderson and Charles E. Jones have 
set to task describing Astro-Blackness, or “an Afrofuturistic concept in which a 
person’s black state of consciousness, released from the confining and crippling slave 
or colonial mentality, becomes aware of the multitude and varied possibilities and 
probabilities within the universe” (2016, vii). Astro-Blackness, they suggest, 
understands space and global technocultural assemblages as ripe for the emergence of 
Black identity. 
While Afrofuturist critique has assessed the racial violence of Cold War 
colonial science fiction, and while postsocialist and Cold War studies have explored 
many of the differences between US and Soviet outer space programs, here I follow 
Țichindeleanu’s line of decolonial inquiry in assessing socialist astrofuturism. While 
he agrees with Buck-Morss that both state socialism and democratic liberalism were 
chimerical inverses of each other throughout the Cold War, each bearing the same 
root of post-Enlightenment modernism (2016), he also points to differences between 
state socialist astrofuturist imaginaries and those of its Western counterpart. This, he 
suggests throughout the film, has everything to do with communist visions of 
collectivity, which socialist speculative futurists imagined as being at its most utopian 
in outer space. While this merged with Western colonial imaginaries, it nevertheless 
produced something new. 
Unlike their Cold War colonial counterparts, socialist astrofuturists sat on the 
edge of the future, imagining that, as Țichindeleanu puts it, “an entirely different 
history of the world was about to be written.” This divergence and its revolutionary 
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potentials, he suggests, is still active and alive, particularly amongst those who grew 
up in the tradition of real socialism. After all, it became etched into daily life, even 
into concrete. As Stephen Collier notes, what was remarkable during this time was 
not the state’s ability “to create ‘ideal cities of the future’ but its utterly pathological 
inability to do anything else” (2011, 112). This utopic project projected speculative 
futurist imaginaries into youth centers and mosaics. In material form, these endure 
after socialism’s putative death, into the era in which the post-Cold War US continues 
to protract its imperial ambitions into the farthest reaches of space. Today, former 
utopian relics are now being grown over with plants, some of which may be, as in 
Solaris, still teleporting socialist visions into outer space. Whether we seem them as 
annoying weeds or as Gagarin’s Tree, chimerically growing on in the wake of the 
Cold War space race 2.0, is entirely up to us. But the question nevertheless remains, 
what can speculative futures past tell us about why are these dreams are now in ruin? 
 
Non/alignment 
Reflecting upon its paradoxes, Țichindeleanu muses that the socialist space 
dream “was actually a sort of engine that brought together the most different 
commitments, from the dream of an ecological communism to that of the most 
aberrant industrialization.” Today, what lives on is the “power of that dream to bring 
people together and to create another history. This history remains to be written.” 
During socialism, he reminds us, a notion of multiculturalism arose within Romania 
and Moldova quite different from that of the Western world. While Western 
multiculturalism of the time, what Jodi Melamed has described as racial liberalism 
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and neoliberal multiculturalism (2011), uses difference in order to further capitalism’s 
scope, the socialist concept of prietenia între popoare (friendship amongst the 
peoples) was dissimilar. In other words, through neoliberalism, multiculturalism and 
racial liberalism grew in particular directions in the West; multiculturalism developed 
much differently in socialist contexts. 
In 1957, for instance, the Romanian internationalist magazine Orizonturi 
(Horizons), edited by philosopher Mihai Şora, collaborated with the Présence 
Africaine magazine to publish articles and poems by founders of Negritude. The 
Senegalese historian of African pre-colonial culture, Cheikh Anta Diop, was featured 
in particular. Much of the text revolved around themes of militant resistance for Third 
World liberation. Romania was not alone in these early socialist friendships. The 
Soviet bloc had begun hosting South African dissidents as early as 1951. As James 
Mark and Quinn Slobodian proffer of the era, “Both the Iron Curtain and the borders 
of the Black Atlantic were more porous than often assumed, offering contact zones 
for interconnection between the Eastern Bloc and the Global South” (2018, 15). 
Chişinău’s Casa Naţionalităţilor (House of Nationalities), which also briefly 
enters the frame in “Gagarin’s Tree,” once was dedicated to struggles against slavery 
and its aftermaths in other countries, Țichindeleanu remembers. For instance, 
independence struggles in Angola and Mozambique were supported by Eastern 
Europe (Popescu 2014, 91-109). In 2007, when Romania entered the EU, the country 
by default left the United Nations “Group of 77” of non-aligned developing countries, 
Țichindeleanu bemoans. These were “neither aligned with the Western order, Anglo-
Franco-German-American, nor to the Soviet order. A sort of descendent of the 
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Bandung Conference of the late 1950s. A friendship amongst peoples was the concept 
that framed most of the efforts identified as efforts for world peace.” In fact, when 
Romania joined the G-77 nations in 1976, it unexpectedly went as far, under the 
leadership of Ceaușescu, to declare itself a Latin American nation, defying normative 
geopolitical boundaries (Mark and Slobodian 2018, 6). Yet today, nearly thirty years 
into postsocialism, there is no building nor institution that defends regional 
interests—only spaces of alliance mediated by imperial powers. As Florin Poenaru 
writes, the West has become “the norm par excellence, the only path to follow, the 
East being on the verge of starting a ‘new (blank) page’ of its history” (2010). The 
Western civilizing mission enforced a tabula rasa, with all friendships before 
“inevitably perverted or unusable.” Anticommunism filled and created this void, 
along with new forms of nationalism and a galaxy of “liberal colonial enlargement” 
(Țichindeleanu 2017). Not only were future past alliances delated, but even alliances 
between other Eastern bloc spaces were stifled. But how did this come to be? 
Unbeknownst to many, the very term “decolonization” was first utilized in the 
English language in the 1930s in order to prefigure the independence already 
achieved in Eastern Europe for that which might be gained in Africa and Asia (Ward 
2016, 237-240). It was during this time that Western imperial leaders analogized 
Eastern European geographies with those of other colonized places, a trend that had 
been building since the Enlightenment and its various instantiations of internal 
Orientalism (Todorova 1997; Wolff 1994). For instance, in the late 1930s, the British 
considered offering Nazis authority over Central African territory in exchange for 
curbing their imperial ambitions in Eastern Europe (Pedersen 2015 343–345). 
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Nevertheless, the Communists that came to power after Second World War rarely 
used the word, as they saw it as too Western and paternalistic (Mark and Apor 2016, 
853). Instead, the language of “common struggle” was favored, a struggle that would 
unite the so-called Second and Third World struggles, from Accra to Havana, from 
Hanoi to Bucharest (Gildea et al. 2011; Mark and Slobodian 2018, 2). 
Despite the early intentions of the Communists to censure Western 
imperialism, many organizers from Third World struggles were wary of forming 
alliances with Eastern Europe, and for good reason. During the Paris Conference of 
1919, for instance, Czechoslovakian politicians had lobbied for land in West Africa 
and Kamchatka (Mark and Slobodian 2018, 4). Leaders of popular Polish Maritime 
and Colonial League also argued for colonies, claiming that it was their European 
right, much to the admonishment of Nigerian soon-to-be president, Nnamdi Azikiwe 
(Pulchalski 2017). But then, after fascism began to grow across Europe, things slowly 
shifted. Trinidadian anti-colonial political force, George Padmore, censured 
Germany’s invasion of Czechoslovakia, offering alliance (Mark and Slobodian 2018, 
4). Soon, so did anticolonial intellectuals such as Cyril Briggs, Jawaharlal Nehru, and 
Rabindranath Tagore, all of whom supported the sovereignty of Eastern European 
nations (Minkah 2011, 38; Nehru 1948, 273-274). Meanwhile, as Communist 
governments came to power in the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc, socialist 
economists became excited about the expansion of socialism into the Third World, 
reifying a Marxist teleological approach to futurity (Engerman 2013, 232). 
Nevertheless, many in the Third World continued to be suspicious of the 
Soviet Union as replicating Western imperial models, a fear that drove the Sino-
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Soviet split in the 1960s. As Chari and Verdery have asked, “What, if not 
accumulation by dispossession, were the nationalization and collectivizations the 
Soviets imposed on their satellites?” (2009, 14). While many have critiqued Soviet 
imperialism (Grant 1995; Hirsch 2005; Martin 2001; Slezkine 1994), it is important 
to remember that not all Eastern European socialist spaces were even. Yugoslavia, 
which had broken from Moscow in 1948, was also accorded a special position in 
imaginaries of international solidarity, and it soon became one of the main architects 
of the Non-Aligned Movement (Byrne 2015, 923–927; Niebuhr 2011, 146–179). This 
is not to flatten the differences between the purported second and third worlds. As 
Mark and Slobodian write, analogies between postcolonial and postsocialist 
experiences (as well as socialist and colonials experiences for that matter), have 
“often distorted as much as they revealed” (2018, 3). Yet also, in the words of 
Nikolay Karkov and Zhivka Valiavicharska, “the political and economic 
developments in postsocialist Eastern Europe from the last nearly thirty years—the 
unchallenged privatization of public infrastructure, the rise or escalation of neo-
fascism, nationalism, and ethnophobia, and the re-entrenchment of patriarchal 
relations—should also be seen in light of the decline of the anti-capitalist, anti-
colonial, feminist, antiracist politics that the socialist countries helped forge in the 
global sphere during the twentieth century” (2018, 19-20). State socialism was, after 
all, an incoherent and contradictory spatiotemporality “fractured by the universalist, 
colonial, and ethnocentric paradigms of hegemonic humanism and the evolutionary 
developmentalism of socialist frameworks of modernization, social progress, and 
liberation” (ibid., 21). This history casts a complex specter on today’s understandings 
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of socialism, refusing monolithic narratives. 
Romania was not as assertive as Yugoslavia in its distancing from the Soviet 
Union, but it did reject the Comecon trade agreement, which had mandated that each 
socialist state maintain an economic specialty. Romania had been slated to be 
agrarian due to its longstanding peasant culture. But Gheorghiu-Dej’s Communist 
Party, transfixed with Marxist-Leninist understandings of Communist futurity, 
wanted to develop industry and technology, which it did. Romania adopted a firmer 
anti-Soviet position in 1968, the same year that Tito enacted his final split from 
Moscow. It also became a special ally to China, exchanging architectural idea, 
technology, and even computers. Meanwhile, Romania demonstrated solidarity with 
the anticolonial and liberation struggles in African nations such as Angola, Zambia, 
Mozambique, Ethiopia, Capo Verde, and Burkina Faso, while also actively 
supporting the abolition of Apartheid (Țichindeleanu 2017). Peripherally involved in 
Middle East peace processes, particularly in Libya, Romania maintained strong ties 
with Syria and other Middle Eastern countries as well. But these international 
solidarities have been forgotten, Țichindeleanu laments in “Gagarin’s Tree.” What 
would have happened if Romanians could have learned from the violence of the 
World Bank, the IMF, and Structural Adjustment Programs in 1970s and 1980s West 
Africa? What might have happened if, armored with this knowledge, there could have 
been more resistance to the same policies as they were unleashed in Eastern Europe in 
the 1990s? What then might have materialized of socialist astrofuturisms? 
A good friend’s parents, Radu and Gigi, had both been engineers during 
socialism in Timișoara. Radu, now unemployed and depressed as his job was 
329  
effectively eliminated after 1989 and his future thwarted, loves to regale me in stories 
of socialist-era internationalism. He himself comes from Serbian heritage, as many 
people do in the West, closer to the Serbian border. One morning, sitting at their 
kitchen table while he was attempting to get me drunk on țuică (brandy) before 
breakfast, he decided to tell me the story of “the lion.” It was in the early 1980s, and 
he and a bunch of fellow engineer students were on assignment in the city. They were 
an international bunch, as Romania was a top university destination for many 
engineers in the Third World. One of them was from the Congo. It had been a warm 
summer evening, and they were all sitting around playing cards, with the window 
slightly ajar. Suddenly, their comrade from the Congo jumped up, yelling that he had 
just heard a lion outside. Radu laughed at the man, as did everyone else there, “as we 
don’t have lions in Romania.” And yet, the Congolese friend was unrelenting. “He 
said that he grew up with lions, and he knows a lion when he hears a lion,” my 
friend’s father, Radu, continued. They all shut the window and went on with their 
card game, laughing at their international friend. Then, the next morning, when they 
turned on the radio, the Romanians were shocked. A lion had indeed escaped from a 
local zoo and had been roaming the city over night. “We thought we knew about all 
the cats in this city, but it turns out we didn’t know a thing!” he exclaims. As Radu 
was cracking himself up, Gigi entered the kitchen, laughing at him, to tell me that 
they are still in touch with some of their former classmates from African countries. A 
friend from Burkina Faso will be visiting them soon for a big class reunion, she notes. 
“I wonder how it was for them, back then, here. There aren’t as many people from 
Africa in town these days, just tourists really. Maybe still a few students, here and 
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there,” she ponders. 
Gigi and Radu blame the Romanian Communist Party (and the Soviets, in the 
case of Moldova), as well as Western imperialism, for the crumbling of this past 
“friendship amongst the peoples.” Indeed, the Romanian Communist Party became 
increasingly isolationist and authoritarian, as has been well critiqued and as is now 
the dominant memory of state socialism in and beyond Romania. During this latter 
part of state socialism, Romania pursued extractivist politics, despite ongoing 
influences from Third World friends. Perhaps, Gigi ponders, the problem was the 
socialist embracing of the Marxist-Leninist teleological narrative. This codified 
progress within the terms of post-Enlightenment modernity. Such a temporal vision 
pathologized local “indigenous” understandings of time within Romania, but also the 
temporalities of other Indigenous and colonized peoples across the globe. 
In addition, despite its policies of housing nationalization, public education, 
guaranteed work, and even guaranteed vacations, the Communist Party never really 
addressed ongoing anti-Roma racism. Nor was Romania’s brutal history of anti-
Semitism adequately tackled, as many have told me. Also, during this time, African 
students in Eastern Europe, many of whom had grown accustomed to freedom of 
debate and ideas in African countries, found Soviet-style socialism stifling. For 
instance, in 1963, between 350 and 500 African students fled Bulgaria after finding 
East European disregard for pan-Africanism (Slobodian 2018, 654). Some saw the 
Soviet project as too similar to the Western one. As a Nigerian student explained in 
Moscow, “Africans did not wish to replace western imperialism with eastern 
imperialism, no matter how well camouflaged it might be with seeming sympathy for 
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African nationalism” (qtd. in Kret 2013, 248). 
Of course, antiracist and antifascist organizing contoured early socialist 
organizing in Romania and beyond. Many of the early socialists were Jewish, for 
instance Ana Pauker, a Stalinist, and the world’s first female foreign minister, who 
served Romania in the 1940s and 50s. But Pauker was scapegoated by Gheorghiu-Dej 
as early as 1952 in the name of de-Stalinization in a move that many consider anti-
Semitic and sexist (Levy 2001). After Stalin’s 1953 death, new socialist imaginaries 
began to take hold across Eastern Europe, for instance Marxist Humanism. Yet in 
Romania, the 1970s, there was a strange return to Marxist-Leninism, what some 
called neo-Stalinism (Verdery 1991). This began with the 1971 Tezele din iulie (July 
Theses), issued by Ceaușescu in the name of “social humanism.” While the Theses 
were inspired by Ceaușescu’s visit to the People's Republic of China, North Korea, 
North Vietnam, and Mongolia, they resulted in increased authoritarianism rather than 
transnational friendship. Yet opposition to Soviet acquiescence was sustained, which 
allowed a positive position in the eyes of those critical of Soviet imperialism. After 
1989, across the former Eastern bloc, the idea of friendship amongst the people was 
effectively displaced by NATO and EU understandings of alliance. 
Although Marxist-Leninism and Marxist humanism were the dominant 
discourses in socialist Eastern Europe throughout socialism, it seems that there is a 
need to make space for more nuanced and contradictory understandings of these 
philosophies. Karkov and Valiavicharska suggest that these nuances point to how, 
even within socialist Eastern Europe, the Marxist humanist project of Enlightenment 
led to a stark elision of the project’s “constitutive ‘dark underside’” (2018, 18). Thus, 
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“by the time of the collapse of the state socialist governments (and even a little 
earlier), the internalization of the logic of imperial difference and its epigonal 
aspiration to true Europeanness” would incite internal racial violence (ibid., 18). 
Despite its liberatory potentials, they suggest, Marxist humanism never fully freed 
itself form colonial grounds. It remained too entangled with its chimerical other. 
Yet Shu-mei Shih suggests that perhaps another kind of Marxist humanism 
could have “offered the possibility of conjoining the two terms socialism and 
humanism productively into a compound term, with consequences for both 
postsocialism and posthumanism” (2012, 31). This branch of thought would link with 
Fanon’s “new humanism,” which critiques Enlightenment humanism’s complicity 
with racial and colonial violence. Had this form of humanism, one since taken up by 
Sylvia Wynter, been sustained, it could have, she submits, offered a viable alternative 
to “totalitarian socialism” and the “neoliberal humanism” that has wreaked havoc 
across both sides of the former Iron Curtain. This form of humanism would accord 
that posthumanist outer space imaginaries cannot be obtained if not all people are 
considered human. Put otherwise, posthumanism and its astral imaginaries are only 
liberatory if grounded in antiracist, antifascist, and decolonial struggles. In sum, “our 
current displacement of postsocialism and relegation of posthumanism to cybernetics, 
as well as the apparent disjunction between postsocialism and posthumanism, indicate 
the elision of a global history of Marxist humanism since the 1950s that has cut 
across the first, second, and third worlds” (ibid., 30). Might outer space imaginaries 
have been more fruitful amongst the socialists if “friendship amongst the peoples” 
was stronger, and if antiracism had been better battled within socialist countries? 
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What might have happened if, instead of embracing post-Enlightenment 
temporal narratives during state socialism (Western liberalism’s chimerical other), 
another timeline was constructed altogether? Instead of speculating a way out through 
industrialization alone, what if local cosmologies grounded in difference were fused 
into astral future-making? Perhaps this is some of what Gagarin’s acorn, Solaris’s 
houseplants, and before that, the world of Arimania, had hinted it. This 
trans/posthuman friendship between local cosmologies and outer space utopias, 
between plants, planets, and humans might have been able to code more revolutionary 
friendship amongst the peoples than those fashioned by the Communist Party. While 
intrigued by these possibilities, most of all, I am curious as to what kinds of 
counterfactual histories might be written in which socialist astrofuturists might have 
been inspired not by their chimerical other, but rather by Afrofuturists also trying to 
imagine a way out from the confines of racial technocapitalism and its 
transnationality. What kinds of speculative worlds might have opened up in which the 
raciality of capitalism could be deconstructed and dismantled within both sides of 
post-Enlightenment modernity? 
 
Mapping Futures 
During my first visit to Telciu, to Țichindeleanu’s decolonial summer camp, I 
came across a workshop that two friends were leading with village youth. For two 
months, Lolo and Silvana had been working with local youth to collect stories, which 
would eventually be geolocated and released on an app that decolonial summer 
school participants could use to better understand the village. “App Telciul Copilor 
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(The App of the Telciu Children)” was used to geolocate the multiple stories, and it 
was made available to all of the village locals and summer school participants. While 
many of us had trouble accessing it, as the 3G and 2G networks were spotty, a far 
leap from the 4G highspeed internet of Romanian cities (Europe’s fastest), it 
nevertheless attempted to render a techno-future illegible to Romania’s newfound 
Silicon Valley status. There was the story of an eleven-year-old boy who regularly 
makes his way to an orchard to contemplate the meaning of life. We all visited his 
favorite fruit trees to hear the story in its referenced location, although he wasn’t there 
as he was working in the fields that day. There were stories of the local cemetery, a 
forgotten river, and other local mysteries. 
Lolo later told me that not all of the sites and stories that the youth recorded 
were embedded within the map, as some decided that they didn’t want tourists or 
outsiders going near their favorite places. Now, two years later, they’re thinking of 
taking everything offline, as they don’t want the narratives accessible to outsiders at 
all. During the process of recording and mapping their stories, the youth buried letters 
in the ground near the sites of their stories to their future selves. This is more 
important, Lolo explained over beers one freezing, winter night back in Cluj, in an 
abandoned synagogue and current cultural center, Tranzit. Maybe maps were a bad 
idea to begin with, Lolo muses. They are, after all, he suggests, the ultimate colonial 
tool. Global Positioning System (GPS) is a Cold War military technology, derived 
from the US Navy’s NAVSTAR technology. As Ruth Oldenziel studies, during the 
Cold War, the US colonized new islands in order to set up GPS satellite nodes across 
the world, mostly on islands, to extend its imperiality. “Again and again, these large 
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Cold War technical networks were grounded in colonized islands in an era of 
decolonization,” she writes (2015, 29). 
How does one, amongst socialist, postsocialist, and even, as in the case of the 
synagogue that Lolo and I are sitting it, pre-socialist ruins—spaces all made ruins 
through the entangled deployment of techno-imperialism and racial 
technocapitalism—map new technologies for the future? How can one theorize 
technological, speculative, and cartographic justice as a field of inquiry amongst such 
a complex and contradictory history of technological, speculative, and cartographic 
injustice? What archives can be read from the space of ruins, and what archives can 
still be crafted? Elizabeth Povinelli, writing of a GPS augmented reality mapping app 
that she and colleagues have been constructing in Australia in order to create a 
postcolonial digital archive. Rather than simply digitize and map for the sake of 
making existing information digitally representable, the postcolonial digital archive 
should, she suggests, “create new forms of storage and preservation and new archival 
spaces of time, in which a social otherwise can endure and thus change existing social 
formations of power” (2016, 150). Further, a postcolonial digital archive has to 
grapple with new questions of digital access, mediating who does and does not have 
access to intimate stories and cartographies contained within an online space—similar 
predicaments to those emergent from the App Telciul Copilor. In addition, she 
suggests that this postcolonial digital archive has to contend with the materiality of 
the not-so-rare earth comprising the hardware used to access, much of which has been 
mined and produced in ways that directly dispossess the mapping community. As she 
questions, how can one create new technologies and applications from this cramped 
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space in ways that refuse absorption back into the “enormous smelter” of capitalism 
(2015, 167). 
While Povinelli is concerned with crafting a postcolonial digital archive, here 
I question what a decolonial postsocialist digital archive might be. How could it look 
to socialist technofutures past and present, meanwhile recognizing some of the past’s 
failures, particularly when it comes to race? While the smelters of Western techno-
imperialism and racial technocapitalism can surely be blamed for astrofuturist ruins, 
perhaps it is too easy to blame the West alone. Perhaps a connected rather than 
comparative approach to theorizing astrofuturism, racial technocapitalism, and 
techno-imperialism across both sides of the former Iron Curtain can help map past 
violence, but in order to clear the way for new genres of “friendship”—ones in which 
antiracist, antifascist, and anti-capitalist futures can be cultivated together, whether in 
outer space or not. 
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Epilogue: Blackface on the Nightshift, Proptech AI, and the 
Posthuman Landlord 
 
I had been to “The Office” in Cluj before. Formerly a textiles factory, the new 
shiny glass building on Bulevardul 21 Decembrie 1989 was erected in 2012. Now, 
replete with numerous tech companies, fancy restaurants, banks, and cafes, it is hard 
to imagine what the space might have been like in its former socialist iteration. I had 
attended a couple of tech meetups and corporate hackathons there over the years, 
hoping to gain some insight into the workings of this new Siliconized moment in 
Cluj. However, it wasn’t until meeting up with an old friend in Cluj that I became 
aware of one of the offices in “The Office” that now I can’t stop thinking about. 
My friend Caro had recently moved back to Cluj to be closer to her family, 
while in the midst of finishing her own dissertation on feminist labor histories in 
Romania’s interwar period. Struggling to pay her expenses, she had managed to land 
a job in a call center in The Office. There, she began working for Invitation Homes, 
the US’s largest landlord and a subsidiary of the half-a-trillion-dollar multinational 
company, the Blackstone Group. It was in the midst of the subprime foreclosure crisis 
of 2008 that Blackstone began to acquire single-family homes for cheap prices in the 
US, Spain, and numerous other countries, profiting from the racial technocapitalism 
that designed and implemented the mortgage crisis (Chakravartty and Silva 2012). 
Invitation Homes was launched by Blackstone in 2012 to serve as their “rental 
wing.” In 2017, several Wall Street landlords, including Colony Starwood Homes and 
Waypoint merged with Invitation Homes, the latter suddenly tasked with managing 
82,000 single-family homes. Colony had been owned by California Billionaire, and 
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close associate with Donald Trump, Thomas Barrack, whose company is notorious 
for evictions and poor tenant conditions (Glantz 2017). After a 2017 initial public 
offering (IPO), the Invitation Homes began trading on the New York Stock 
Exchange, accumulating wealth by the millisecond. The company’s evictions also 
occur across the clock, often with the assistance of automated platforms and artificial 
intelligence (AI). Welcome to the age of the automatic Wall Street landlord. 
Caro had no intention of working for Invitation Homes, and really just needed 
a nightshift job in which she could make enough to pay her living expenses. 
Invitation Homes, she explained over coffee on her day off, maintains two call 
centers—one in Dallas, Texas, and one here in Cluj. She works in the sales and 
billing department, in a building adjacent to but not nearly as fancy as the Invitation 
Homes offices of The Office. They could at least have good lighting as it’s the night 
shift, she complains. Her shift begins at 5:30pm. It ends at 2am. It’s not so bad, but it 
does “mess her up a bit.” Others have to start later and work all night, which would 
be worse. She has Tuesdays and Wednesdays off, which enables her to have “less of a 
life” and therefore more time to write. She only found the job because she had friend 
working there. There was a “bring your buddy to work day” that she attended, and 
she was offered the job that day. The only requirement was English fluency. Unlike 
other tech jobs in the city, Caro doesn’t see much middle-class aspirational 
technoculture at the call center. “Lots of students just trying to get by,” she tells me. 
The job is far from enjoyable though. Just the other day, a woman called from 
California whose son was dying. The woman was tired of Invitation Homes denying 
her Section 8 housing. Caro tried to sound compassionate to the caller, but the woman 
339  
saw through all of her boiler plate responses. Frustrated, the caller hung up, 
muttering, “Have a nice life—my son is dying!” “It’s hard to just smile and go on to 
the next call after things like that,” Caro sighed. Other people profile Caro and her 
colleagues for their Eastern European accents. Callers have no idea that they’re 
dialing someone in Romania until they hear the accents. “They really have no idea 
that their home is even owned by Invitation Homes,” she explained. Normally all that 
they’re aware of is that there’s a property management company, and that they have 
to call it to find a rental, or to order certain repairs. But they have no idea who the 
landlord is. 
The job is frustrating, but what aggravates Caro most is the racism of some of 
her coworkers. “We get calls from people trying to get Section 8 housing in 
California,” she began. “This one guy, he racially profiles the callers, and if someone 
is calling because they need certain repairs done, he decides that they’re unworthy 
and doesn’t log the complaint. So, they get no service.” Yet another coworker 
performs Blackface when he profiles a caller as Black, and he chooses a “Black-
sounding” name for himself, just to have fun, she recounts, lividly. “And what’s 
bizarre, is that we’re just supposed to be robots for this bigger company that is built 
upon racial violence in the US!” she exclaims. Yet through new routes of racial 
technocapitalism and Silicon Valley imperialism alike, anti-Black racism in Invitation 
Homes call center in Cluj is impacting tenant experiences back in California. 
Technically, Caro doesn’t even work for Invitation Homes, at least not 
officially. In another weird post-2008 subprime phenomenon, she is working for what 
is considered a property technology company, Yardi System Incorporated. Invitation 
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Homes is one of Yardi’s top clients. “It’s all confusing,” she tells me. “I don’t know, 
do I work for Invitation, for Yardi, for the clients? Maybe if Invitation Homes is 
Yardi’s client, then I work for the clients of the client?” she rhetorically questions. 
The “proptech” company, Yardi, was established in Santa Barbara in 1984 by 
Anant Yardi, and has since expanded to manage properties for large Wall Street 
landlords. Technically, it maintains over 5,000 employees working in thirty offices 
across several continents, managing property managers and landlords. These clients 
own single and multi-family housing, military housing, ports, condos, public housing, 
and more, like Invitation Homes. Yardi also provides software for property 
management, of which they have over 20,000 clients, largely businesses and 
governments. Yardi Breeze is for smaller property managers, and Yardi Voyager for 
larger ones, such as Invitation Homes. Yardi also offers online platforms to mediate 
landlord-tenant relations, such as RENT Café and COMMERCIAL Café. They also 
offer residential screening technologies so that landlords can profile prospective 
tenants. 
“Yardi Romania” is the Yardi’s third largest office worldwide. There, it 
contracts with Invitation Homes, as well as PropertyShark, a real estate database used 
by speculators across the US, which it purchased in 2010. It maintains space in The 
Office for fancier IT related jobs. But the Call Center, or Center Point, is a bit down 
the street, above Lidl Marăști. The call center opened in 2013, and as of 2017, there 
were 480 employees working there. It had emerged as a laboratory experiment 
alongside a call center in Irving, Texas. Yardi wanted to see which location was more 
advantageous, and Cluj seems to have won. Today, they provide 24/7 support in 
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English and in Spanish. “We all know English from TV and school, and then most of 
us know Spanish from the telenovelas we were glued to in the 90s,” Caro laughs. 
They are all trained in “Basics of Telephone Etiquette,” and “Hold Procedures— 
Putting the Customer on Hold the P.R.E.T.T.Y way.” Rolling her eyes, Caro pulls out 
some papers in her backpack to prove that these trainings are real. 
As one of Caro’s colleagues, Loredana, illuminated weeks later in an 
interview, she and her fellow nightshift workers in the maintenance department have 
become experts in US domestic culture. While she hasn’t observed racism in 
maintenance, she does get frustrated often. She doesn’t understand how people in the 
US could possible think that a broken clothing dryer or air conditioner is an 
emergency. “Here in Romania, we don’t really have either of those things, dryers or 
air conditioners, and when something does break, we just fix it ourselves.” But their 
US clients find emergencies in everything. “They also have no idea when they’re 
calling with one of these emergencies that they have a corporate landlord,” she 
confirms. But this is the way that property works now—there’s no going back, she 
thinks. People do often think that she’s a robot on the phone, which infuriates her to 
no end. “I start talking, and then they start yelling commands and pressing buttons, as 
if I’m a robot. If Yardi or Invitation Homes does get robots to replace us, well the 
clients, they’ll be making complaints about that too!” Loredana is in the midst of 
finishing her undergraduate degree in European Studies, and she doesn’t know what 
she’ll do after graduating. She had been shy before working for Yardi/Invitation 
Homes, and she appreciates that she’s gained better “people skills” through the job. 
She thinks that she wants to become a police officer like her father, but she worries 
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that she’s too short. Maybe she’ll just stay at the call center, as long as she doesn’t 
become replaced by a robot, she laughed as it began raining on us at an outdoor café. 
The last several years have seen a proliferation of digital platforms and 
proptech (also called “realtech”) companies reshaping multiple domains of urban life, 
including the provision, consumption, and management of rental housing. These 
platforms apply different forms of AI and machine learning in order to benefit 
property owners, many of whom are now Wall Street entities. Proptech platforms 
facilitate the management, consumption, and investment of particular properties, and 
also regulates landlord and tenant relationships (Shaw 2018). By incorporating 
artificial intelligence and machine-based learning, proptech targets tenants and 
automates evictions, forming figures that Desiree Fields has termed the “automatic 
landlord” (2019). This automated landlord is what might also be called a superhuman 
landlord, a posthuman figure that embodies the knowledge of who should and should 
not be living in particular housing, neighborhoods, and cities. Today, there are 
platforms that allow landlords to evict tenants through “click notices,” and also 
applications used to allow neighbors to “snitch” on other neighbors for what are 
described as nuisances (McElroy and Werth 2019). 
By obscuring human decision-making processes and calculi, proptech 
automation and its superhuman landlord proliferates postracial imaginaries, 
pretending that race does not matter in these calculations. However, as in the case of 
other forms of AI, automation only recodes racism, with both “intelligence” and 
racism transmitted from machine makers to AI materiality and usage (Atanasoski and 
Vora 2019). This is not to deny the realness of digital worlds and futures, but it is to 
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find spaces of temporal entanglement between prior conceptions of the human and the 
superhuman landlord of today. The human of the posthuman landlord, in other words, 
is still human. This imaginatively posthuman owner/manager depends upon the 
transiting of race and racism across the Silicon Curtain. Yet unlike the digital nomad, 
the avatar of Silicon Valley imperialism, who lands in Romania and doubly 
dispossesses Roma people materially and allegorically—this posthuman landlord 
preys upon the lifeworlds and data of Section 8 tenants and renters within the heart of 
Silicon Valley imperialism. Yet at the same time, the posthuman landlord drags US 
renter data and futures into Romania, where new frictions transpire, indexed by 
strange transits of anti-Black racism and anti-Eastern European racism alike. In the 
Silicon Valley of Europe, this configuration sits upon the ruins of other technological 
futures past—infrastructurally, epistemologically, and imaginatively. 
Through postsocialist analytics and a connected approach to mapping 
difference and entanglements, it becomes possible to begin understanding historic 
forms of race and raciality now being updated in the artificial present. While it is 
understood that histories of settler colonial histories and transatlantic slavery inform 
contemporary understandings of property and land both in the US and in Romania, 
postsocialist and connected approaches help illuminate what transpires when these 
histories entangle with those of data colonialism and AI. After all, while both Silicon 
Valley and Romania have long been sites of data accumulation, albeit of different 
genres, questions remain as to what happens when these forms mix in to the 
postsocialist moment. How does ownership of land and the ownership of data enfold 
upon each other? How does this entanglement lead to a new form of postsocialist 
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double dispossession, one that continues to inflict violence and extraction upon the 
lives that techno-imperialism and racial technocapitalism have always depended?  
A connected rather than comparative approach brings these configurations 
into visibility, foregrounding entanglements across space and time. Methodologically, 
connected inquiry remains rooted in community organizing, and centers housing, 
technological, and cartographic justice as fields of inquiry. Romanian cities are 
neither the Silicon Valley, the most dangerous town on the internet, nor the little Paris 
of the East. This is not to deny that older histories of comparativity are not deeply 
woven into Romania’s materialities and dreamworlds; rather, it is to think beyond 
modes of comparison and metaphor that delete spatiotemporal connections and the 
politics of displacement. Moving forward, I hope that mapping these connections 
across time and space help create new forms of international solidarity. Tracing these 
nodes and routes can after all help in charting and organizing futures unrecognizable 
to Silicon Valley imperialism and racial technocapitalism alike. Today, this new 
terrain of proptech AI, as it transits race, data, and dispossession across postsocialist 
space, be one of many places in which this work of non-alignment might continue.  
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Endnotes 
1 I am indebted to Megan Moodie for pointing me towards thinking connectivity as 
method. Her guidance was integral as I began drafting this conceptual intervention. 
2 The Housing Justice in Unequal Cities was launched at the University of California, 
Los Angeles in 2019, led by Ananya Roy. Comprised of various partners, myself 
included, the Network aims to address interconnected housing crises in various 
scales, maintaining “transnational, interdisciplinary, and intergenerational 
collaboration to tackle analytical and methodological problems pertaining to spatial 
exclusion.” By foregrounding the “realms of geographic inquiry, carceral geographies 
and land dispossession” it “builds data collection, data visualization, and story 
mapping tools that can capture the complex space-time geographies of housing 
precarity” (Unequal Cities 2019). 
3 The Dark Enlightenment is a neo-fascist and “neo-reactionary” movement that 
considers itself to be paradigmatically opposite of the Enlightenment. It opposes 
democracy, and it is popular amongst far-right and “alt-right” bloggers in the US 
(Haider 2016). 
4 Here I draw upon Katherine McKittrick’s observation that spatial matters are racial 
matters in contexts of Black diaspora (2006). 
5 While numerous debates have endured since Edward Said’s 1978 writing of 
Orientalism as to its spatial and temporal purchase beyond the Middle East, arguably 
there are many Orientalisms (Bakić-Hayden 1995; Lowe 1990; Saul 2007; Todorova 
1997; Wolff 1994; Zăloagă 2012). 
6 In this section, I draw upon work co-authored with Alex Werth, which troubles the 
imposition of San Francisco-based urban study frameworks in Oakland, as well as 
comparative trends in gentrification studies (McElroy and Werth, 2019). I also draw 
upon ongoing conversations with Megan Moodie on the merits of connected rather 
than comparative methods. 
7 At the time of this writing, the eviction is on hold. Meanwhile, Impact Hub has left 
the park 
8 Perhaps queering and corrupting techno-normative narratives of corruption enacts a 
similar coding act as found in Marx’s interpretation of Hegel’s “negation of the 
negation” in Kapital. There, Marx describes how for Communism to manifest, first 
capitalism must negate feudalism, and then Communism must negate capitalism 
(1976, 837). Might the șmecher corruptions of anticommunist corruption narratives 
help also to produce something new, some queer excess of desires past and yet-to-
come? 
9 After archival material and news of Kamprad’s Nazi past was published in a 
Swedish newspaper in 1994, Kamprad publicly renounced his affiliation. However, 
years later in 2011, he claimed that “Per Engdahl was a great man, and I’ll maintain 
that as long as I live” (Asbrink 2018). IKEA didn’t know how to respond to 
resurfaced Nazi ties, and eventually donated $51 million donation to the United 
Nations High Commissioner on Refugees in response. 
10 Harvard paid over $100 million for the land incurred debt through the transaction, 
which IKEA assumed in exchange for obtaining 98 percent of Harvard’s property. 
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11 Redlining was a racist cartographic method implemented by the Home Owners’ 
Loan Corporation (HOLC) in the 1930s, in which over a million homes across the 
United States were ascribed within “residential safety maps.” Areas were classified 
according to the age and type of buildings, but also the “threat of infiltration of 
foreign-born, negro, or lower grade population,” who were considered “dangerous” to 
lend to (Green 2016). Red areas were considered most dangerous, secondarily, yellow 
ones. Communities of color suffered economically due to the limits that redlining set, 
and disinvestment made them ripe for speculators to profit later. Today, as the 
California Reinvestment Coalition and the Anti-Eviction Mapping Project have 
found, banks and real estate investors profit in the designated red and yellow “off 
limit” areas (2018). This indicates what can be understood as contemporary urban 
revanchism, or reverse-redlining, processes exacerbated by the influx of 
technocapitalist wealth and speculation. Marxist geographer Neil Smith (1996) uses 
the term revanchism to describe the gentrification of late-20th century New York 
City. Building upon the political economy of late-19th century Paris and the 
withering of liberal urban policy, Smith understands the revanchist city as that in 
which neoliberal urban policies and forces enact revenge upon communities of color, 
working-class and poor neighborhoods, and queer spaces. 
12 Technology innovation districts are often called clusters, and they are often 
understood as strategically grouped in order to accumulate capital. Many resemble 
each other, and they are thought to be clones of Silicon Valley.  
13 There have been debates as to whether the Soviet Union can be theorized as an 
empire in its move to expand, as Moore (2001) and Lazarus (2012) well argue. One 
therefore cannot elide the importance of space when theorizing Soviet socialism. 
Neither can one ignore the importance of time under capitalism. Rather, I draw upon 
these ratio formations to stress differential structures of spatiotemporal valorization. 
14 Bears have been used to symbolically denigrate Russians since the 16th century 
(Platoff 2012). 
